JUDGMENT - BHATTACHARJEE A.M., C.J.:—This may now be taken to be the settled law, and we take it as such, that where the order of termination of service of a workman has been set aside, reinstatement should ordinarily follow as a matter of course. And where such reinstatement has been directed, the entire back wages payable to the workman should also ordinarily follow. There are number of authorities on the point emanating from our Apex Court and reference, if necessary, may be made, among others, to the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 75; (G.T. Lad v. Chemical Fibres of India Ltd.)2, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 582 and (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Mazdoor Sabha)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1898. The Division Bench of this Court in (Changunabai Chanoo Palkar v. Khatau Makanji Mills Ltd.)4, 1992(1) Bom.C.R. 85 , has also ascertained the law to that effect and has pointed out that if the termination is bad, reinstatement is the rule and that the normal rule on being reinstated is full back wages, since the order of termination is non est. Reliance was placed by the Division Bench on the two decisions of the Supreme Court, being G.T. Lad (supra) and (Panitols Tea Estate)5, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2171. We do not think that the decision in Panitols Tea Estate's case to be an authority for the proposition that on reinstatement, payment of full back wages to the worker should ordinarily follow as a matter of course. But, as already pointed out, the decision in G.T. Lad (supra) was obviously a clear authority on the point and also the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra), to which reference has been made by the Division Bench, but then for some other proposition. 2. But though on reinstatement payment of full back wages in ordinarily the normal rule, there may be extraordinary circumstance which may, in a given case, justify non-payment of back wages, whether in full or in part. That again appears to be the settled law as will appear from the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court, all emanating from three-Judge Benches, presided over by Justice Krishna Iyer and also speaking through him in the first and the third cases. 3. That again appears to be the settled law as will appear from the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court, all emanating from three-Judge Benches, presided over by Justice Krishna Iyer and also speaking through him in the first and the third cases. 3. In the case at hand, the Industrial Tribunal has declined back wages on the ground that the workmen by unfair and dishonest conduct have, at some stages, disclosed that they possessed qualifications less than what they really possessed in order to qualify for the jobs. Ms. Paranjpe, who has argued the case on behalf of the Life Insurance Corporation with appreciable dexterity, has drawn our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd.)6, l994-1 SCALE 118, and has very seriously urged that in view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decision, the denial of back wages in the case at hand was perfectly justified and cannot warrant interference. Be it noted, however, that the order of reinstatement made by the Industrial Tribunal has not been challenged, even remotely, by the Life Insurance Corporation. 4. In the Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. (supra), one of the conditions for eligibility for appointment was that the educational qualification of the candidates should not be more than the 8th Standard. But the respondent workman produced a certificate to the effect that he had passed the 7th Standard only in order to show that his qualifications were not more than the 8th Standard. The respondent succeeded in having himself empanelled as a workman, but on receiving certain complaints that the respondent had secured employment by suppression of truth and by false representation, the appellant Company issued a show cause notice to the respondent asking as to why action should not be taken against him under the standing orders. In reply to the show cause notice, the respondent workman admitted that he had completed the 10th Standard and pleaded for sympathy. The appellant Company terminated the services of the workman for fraudulent misrepresentation. The Labour Court set aside the order of termination and in the writ proceeding initiated by the appellant Company against the order of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge of the High Court also dismissed the writ petition. The appellant preferred a writ appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court which also declined to interfere in appeal. The Labour Court set aside the order of termination and in the writ proceeding initiated by the appellant Company against the order of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge of the High Court also dismissed the writ petition. The appellant preferred a writ appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court which also declined to interfere in appeal. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the Labour Court and the High Court and allowed the appeal and observed as hereunder :- “In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability.' 5. Let us again point out, at the cost of repetition, that in the case at hand the Life Insurance Corporation has not challenged the order of reinstatement in any way but has accepted the same. The workmen have come up before us in writ proceeding challenging the order of the Industrial Court only in so far as it has denied back wages to them. It is true that Ms. Paranjpe has tried to impress upon us that since on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. (supra) , the order of reinstatement was liable to be quashed, the order declining back wages must, therefore, be sustained because as a result of the reinstatement (which has not been challenged by the Life Insurance Corporation) the writ petitioners have already got the reliefs to which they would not have been entitled to in view of the ratio in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. We are, however, not in a position to agree with Ms. Paranjpe for the reasons stated as hereunder. 6. The order of reinstatement, not having been assailed by the Life Insurance Corporation in any way, stands as solid as brick, and it would no longer be relevant to urge that the order of reinstatement ought not to have been passed as the said order has acquired absolute finality. The only question, therefore, before us is that the reinstatement having been ordered, and not having been assailed in any way, whether the workmen are to be denied their back wages. As already noted, the ordinary law being granting of full back wages on reinstatement, we would like to ascertain whether there is anything extraordinary in this case which should disentitle the workmen from back wages, whether full or in part. 7. In the Supreme Court decision in Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. (supra) the workman concerned not only held out himself to be underqualified by suppressing the truth at all stages during the process of appointment, but continued to conceal the same even after the appointment and came out with the real picture of his being overqualified only after he was served with a notice to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated on the ground of false statement. In the case at hand, however, it is the clear finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the workmen, after their initial concealment of higher qualification nevertheless disclosed their higher qualification not only before any detection by the employers but even before the appointment letters were delivered to them. We have no doubt that this is a strong distinguishing feature. Numberless educated unemployed in our country is a stigma for our administration and a shame for the entire nation. It may be quite difficult, if not impossible, for one belonging to our class to appreciate the agony of those people who are not in a position to secure any employment whatsoever for years and years in the prime of their youth, even though otherwise qualified therefore. It may be quite difficult, if not impossible, for one belonging to our class to appreciate the agony of those people who are not in a position to secure any employment whatsoever for years and years in the prime of their youth, even though otherwise qualified therefore. If, therefore, under the agonising pressure of unemployment and consequential poverty some of the unemployed have at some stage held out themselves to be underqualified and got employment, they should not be visited with any penalty, where, as here, they nevertheless disclosed their higher qualifications to the authorities concerned before the appointment letters were issued to them and they joined their work and the authorities concerned, therefore, had enough scope to decline appointment on that score. The consideration which greatly weighed with the Supreme Court in the Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. (supra) to the effect that the workman concerned secured a job concealing and not-withstanding his higher qualification and that Management will have no answer to the claims of similarly overqualified candidates who might have come to be rejected because of overqualification and as a result “those who stated the truth would be said to be at a disadvantage and those who suppressed it stood to gain” cannot arise in this case because, as already stated, the workmen concerned nevertheless disclosed their higher qualifications to the authority before the appointment letters were issued and they were asked to join the service. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that in the case at hand there is no such extraordinary or compelling circumstances to justify departure from the ordinary rule of not denying full back wages of reinstatement. Looking to the horrendous state of affair in our country resulting from acute unemployment of our youths, we are inclined not to throw, if we can, into the scale, already too much depressed by frustration and poverty, the additional weight of poverty by declining wages and we have decided to do so in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, which distinguish the same from the Supreme Court decision in Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. (supra). 8. We accordingly allow the writ petition, set aside that part of the order of the Industrial Tribunal declining the back wages to the petitioners and direct that they be paid full back wages with effect from the date of their termination from service upto the date of reinstatement. 8. We accordingly allow the writ petition, set aside that part of the order of the Industrial Tribunal declining the back wages to the petitioners and direct that they be paid full back wages with effect from the date of their termination from service upto the date of reinstatement. We, however, make no order as to costs. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 prays that the operation of this order be stayed for a period of eight weeks. We find no reason to grant such prayer. Prayer rejected. 10. Issuance of certified copy of this judgement is expedited. Writ petition allowed. -----