S. N. SAHAY, J. This is a petition for issuing a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner, who is under detention in connection with Case Crime No. 566 of 1994 under Section 302/307, I. P. C. of P. S. Kotwali Nagar, district Faizabad. 2. The facts of the case which are not in dispute are that on 28-6-1994 at 8. 30 a. m. a report was lodged by Mahatam Yadav against the petitioner Virendra Singh and one Dinai at P. S. Kotwali Nagar, Faizabad in connection with the murder of Ram Sewak Singh. The aforesaid case crime was regis tered by the police on the basis of the said report against the persons named in the report, namely, petitioner and Dinai. On 21-7-1994 the petitioner was arrested at his residence in district Azamgarh by Sri Surya Bali Singh, Ins-pector-Incharge alongwith S. I. Kulbhushan Tewari and S. I. Indra Prakash Singh and certain others. The arrest was made at 4. 00 a. m. The petitioner was brought by the police party to P. S. Kotwali Nagar on the same day at 4. 00 p. m. and was thereafter lodged in District Jail, Faizabad after obtaining the order of the Magistrate and since then the petitioner is under detention in jail. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner was detained at P. S. Kotwali Nagar, Faizabad on 21-7-1994 from 4. 00p. m. to 4. 50 p. m. and was thereafter produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for remand. The necessity for taking the petitioner to the Chief Judicial Magistrate from the Kotwali in the manner suggested by the petitioner was that by that time the court was closed after court hours. According to the petitioner, the Chief Judicial Magistrate refused to grant any remand and hence the petitioner was thereafter taken to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for the purposes of remand. However, the petitioner was not produced before him and without completing the formalities of law, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate granted remand from 21 -7-94 to 3-8-94. These facts are denied by the respondents and it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was actually produced before the learned Addi tional Chief Judicial Magistrate and remand was granted by him after perusing the relevant papers and satisfying himself that remand was necessary. 4. These facts are denied by the respondents and it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was actually produced before the learned Addi tional Chief Judicial Magistrate and remand was granted by him after perusing the relevant papers and satisfying himself that remand was necessary. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the remand order, a copy of which has been filed as Annexurc-1 to the writ petition. It shows that under the signatures of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, the date if mentioned as 21-7-91. Learned counsel has argued on the be his of this entry in the remand order that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magis trate did not apply his mind and did not consider the relevant papers and passed the remand order in a mechanical way. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that figure 91 below the signatures of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is merely a slip of pen and no adverse inference can be drawn on the basis of that entry. We see no reason to disbelieve the averments made in the counter-affidavit regarding the production of the petitioner and neces sary papers before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned, who granted remand for the period from 21-7-94 to 3-8-94. In our opinion, the allegation made by the petitioner cannot hold water in the face of the aver ments made in the counter affidavit. The first contention of the petitioner has no force. 5. The second contention of the petitioner is that the charge-sheet has been submitted against the accused persons and the enquiry is pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Further remand has been granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and in that connection the custody warrant has also been issued by him. A copy of the custody warrant has been filed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit sworn by Sri Chunni Lal, District Jailor, Faizabad. In the said custody warrant it is mentioned that the accused is remanded to judicial custody and shall be detained in jail during and until the conclusion of trial and shall be produced in the court on the dates endorsed on the said warrant. The exact words of the custody warrant may be quoted as below : 6. In the said custody warrant it is mentioned that the accused is remanded to judicial custody and shall be detained in jail during and until the conclusion of trial and shall be produced in the court on the dates endorsed on the said warrant. The exact words of the custody warrant may be quoted as below : 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since the enquiry proceedings are still pending, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant a remand for the period during the trial and until the conclusion of trial. Ho has submitted that this will be against the provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. Learned Additional Government Advocate has tried to argue that the word vicharan clearly refers to the stage of enquiry and does not refer to the stage of trial. But we are not inclined to accept this contention, for, the word vicharan as, in Hindi, assumed a technical meaning now and it is used for the word trial. There is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the peti tioner that at the stage at which the above mentioned custody warrant dated 16-8-94 was issued, it could not be predicted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the case will necessarily be committed to the Court of Session, although there was a great possibility of it in view of the fact that the case against the accused persons is one under Section 302/307, I. P. C. Accord ing to the learned counsel, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have legitimately issued the custody warrant for keeping the petitioner in jail during and until conclusion of the trial at that stage, till the committal order had been passed. We do not wish to express any final and concluded opinion on this point. Even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded, we think that the detention of the petitioner cannot be held to be illegal merely on the ground that a direction was giving in the remand order for keeping the petitioner in jail during and until the conclusion of trial. This direction was followed by another direction in the same remand order that the accused shall be produced in the court on the dates endorsed on the custody warrant, troth these directions go together and are to be read as such. Even if one part of the direction is without jurisdiction, nothing has been said with regard to the other part of the direction and if the other direction, namely, production of the accused on the dates endorsed on the custody warrant is valid and legal, it cannot be said that the detention of the petitioner in jail on the basis of that custody warrant is also illegal. The two directions are separable and the second direction being valid, it clearly implies that the accused was to be detained in jail from the date he was sent to jail till the date he was required to be produced before the court. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also. 7. The third and the last contention of the petitioner is that compliance with the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been made in this case inasmuch as the petitioner was never informed of the full particulars of the offence and the grounds of arrest. According to the petitioner his wife was also present at the time of arrest and in spite of request made by both of them, the police authorities never disclosed the grounds of arrest or particulars of the offence to them. On the other hand, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that at the time of arrest, Nam war Singh, brother of the petitioner was present and the police officers disclosed to them full particulars of the offence in connection with which he was arrested. The relevant facts are stated in paras 14, 19 and 22 of the counter-affidavit sworn by S. I. Indra Prakash Singh. We feel that the counter-affidavit should have been filed by Inspector-in-charge Sri Surya Bali Singh himself, who is said to have effected the arrest and completed the transaction. The relevant facts are stated in paras 14, 19 and 22 of the counter-affidavit sworn by S. I. Indra Prakash Singh. We feel that the counter-affidavit should have been filed by Inspector-in-charge Sri Surya Bali Singh himself, who is said to have effected the arrest and completed the transaction. However, since S. I. Indra Prakash Singh is shown to have been a member of the police party which was con cerned with the arrest of the petitioner, we proceed , to discuss the matter in the light of the counter-affidavit sworn by him. But we expect that in such cases the person who has actually made the arrest and completed j legal for malities should take the responsibility upon himself and file personal affidavit. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that there is a dispute with regard to the facts regarding the disclosure of grounds of arrest to the petitioner and in such a situation, it is the entry in the General Diary which must be held to be decisive. A copy of the relevant entry in the General Diary dated 21-7-94 has been filed as Annexure CA-2 to the counter-affidavit sworn by S. I. Indra Prakash Singh. In this General Diary it is only men tioned that ground of arrest was disclosed to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it is not mentioned that particulars of the offence were disclosed and the facts which are now stated in the counter -affidavit were also disclosed to the petitioner at the time of arrest. He has referred to two cases in support of his contention that a vague and general statement in the General Diary that the grounds of arrest were disclosed to the accused is not sufficient. He has relied upon Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of U. P. , 1988 A Crc 390 and Sher Bahadur Singh y. State of U. P. , 1993 JIC 610 . Learned counsel for the petitioner was fair enough to bring to our notice and for that purpose we record our appreciation that in the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava v. Senior Superintendent of Police, 1992 JIC 786 , a contrary view has been taken and it has been held that the entry of the kind mentioned in the General Diary (Annexure CA-2) will satisfy the requirements of Article 22 and Section 50 (1), Gr. P. C. In that case the case of Ashok tumor Singh v. State of U. P. cited above has also been refer red to and considered. In view of the decision given in Ram Chandra Srivastavas case, so that the force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been taken away. He has, however, referred to the case of Vikram v. State of U. P. , 1994 JIC 474 , in which an attempt has been made to distinguish the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava. The case of Vikram related to the disposal of bail application and was decided by a learned Single Judge. In para 9 of the judgment, he has distinguished the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava on the ground that in that case it has not been stated that in the General Diary whether there was a detailed mention of the particulars of the offence which were told to the arrested persons or not and since there is no discussion in detail, the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava provides no assis tance to the State in the matter of disposal of bail application. In our opinion, the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava could not be distinguished on the ground that detailed discussion was not made. A case which is cited as a precedent can be distinguished only on the basis of facts and not on the basis of the nature of discussions made therein. If there is a pronouncement of law, it is binding as a precedent but if it is distinguishable on facts then only it cannot be applied to the facts of a particular case. So, in view of the observation made in the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava, we do not think that the entry in the General Diary (Annexure CA-2) can be brushed aside. 9. We do not, however, want to rest our decision on the above mentioned circumstance only. In para 21 of the writ petition, it is stated that the grounds of arrest and full particulars were not disclosed to the petitioner at the time of arrest and no compliance was made with the provisions of Arti cle 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure. In para 21 of the writ petition, it is stated that the grounds of arrest and full particulars were not disclosed to the petitioner at the time of arrest and no compliance was made with the provisions of Arti cle 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure. The averments made in para 21 of the writ petition were denied in the counter-affidavit of S. I. Indra Prakash Singh and the relevant facts were stated in detail in paras 14, 19 and 22, as already indicated above. To this counter-affidavit, the petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit and para 22 of the rejoinder affidavit, it is stated as follows : 10. Nothing has been specifically stated in order to show that averments made in paras 14, 19 and 22 of the counter-affidavit are wrong. There fore, on facts, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the petitioner put forth before us in a general manner that grounds of arrest and particulars the offence were not disclosed to the petitioner at the time of arrest. We see no reason to brush aside the averments made in the counter-affidavit which along with the entry made in the General Diary (Annexure CA-2) go to show that the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were duly complied with. Therefore, the third contention of the petitioner also fails. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at great length, we are satisfied that the arrest and detention of the petitioner is not shown to be illegal on the date of return. The writ petition has, therefore, no force and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .