JUDGMENT - S.D. PANDIT, J.:---Shri Lahu Garbad Shinde-original plaintiff in Regular Suit No. 97 of 1977 on the file of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amalner has come in Second Appeal before this Court. The property in dispute between parties is an agricultural land bearing Survey No. 928/3-4A, admeasuring 1 acre 24 gunthas situated within the Municipal limits of Amalner. This property originally belonged to the appellant/plaintiff. In February 1965, he was in need of Rs. 3,500/- and therefore, he approached the respondent-original defendant who was doing money lending business. But he was not holding any money lending licence. Therefore, he suggestd the plaintiff to execute a Sale Deed in his favour in respect of the suit premises by way of security for loan of Rs. 3,500/-. The said suggestion was accepted by the appellant-plaintiff. Accordingly on 5th February, 1965, two documents i.e. a document of sale at Exhibit 51 and an agreement for sale at Exhibit 48, took place between parties viz. present appellant and the original defendant Shaikh Nazir Shaikh Sardar. As per the original document, it was agreed that the plaintiff was to return the amount of Rs. 3,500/- on or before 31st March, 1968 and on payment of the said money, the original defendant was to execute the reconveyance deed in his favour. The appellant was not in a position to perform the said agreement in favour of the defendant, and therefore, he approached the defendant and got the time extended upto 31st May, 1969. However, he was not in a position to perform his part on or before 31st May, 1969, and therefore, he got the time extended till the end of year 1974. It is the claim of the appellant/plaintiff that at the time of Khopdi Ekadashi in the year 1974, he had approached the original defendant and offered the amount of Rs. 3,500/- and had requested him to return and reconvey the property in his favour but the original defendant avoided the same. Though the plaintiff had made several offers, the defendant did not accept those offers, and consequently, no reconveyance deed took place. Ultimately, he issued a notice to the defendant by R.P.A.D. dated 19th May, 1977. The said notice was also refused by the original defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit. Though the plaintiff had made several offers, the defendant did not accept those offers, and consequently, no reconveyance deed took place. Ultimately, he issued a notice to the defendant by R.P.A.D. dated 19th May, 1977. The said notice was also refused by the original defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit. In the said suit, the plaintiff had alleged that the real transaction between the parties was that of a mortgage and that there should be a decree of redemption. At the same time he also made a prayer that the agreement dated 5th February, 1968 if treated as an agreement to reconvey the property then he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and that a decree for specific performance be passed in his favour. 2. The original defendant had contested the claim of the plaintiff by filing his written statement at Exhibit 17. He had denied the claim of the plaintiff that the real transaction between the parties was that of a mortgage. He also contended that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff had never approached the defendant for getting the reconveyance within the stipulated time. He, therefore, sought dismissal of the plaintiffs suit with costs. 3. In view of the rival pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the issues at Exhibit 15 and recorded the evidence of both sides. The trial Court had found that the real transaction between the parties was not of a mortgage and the agreement in question is - an agreement for reconveyance. The trial Court also found that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree for specific performance of agreement of reconveyance. The trial Court, therefore, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Being aggrieved by the said decision, the original defendant had gone in appeal before the District Court, Dhule, and during the pendency of the said appeal, the original defendant died and his heirs and legal representatives-the present respondents were brought on record. After hearing both the sides, the learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the present appellant-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and consequently, he was not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. After hearing both the sides, the learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the present appellant-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and consequently, he was not entitled to get a decree for specific performance. The Appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs throughout. 5. Both trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have concurrently held that the suit agreement dated 5th February, 1965 was an agreement of reconveyance. The trial Court as well as appellate Court had found that the originally the period fixed for performance of the contract by the said document dated 5th February, 1965 was further extended by agreement between the parties dated 25th March, 1968 and 29th May, 1969. The trial Court and First Appellate Court had found that the endorsement of extending period of performance by the present appellant/plaintiff at Exhibit 48-B was signed and executed by the original defendant. But in spite of this, it was vehemently urged before me by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the original defendant had all long disputed the endorsement of Exhibit 48-B and had disputed his signature and therefore, both the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court were not justified in holding that the time was extended till the end of the year 1974 for the performance of the said contract. But if the evidence of the plaintiff and the documents on record taken into consideration then the finding recorded by the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court that the time was extended till the end of the year 1974 is quite proper and correct. The original defendant had given an application at Exhibit 28 and by the said application at Exhibit 28, he had sought permission to file additional written statement which is at file D of the trial Court. Along with the said application Exhibit 28, he had also filed an affidavit Exhibit 29. In the said additional written statement, there is clear pleading by the original defendant that his signature below the endorsement of the extended period till 1974 was obtained by playing fraud on him. His attention was drawn to that admission given by him in his additional written statement and he was unable to explain the same. But without giving any explanation, he denied the same. His attention was drawn to that admission given by him in his additional written statement and he was unable to explain the same. But without giving any explanation, he denied the same. The original defendant had not only denied his said contents in the said additional written statement but he has also gone to the extent of denying his signature on his affidavit Exhibit 29 and his signature on Exhibit 28. He has also gone to the extent of even denying his signature on the suit agreement Exhibit 48. In the circumstances, the denial of the original defendant is obviously not an honest denial and no importance could be given to the said denial. Therefore, in the circumstances, I do not find any fault with the findings of the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court that the parties had agreed to have reconveyance of the property in question before the end of the yeaar 1974. 6. The real crux of the matter is as to whether the First Appellate Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and thereby refusing a decree of specific performance in his favour. 7. The learned District Judge had observed in his judgment that the Appellant-original plaintiff Shri Lahu Garbad Shinde had come before the Court with a case that the real transaction between the parties was that of a mortgage and that a decree of redemption should be passed in his favour. Therefore, that conduct of the plaintiff is a circumstance for holding that the Appellant-original plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. But when the learned District Judge had made said observation, he had not read whole of the pleadings of the plaintiff and he has only taken into consideration those contents of his plaint by which he had made a claim that the real transaction between the parties was that of a mortgage and that the plaintiff should be given a decree for redemption. The said pleadings of the Appellant-original plaintiff must also be taken into consideration along with the contents of the Exhibit 48 the agreement of reconveyance. The said pleadings of the Appellant-original plaintiff must also be taken into consideration along with the contents of the Exhibit 48 the agreement of reconveyance. If the said contents of the Exhibit 48 are properly and carefully read then it could not be said that the said claim made by the plaintiff Lahu Garbad Shinde was that of a dishonest person. In the plaint, in para (6), the appellant/plaintiff has made a specific averment regarding his readyness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Not only he has made those pleadings in his plaint but even has also deposed accordingly in his deposition at Exhibit 54. The appellant/plaintiff has deposed as under : "I was ready and willing to perform my part of contract by paying the amount, and to get the sale deed conveyed at my cost." Thus there is not only pleadings by the plaintiff regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract but he has also led evidence to show that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If the cross-examination of the plaintiff is seen then it is quiet clear that from the cross-examination it is not possible to hold that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 8. The learned District Judge has observed in his judgment that the present Appellant-original plaintiff had not performed his part of the contract within 3 years as per the original agreement and got the period extended by Exhibit 48-A and then again he got the period extended upto the end of the year 1974. He had also given an admission that he had no sufficient money to make the payment within first 3 years, he got the period extended. According to the learned District Judge these extensions show or indicate that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. But I am unable to accept the said reasoning of the District Judge. That fact shows that he had no financial position to perform his part of the contract, so he approached the original defendant and got the time extended. But I am unable to accept the said reasoning of the District Judge. That fact shows that he had no financial position to perform his part of the contract, so he approached the original defendant and got the time extended. His approaching the defendant and getting the time extended, shows that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and because of his financial stringency he wanted the extension of time to perform his part of the contract. But because of his financial strigency it could not be said that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The learned District Judge has made the following observations in the latter part of para 15 of his judgment that: "The plaintiff was knowing the consequences of not performing his part during the stipulated period and therefore on eariler two occasions he got the period extended within the stipulated period. Then if he was not in a position to perform the contract or if the plaintiff wanted further time, he could have obtained the endorsement of the defendant on this agreement as he had obtained on the previous occasions. But nothing of the kind was done. Then if he had really gone to the defendant with money in the year 1974 and if the defendant had not accepted the same, one would have expected him to give a notice to the defendant. But nothing of the kind was done. It is significant to note that the plaintiff who was conversant with the procedure, inasmuch as he has obtained previous endorsements before the expiry of the stipulated period, he would have certainly obtained further endorsement or given a notice or would have taken the step. But nothing of the kind was done for more than two years and for the first time he gives the notice on 19-5-1977 more than two years after the expiry of the lengthy period." 9. The above observations of the learned District Judge show that he has not considered the evidence on record properly when it is the case of the appellant-original plaintiff that he had approached the original defendant with money at the time of Khopdi Ekadashi sometime in the year 1974, it cannot be said that he ought to have got time extended. The above observations of the learned District Judge show that he has not considered the evidence on record properly when it is the case of the appellant-original plaintiff that he had approached the original defendant with money at the time of Khopdi Ekadashi sometime in the year 1974, it cannot be said that he ought to have got time extended. The question of getting time extended would arise only in the case of the plaintiff did not want to pay money within the stipulated period. It must be further mentioned that the plaintiff had explained in his pleadings as well as in the notice dated 19th May, 1977 as to why he had not given notice prior to 19th May, 1977. According to him, when he approached the original defendant at the time of Khopdi Ekadashi in the year 1974, the defendant told the plaintiff that he would execute the reconveyance after taking the crops. He has further averred in the plaint as well as in the notice that he was therefore approaching the original defendant from time to time and the original defendant was giving assurance of executing the conveyance deed and of possession of the land and when ultimately he started insisting for original transaction for taking more moneys from him and to give land, he had issued the notice and then he has come before the Court. This explanation or this conduct of the appellant-plaintiff could not be said to be at all improbable when both the plaintiff and defendant are hailing from same town and when the material on record shows that their relations were cordial and when the defendant had earlier obliged the plaintiff by extending the time from the year 1968 to 1974. The conduct of the plaintiff repeatedly approaching the defendant asking him to accept the money and to execute the deed could not be said to be improbable and unbelievable. He has also stated in his pleadings as well as notice that he had issued a notice and had come before the Court for specific performance that the original defendant is not at all ready and willing to deliver the possession of the property to him and he was insisting to continue the property with him. He has also stated in his pleadings as well as notice that he had issued a notice and had come before the Court for specific performance that the original defendant is not at all ready and willing to deliver the possession of the property to him and he was insisting to continue the property with him. Therefore, the observations made by the learned District Judge were not proper and correct and the approach of the learned District Judge in the matter was not at all correct. 10. It must be mentioned here that the learned trial Court has preferred the evidence of the plaintiff to that of the defendant. It must be also mentioned here that the defendant denied the simple truth. He denied even his admitted signature on the suit agreement, additional written statement and affidavit filed in the trial Court. In the circumstances, the trial Court preferring the evidence of the plaintiff to that of the defendant holding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that he had approached the defendant to complete the transaction will have to be accepted. 11. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, I hold that the learned District Judge was not at all justified in interferring with the findings of the trial Court and holding that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and consequently he was not entitled to get a decree for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance. 12. The learned Advocate for the respondents urged before me that the time was essence of the contract in question and in support of that contentions, he had cited before me the case of (Mangalam Pillai v. C.S.A. Udayar)1, reported in A.I.R. 1976 Madras 360 which has made reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (K. Simrathmull v. Najalingiah Gowder)2, reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1182 and in the case of (Caltex (India) Ltd. v. Bhagwan Devi Marodia)3, reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 405. But the First Appellate Court had found favour with the contention that the time was essence of the contract but the time in this case was extended till the end of the year 1974. That was the finding of the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court. But the First Appellate Court had found favour with the contention that the time was essence of the contract but the time in this case was extended till the end of the year 1974. That was the finding of the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court. In view of the findings of the lower courts as well as this Court that the original plaintiff had approached the defendant in November 1974 and had asked for the reconveyance of the property by accepting the amount of Rs. 3,500/-, the original plaintiff was entitled to get a decree of specific performance as he had made that offer within the time agreed between the parties. 13. Thus, the present appeal will have to be allowed. The judgment and order of the First Appellate Court will have to be set aside and that of the trial Court will have to be restored. 14. Thus, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 324 of 1981 is set aside and the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Amalner in Regular Civil Suit No. 97 of 1977 on 3rd September, 1981 is restored. 15. The respondents to pay costs of the appellants throughout. Appeal allowed. *****