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1994 DIGILAW 616 (MAD)

Venkataraman v. State represented by Sub Inspector of Police, Melapalayam, Police Station, Tirunelveli District

1994-08-11

JANARTHANAM

body1994
Judgment : The present action in one, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974, for short ‘Code’) by one Dr. Venkataraman, attached to Primary Health Centre, Reddiarpatti, who is arrayed as accused 4 in Sessions Case No.87 of 1991 on the file of I Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli for an alleged offence under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, to quash the said proceedings, in so far as it relates to him. 2. The fact situation and circumstances leading to the present action are re-elected below as revealed from the materials collected in the shape of Sec. l61(3) (of the Code) statement and other connected records, culminating in final report being filed under Sec. l73(2)of the Code. (a) One Leela Joice (since deceased) had been functioning as a Lecturer in Saral Tucker College, Palayamkottai even prior to her marriage. Her marriage with Stephen Jaison (accused 2) had been solemnized on 2. 1989 at Nazarath. D. Diraviaraj (accused 1) is the father of the accused 2. One Nirmala Jeyaseeli (accused 5) is the daughter of accused 1. All of them were living together at Door No. 55, Deaf School Teachers, Quarters Kulavanigapuram, Palayamkottai. Accused 1 has a sister by name Lilly. She had been given in marriage to one Albert Samuel. They were living at Door No. 62-B in the aforesaid quarters. (b) One D.Victor (accused 3) is the brother of accused 1. He had been residing at door No.57-A/2, Masilamani Nagar, Ambai Road, Kulavanigapuram, Palayamkottai. He had been working as driver under accused 4. (c) In the Primary Health Centre, where accused 4 had been functioning as Medical Officer, one Dr.J. Ponnu Rajeswari had also been functioning as a Medical Officer. One Jayanthi had been working there as Junior Assistant. Accused 3 was known to them, in the Course of his avocation as driver under accused 4. There is Nursing Home, going by the name, “Ravi Vaidhya Salai” at Murugankurichi, Palayamkottai, belonging to one Dr. Victor Durairaj. It is also known as Victor Nursing Home. He had been very well acquainted with accused 1. (d) On 29. 1989 at about 7 p.m. the deceased was engaged in the kitchen. There is Nursing Home, going by the name, “Ravi Vaidhya Salai” at Murugankurichi, Palayamkottai, belonging to one Dr. Victor Durairaj. It is also known as Victor Nursing Home. He had been very well acquainted with accused 1. (d) On 29. 1989 at about 7 p.m. the deceased was engaged in the kitchen. Accused 1 entered into the Kitchen at that time and caught hold of her from behind, obviously to quench his thirst for sex. The deceased somehow or other avoided such, a nasty situation. The matter did not appear to stop there. Half an hour later, that is, at about 7.30 p.m., accused 1 made a further thrush by making overtures to yield her to his desire. The deceased was not, however, amenable to such a course. Infuriated accused 1 pushed her down and hit her head violently against ground, consequence of which was, she became unconscious. Thereafter, under the facade of administering some medicine, he actually took some powder, mixed it with water and administered the same to her through her mouth. This apart, he also throttled her neck. Thereafter, he sent word to his sister Lilly and her husband Albert Samuel. On their arrival, a taxi was sent for through the said Albert Samuel, and eventually the victim-deceased was taken in the taxi so procured, to Ravi Vaidyasalai, wherein Dr. Victor Durairaj was stated to have given to the victim-deceased some cardiac massage for a few minutes so as to restore her respiration. Efforts so made proved futile and she had been declared dead. The body of the deceased had been taken home and then accused 1 instructed others to say that the cause of her death was due to cardiac arrest, that is to say, heart attack. (e) The next day, that is, on 27. 1989 at about 11 a.m. accused 1, along with accused 3, went to Primary Health Centre at Reddiarpatti and met accused 4. They had secret conversation among themselves, which was noticed by the other Medical Officer Dr.Ponnu Rajeswari and Junior Assistant Jayanthi. Thereafter, accused 4 issued a certificate to the effect that the deceased was under his care for Endogenous depression with Ischaemic heart disease for the past three months and she expired at 8 p.m., on 29. 1989 following the attack of acute Myocardial infarction. (f) Then Dr. Thereafter, accused 4 issued a certificate to the effect that the deceased was under his care for Endogenous depression with Ischaemic heart disease for the past three months and she expired at 8 p.m., on 29. 1989 following the attack of acute Myocardial infarction. (f) Then Dr. Victor Durairaj had been approached by accused 1 for issuance of a death certificate, on the strength of the certificate issued by accused 4. The said doctor appeared to have questioned as to where was the necessity for the issuance of another certificate and on the reply that the deceased died in his hospital and therefore, the certificate of death to that effect was necessary, the said doctor issued a certificate to the effect that the deceased died due to cardiac arrest, at 8 p.m., on 29. 1989. (g) One A. Sundarapandi Edward, brother-in-law of the deceased, suspecting foulplay in her death, lodged an information to the Station House Officer, Melappalayam, who, in turn, registered a case in Crime No.502/89 for an offence under Sec. 174, Crl.P.C. After the registration of the case, he sent copies of the same to the Tahsildar Palayamkottai and other concerned official. (h) Subsequently there was an inquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer, besides the body of the deceased being sent for postmortem. In the said inquiry accused 1 gave a confessional statement narrating the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased and the methodology adopted by him in procuring the certificate from accused 4. Accused 4 also gave a statement to the Revenue Divisional Officer that he had not at all seen the deceased at any point of time, nor did he give any sort of a treatment to her; but he gave a certificate regarding her death on the information furnished by accused 1 and 3. (i) On the completion of the investigation, final report under Sec. 173(2) of the Code had been laid against accused 1 to 4 for alleged offences under Secs. 302 read with 201 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code before the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Tirunelveli and on committal, the case had been taken on file in the aforesaid Sessions Case. 302 read with 201 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code before the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Tirunelveli and on committal, the case had been taken on file in the aforesaid Sessions Case. (j) At the stage of framing of a charge in an inquiry under Sec. 227 of the Code, accused 4 filed an application in Crl.M.P.No. 113 of 1992 before the court below praying for his discharge stating that the materials collected during the course of investigation do not prima facie reveal anything implicating him with any offence: much less an offence under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. (k) Learned Sessions Judge, on consideration of the materials and after hearing the arguments of respective learned counsel for the parties, however, dismissed the said petition. Aggrieved by the said order accused 4 came forward with the present action. 3. He also filed an application in Crl.M.P.No.6198 of 1992 to stay all further proceedings before the court below, pending disposal of this action. This Court in the said application, by order dated 19. 1992 stayed the proceedings of the court below, in so far as accused 4 alone. It was, however, made clear that the court below was free to proceed with the trial as against the rest of accused 1, 2, 3 and 5. The Registry was, however, directed, not to call for the records from the court below, inasmuch as learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner agreed to file a typed set of all relevant papers namely, F.I.R. copies, of Sec. 161 (of the Code) statements of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution and other materials, inclusive of the copy of the final report. It appears that the court below proceeded with the trial of the rest of the accused and trial was at its fag end. The Registry, however, either by inadvertence or oversight, appeared to have lost sight of the direction, as abovesaid and called for the records thereby preventing the court below from proceedings further. However, taking notice of the delay involved in the trial, the Registry after obtaining specific orders of My Lord, the Honourable the Chief Justice, posted this matter before Court for final disposal. 4. Arguments of Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and that of Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor representating the respondent were heard. 5. However, taking notice of the delay involved in the trial, the Registry after obtaining specific orders of My Lord, the Honourable the Chief Justice, posted this matter before Court for final disposal. 4. Arguments of Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and that of Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor representating the respondent were heard. 5. No doubt true it is that test to determine a prima facie case at the stage of framing of a charge under Sec. 227 of the Code would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. The Apex Court of this country, however, happened to express certain guidelines on this aspect of the matter in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978)1 S.C.R. 257 , reflecting as below (at pages 259-260): “....The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Sec. 227 or Sec. 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed offence then it is not open to court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defense evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.” 6. Let the, however, apply the aforequoted guidelines to the facts of the instant case. The petitioner accused 4 had been charged by the court below for the alleged offence under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, based on the materials reflected in the final report filed under Sec. 173(2), Crl.P.C. The essential ingredients of the offence under Sec. 201 of the Indian Penal Code are: Firstly it must be proved that an offence had been committed; Secondly, the accused must know or have reason to believe that the offence has been committed; Thirdly, the accused either causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear or give any information respecting the offence, which he knows or believes to be false; and Lastly, the accused must have acted with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. 7. The incriminating circumstances and pieces of evidences prima facie relied upon by the prosecution in proof of the offence under Sec. 201 read with Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code as against the petitioner accused 4 consist of the following: .(1) The deceased was aged 29 at the time of her death. .(2) The deceased died all of a sudden within eight months after the solemnisation of her marriage. .(3) The death was not due to natural causes and in fact she died due to the cumulative effects of (1) partial strangulation with injuries to the head: and (ii) cyanide poisoning. .(4) The deceased had never been treated for any malady at any point of time before her death: Nor had she been examined at the time of her death, by the petitioner- accused 4, serving as a pointer to the tissue of falsehood, taking shelter under the certificate issued by him as to the cause of death of the deceased. .(4) The deceased had never been treated for any malady at any point of time before her death: Nor had she been examined at the time of her death, by the petitioner- accused 4, serving as a pointer to the tissue of falsehood, taking shelter under the certificate issued by him as to the cause of death of the deceased. .(5) The confession statement of accused 1 before the Revenue Divisional Officer implicating the petitioner- accused 4, as relatable to the offence under Sec. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, serving as a piece of incriminating circumstances to be taken into consideration under Sec. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. 8. Thus, the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to be not arousing the gravest of suspicion as to his complicity in the crime-sufficient and adequate enough-to frame a charge therefor. In this view of the matter, the charge, as framed against the petitioner-accused-4 cannot be stated to be erroneous or perverse liable to be quashed. 9. The petition, as such, deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, Crl. M.P. is also dismissed.