JUDGMENT :- Certain points and issues, involving and concerning power and procedure or rather practice followed and prevailant by and or in the Courts of Magistrates (including J. M. F. C. as also Metropolitan Magistrates in Metropolitan Cities) with regard to passing orders for remand, of the accused involved in the offences, exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, till the passing of the order of committal of such cases by them (i. e. by Magistrates) to the Sessions Court, are raised and canvassed in these groups of applications before this Court in the light and context of provisions of Sections 167(2), 173(3), 207, 208, 209 and 309(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Hereinafter "The Cr PC." in brief.) 2. The applicants, involved in various offences exclusively triable by the Sessions Courts and who have been earlier denied bail, on merits, by the Sessions Courts as also by this Court, who are detained as under trials in the Prisons, have sought their release on bail, inter alia on the grounds : i) That there is a failure on the part of the learned Magistrates, before whom the applicants were initially produced for the purpose of remand under Section 167 of the Cr PC and who remanded them to the custody during the prescribed period of 60/90 days and till the submission of Police Reports/Charge Sheets under Section 173(3) of the Cr PC to pass proper and legal orders of further remands. In asmuchas, it is urged, that the learned Magistrates have not "taken cognizance of the offences against the applicant as required under Section 309(2) of Cr PC and have simply adjourned the matters. In the circumstances these are no valid remand orders against them and their detention is therefore illegal which would entitle them to be released on bail. ii) It is urged that since the offences against them (i.e. the applicants) being exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the Magistrates have no power to take cognizance thereof so as to remand them in Custody under Section 309(2) of Cr PC and purported remand orders made against them are illegal without power and jurisdiction and consequently their detention under such "illegal orders" has become illegal, which would entitle them to be released on bail. iii) That there is inordinate, unexcusable and unexplained delay in committing their cases to the Sessions Courts which has resulted in their prolonged continuous detention for no fault of theirs, and therefore they should be released on bail. iv) That in case of applicant in Criminal Application No. 2201 of 1994, no committal order is made till date although he (i. e. the applicant) was arrested on 17th March 1992 charge sheet was filed on 2nd May 1992. It is asserted that his detention therefore is illegal and he should be let out on bail. v) That orders committing the cases to the Sessions Courts have not been properly and validly passed as required under Section 209 of Cr PC. 3. Before I embark on examination and consideration of the aforesaid issues raised and also the factual aspects in each of the cases, it is necessary to point out, that such issues were also raised and agitated in the past, in this Court before some of my brother Judges sitting singly. In some cases, as the applicants have brought to my notice, orders for release on bail were passed the plea of "default" whereas, in some relief for bail was rejected. I propose to refer such decisions later on. 4. In view of such conflicting views, on the aforesaid issues, one would expect, and legitimately and properly, reference of the issues to the larger Bench i.e. Division Bench, for resolution of the conflicts. But, as will be pointed out in this Judgment, in view of decisions of the Apex Court as also of the Division Benches of this Court, the issues remain no more res-integra. Reference therefore felt unnecessary. 5. Firstly I will briefly advert to the facts in each case. (i) Criminal Application No. 1385 of 1993 The applicants in this application are involved in the offence registered under Sections 143, 147 148, 149, 302 read with Section 34 of IPC vide Crime No. 423/90 by Colaba Police Station in Greater Bombay. The date of alleged offence is 2nd August 1990. The accused were arrested on 9th August 1990. Their 1st application before the Sessions Court being No. 844/90 for bail rejected on 27th November 1990. The High Court in Criminal Application No. 2941/90 rejected their bail on 13th December 1990. The date of alleged offence is 2nd August 1990. The accused were arrested on 9th August 1990. Their 1st application before the Sessions Court being No. 844/90 for bail rejected on 27th November 1990. The High Court in Criminal Application No. 2941/90 rejected their bail on 13th December 1990. The second application before the Sessions Court being No. 37/92 rejected on 15th January 1992, the third application before the Sessions Court being No. 209/93 was rejected on 16th April 1993. The present application is filed in April 1993 before this Court. The Charge sheet is filed on 5th November 1990 and committal order was made on 21st January 1992. (ii) Criminal Application No. 2201 of 1994 The offences have been registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 504 and 506 of IPC vide C. R. No. 1/33 of 1992 by Ulhasnagar Police Station. The date of incident is 16th March 1992. The accused was arrested on 17th March 1992. The charge-sheet is filed on 2nd May 1992. Bail application was made before the High Court being No. 2953/92 which was withdrawn. Before the Sessions Court application being No. 1897/92 which came to be rejected on 16th January 1993. In the High Court being No. 1052/93 which came to be rejected on 27th July 1993. It is stated that case has not yet been committed. (iii) Criminal Application No. 2252 of 1994 The offences are under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 read with Section 502 of IPC registered vide C. R. No. I-23/92 by Hill Line Police Station, Ulhasnagar, Dist. thane. The accused were arrested on 26th March 1992. The Charge-sheet is filed on 2nd June 1992. The bail application before this Court being No. 588/94 rejected on 7th March 1994. Second application being No. 1335/94 rejected on 9th May 1994. It is stated that the matter is not yet committed to the Sessions Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel Mr. Shirodkar, Mr. Ghare and Mr. Bhagat for the applications at great length. Various decisions were also referred to by the learned counsel for the applicants. I also heard the learned A. P. P. for the State. Notice was issued to the Public Prosecutor, Sessions Court, Greater Bombay and in response thereto Shri D. G. Paranjape appeared and he also rendered useful assistance to this Court. Bhagat for the applications at great length. Various decisions were also referred to by the learned counsel for the applicants. I also heard the learned A. P. P. for the State. Notice was issued to the Public Prosecutor, Sessions Court, Greater Bombay and in response thereto Shri D. G. Paranjape appeared and he also rendered useful assistance to this Court. For some reasons, probably because of communication gap, the Chief Police Prosecutor for the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates' Courts, has not been able to response to the notice of this Court. But Shri Paranjape, the P. P., clarified certain points which this Court needed with regard to the prevailant procedure and practice in the process of remand and committal orders. This Court felt it appropriate to know and get acquainted with the position in the light of issues agitated before it with a view to properly appreciate the pros and cons in proper perspective. I record my appreciation and satisfaction over valuable assistance rendered to this Court by Mr. Shirodkar and Mr. Paranjape. 7. The applicants, thus, are seeking their release on the basis, what is known as "on default." 8. Various decisions of the Apex Court, of this Court as also of various other Courts were referred to and relied upon by both aides. The latest one being the decision of the Supreme Court decided by its Constitution Bench comprising of 9 Judges, and decided on 9th September 1994 in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C. B. I. Bombay. (1994 AIR SCW 3857). The reference to all of them be not necessary. However, few of them will be referred to. 9. As would be evident that in case of all these applicants, Police Reports/Charge Sheets have been filed within the prescribed period as prescribed under Section 167(2) of Cr. P.C. Therefore the question of there being default or failure on the part of prosecution in filing Police Report which would entitle the applicants to be released on bail would no more in these applications. P.C. Therefore the question of there being default or failure on the part of prosecution in filing Police Report which would entitle the applicants to be released on bail would no more in these applications. However it may be stated that the judicial view that default in compliance of provisions of Section 167(2) of filing Charge Sheet offers indefeasible right to the accused to be released on bail, as was reaffirmed by the Apex Court in the case popularly known as Hitendra Thakur's Case, (1994 AIR SCW 3699) no more remains a good law in view of the Apex Court's latest decision in Sanjay Dutt's Case (supra). In that this is how in concluding part, Apex Court enunciates- "(2) (b) The indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4) (bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage." 10. The above principle enunciated by the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt's case is clear departure from the existing judicial view that the default or failure in compliance with the provision of Section 167(2) of Cr PC enures indefeasible right to the accused. The legal position, therefore is, that once challan is filed, even beyond prescribed period then the bail provisions as provided under Chapter XXXIII of Cr PC. would govern such application. The legal position, therefore is, that once challan is filed, even beyond prescribed period then the bail provisions as provided under Chapter XXXIII of Cr PC. would govern such application. Most of the decisions cited on behalf of the applicants proceeded to adopt the view in consonance with the ratio in Hitendra Thakur's case that such default afforded indefeasible right to the accused. It is therefore not necessary to refer to such authorities. 11. It was, however, sought to be urged by the Counsel for the applicants that the decision in Sanjay Dutt's Case is based on "concession" and therefore it cannot be held as having effect of law. If one reads the said Judgment, it is impossible to accept the said submission of the learned counsel for the applicants. What was conceded was a factual aspect and not the legal principles and legal interpretation. It is important to note that the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt's Case has expressly overruled the Hitendra Thakur's Case. I made reference to the ratio as laid down in Sanjay Dutt's Case at this stage itself to highlight the aspect as to how far so-called default theory be extended and whether the same would ensure any benefit and provide any indefeasible right to the accused, as the applicants in these group of applications, should there be any flaw, default or breach in the compliance of the provisions as contained in Section 209(2) of Cr. P.C. 12. Section 209 of Cr. P.C. which is most material in the context of contravention, is for convenience reproduced. "209. P.C. 12. Section 209 of Cr. P.C. which is most material in the context of contravention, is for convenience reproduced. "209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it.-- When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall - (a) commit, after complying with the provisions of Section 207 or Section 208, as the case may be, the case to the Court of Session, and subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail remand the accused to custody until such commitment has been made; (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of the trial; (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence; (d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session." 13. The next vital provision is as contained in Section 309 of Cr PC which reads : "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.- (1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody : Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this Section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time : Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing : (Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against the sentence proposed to be imposed on him.) Explanation 1 : If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2 : The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the Accused. 14. Section 209 occurs in Chapter XVI of Cr. P.C. entitled "Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrates." The expression appearing therein is "appears to the Magistrate" is most significant. Therefore it clearly implies that it does not contemplate that the Magistrate should hear the accused as to whether the Case is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Magistrate is not required to weigh the evidence. He has to look into the materials on record to find out whether an offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. Once he does that then he has to ensure the compliance of Sections 207 and 208 of Cr. P.C. before passing committal order. It is thus manifest that the scheme and procedure in the present Cr. P.C. is radically different from the old Code, which required preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate before the order of Committal. The statement and object refers to the recommendation of the Law Commission, which makes the intention of the Legislature clear. "(ii) Cl. P.C. before passing committal order. It is thus manifest that the scheme and procedure in the present Cr. P.C. is radically different from the old Code, which required preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate before the order of Committal. The statement and object refers to the recommendation of the Law Commission, which makes the intention of the Legislature clear. "(ii) Cl. 214 (S.209) : Preliminary inquiries by Magistrates in cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session are being dispensed with as such an inquiry has served no useful purpose and, on the contrary, it involves a great deal of infructuous work causing delay in the trial of serious cases. The abbreviated form of inquiry provided for the amendments made in 1955 and contained in Section 207A has been the subject of controversy and opinion is almost unanimous that this procedure while solving no problems, created fresh problems. Preliminary inquiries are, therefore, being dispensed with in cases triable by a Court of Session. However, to perform certain preliminary functions like granting copies, preparing the records, notifying the Public Prosecutor, etc. provision is being made that the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case will perform these preliminary functions and formally commit the case to the Court of Session. As regards private complaints in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session the inquiry into the complaint by the Magistrate under the existing Section 202 will serve the purpose of a preliminary scrutiny." S. O. R. Gaz. of Ind., 10-12-1970, Pt. II, S. 2, Extra, P. 1309 (1320)." It is thus plain that what the Magistrate has to do is to inquire as contemplated under Section 2(g) of the Cr PC 15. This legal position has also been clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of U. P. v. Lakshmi Brahman reported in 1983 Cri LJ p. 839 : AIR 1983 SC 439 , (1983) All LJ 419) Dealing with the similar points as urged in these applications, mentioned above, legal principles are luminously laid down : "Now, if under Sec. 207, the Magistrate is performing a judicial function of ascertaining whether copies have been supplied or not, it would undoubtedly be an inquiry for the purpose of satisfying himself that Sec. 207 has been complied with in letter and spirit. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than a trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be an inquiry. The making of an order committing the accused to the Court of Session will equally be a stage in the inquiry and the inquiry culminates in making the order of commitment. Thus, from the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Sec. 170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether Sec. 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Sec. 2(g) of the Code. We find it difficult to agree with the High Court that the function discharged by the Magistrate under Sec. 207 is something other than a judicial function and while discharging the function the Magistrate is not holding an inquiry as contemplated by the Code. If the Magistrate is holding the inquiry obviously Sec. 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. Sub-Sec.(2) of Sec. 309 provides that if the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. There are three provisos to Sub-Section (2) which are not material. If, therefore, the proceedings before the Magistrate since the submission of the police report under Section 170 and till the order of commitment is made under Section 209 would be an inquiry and if it is an inquiry, during the period, the inquiry is completed, Section 309 (2) would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody." 15(A). Further, Section 309(2) of Cr. P.C. empowers and authorises the Magistrate to remand the accused to Custody. It is necessary to bear in mind that when the accused is initially produced before the Magistrate under Section 167 of Cr. P.C. he is empowered to order the remand of the accused. Such remand is not mechanical or ritualistic process. Further, Section 309(2) of Cr. P.C. empowers and authorises the Magistrate to remand the accused to Custody. It is necessary to bear in mind that when the accused is initially produced before the Magistrate under Section 167 of Cr. P.C. he is empowered to order the remand of the accused. Such remand is not mechanical or ritualistic process. But judicial process which presupposes the application of mind by the Magistrate to the material placed before him against the accused and only on scrutiny and examination thereof, which scrutiny may not necessarily be elaborate or meticulous, but directed to probe whether the material is adequate enough to pass order of remand of the accused. As emphasized by the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Brahman's Case (supra) this is a radical departure that New Code has made which has dispensed with preliminary inquiry under the old Code. In a sense, Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence. Thereafter the Magistrate adjourns the matter for inquiry as envisaged under Section 209 of Cr. P.C. after filing of the Police Report. It is therefore at two stages that Magistrate applies his mind, firstly at the stage of remand under Section 167 and then while making inquiry before the Committal of the Case. This being the clear position, there is no substance and merit in the contention of the applicants that Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence before order of remand. 16. The above Lakshmi Brahman's Case also meets the contention raised by the applicants in the context of power of remand of the Magistrate as envisaged under Sub-Section (2) of Section 309 of Cr PC. 17. Similar view is taken in the following cases : (i) 1978 Cr LJ 1080 : ( AIR 1978 Pat 225 ) (F. B. Patna High Court) Tuneshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (ii) AIR 1986 Raj 58 (FB) : 1985 Cr LJ 301, Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan (iii) II (1993) CCR 1419, Biju Varghese v. State of Maharashtra (Saldanha, J.) (iv) III (1993) CCR 2317 (DB) (Bomb.) Riyaz Hussein Kadar Hussein v. State of Maharashtra. The Division Bench of our Court in this Riyaz Hussein's Case sets at rest the entire controversy, when it lays down : "Section 209 of the Cr. The Division Bench of our Court in this Riyaz Hussein's Case sets at rest the entire controversy, when it lays down : "Section 209 of the Cr. P.C. has been introduced by the new Code of Criminal Procedure and it provides for commitment of a case which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. A reading of Section 209 of the Code would show that it is self-contained Code. The object of inquiry under this Section is two-fold, firstly to prevent the committal of cases in which there was no reasonable ground for conviction so as to, on one hand save the accused from the prolonged anxiety of undergoing a trial for offences that could not be brought home to him and on the other hand save the time of the Court being wasted over cases in which the evidence would obviously not justify a conviction. Section 209(b) also empowers the Committing Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of Code relating to bail. No specific form of warrant has been prescribed under Section 209, Cr. P.C. while remanding accused to judicial custody at the time of commitment of the case. No reasons are required to be assigned for remanding the accused to jail custody till the conclusion of the trial. The provisions of Clause (b) of Section 209, thus, vests the Magistrate with a power to authorise the detention of an accused in jail custody during and until the conclusion of the trial while committing him to stand his trial before the Sessions Court. In such a case even though all further proceedings are to take place before the Court of Session and no proceedings are to take place before the Magistrate, the detention of the accused in jail custody can be authorised by the Magistrate who commits the cases to Sessions." 18. The contrary view is to be found in the following cases. 1. 1978 Cr LJ p. 1074 (DB) Patna. Kunden Mahto v. State of Bihar. 2. 1982 Cr LJ 284 : (AIR 1982 NOC 72 (Guj)) (FB) Gujarat. Babubhai Purshottomdas Patel v. State of Gujarat. 3. Criminal Application No. 2431 of 1991 (Bom) decided by Daud, J. on 23rd October 1991. 4. Criminal Application No. 1812 of 1991 (Bom) decided by Daud, J. on 5th September 1991. 5. Kunden Mahto v. State of Bihar. 2. 1982 Cr LJ 284 : (AIR 1982 NOC 72 (Guj)) (FB) Gujarat. Babubhai Purshottomdas Patel v. State of Gujarat. 3. Criminal Application No. 2431 of 1991 (Bom) decided by Daud, J. on 23rd October 1991. 4. Criminal Application No. 1812 of 1991 (Bom) decided by Daud, J. on 5th September 1991. 5. Criminal Application No. 3455 of 1993 (Bom) decided on 1st March 1994 by Dudhat, J. 6. Criminal Application No. 281 of 1989 (Bomb.) decided by Suresh, J. on 14th February 1989. The decisions at Sr. Nos. 3 to 6 are of this Court rendered by respective brother Judges singly, where contrary views are taken and bail orders were passed. As stated earlier in para 15 that in view of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Lakshmi Brahman's Case (supra) and our Division Bench decision in Riyaz Husseins's Case (supra) there need no more comments. 19. The conspectus of the judicial principles as enunciated in the decisions of the Apex Court in Lakshmi Brahman's Case (supra), Full Bench decisions in the case of Tuneshwar Prasad (Patna) and Mahesh Chand (Raj.) and Division Bench of our Court in Riyaz Hussein's case (supra), it clearly emerges. i. That the Magistrate has the power to remand the accused to Custody under Section 209 and Section 309(2) of Cr. P.C. till the committal order and after passing committal order. ii. That the inquiry contemplated before committal order under Section 209 is as envisaged under Section 2(g) of Cr. P.C. and to ensure the compliance of the provision of Sections 207 and 208 of Cr. P.C. iii. Notwithstanding any irregularity or illegality in the remand order of the Magistrate, that by itself does not bestow any right upon the accused to seek release on bail, dehors the provisions as contained in Chapter XXXIII of Cr. P.C. 20. In the light of above decisions, it is held that the various contentions raised by and on behalf of the applicants have no merits and are not sustainable. Consequently their applications have to be rejected. 21. However, all said and done, I find some merits and justification in the grievances voiced by the applicants, namely, inordinate delay on the part of the concerned Magistrates to pass committal orders. Consequently their applications have to be rejected. 21. However, all said and done, I find some merits and justification in the grievances voiced by the applicants, namely, inordinate delay on the part of the concerned Magistrates to pass committal orders. Hereinabove, while adverting to factual aspects in each of the applications, mention is made of the chronological sequence of events, such as date of arrest, submission of Police Reports, etc. It would be noticed that, even after submission of the Charge Sheets/Police Reports, before the concerned Magistrates, the matters have remained on their file for years together. In some cases more than two years. It is noticed and so stated that in the case of Criminal Application No. 2252 of 1994 my brother Judge has, by order dated 9th May 1994, passed in Criminal Application No. 1335 of 1994, specifically directed the Magistrate to pass the committal order without any further delay. It is indeed shacking that the learned Magistrate has not even complied with the specific directions of this Court. 22. It is true that Section 209 of Cr PC does not stipulate any time limit as such for passing orders of committal. However, what is not explicit is amply and explicitly available in the Cr. P. C itself i. e. New Code. In the New Code, various radical changes have been introduced and some antiquated have been done away with. This is so, in particular, with regard to the provisions of Section 209 of Cr PC. In the Old Code, before Committal, preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate was contemplated, which required examination of the prosecution witnesses. This has been done away with sole object being to avoid delay in the trial. I have already reproduced hereinabove the Objects and Reasons spelt out by Law Commission. However it is a matter of regret and concern that the plain provisions of the Statute is flouted for no conceivable cogent reasons by the Magistrates. Mr. Paranjape, the learned P. P. Sessions Court, stated, in a nebulous manner, that except the work load, there cannot be any other reasons for the Magistrates to delay the committal process. 23. I am constrained to note that more than pressure of work, 1st is insensitiveness to the appalling plight of the accused/undertrials languishing in the Jail awaiting their trial. Legal mandate is observed in breaches and shown scant respect. 23. I am constrained to note that more than pressure of work, 1st is insensitiveness to the appalling plight of the accused/undertrials languishing in the Jail awaiting their trial. Legal mandate is observed in breaches and shown scant respect. It is indeed deplorable that the Wing of the Judiciary is contributory to such grown injestion. It is impossible to comprehend as to why the Magistrates should take such intolerably and inexcusably long time to pass committal orders in the cases exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, after filing of the Charge Sheet/Police Reports and when they are not called upon or required into elaborate inquiry as in the Old Code. It is more so when the accused involved in such cases, as in the matters in hand, are refused bail. It is indeed disturbing state of affairs. 24. What is further important to note is, that as the result of delayed or late committal of the cases to the Sessions Courts, the Sessions Court registers much committed case on its receipt as new Case and Cases are listed and notified for trial as per its (i.e. Sessions Court) Register in Chronological order. This means that although the crime has occurred in a given case much earlier and accused therein arrested much before, the Case will get its turn in the order of chronological sequence. This reality has to be realised by all concerned. 25. Speedy trial is regarded as a basic right of a person. The apex Court in its number of Judgment has emphasised this aspect. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1369 : (1979 Cri LJ 1045) this is what in para 9 it is laid down : "It is possible that some of them, on trial, may be acquitted of the offences charged against them and in that event, they would have spent several years in jail for offences which they are ultimately found not to have committed. What faith would these people have in our system of administration of justice ? Would they not carry a sense of frustration and bitterness against a society which keeps them in jail for so many years for offences which they did not commit ? What faith would these people have in our system of administration of justice ? Would they not carry a sense of frustration and bitterness against a society which keeps them in jail for so many years for offences which they did not commit ? It is therefore, absolutely essential that persons accused of offences should be speedily tried, so that in cases where bail, in proper exercise of discretion, is refused, the accused persons have not to remain in Jail longer than is absolutely necessary." 26. The Supreme Court yet in another decision, in the case of Nimeon Sangma v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Meghalaya, reported in AIR 1979 SC 15 18 : (1979 Cri LJ 941) has expressed its anguish and displeasure and disapproval. "We find a large number of cases where detention for considerable periods, without the trial having even commenced is being suffered by various persons, criminal justice brooks down at a point when expeditions trial is not attempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail. The Criminal Procedure Code in Ss. 167, 209 and 309 has emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigations and trials. It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have been such considerable delay in investigations by the police in utter disregard of the fact that a citizen has been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an offence. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the Constitution especially under Art. 21 as interpreted by this Court." 27. It is unnecessary to elaborate anything more. There cannot be compromise over the matter of ensuring speedy trial at all the levels, which would apply to judiciary as well. 28. In the circumstances as noted hereinabove, impel this Court to issue directions to the Magistrates in this State who will be dealing with the process of Committal of the Cases to ensure the passing of the Committal orders in respect of cases exclusively triable by the Sessions Courts, which are pending and which may be filed before them expeditiously on complying with the required procedure as contemplated under Sections 207 and 208 of Cr. P.C. In any event, matters should never remain uncommitted before them for more than two months on receipt of the Police Report. I hasten to add and clarify that the Statute does not provide any time limit and time limit indicated by me, is done keeping with the provisions of the Statute both in letter and spirit. This does not mean that the Magistrates should wait for the period of two months. In a given case or cases, it must be done even before that. The point to bear in mind is that it must be done with least delay and with quick despetch. 29. Further, the Magistrates, while passing committal orders under Section 209, of Cr. P.C. they should ensure that their orders are made in accordance with the statutory provisions. Same should be precise, clear and must exhibit the application of their mind to the facts that : i. They are satisfied that the offences are exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, ii. Proper order remanding the accused involved in such cases. iii. that there is compliance of provisions of Sections 207 and 208 of Cr. P.C., etc. and it is also felt necessary to draw attention of the concerned Magistrates to the provisions as made by this High Court in Criminal Manual meant for the guidance of the Criminal Courts and Officers subordinate to it, in particular paragraph Nos. 4 to 7 in Chapter I and paragraph No. 1A in Chapter III on the point under discussion. The attention of all concerned is also invited to the specific directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court (Mohta and Shah, JJ.) in group of Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 1516 to 1519, 1537, 1625, 1627 of 1992 and 26, 246, 247 of 1993 to the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay, District Courts and Magistrates' Court. (The said Judgment is reported in III (1993) CCR at Page 2317). 30. As far as applications herein are concerned, the same stand rejected. ORDER 1. Criminal Applications Nos. 1385 of 1993, 2201 of 1994 and 2252 of 1994 stand rejected. 2. The Additional Registrar, Judicial is directed to forward copies of this Judgment to : i. Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. ii. 30. As far as applications herein are concerned, the same stand rejected. ORDER 1. Criminal Applications Nos. 1385 of 1993, 2201 of 1994 and 2252 of 1994 stand rejected. 2. The Additional Registrar, Judicial is directed to forward copies of this Judgment to : i. Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. ii. All District Judges, with directions to bring to the notice of the concerned Magistrates under their respective jurisdiction the relevant observations appearing in this Judgment in respect of steps to be taken while passing of the Committal orders. (Paras 19 to 28) iii. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Greater Bombay, with direction to bring to the notice of concerned Magistrates in Greater Bombay the relevant observations appearing in this Judgment in respect of steps to be taken while passing of the committal orders. (Paras 19 to 28) iv. C. C. expedited. Order accordingly.