JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:—By judgment impugned in this revision, the Small Causes Court dismissed the suit of the applicant/landlord to recover possession from non-applicants/tenants. The precise reasons for dismissal are : (a) termination of tenancy was not in conformity with the requirement of section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, (b) suit itself is barred in view of the provisions of The Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971. 2. While questioning the correctness of the impugned judgment, it is pointed out that the applicant issued Notice dated 9-12-1983 (Exh. 53) terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-1-1984. However, during trial, applicant could not produce postal acknowledgment indicating that notice was served on non-applicants before 15 days of expiry of the tenancy month. Undisputedly, non-applicants received the notice. They replied on 1-2-1984 vide Exh. 55, wherein, inter alia, they stated that notice is not in conformity with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, they have not given the date of receipt of notice. Moreover, they have not produced the postal envelope containing the notice in response to notice to produce served on them pursuant to Order XI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question relating to service of notice in compliance with section 106 was to be adjudged on the pleadings of the parties. 3. In para (4) of the plaint, the applicant has pleaded that the non-applicants/defendants received the notice on 20-12-1983. If it was so, undisputedly then the service of notice was in compliance with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In reply, the non-applicants merely recorded that the contents in this para (para 4) and of the notice are denied. Denial was general. No specific denial is recorded relating to pleadings asserting date of receipt of notice by the defendants. The date of receipt of notice was well within the knowledge of the non-applicants. However, they have not specifically disclosed the same in the pleadings. Disclosure thereof does not appear in any manner advantageous to the non-applicants. The pleadings in reply were completely evasive. Rule 3 of Order VIII of the Code emphasises that denial in the written statement needs to be specific, else every allegation of facts in the plaint, in terms of Rule 5 has to be taken of having admitted. Disclosure thereof does not appear in any manner advantageous to the non-applicants. The pleadings in reply were completely evasive. Rule 3 of Order VIII of the Code emphasises that denial in the written statement needs to be specific, else every allegation of facts in the plaint, in terms of Rule 5 has to be taken of having admitted. Shri Bobde, the learned Counsel for applicant, submitted that such evasive replies, having regard to Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order VIII, constitute an admission of averment of facts. As such, the Small Causes Court was wrong in holding that the applicant could not prove service of notice in compliance with section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Shri Manohar, the learned Counsel for non-applicants, relying on proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order VIII of the Code, submitted that even if admission is in terms of sub-rule (1), the Court within its discretion can call upon the party to prove the fact so admitted. The discretion as exercised by the Court since within the jurisdiction, interference in this revision is not warranted. In support, the learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision in (Broja Kishore Ghosh v. Smt. Krishna Ghose)1, A.I.R. 1989 Cal. 327. In the matrimonial proceedings, husband denied all the allegations of cruelty generally and specifically, excepting one instance incorporated by a belated amendment. The High Court having regard to the facts, as a rule of prudence, asked the party for independent corroboration of those allegations, which were not specifically disputed. The dictum as laid down having regard to the facts of that case, cannot squarely be extended or made applicable to the present case. Even in case of evasive reply or absence of specific denial, having regard to the nature of relationship between the parties and of dispute, the Court as a rule of prudence, can call upon the party to substantiate those allegations. 4. Shri Manohar then placed reliance on a decision in (Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati)2, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 364. The Supreme Court reasserted the golden rule that Court can ignore admission in pleading as a rule of prudence when there is even a marginal possibility of collusion. In the present case, there was no possibility of the parties colluding with each other. The Supreme Court reasserted the golden rule that Court can ignore admission in pleading as a rule of prudence when there is even a marginal possibility of collusion. In the present case, there was no possibility of the parties colluding with each other. It being a litigation between landlord and tenant, they were on cross terms for all purposes to defend their claim. Absence of specific denial or evasive reply was not accidental or motivated. As such, in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order VIII of the Code, the Court ought to have taken the same as having admitted the averments in the plaint. The Supreme Court in the decision cited supra, has observed that — “A decision on such admission would be against public policy and is bound to affect not only the parties to the proceedings, but also their issues, if any, and the general interest of the society. Where, however, there is no room for supposing that parties are colluding, there is no reason why admission of parties should not be treated as evidence just as they are treated in other civil proceedings.” Having regard to the ratio laid down, the issues involved in the instant proceedings are confined to the parties to the proceedings and have no general applicability. The decision between the parties would not affect any public policy and there is no cogent reason—apparent or otherwise— available, which can by way of rule of prudence, deter the Court to avoid admission in pleadings. In view of this, the trial Court exercised jurisdiction with a patent illegality in ignoring the admission relating to receipt of the notice. The termination of tenancy was in conformity with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. It is a common ground that area where the suit house is located is declared as a slum excepting the pukka construction. In view of section 22 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, the Civil Court cannot entertain any suit for recovery of possession. It is further undisputed before me that in view of a decision in (Fattechand Murlidhar Shop by Proprietor v. Shrikrishan s/o Tejamalji)3, 1984 Mh.L.J. 796, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the construction is kucha or pukka. It is further undisputed before me that in view of a decision in (Fattechand Murlidhar Shop by Proprietor v. Shrikrishan s/o Tejamalji)3, 1984 Mh.L.J. 796, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the construction is kucha or pukka. Shri Bobde initially urged that the ground set up by the non-applicants is not in good faith, but with a view to prolong the litigation. The non-applicants have not raised any such plea while litigating before the Rent Control Authorities for permission to terminate the tenancy. He further referred to order dated 6-2-1990 passed by the Maharashtra Slum Tribunal wherein it was recorded that the suit house was a pukka construction. Shri Manohar successfully countered the submission and pointed out that the order on which reliance is placed does not subsist since it was subsequently set aside in the writ petition. The applicant has withheld this fact and as such, he is also entitled a relief. No doubt, that subsequent decision in writ petition has not been referred to. However, whether such suppression was motivated for the wrongful gain? Shir Bobde made a submission that suppression is not deliberate and omission is accidental and without consequences. Irrespective of the order referred to, the Small Causes Court independently tried the issues and parties were at trial before the Court and, therefore, suppression could not be deliberate or with a motive. I find the submission just and proper. 6. Shri Manohar then made a submission that whether nature of construction is pukka or kucha is to be decided in reference to the Slum Act. The Small Causes Court was justified in accepting the evidence of DW 2 Bedi and reached the conclusion that the suit house was a kucha construction. The reasoning as adopted does not suffer from any jurisdictional error and, therefore, it could not be interfered with in this revision. Shri Bobde countered the submission by contending that the Small Causes Court committed a patent illegality in appreciating the evidence. He urged that construction was pukka and even today, non-applicants are in occupation of the suit premises. He further urged that DW 2 Bedi was merely a Contractor. He inspected the premises in the absence of applicant/landlord. His report and evidence are tainted with the motive. He had more anxiety to oblige the non-applicants. Even otherwise, as pointed out, DW 2 Bedi averred that premises are safe for residence after repairs. He further urged that DW 2 Bedi was merely a Contractor. He inspected the premises in the absence of applicant/landlord. His report and evidence are tainted with the motive. He had more anxiety to oblige the non-applicants. Even otherwise, as pointed out, DW 2 Bedi averred that premises are safe for residence after repairs. It is, therefore, clear that kucha construction, which is always for temporary period, could not become safe for residence even after effecting repairs. Besides this, P.W. 2 Modak certified that the suit house is a pukka construction. He took inspection in presence of the parties. Undisputedly, as per the report, construction is ground plus two storeyed structure. P.W. 2 Modak was in-charge of the Slum Department and he also worked as a Competent Authority under the Slum Act. In cross-examination, the only suggestion was made that flooring of first and second floors was of wooden frame. To this, he answered in the affirmative. Another suggestion was made that the wooden work is rotten, which he had emphatically denied. Apparently, DW 2 Bedi was merely a contractor. His evidence does not lead to a definite conclusion that the house was a kucha construction. The trial Judge, therefore, acted with material illegality in accepting his testimony and discarding the testimony of PW 2 Modak, which is on positive lines. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, revision is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree is set aside. The suit claim is hereby decreed. No order as to costs. Revision allowed. -----