JUDGMENT S. R. Singh. J. 1. The special appeal in hand is directed against the judgment dated 22-11-1993 whereby a learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants seeking issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the employment-notice dated 21-8-1992 issued by the Senior Divisional Manager, Varanasi Division, Varanasi of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (in sort the 'Corporation') for empanelment of candidates for appointment in Class-IV cadre against the 13 vacancies existing in various office of the Corporation located in its Varanasi Division. By means of the said employment-notice, applications were invited from qualified persons through Employment Exchange/Soldier Boards. 2. The appellants challenged the validity of the employment notice by means of the writ petition giving rise to this special appeal basically on the ground that the corporation has illegally restricted the field of consideration to the candidates whose applications are forwarded through Employment Exchange/Soldiers Board. The appellants are presently working under the Corporation on daily wages They are although registered with the employment Exchange, Varanasi and are also possessed of requisite qualifications for appointment on the posts in question but they were not sponsored by the Employment Exchange- They are, in fact, aggrieved by the restriction of the field of consideration to candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange/Soldiers Board only. Their case is that the respondents are not justified in not inviting the applications directly through press or otherwise from the open market. The learned single Judge held that 'Inviting Candidatures for the purpose of making appointment's on the posts under consideration through the Employment Exchange or Soldiers Board rules out the unfair practices and also ensures fair treatment to unemployed persons who are registered with the Employment Exchange or Soldiers Board" and dismissed the writ petition. The learned counsel appearing for appellants urged that the impugned employment notice, in so far as it restricts the field of consideration to the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange or Soldiers Board, results in denial of the equality clause of the constitution contained in its Articles 14 and 16. The learned counsel urged that the sole purpose of notification of vacancies under the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act. The learned counsel urged that the sole purpose of notification of vacancies under the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act. 1939 is to give wide publicity to the extent of vacancies so that the candidates registered with Employment Exchange are also considered for employment but, proceeds the argument, there does not exists any justification whatsoever from limiting such consideration only to the candidates whose names are forwarded by the Employment Exchange/Soldiers Board. The learned counsel for the respondents refuted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants 3. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants but we find no merits in this special appeal. 4. The recruitment under the Corporation to posts in class-Ill and class IV cadres were earlier governed by the Life Insurance of Corporation Recruitment (of Class-Ill and Class-IV Staff) Instructions, 1979 issued on 27-11 1979. The said instructions were, however, superseded by the Life Insurance of Corporation Recruitment (of Class-Ill and Class-IV Staff) Instructions 1993. Under the earlier rules various Divisional Offices under the Corporation were required to draw a ranking list to the extent of vacancies and contingency list to the extent of 50% of the number of vacancies whereas under the revised Instructions the offices are now required to draw up instead of a ranking list and contingency list, only a panel of selected candidates. The candidates in the order of ranking in the panel will be offered appointment against immediately available permanent vacancies and 'the remaining persons are to be observed in regular services as and when the vacancies arise. The revised Instructions also provide for appointment, out of the panel, on temporary basis as and when need arises. Another distinguishing feature in the revised instructions, in so far as it releates to recruitment to Class-IV cadre, is that earlier the Divisional Offices were allowed to recruit not only through Employment Exchanges but, where they considered necessary, even by an open advertisement and by inviting applications from the open market. But the revised Instructions make it clear that recruitment to posts in Class-IV cadre should be made only through Employment Exchanges. But the revised Instructions make it clear that recruitment to posts in Class-IV cadre should be made only through Employment Exchanges. But at the same time the revised Instructions make it clear that if the vacancies are very large and it is felt that it may not be possible to prepare the panel, keeping in view the number of vacancies, only by inviting applications through Employment Exchanges then the Managing Director can allow recruitment from the open market. Having regard to the fact that empanelment in the instant case is to be made for 13 vacancies, we are of the view that the impugned employment notice has been issued well in accordance with the requirement of the L.I.C. Recruitment (of Class-Ill and Class-IV Staff) Instructions, 1993. So far as the plea that the impugned notice is violative of the fundamental right to equality of opportunity in the matter of employment guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is concerned, we are of the view that the point is concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. N. Hargopal, AIR' 1987 SC 1227. In that case certain instructions issued by the Government of India requiring vacancies in Central Government establishments, other than those filled through Union/Service Commission to be notified to the nearest Employment Exchanges and that no office should fill any vacancy by direct recruitment unless Employment Exchange certify that they are unable (to supply suitable candidates. These instructions were challenged before a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which held that the Act has no application to the Government establishment and that no obligation was cast nude? the Act either on the Public Sector establishment or private Sector establishment to make appointment from among candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges only and that any insistence that candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges alone should be appointed would bs contrary to the right guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16. Aggrieved by the view taken by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh the Union of India went in appeal before the Supreme Court by means of special leave petition which was taken up along with certain writ petitions filed directly before the Supreme Court. Aggrieved by the view taken by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh the Union of India went in appeal before the Supreme Court by means of special leave petition which was taken up along with certain writ petitions filed directly before the Supreme Court. It was argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of Union of India that the object and scope of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 and the instructions issued by the Government of India from time to time left no option to the employers 'but to confine their field of choice to candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges and that insistence for appointment to be made from the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges only did not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held, as to scope and ambit of the Act, as follows : "It is evident that there is no provision in the Act which obliges an employer to make appointments through the agency of employment exchanges. Far from it, section 4 (4) of the Act, on the other hand, makes it explicity clear that the employer is under no obligation to recruit any person through the employment exchanges to fill in a vacancy merely because that vacancy has been notified under section 4 (1) or section 4 (2) In the face of section 4 (4), we consider it utterly futile for the learned Additional Solicitor General to argue that the Act imposes any obligation on the employers apart from notifying the vacancies to the Employment Exchanges " 5. Repelling the arguments advanced on behalf of the Union of India that the Act aforesaid restricted the field of choice of candidates to those sponsored by the Employment Exchanges, the Supreme Court observed as under: ".........We are unable to appreciate the argument since there is no provision in the Act which we may reasonably interpret as compelling the employer to appoint persons sponsored by the employment exchanges. On the other hand, we have already referred to section 4 (4) which is implicit that there is no such obligation on the part of the employer. We also notice that the object of the Act is not to restrict the field of choice a any particular manner, but to enlarge the field of choice............" The Supreme Court went on to hold further. We also notice that the object of the Act is not to restrict the field of choice a any particular manner, but to enlarge the field of choice............" The Supreme Court went on to hold further. "It is, therefore, clear that the object of the Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and the most efficient and provide an opportunity to the worker to have his claim for appointment considered without the worker having to knock at every door for employment, We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the employment exchanges, However, dealing with the question whether the instruction issued by the Government insisting that the field of choice should be restricted only to candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges, infringes Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, observed as under : "In the case of public employment, it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in the matter of employment. There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointments as he likes a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Arts. 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. We, therefore, consider that insistence of recruitment through employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The submission that employment exchanges do not reach every where applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. Advertisement in the daily press for example, is also equally ineffective as it does not reach every one desiring employment in the absence of a better method of recruitment, we think that any restriction that employment in Government Department should be through the medium of employment exchanges does not offend Armeies 14 "and 16 of the Constitution of India (Emphasis supplied). 6. It is thus evident from the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is concluded against him by the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court. 6. It is thus evident from the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court that the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is concluded against him by the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the appellant also tried to assail that clause of the Staff Instruction, 1993 which gives a discretion to the respondents to invite applications through open market. It was urged by Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the appellant that the discretion vested with the respondents to invite applications through open market, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The submission, in our opinion, is misconceived in as much as the discretion is conferred upon a very high officer "Managing Director" in the Corporation who can allow recruitment from open market, if the vacancies are very large in number and it is felt that it may not be possible to prepare panel, keeping in view the number of vacancies. Guidelines are thus clearly provided. The power being conferred on a very high authority is by itself efficient safe-guard and there is no scope of any arbitrariness, ft is a matter of common experience that in the present scenario of large scale employment, if applications are invited through open market for appointment to fill a, small number of vacancies, for example 13 in the present case, a very large number of application are bound to come which in turn would result In loss of public money and energy in arranging written examination etc. 7. No other point was urged before us. 8. In view of the above observation that special appeal lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed at the motion-hearing stage itself. Petition dismissed.