N. L. GANGULY, J. The second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25-7-1975 passed by the Civil Judge, Saharanpur dismissing the plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 28-10-1970. 2. The plaintiff-appellants had filed a suit for declaration that they are the owners of the property in suit and are in possession thereof. The trial court was pleased to decree the suit declaring the plaintiff- appellants to be the owner of the property in suit but the declaration regarding possession of the plaintiffs was refused. It was observed in appeal that the plaintiffs may recover possession under Section 6 (4) of the Specific Relief Act. Thus both the judgments of the courts bellows are subject to consideration in the second appeal. 3. It is the admitted case between the parties that one Khursheed Alam, real brother of Sayeed Ahmad, had migrated to Pakistan and the property in question was taken over by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The entire property including the share of Sayeed Ahmad was taken over by the Custodian. Sayeed Ahmad remained in India. He had filed objection against the taking over of the entire premises by the Custodian and there was a compromise between the Custodian and heirs of Sayeed Ahmad. The share of Sayeed Ahmad in premises No. 8/2256 also vested to the Custodian. 4. The property vested in the Custodian was auction sold in 1955. The other property, which was not of the Custodian was not auctioned. Later on in 1966 the Custodian again auctioned the property in dispute which was purchased by the plaintiff-appellants. The plaintiff-appellants names were duly mutated in the Municipal record on the basis of auction sale in his favour. One Piarey Lal was in possession of the disputed premises and he vacated the same in August, 1965. The plaintiffs took over possession of the same in February, 1966, and also on 12-8-1968 obtained the sale-deed in respect of the disputed premises from one Gurditta Mai, who had allegedly purchased the same in earlier auction of 1955. By the auction sale the plaintiffs and the sale- deed from Gurditta Mal, the plaintiffs became the owner of the property in question. 5. By the auction sale the plaintiffs and the sale- deed from Gurditta Mal, the plaintiffs became the owner of the property in question. 5. The respondent Bhagwan Dass filed original suit No. 245 of I960 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for possession over the suit property alleging that the plaintiffs had forcibly entered into the same and dispossessed Bhagwan Dass in May, 1966. The suit of Bhagwan Dass under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was decreed. The plaintiffs being threatened of dispossession due to the decree of Bhagwan Dass in suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act filed the present suit for declaration that the plaintiffs are in possession and owner of the premises in suit and subsequently at the appellate stage they also added the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking over possession by dispossessing the plaintiffs from the premises in question. 6. In appeal before the court below the controversy raised by the contesting respondent was that the decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act in favour of Bhagwan Dass was first to be executed and possession given to him. There was no dispute about the sale-deed of the plaintiffs from Gurditta Mal on 12-8-1968 and auction sale taken from the Custodian in 1965. The title of the plaintiffs was fully established. 7. The courts below were of the view that the judgment and decree in original Suit No. 245 of 1966 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was to be respected at all costs. The court below referred to paragraph 5 of the Law Commission Report before the enactment of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The court below referred to the reasons and circumstances for the legislation under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which is equal to the old Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The court below referred to paragraph 5 of the Law Commission Report before the enactment of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The court below referred to the reasons and circumstances for the legislation under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which is equal to the old Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court below was impressed on the ground that a trespasser can, in no case, be provided any benefit of his act of trespassing and in such circumstances the decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act has to be enforced first and thereafter if the trespasser acquires or proves to have legal right and title in respect of the same property, he may choose to proceed to seek such relief from a competent court but the decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act has to be given effect and the same should be enforced first before issuing any such declaration if the person, who once took possession, legally seeks any relief of injunction. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants cited AIR 1972 All 418 , Chunni v. Sullahar, paragraph 6 of the said judgment deals with the facts which are exactly identical to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench of our High Court was pleased to observe as under : "the lower courts have found that the appellant lodged the first information report on account of malice. There was no reasonable and probable cause for filing the report against the plaintiff. The report, so far as it implicates the plaintiff, is false to the knowledge of the appellant. The plaintiff was not present at the time of occurrence, purchase referred to above. There On those findings the lower courts passed a decree for damages against the appellant. The main point urged before us on behalf of the appellant is that he did not initiate any prosecution against the plaintiff. Learned Single Judge as well as the Courts below have held that in the circumstances of the case he should be regarded as having initiated the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff. " 9. Thus the Division Benchs case of our Court completely clinches the issue. The courts below were wrong. Learned Single Judge as well as the Courts below have held that in the circumstances of the case he should be regarded as having initiated the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff. " 9. Thus the Division Benchs case of our Court completely clinches the issue. The courts below were wrong. in dismissing the plaintiffs claim and rejected the prayer for decree for mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree in the Suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act obtained by him in Suit No. 245 of 1966. The court below had to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case when it was fully established that the plaintiff appellants were the owner of the property by the sale-deed and auction purchase referred to above. There was neither any legal requirement nor necessity to first handover possession in execution of the decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The intention of law is not to multiply the litigation and delay in Administration of Justice. The Division Benchs case referred to above completely answers to the erroneous view taken by the courts below. In view of these facts I am of the view that this second appeal is bound to be allowed and the judgment and decree of the courts below refusing the injunction claimed by the plaintiff- appellants restraining the defendant from executing the decree in Suit No. 245 of 1966 is set aside. The relief claimed by the plaintiff-appellant is allowed and the suit is directed to be decreed as claimed in the plaint. The case is peremptorily listed but the counsel for the respondent is not present. 10. The appeal is allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. .