Judgment :- Gulab C.Gupta, J. The petitioners are the wives of the three detenus Om Prakash Goyal, Bharat Bhushan Goyal and S.Vaidyananthan, who have been lodged in Central Prison, Madras pursuant to the order dated 24. 1994 passed under Sec.3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) with a view to prevent them from engaging in smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods in future. They feel aggrieved with the said detention and have preferred these writ petitions challenging the legal and constitutional validity thereof under Art.226 of the Constitution. .2. The detenu, Bharat Bhushan Goyal is the partner of M/s. Goyal Dresses, a firm constituted under the Partnership Act and having its business premises at No.556, Mount Road, Madras. The detenu, Om Prakash Goyal is the father of the said Bharat Bhushan Goyal and is also a partner in the firm M/s.Goyal Dresses. The detenu S.Vaidyanathan, is the managing partner of M/s. Best Fabrics, another firm concerned in the matter. It is alleged that the Zonal unit of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence obtained information that the detenus and their firms were evading customs duty on Label Tape and nylon outer lining material imported by them by falsely availing the benefit of exemption notifications under Duty Exemption Scheme by producing fabricated Bill of Lading grossly mis-declaring their value for the purpose of assessment. The factory and office premises of the above mentioned two firms and the residences of the detenus were, therefore, put to searches on 12. 1994. The office premises of M/s. Bhansali Garments (Private) Limited yet another firm at No. 10, Part Street, Kilpauk Garden Colony, Kilpauk, Madras and the residence of Rajesh Bhansali of the said firm at No.26, Khan Street, Choolaimedu, Madras were also, searched. It is alleged that in the aforesaid searches, the officers recovered incriminating documents and files relating to various imports made in the name of M/s.Best Fabrics as well as in the name of M/s.Goyal Dresses and M/s.Singhal Agencies, New Delhi. During the course of search of the premises of M/s.Best Fabrics and M/s.Bhansali garments, the officers are alleged to have found a few consignments of imported cargo kept stored in those places. On a scrutiny of documents it was seen that the consignment of 400 cartons of label tapes covered by Bill of Entry No.3507 dated 21. During the course of search of the premises of M/s.Best Fabrics and M/s.Bhansali garments, the officers are alleged to have found a few consignments of imported cargo kept stored in those places. On a scrutiny of documents it was seen that the consignment of 400 cartons of label tapes covered by Bill of Entry No.3507 dated 21. 1994 was cleared duty free under Duty Exemption Scheme against Advance Licence No. 152873 dated 7. 1992 issued in favour of M/s.Reflex International Private Ltd., Delhi and Transferred to M/s.Goyal Dresses. It was also found that M/s.Goyal Dresses Subsequently transferred the said licence to M/s.Pharma and Vijay Investments and Financing Company Private Limited and ultimately M/s.Best Fabrics, Madras. It was also found that the Bill of Lading filed along with the Bill of Entry was a fabricated document and the shipment date was antedated so as to bring it within the validity period of the licence produced. 3. As regards consignment of 100% nylon outer lining it was found that the clearance of the consignment was made duty free by misusing the advance licence, which, was for the import of various goods including fabrics to be used in the garments for the export of goods declared as ‘gents half sleeve shirts and blouses’. The statement of the detenus and others was recorded on ,12. 1994 from which it appeared that the detenu S. Vaidy anathan worked for the detenu Bharat Bhooshan Goyal and allowed his. advance licence to be used for consideration. It was also discovered that the goods were received at the godown of M/s.Best Fabrics and delivered on Bharat Bhooshan Goyal’s Instruction. It was also discovered that the goods imported were actually not lining material but nylon taffetta used in the manufacture of umbrella. The detenu Vaidyanathan is said to have admitted that this material was not used as lining material. As regards label tape imported in the name of M/s.Best Fabrics it was discovered that they were actually imported by the detenu Bharat Goyal in the name of M/s. Best Fabrics for disposal in the market. The detenu Vaidyanathan is also reported to have stated that the validity of advance licence dated 7. 1992 had expired on 7. 1993, but it was made valid upto 28. 1993 by making the same transferable on 22. 1993. The detenu Vaidyanathan is also reported to have stated that the validity of advance licence dated 7. 1992 had expired on 7. 1993, but it was made valid upto 28. 1993 by making the same transferable on 22. 1993. It was also found that the detenu Bharat Bhooshan Goyal had manipulated the Bill of Lading No. 351326145 to show the date of shipment as 30.9.1993 in order to clear the consignment duty free before the expiry of the licence. In view of the material collected during the course of investigation the department claims to have reasonably believed that Bharat Bhooshan Goyal, the detenu Vaidyanathan and Rajesh Bhansali were guilty of offence punishable under Sec. 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. They were therefore, arrested and produced before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, ‘Madras on 12. 1994 and were remanded to Judicial custody till 3. 1994. However, they were released on bail on 2. 1994. It appears that there was a compromise between the Department and Rajesh Bhansali and, therefore, no action against him was taken under the Act. The Department, however felt that there was sufficient reason to secure preventive detention of the detenus Bharat Bhooshan Goyal and S.Vaidyanathan and, therefore, they placed the material collected against them for consideration of the respondents under this Act. 4. It appears that during the course of investigation as aforesaid the statement of detenu Om Prakash Goyal was also recorded on 12. 1994, when he is reported to have stated that he had stopped going to the factory of M/s.Goyal Dresses for the last about nine months and was not aware of the imports made by the said firm. He also is reported to have stated that the-day-to day affairs of the firm M/s.Goyal Dresses were looked after by Bharat Bhooshan Goyal and that he was not aware of any import of Goyal Dresses in the name of any other company. This detenu is however said to have admitted knowing Shankar Kakoo and his wife Diana of Ram Ever Prosper, Taiwan and Ganshyam of M/s.Conquest, Kobe, Japan and the fact that some fabrics were imported from these persons earlier. 5. This detenu is however said to have admitted knowing Shankar Kakoo and his wife Diana of Ram Ever Prosper, Taiwan and Ganshyam of M/s.Conquest, Kobe, Japan and the fact that some fabrics were imported from these persons earlier. 5. The investigation also revealed that apart from the illegalities in relation to label tapes and nylon taffetta mentioned earlier the detenus had been clearing consignments against advance licences by tampering with the description of the goods and licence to suit the description in the Customs documents. It was also found that even in the past the detenus had engaged in illegal imports under duty exemption scheme by misdeclaration of quantity, description and value of goods in the name of M/s. Goyal Dresses. It was further found that the detenus were negotiating with M/s.Kabul Limited, Kores for the import of nylon trico flocking and contracted to import a large quantity of the said material at U.S. dollar 2.6 per metre but obtained a pro forma invoice from them indicating unit price of U.S. dollars 0.80 per metre. .6. The aforesaid and several other material collected during the investigation led the authorities to believe that nothing except preventive detention of the detenus would be able to prevent the aforesaid illegal activities perpetuated by them. The sponsoring Authority therefore, placed the entire material for consideration of the first respondent to exercise powers under Sec.3(l) of the Act. The respondent-Detaining Authority carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the documents referred to including the retractions and arrived at the conclusion that the detenus have been engaging themselves in the smuggling of goods and abetting the smuggling of goods and indulging in various acts and omissions viz., gross mis-declaration of value, description, quantity and by causing diversion of good imported duty free in contravention of the terms of the advance licence and the conditions stipulated therein. The respondent- Detaining Authority was also of the view that in spite of adjudication and prosecution under the Customs Act the detenus would continue to engage themselves in the above-mentioned smuggling activities and hence there was a compelling necessity for an order of preventive detention under the Act with a view to preventing them from engaging in the activities as aforesaid. Consequently the impugned orders were passed and served on each of the detenus together with the documents referred to in the annexures to the grounds. Consequently the impugned orders were passed and served on each of the detenus together with the documents referred to in the annexures to the grounds. The constitutional validity of these orders is the subject matter of challenge in these writ petitions filed by the wives of the three detenus. 7. The detenus were informed that they have a right to make representation to the Detaining Authority, the Advisory Board and the Central Government against the order of detention. The detenus made their representations to all of them through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras on 6. 1994. In this representation they complained that they had not been supplied all the documents referred to and relied on by the Detaining Authority and were, therefore, handicapped in making their representation. They further submitted that large number of documents supplied to them were illegible and could not be used and hence they were not able to make any effective representation. It appears that this complaint was noticed by the respondent-Detaining Authority, who ordered that the documents required by the detenus be supplied to them. The documents were accordingly supplied on 26. 1994. Thereafter the detenu Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal submitted further representation on 7. 1994. Subsequently both the representations of the two detenus were rejected. As regards the detenu S.Vaidyanathan it appears that his representation dated 6. 1994 was rejected and the said rejection communicated to him together with the documents required by him. It further appears that since the first representation had been rejected he did not make any further representations. In the meantime these writ petitions were filed by their wives and hence the matter is under consideration of this Court. 8. Mr. G.Ramaswami, learned Senior Advocate appeared for the petitioner in H.C.P. No.907 of 1994 and made submissions against the detention of Om Prakash Goyal. In the meantime these writ petitions were filed by their wives and hence the matter is under consideration of this Court. 8. Mr. G.Ramaswami, learned Senior Advocate appeared for the petitioner in H.C.P. No.907 of 1994 and made submissions against the detention of Om Prakash Goyal. Mr.Habibulla Badsha, senior Advocate appeared for the petition in M.C.O. No.906 of 1994 and made his submission against the detention of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal, Mr.B. Kumar, Advocate, however, made submissions in H.C.P. No.903 of 1994 impugned the detention of S.Vaidyanathan, Mr.G. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the detenu, Om Prakash Goyal, submitted that there is flagrant violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as several importance and vital documents referred to and relied on by the Detaining Authority in the grounds were not given along with the order of detention within the period provided for the purpose under the Act and therefore, the detenus were denied the opportunity of exercising their right of making representation. It is further submitted that subsequent supply of documents was of no avail and the same would not cure the infirmity in the detention as aforesaid. The learned counsel specifically mentioned that the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal recorded on 12. 1994 and referred to in para. 20, the statement of Rajesh Bhansali dated 12. 1994 referred to in para.20, Bill of Lading and invoice referred to in paras 33(c) and 41, the opinion of the customs referred to in para 14, the statement of Venteswaran, dated 13. 1994 referred to in para 25 and incriminating documents mentioned in para 3 were not supplied. It is therefore submitted that non-supply of these documents not only violated Art.22(5) of the Constitution but also caused serious prejudice to the detenus. Reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Khudiram Bose v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: (1975)1 S.C.J. 542, Ichchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, Shantini Soni v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S. C. 431: (1970)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 126: (1970)2 An. Reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Khudiram Bose v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: (1975)1 S.C.J. 542, Ichchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, Shantini Soni v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S. C. 431: (1970)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 126: (1970)2 An. W.R. (S.C.) 26: (1970)2 S.C.J. 671, Kirit Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1621: (1981)2 S.C.C. 456 : 1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 471:1981 Crl.L.J. 1187, Ibrahim Ahmed v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1982 S. C. 1500 and Ahmad Kutty v. Union of India, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 258; (1990)1 S.C.C. I. It was then submitted that large number of documents supplied to the petitioners were illegible and could not be used for the purpose of making any effective representation and hence the impugned detention is vitiated, it is also submitted that detention orders are based on extraneous and irrelevant material indicating non-application of mind and causing prejudice to the petitioners. It is further submitted that the detenus Bharat Bhooshan Goyal and S.Vaidyanathan were released on bail and hence the bail order passed by the Magistrate was a vital and important document. It was referred to and relied on by the Detaining Authority. In spite of it, the full text of the bail order was not made available to the detenus and instead a truncated order containing the gist of only the operative portion of the order passed by the Magistrate was supplied. This, according to the learned counsel, prejudiced the right of representation of the detenus under Art.22 .(5) of the Constitution. Since the full bail order was also not made available to the Detaining Authority it has materially affected his subjective satisfaction and introduced an illegality in the impugned Order. Reliance was placed on Abdul Sattar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, (1992)1 S.C.C. 1 and the decision of this Court in H.C.P. No.370 of 1993 decided on 26. 1994 in this behalf. Reliance was placed on Abdul Sattar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, (1992)1 S.C.C. 1 and the decision of this Court in H.C.P. No.370 of 1993 decided on 26. 1994 in this behalf. The learned counsel laid considerable stress on the fact that the grounds do not involve the detenu Om Prakash Goyal in the alleged illegalities in the import of anything and, therefore, the exercise of power of preventive detention against this detenu is really colourable and not reasonable and bona fide It is particularly brought to the notice of this Court that except for statement in para 15 of the grounds, there is nothing else anywhere to connect the detenu Om Prakash Goyal with the matter. As regards para 15, it is submitted that the statement contained therein have not been found or held to be wrong and hence there is no justification whatsoever either on fact or on law in passing the order of preventive detention against him. 9. Mr.Habibulla Badsha, learned counsel for the detenus Bharat Bhooshan Goyal relied upon the submissions made by Mr.G. Ramaswami and in addition submitted that considering the voluminous and bulky nature of documents and a short period of 24 hours available to the Detaining Authority it is humanly impossible for the said authority to have gone through the material and passed the impugned order. This, according to the learned counsel, indicates non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority, as regards the documents, it is submitted that incriminating documents mentioned in para 3 of the grounds and adjudication order dated 12. 1994 mentioned in para 39 of the grounds were not available to the Detaining Authority while passing the order and hence it was a clear case of non-application of mind. The learned counsel also submitted that the past alleged activities of the detenu have no proximity with the order of detention and hence the order of detention must be treated as passed on stale grounds liable to be quashed. It is also submitted, placing reliance on para 5 of the grounds, that the allegations against the detenu are vague in necessary particulars inasmuch as there is no details of misdirection no finding about manipulation and no basis for holding that there was any smuggling. This according to the learned counsel, vitiates the impugned action. It is also submitted, placing reliance on para 5 of the grounds, that the allegations against the detenu are vague in necessary particulars inasmuch as there is no details of misdirection no finding about manipulation and no basis for holding that there was any smuggling. This according to the learned counsel, vitiates the impugned action. It is ultimately submitted by the learned counsel that the authority has also not applied his mind to the various provisions of the Customs Act to consider whether this was a case of smuggling and hence non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority is patently clear vitiating the entire action. 10. Mr.B.Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner in M.C.P. No.903 of 1994 relied upon the submissions of Mr.G. Ramaswami and Mr. Habibulla Badsha and in addition submitted that some documents which were in favour of the detenu and were available with the sponsoring authority were not placed before the Detaining Authority for his consideration and hence his subjective satisfaction is vitiated. The learned counsel particularly referred to a letter written by the detenu to the Minister, which according to him, was forwarded to the sponsoring authority but was not placed for consideration of the Detaining Authority. Reliance had been placed on Pushpa Devi v. M.L.Wadhavan, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1748 and Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 364. It was further submitted that the detenu S. Vaidyanathan had in his representation complained that he was not supplied with large number of documents which were vital and material for exercising his right of representation, but, the said representation was rejected on 7. 1994 on which date the copies of the documents were also available. Rejection of the representation however deterred this detenu from making any further representation and thus, his right under Art,22(5) of me Constitution was defeated. Reliance has been placed on two decision of this Court in W.P. No. 1662 of 1988 dated 18. 1988 and H.C.P. No.775 of 1994 dated 17. 1994. .11. Rejection of the representation however deterred this detenu from making any further representation and thus, his right under Art,22(5) of me Constitution was defeated. Reliance has been placed on two decision of this Court in W.P. No. 1662 of 1988 dated 18. 1988 and H.C.P. No.775 of 1994 dated 17. 1994. .11. Mr.TuIsi, Additional Solicitor-General of India, appearing for the respondents submitted that the complaint of violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution was without any factual basis and, therefore, wholly baseless, Relying on the Supreme Court decisions from Khudiram v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 to the latest decision in Moosa Hussain v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1479, the learned counsel submitted that the law of preventive detention aims at curbing an important and widespread social evil in wider national interest and leans in favour of detenus only when some substantial and real violation of his rights resulting in serious prejudice to him is found to be existing. The learned counsel, therefore submitted that insignificant violations of Art.22(5) having no prejudicial effect on the detenu’s right to make an affective representation against his detention have to be ignored. Elaborating his submissions further in the context of the detenu’s rights under Art.22 (5) of the Constitution to receive “grounds” and make an effective representation the learned counsel submitted that the detenus have no right to receive documents of their choice and their right is confined only to receive documents which forms “basic material” to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. The learned submitted that the documents allegedly not supplied the order of detention did not form this basic material and hence there was no violation of Art.22(5) as alleged. The fact that these documents were subsequently supplied would only prove the fairness and bona fides of the respond and nothing else. Referring to the bail order the learned counsel submitted that the Detaining Authority had only seen the summary of the bail order and the said summary was made available to the detenu along with the impugned order and hence there was total compliance of Art.22(5). Referring to the bail order the learned counsel submitted that the Detaining Authority had only seen the summary of the bail order and the said summary was made available to the detenu along with the impugned order and hence there was total compliance of Art.22(5). It is further submitted that there is nothing in the full text of the bail order that was not disclosed to the detenus and hence subsequent supply of full text would not affect the detention in any manner particularly when the full and was not before the Detaining Authority and was not relied by him. It is also submitted that the representations of the detenus Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal made on 7. 1994 show nothing new based on the full text of bail order and hence their grievance that the non-supply of full text has prejudiced them is imaginary. As regards the illegible documents, the learned counsel submitted that illegibility is not of any consequence and in any case does not adversely affect the right of the detenus to make representation. Rebutting the submission that there was no valid material to establish that the detenus were engaged in smuggling, it is submitted that the Detaining Authority is required to reach its own and independent satisfaction in this behalf and hence any act and omission of the authority under the Customs Act would not be of any consequence in this case. Referring to various documents relied on by the Detaining Authority it is submitted that a good case of smuggling by the detenu exist and hence satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in this behalf cannot be impugned. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that there was no scope of any interference by this Court in the impugned detention, and hence these petitions deserve to be dismissed. .12. Mr.HabibuIla Badsha, learned counsel for the petitioner in H.C.P. No.906 of 1994 filed an application during the course of the hearing as aforesaid seeking permission of this Court to challenge the legal validity of the order dismissing the representation of the petitioners Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal. This application was allowed giving liberty to the parties to make their submissions at the end of the arguments started as aforesaid. This application was allowed giving liberty to the parties to make their submissions at the end of the arguments started as aforesaid. The learned counsel for the petitioner therefore submitted that the representation of these detenus were made not only to the Detaining Authority but also to the Advisory Board and the Central Government. The said representation was however considered and rejected by the Central Government only. According to the learned counsel, it was the constitutional duty of the Detaining Authority to consider the aforesaid representation as the power to rescind the detention order vests in the said authority alone and since this has not been done, their Constitutional right under Art.22(5) has however submitted that because of the paucity of time affidavit of the Detaining Authority in this behalf could not be filed. The learned counsel however submitted for perusal of this Court the original file dealing with the aforesaid representation and pointed out that the file contains an order passed by the Detaining Authority rejecting the said representation. It is only after the Detaining Authority has considered and rejected the said representation that the same was forwarded to the Central Government for consideration. It is, therefore, submitted that there has been no illegality in the matter. The learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter submitted that the order of the Detaining Authority not having been communicated to the petitioners this Court should assume that there was no order passed by the said authority and hence the constitutional rights of the petitioner remain violated. 13. “Liberty for all and liberty by all” may perhaps be a good definition of ‘democracy’ in the present context of universalisation of the concept and globalisation of its demand. Our constitution makers had shown remarkable sensitivity to the personal liberty as they perhaps felt that it was the most satisfactory way of informing the people that they were free and enjoying personal liberty as the fruit of hard won freedom. We, the people of India, while enacting, adopting and giving the constitution to ourselves, promised to secure for all, through our sovereign democratic republic, the liberty of thought, expression, faith and worship. Part III of the Constitution gives effect to this declaration and provides that no law that contravenes the fundamental rights would be valid. We, the people of India, while enacting, adopting and giving the constitution to ourselves, promised to secure for all, through our sovereign democratic republic, the liberty of thought, expression, faith and worship. Part III of the Constitution gives effect to this declaration and provides that no law that contravenes the fundamental rights would be valid. Personal liberty in Art.21 is, therefore, an Article of faith for us and since it is also the fruit of freedom it is of little more than ordinary importance. In spite of it, the founding fathers had not forgotten the pages of our history and felt the necessity to effectively preserve this personal liberty. They had the experience of law of preventive detention which they had termed as "Draconian" and "antidemocratic" in British days. In spite of it, they felt that the preventive detention would be an effective means of preserving and protecting liberty. In order to make the preventive detention democratic and constitutionally valid, they provided procedural safeguards in Art.22 of the Constitution. These procedural safeguards would, according to the constitution makers, make the law of preventive detention serve the public good and promote social justice. This Constitutional Scheme had been examined by the Supreme Court from time to time. It was examined in the context of COFEPOSA in Khudiram v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, wherein it was laid down that the right of a detenu to make representation against the order of detention which depends on his right to receive grounds upon which the order was made would include not only the right to bare grounds but the supporting material also. It was also clarified that the right under Art.22 (5) is two-fold: viz., (1) the authority making the order must communicate to the detenus within five days and within 15 days for recorded reasons, the grounds on which the order has been made, and (2) the detenu must be afforded the earliest opportunity of making representation This decision was quoted with authority in Ichchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983 as under: "The true meaning and import of clause (5) of Art.22 of the Constitution was explained by this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: "The Constitutional imperatives enacted in this Article are two fold: (1) the Detaining Authority must, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the Detaining Authority must afford the detenu the earliest possible opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguard which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security". It will be seen that one of the basic requirements of clause (5) of Art.22 is that the authority making the order of detention must, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and under Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the words "as soon-as may be" have been translated to mean "ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention. "The grounds of detention must therefore be furnished to the detenu ordinarily within five days from the date of detention but in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to the recorded in writing, the time for furnishing the grounds of detention may stand extended but in any event it cannot be later than fifteen days from the date of detention. "The grounds of detention must therefore be furnished to the detenu ordinarily within five days from the date of detention but in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to the recorded in writing, the time for furnishing the grounds of detention may stand extended but in any event it cannot be later than fifteen days from the date of detention. These are the two outside time limits provided by Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act because unless the grounds of detention are furnished to the detenu, it would not be possible for him to make a representation against the order of detention and it is a basic requirement of clause (5) of Art.22 that the detenu must be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention. If the grounds of detention are not furnished to the detenu within five of fifteen days, as the case may be, the continued detention of the detenu would be rendered illegal both on the ground of violation of clause (5) of Art.22 as also on the ground of breach of requirement of Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject to course to Clause (6) of Art.22 in order to constitute compliance with Surjeet Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1153: 1981 Crl.L.J. 814: (1981)2 S.C.C. 569 : 1981 S.C.C. (Crl) 852. Clause (5) of Art.22 and Sec.3, Sub-Sec.(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, one of the primary objects of Communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of clause (5) of Art.22 read with Sec.3, Sub-Sec. (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to clause (6) of Art.22 copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If the requirement of clause (5) of Art.22 read with Sec.3, Sub-sec.(3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void." The subsequent decisions in Razia v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1751, Nainmal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2129, Surjeet v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1192 elaborated on the aforesaid by holding that the detenu’s right to make representation against the detention order includes his right to receive copies of "statements and documents" which are "referred" to and "relied" upon in the grounds. It was emphasized that the grounds cannot be said to have been "communicated" to the detenu under this constitutional guarantee unless he was given sufficient and effective knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention was based. The decisions in Dharmista v. State of Karnataka, (1989)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 155, Kamia Khushiani v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 814: 1981 Crl.L.J. 848:1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 297 and Ahmed Kutty v. Union of India, 1990 S.C.C. 1, N.Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1989 S.C.C. (Crl.) 732, Abdul Sattar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1 and Hoor Salman Makami v. Union of India, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 521 follow this very law and apply these principles to the facts of those cases. These cases, therefore lay down that Art.22 (5) of the Constitution obliges the Detaining Authority to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made i.e. to indicate the kind of prejudicial activity the detenu is being suspected to be engaged in. But the obligation to furnish facts and particulars relied upon by the authority is based on the second part of Art.22(5) which requires the authority to afford the detenue the earliest opportunity of making representation against his detention for without giving information sufficient to make the representation it will not be possible for the detenu to exercise this right. We have therefore, no doubt that the detenu is entitled as of right in addition to the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to have the particulars as full and adequate as the circumstances may permit furnished so as to enable him to make an effective representation against his detention. 14. The aforesaid law when considered in the context of judicial review, permits this Court not only to examine the validity of law but also the grounds specified in the order of detention, to see whether they are relevant to the circumstances under which the preventive detention could be supported. For this purpose the court can examine the grounds to ascertain whether the order was based on no material State of Gujarat v. Adam, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2005: 1981 Crl.L.J. 1388: (1981)4 S.C.C. 216 or whether the grounds supplied have a rational nexus with the order. Thus, though the court would not undertake an investigation as to the sufficiency of the materials on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was based, it would be entitled to see whether the Detaining Authority has applied his mind to all basic and relevant materials and if the order was bona fide, i.e., to say that the was not used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was enacted. The court is bound to strike down the order of preventive detention if it violates any of the requirements of Art.22 or does not follow the procedure laid down in the COFEPOSA Act. Under the circumstances, it is clear that this Court has the authority and indeed the obligation to strike down an order passed by the Detaining Authority without applying his mind to all relevant and basic facts and materials. Under the circumstances, it is clear that this Court has the authority and indeed the obligation to strike down an order passed by the Detaining Authority without applying his mind to all relevant and basic facts and materials. Similarly, it is also the obligation of this Court to strike down the order in case it reaches the conclusion that the same has been based on no material whatsoever or some materials which would have influenced the mind of Detaining Authority one way or the other was neither placed before him nor considered by him before making the order.Mohd. Yusuf v. State of J. & K., (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1925, Ahamed Kutty’s case, (1990)2 S.C.C. 1 : 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 258, quotes a passage from Khudiram’s case, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: (1975)1 S.C.C. 81: (1975)1 S.C.J. 542 to establish that the right of courts to examine an order of detention as aforesaid is not new and has been in existence from the very beginning para 22 of the said judgment being relevant, deserves reproduction for ready reference: “In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975)2 S.C.C. 81 , this Court held that where the liberty of the subject is involved it is the bounden duty of the court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and that the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. The constitutional requirements of Art.22(5) is that all the basic facts and particulars which influenced the Detaining Authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to making the detention order must be communicated to the detenu so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention (S.C.C. 96, Para. 13) It is therefore, not only the right of the court, but also its duty as well to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually in fact weighed with the Detaining Authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be for closed by a mere statement of the Detaining Authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence it satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be for closed by a mere statement of the Detaining Authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence it satisfaction. The court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the Detaining Authority and for that purpose, the court can certainly require the Detaining Authority to produce and make available to the court the entire record of the ease which was before it. That is the least the court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the Detaining Authority.“ 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however submitted that the aforesaid principles are laid down by application of rule of strict interpretation of the law and the Constitution and therefore, this Court should consider only whether the legal provisionn and constitutional guarantee have been violated. The question of prejudice to the detenu by any such violation would according to the learned counsel, be immaterial. The learned Additional Soliciter General however submitted that all cases starting from Khudiram’s case, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: (1975)1 S.C.C. 81: (1975)1 S.C.J. 542 upto the latest decision in Noor Salman Makani v. Union of India, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 521 apply the test of prejudice to reach the conclusion in relation to the facts of that case. It is therefore, submitted that unless some prejudice is caused to the petitioners in exercise of their right, to make an effective representation, this Court would not hold that there was any violation of the above mentioned constitutional or legal grarantee. The principle of prejudice seems to have been specifically submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court in Teeing Dolkar v. Administrator W. T., Delhi, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1192 and rejected by taking the view that none of the cases decided earlier apply of the test of prejudice. The court also held that the proper principle of interpretation would be the principle of strict interpretation of the constitutional provision and hence strict compliance thereof by the authori-ties. The following passage from the Judgment being of importance is reproduced for ready reference. The court also held that the proper principle of interpretation would be the principle of strict interpretation of the constitutional provision and hence strict compliance thereof by the authori-ties. The following passage from the Judgment being of importance is reproduced for ready reference. ”The learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon the feature that the petitioner wife knew both English and Tibetan languages and an effective representation as a fact had been made. There can be no two opinions that the requirement of law within the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution is that the detenu has to be informed about the grounds of detention in a language which he understands. The fact that the detenu’s wife knew the language in which the grounds were framed does not satisfy the legal requirement. Reliance was placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General oh, a decision of this Court in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary Government of Kerala, (1985)2 S.C.R. 697: A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 687 in support of his contention that unless the detenu was able to establish prejudice on account of the fact that the grounds of detention and the documents accompanying the grounds were not in a language known to the detenu the order would not be vitiated. There is no clear indication of test of prejudice being applied in that case. On the facts relevant before the court, a conclusion was reached that the detenu was merely feigning ignorance of English and on the footing that he knew English, the matter was disposed of. We must make it clear that the law as laid down by this Court clearly indicates that in the matter of preventive detention, the test is not one of prejudice but one of strict compliance with (he provisions of the Act and when there is a failure to comply with those requriements it becomes difficult to sustain the order: (See: A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1513, (1975)2 S.C.R. 832 ; A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 245." (Para. 12) The court however applied the test of prejudice in M.L. Anand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 176, (para.27) to condone the default of the Detaining Authority in supplying a document relied upon. 12) The court however applied the test of prejudice in M.L. Anand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 176, (para.27) to condone the default of the Detaining Authority in supplying a document relied upon. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, 1991 S.C.C (Crl.) 88: A.I.R. 1991 S.C 1640, the court considered the constitutional guarantee in the context of detenu’s right to receive copies of documents referred to in the grounds, made a distinction between the documents relied on and the documents referred to in the grounds and held that "the detenu would have been entitled to any document which was taken into consideration while formulating the grounds of detention. But, mere mention of the fact that certain obligations were carried out in the course of the investigation which have no relevance to the detention of the detenu cannot cause an obligation on the Detaining Authority to supply copies of those documents." While taking the aforesaid view, the court observed as under: "It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu’s right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand of any or every document however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention, cannot vitiate and otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired or prejudicied his right, however slight or insignificant it may be." This decision ahs been followed and relied on in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2264, but without stating anything about the aforesaid principle of prejudice. 16. The discussion about the principle of interpretation is, in our opinion, acadamic and ignores our constitutional scheme. Since Arts.21 and 22 have to be read together, it should be clear that "personal liberty" guaranteed under Art.21 does not include the liberty to do acts which may justify preventive detention and hence the denial of personal liberty. In such cases, the Constitution only guarantees "procedural safeguards" under Art.22(5) and Preventive Detention Law and nothing more. Since Arts.21 and 22 have to be read together, it should be clear that "personal liberty" guaranteed under Art.21 does not include the liberty to do acts which may justify preventive detention and hence the denial of personal liberty. In such cases, the Constitution only guarantees "procedural safeguards" under Art.22(5) and Preventive Detention Law and nothing more. This Scheme represents a rational synthesis of individual liberty and social justice which is the signature tune of our constitution. It should, therefore, be clear that those who risk their liberty by undertaking activities justifying their preventive detention do so at their own risk and consequence our constitutional concept of personal liberty is, therefore, not an absolute concept and hence, a person cannot claim liberty in that wider sense to include even activities which may justify his preventive detention. If this was so no law of preventive detention would ever be constitutionally valid. The law of preventive detention in our constitutional scheme is a reality and must be given full effect to in the wider interest of social justice. If above quoted observations of the Supreme Court are appreciated in this context, it would be clear that the court by adopting the rule of shrict interprotation did not intend to change the contitutional scheme or enlarge the concept of personal liberty. Application of this Rule only means that the personal liberty which is already impaired by the law of preventive detention would not be further impaired and, therefore, the law of preventive detention under Art.22(5) must receive its strict interpretation. Similarly, application of rule of prejudice only means that since Art.22(5) intends to prejudice the individual liberty, nothing sure than the permitted restraints should be caused and this can properly be judged by ascertaining whether the liberty or the rights under Art.22(5), have in any way been prejudiced. In either case intention is to give full effect to the constitutional scheme and not sabotage it. Viewed in this way, there should be no apprehension that strict interpretation of either Art.21 or ARt.22(5), would unduly enlarge the scope of personal liberty and even permit such prejudicial activities which justify preventive detention. Judicial interpretation is can exercise in rationality intended to achieve the objective and potentiality of the law. Pregamatism should, there, be the rule and efforts should be made to give full effect to the personal liberty as also the law of preventive detention. Judicial interpretation is can exercise in rationality intended to achieve the objective and potentiality of the law. Pregamatism should, there, be the rule and efforts should be made to give full effect to the personal liberty as also the law of preventive detention. In this context, the Constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) only aims at rationalising the law of preventive detention rather than sabotaging it. In spite of it, the personal liberty of a person cannot be further limited by a judicial pronouncement. This Court would therefore, follow the rule of strict interpretation, to ensure that already limited personal liberty is not further restricted in any manner. In other words, this Court would not interpret the law in any manner as to cause any further prejudice to the right of personal liberty. But, in so doing and while considering the ambit and scope of procedural safeguards under Art.22(5) this Court would judge their efficacy by applying the test of prejudice and ensure that they do not cause any further prejudice to the personal liberty. We cannot by interpretative process change the constitutional scheme. Our interpretation must advance the policy and purpose underlying. It is wise to be objective in the matter of personal liberty and purposeful while giving effect to the law of preventive detention. This belonging of interests is the crux of the matter and hence we must, proceed to examine the submissions of the parties on their merits. 17. The first submission of the detenus is that they were released on bail by a detailed order passed by the Magistrate in this behalf but the said bail order was neither placed before the Detaining Authority for his consideration nor a copy thereof supplied to the detenu for making representation. Instead a summary of the bail order was placed for consideration of the Detaining Authority and a copy thereof supplied to the detenus. This, according to the learned counsel amounts to violation of both the guarantees under Art.22(5) besides-non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority to a vital material aspect of the matter. The more specific submission is that bail orders give important reasons for granting bail which reasons if brought to the notice of the Detaining Authority might have weighed in the formation of subjective satisfaction by him. Since these bail orders-were not produced it is a case of non-application of mind vitiating subjective satisfaction. The more specific submission is that bail orders give important reasons for granting bail which reasons if brought to the notice of the Detaining Authority might have weighed in the formation of subjective satisfaction by him. Since these bail orders-were not produced it is a case of non-application of mind vitiating subjective satisfaction. It is also submitted that the summary of the bail order cannot be termed as a “bail order” and, therefore, supply of summary to the detenus neither satisfies the first part of the constitutional guarantee nor affords an effective opportunity of making representation against the impugned order. It may however be noticed that the detenus in their representation made this complaint, and, therefore, the copy of the full bail order was supplied on 26. 1994. Since this has been done beyond the period prescribed under Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is submitted that there has been no compliance of Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The learned Additional Solicitor General however sub-mitted that there is no law requiring the Detaining Authority to either rely on full text of the bail order or supply the same to the detenus. The law, according to him, is that if the order of the court granting bail makes significant observations of the nature which could materially affect the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority or imposed conditions on the movement of the detenus of the nature which is likely to alter the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority the said order should be relied on and copy thereof supplied of the detenu. But, if the information with regard to grant of bail that is placed before the Detaining Authority is such that it contains the entire materials which could be read in favour of the accused from the order granting bail, non-supply of complete text of the order would not vitiate the action. Since both the parties have relied on the decisions in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261: (1992)1 S.C.C. and Ahamed Kutty v. Union of India, (1990)2 S.C.C. 1 : 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 258, it may be necessary to examine the law laid down in these decisions in detail. Since both the parties have relied on the decisions in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261: (1992)1 S.C.C. and Ahamed Kutty v. Union of India, (1990)2 S.C.C. 1 : 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 258, it may be necessary to examine the law laid down in these decisions in detail. Ibrahim Manik’s case summarises the law on the subject in six broad principles which are as under: .(1) A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody, In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody. .(2) When such awareness is there then it should further appear from the grounds that there was enough material necessitating the detention of the person in custody. This aspeot depends upon various considerations and facts and circumstances of each case. If there is a possibility of his being released and on being so released he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity then that would be one such compelling necessity to pass the detention order. The order cannot be quashed on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and that if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a higher court. (3) If the detenu has moved for bail then the applications and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the Detaining Authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant material. The question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody. .(4) Accordingly the non-supply of the copies of bail application or the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu’s right of being afforded a reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.22(5) when it is clear that the authority has not relied or referred to the same. .(5) When the Detaining Authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. .(5) When the Detaining Authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Only when the Detaining Authority has not only referred to but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstances amount to violation of Art.22 .(5) of the Constitution of India. Whether in a given case the Detaining Authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the court. .(6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the Detaining Authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu. This was a case where the detenu was in jail and his bail application had been dismissed, but, the application and order refusing bail were not placed before the Detaining Authority. It was, therefore, submitted that it amounts to suppression of relevant material and consequently non-application of mind sufficient to impair subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. Thecourt relying on the counter-affidavit concluded as a matter of fact, that bail application and the order refusing bail were not with the sponsoring authority and were, therefore, not placed before the Detaining Authority. It was, therefore, held that the Detaining Authority could not rely on those documents. The court relying on its earlier decisions including the decision in Ahamed Kutty’s case, (1990)2 S.C.C. 1 : 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.)258, which they distinguished on facts, held that the non-supply of copies of bail application and the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu’s right of being afforded the reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.22(5) when it is clear that the authority has not relied upon or referred to the same. It was in that contest that Ahamed Kutty’s case, received consideration of the court. It was in that contest that Ahamed Kutty’s case, received consideration of the court. The court observed that “in Ahamed Kutty case, no doubt, there is an observation having regard to the fact therein that non-consideration of bail application and the order of release would amount to non-application of mind and that would affect the detention order”. The court however observed that “it is not laid down clearly as a principle that in all cases non-consideration of the. bail application and the order refusing bail would automatically affect the detention”. The court also observed that: “We are satisfied that the above observations made by the Division Bench of this Court do not lay down such legal principle in general and a careful consideration of the entire observation would go to show that these observation were made while rejecting the detention that the bail application and the order granting bail though referred to in the grounds were not relied on and, therefore, need not be supplied”. The court, therefore, distinguished Ahamed Kutty’s case, for the reason that it has ben given on its own facts. In spite of it, while summerising the law on the subject, the sixth principle was stated as aforesaid. The said conclusion read by itself, indicates that in a case where the detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the Detaining Authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case, the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied of the detenu. Mr.G. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the detenu strenuously urged that this Principle should be read along with principle No. 3 which deals with an order rejecting bail and if so read it would be clear that if the application and bail order is not placed before the Detaining Authority it will amount to suppression of relevant material and hence the question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being would necessarily arise. The learned Additional Solicitor General however submitted that the six propositions as aforesaid cannot be read in isolation. The learned Additional Solicitor General however submitted that the six propositions as aforesaid cannot be read in isolation. According to him, if propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 are read together it will become clear that prejudice caused by non-supply of the order granting bail to the detenu is a pre-condition for vitiating the order, Relying on Noor Salman Mankani’s case, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 521 and Hawabai Sayeed Arif Syed Hanif v. L.Hingliana, 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 304, Para.33), it is submitted that non-consideration and non-supply of the bail order even when it imposes a stringent condition has not been held to be sufficient for vitiating the detention and supply of gist fo remand order was held to be sufficient compliance of the constitutional guarantee. 18. Neither Ahmed Kutty, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 258: (1990)1 S.C.C. 1 , nor Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Makani’s case, (1992)1 S. C. C. 1 dealt with the situation where the bail application and the summary of the bail order were cosnidered and copies thereof supplied to the detenu. Both those cases dealt with situation where bail order though relied was not supplied. In Ahamed Kutty’s case, the court perused the record to hold that the bail application and the bail order were furnished to the Detaining Authority. On his enquiry it was therefore, inferred that the Detaining Authority has considered and relied on those documents. In spite of it, the copies of bail application and the bail order were not furnished to the detenu to enable him to make representation. The court, therefore, held that it was a case where the documents relied on were not supplied and thereby the constitutional requirement of Art.22(5) remained violated. Material observations of the court which are contained in para 27 reads as under: “Considering the facts in the instant case the bail application and the bail order were vital materials for consideration. If those were not considered the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority itself would have been impaired, and if those had been considered, they would be documents relied on by the Detaining Authority though not specifically mentioned in the annexure to the order of detention and those ought to have formed part of the documents supplied to the detenu with the grounds of detention and without them the grounds themselves could not be said to have been complete. We have, therefore, no alternative but to hold that it amounted to denial of the detenu’s right to make and effective representation and that it resulted in violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India rendering the continued detention of the detenu illegal and entitling the detenu to be set at liberty in this case.” The observations of the Supreme Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik’s case, (1992)1 S.C.C. 1 , noticed earlier related to these findings and hence no overdue importance can be attached to them. Whatever may be the interpretation of these two decisions, it is clear that they are not the authorities for the proposition that even where the bail application and summary of the bail order have been supplied to the detenu as they were the only documents relied on by the Detaining Authority, the constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) would be violated. This Court is, therefore of the opinion that neither of these two decisions can govern the decision of this case. The submission that principle No.6 as stated would sufficiently indicate that the full text of bail order alone was a relevant material and has to be relied on cannot be accepted as this Court is unable to read the said proposition in the manner aforesaid. The said proposition does not in term lay down that the Detaining Authority should necessarily rely on the order passed by the Magistrate granting bail to the accused persons. The first part of the aforesaid para deals with a case where the detenu is released on bail and obliges the authority to take the said fact into consideration while recording its subjective satisfaction, as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. This part does not say anything about the order granting bail. The second part of this proposition however mentions the order granting bail. The submission of the learned counsel for the detenus is that the words “order granting bail” should be read as “order granting bail as passed by the Magistrate”. There is no jusitification for adding anything to the aforesaid statement. The mandate of the Supreme Court according to this Court is that in cases where the detenu was arrested and subsequently released on bail the Detaining Authority should be aware of the said fact as the same would be a vital material for ordering detention and nothing more. There is no jusitification for adding anything to the aforesaid statement. The mandate of the Supreme Court according to this Court is that in cases where the detenu was arrested and subsequently released on bail the Detaining Authority should be aware of the said fact as the same would be a vital material for ordering detention and nothing more. This does not mean that the Detaining Authority should be aware of the facts and circumstances relating to the detenu’s release on bail only by perusing the order of the Magistrate. The bail application of the detenu, counter of the prosecution and the summary of the bail order would, in our opinion, sufficiently met the aforesaid requirement. The correctness of this conclusion can be judged by asking whether the detenu’s right to make an effective representation is, in such situation, impaired in any manner. In Noor Salman Mankani’s case, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 521, the Supreme Court considered a case where bail order imposing stringent conditions was not placed before the Detaining Authority and it was submitted that this vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. The argument was rejected by observing that whether a particular document is vital or not is an issue which depends on the facts in each case and in the context of the facts of the said case it was held that non-consideration of the bail order imposing stringent conditions did not vitiate the detention order. Hawabi Sayeed Arif Syed Manif, was a case where similar argument was submitted in relation to the gist of the remand orders which only were supplied. The court held that since the substance of the order was placed before the authority, subjective satisfction was not in any way affected. It is true that while so holding, the court did not clearly and specifically held that the remand order was also a vital document and yet it was the submission of the petitioners that the said document was vital to the subjective satisfaction. This case, therefore, is the authority for the proposition that supply of the gist of a document is not by itself offensive to Art.22(5) of the Constitution. This Courts decision in Jaikumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, I.L.R. (1994)2 Mad. 1008 does not lay down any new law on the subject and has been decided on its own facts. 19. This case, therefore, is the authority for the proposition that supply of the gist of a document is not by itself offensive to Art.22(5) of the Constitution. This Courts decision in Jaikumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, I.L.R. (1994)2 Mad. 1008 does not lay down any new law on the subject and has been decided on its own facts. 19. Since we have been taken through the full text of the bail order as also its summary, it is necessary to ascertain as to what is vital to the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority the order passed by the Magistrate or the fact that in spite of the objection from the prosecution the detenus were granted bail? Since the decision of this question has relevance not only to the constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) but also to formation of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, it should receive a serious consideration. As regards application of mind by the Detaining Authority, this Court has no doubt that it is the relevant material and not the source thereof that is important. The authority is requried to be aware of the fact that the detenus having been arrested are on bail so that it may consider whether they were likely to be engaged in prejudicial activities and whether there was any compelling necessity to order their preventive detention. The reason that prompted the Magistrate to order release of the detenus on bail would be, in such a context irrelevant. Since the necessary material is contained in the bail application of the detenus, the counter of the prosecution and the summary bail order, there would be no impediment to the formation of subjective satisfaction. Under the circumstances, this Court would not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority has been in any way impaired. As regards the right of the detenu to obtain a copy of a vital document, the same is considered necessary for effective exercise of the right of making a representation against the order of detention. The use of the word ‘effective’ in the context of detenu’s right of making representation has resulted in enlarged meaning of the word ‘grounds’ which now includes the statements and materials forming the basis thereof. The use of the word ‘effective’ in the context of detenu’s right of making representation has resulted in enlarged meaning of the word ‘grounds’ which now includes the statements and materials forming the basis thereof. It is common ground that the Detaining Authority had not relied on the full text of bail order and, therefore, the said bail order cannot be said to have formed the basic material to be included in the constitutional guarantee of supply of grounds to the detenus. In this view of the matter, it only remains to be seen whether non-supply of the full text of bail order had in any manner affected the detenu’s right of making an effective representation. It may be that detenu may require many more documents than the Detaining Authority is obliged to supply him under first part of Art.22(5) for making an effective representation and its non-supply may, in conceivable cases, result in violation of the second guarantee under Art.22(5). But, this is not the grievance in the instant case. The detenus knew all that they have stated before the Magistrate for securing a bail order. They were also aware of everything stated by the prosecution in opposition of the grant of bail, they were even aware that in spite of this opposition the bail has been granted. They were also aware of the conditions attached to the said bail order. This, when considered in the context that the bail order was obatined by the detenus themselves and there was no constitutional obligation to supply a copy thereof, would in the opinion of this Court, be sufficient to hold that there was no impediment to an effective exercise of right of making representation. This Court, would in this context, like to recall the observations in Kamarunnissa’s case, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 88: A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640 reproduced in earlier part of this judgment. This Court therefore finds no illegality in the impugned orders for the non-supply of full text of bail order, and is pleased to reject the submission in this behalf. 20. It may, therefore, be examined if the non-supply of some of the documents has violated the petitioner’s constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5). This Court therefore finds no illegality in the impugned orders for the non-supply of full text of bail order, and is pleased to reject the submission in this behalf. 20. It may, therefore, be examined if the non-supply of some of the documents has violated the petitioner’s constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5). It has already been noticed that the constitutional guarantee of supply of documents when considered in the context of Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act, means supply within five days on the order of detention, which period can be extended for recorded reasons upto a maximum of 15 days. It has also been noticed that the detention order was passed on 25. 1994 on which date large number of documents were made available to the detenus. In spite of it, on 6. 1994 when the detenus made their representations, the complaint of nonsupply of some other documents was made and copies thereof were requested. Those documents were admittedly made available on 26. 1994. Supply of documents on 26. 1994 would clearly be beyond the period prescribed under Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act and if these documents are considered relevant to the Constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) there would be an infringement of that guarantee. The common submission of all the learned counsel for the petitioners is that those documents were vital and necessary as they were not only referred to in the grounds but also relied upon by the Detaining Authority to reach his subjective satisfaction. It is therefore, submitted that non-supply thereof has resulted in violation of both the guarantees under Art.22(5) The learned Additional Solicitor General of India has, on the contrary, submitted that the documents asked for in the representation and supplied subsequently were not vital or material documents and were not relied upon by the Detaining Authority to record his subjective satisfaction. It is specifically submitted that the complaint of the detenu has to be examined in the context of its relevance and significance to the grounds of detention. It is specifically submitted that the complaint of the detenu has to be examined in the context of its relevance and significance to the grounds of detention. We have earlier dealt with the law on the subject and held that the right of the detenu to receive “grounds” includes, the right to receive “all those basic facts and materials which weighed with the Detaining Authority in reaching his subjective satisfaction about the preventive detention.” This law which owes its Origin to Khudiram’s case, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550: (1975)1 S.C.C. 81: (1975)1 S.C.J. 542 has not changed since then and has been applied almost consistently to subsequent cases the results of which have depended on the peculiar facts and circumstances thereof. The observations contained in para 14 of Karunnissa’s case, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 88: A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640 only clarifies the aforesaid principle and must govern our consideration. Since the parties are divided about the nature and use of the documents, it is necessary for this Court to examine the grievance individually in relation to each one of them to ascertain whether the constitutional guarantee has been in any way, impaired or violated. 21. The learned counsel for the detenu Om Prakash Goyal made the complaint of non-supply of the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal and Rajesh Bhansail dated 12. 1994 referred to in para 20 and submitted that since the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal, was the statement of retraction, it was very relevant. Similarly it is submitted that the statement of Rajesh Bhansali was a statement of affirmation and was, therefore, very relevant. The reply of the learned Additional Solicitor General is that the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal recorded on 12. 1994 was not a statement of retraction and has no bearing on the subjective satisfaction for the Detaining Authority. Referring to the said statement it is submitted that it was an incomplete statement and since the subsequent statement of the said Bharat Bhosshan Goyal recorded on 22. 1994 was supplied without delay, the non-supply of statement dated 12. 1994 was immaterial. As regards the statement of Rajesh Bhansili it only reiterated the earlier statement, a copy of which has already been supplied, there was no necessity of supplying the statement dated 12. 1994 and hence, the non-supply has no effect on the detention. 22. This Court has gone through the statement of Bharat Bhosshan Goyal dated 12. 1994 was immaterial. As regards the statement of Rajesh Bhansili it only reiterated the earlier statement, a copy of which has already been supplied, there was no necessity of supplying the statement dated 12. 1994 and hence, the non-supply has no effect on the detention. 22. This Court has gone through the statement of Bharat Bhosshan Goyal dated 12. 1994 and finds that he really stated nothing on that date. When asked to explain certain facts about the invoices shown to him, he promised to go through the documents and make statement about them subsequently. Recording of the evidence was, therefore, stopped. It also appears that the said Bharat Bhooshan Goyal gave detailed statement on 22. 1994 explaining facts relating to his involvement in various imports. In the context of this detailed statement, a copy of which had been made available to the detenus, the non-supply of statement dated 12. 1994 can have no effect on the right of the detenus higher to receive grounds or make effective representation against the detention. The learned counsel for the detenus however submitted that this statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal contained his retraction to the earlier statement and was, therefore vital for formation of subjective satisfaction. Though this Court has found nothing in the said statement which may amount to retraction, it is necessary to recall the decision in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Sec-retary to the Government, A.I.R. 1986S.C. 687:1985 S.C.C. (Crl.) 332, wherein a retraction of confessional statement of the detenu had not been referred to in the grounds of detention and the complaint was that it amounted to non-application of mind to a vital statement and material. The Supreme Court rejected the said submission by holding that even if the statement was taken to be retracted the subjective satisfaction of the authority would, not be impaired as those very facts were available else where in the record. This decision was quoted with approval in Mandanlal Anand’s case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 176: 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.)51 and must, therefore, be held to be the settled law. Under the circumstances, non-supply of the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal dated 12. 1994 has no effect on the order of detention. This decision was quoted with approval in Mandanlal Anand’s case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 176: 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.)51 and must, therefore, be held to be the settled law. Under the circumstances, non-supply of the statement of Bharat Bhooshan Goyal dated 12. 1994 has no effect on the order of detention. Even otherwise, it is our considered view that the said statement is not at all relevant to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and hence its non-supply has no affect on the detention. .23. As regards the statement Of Rajesh Bansali, it appears that the said Rajesh Bansali had complained to the court of violence and torture by the authorities which necessitated recording of his statement on 12. 1994. In this statement, he reiterated his earlier statement, which he claimed to have given voluntarily and submitted that his complaint of violence etc. was made under stress of arrest and investigation and was false. The effect of this statement was to reiterate the correctness of his statement dt. 12. 1994. The correctness of his earlier statement had become doubtful because of his allegations of violence and torture while in custody. Then the witness also disclosed existence of imported material at his godown and thus provided material evidence, to the alleged illegalities of the detenus. This statement was, therefore, vital and material to the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and constituted “grounds” within the meaning of the first part of the constitutional guarantee. Under the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that an important and vital document has not been made available to the detenus within the prescribed time. Subsequent supply would neither cure violation of Sec.3(3) of COFEPOSA Act not satisfy Art.22(5) of the Constitution. The explanation of the Detaining Authority that it only referred to the said statement in the grounds and not relied upon it, cannot be accepted as it is nothing but his ipso dixit. The statement is held earlier has an important bearing on the formation of the subjective satisfaction, and its non-supply vitiates Art.22(5). Even otherwise non-consideration of this important material would indicate non-application of mind and vitiate the impugned detention. .24. It was thereafter submitted that the statement of Venkateswaran dated 13. 1994 referred to in para 25 of the grounds was also not made available to the detenu. Even otherwise non-consideration of this important material would indicate non-application of mind and vitiate the impugned detention. .24. It was thereafter submitted that the statement of Venkateswaran dated 13. 1994 referred to in para 25 of the grounds was also not made available to the detenu. A reference to para 25 of the grounds would indicate that Venkateswaran is the supervisory in-charge of M/s.Best Fabrics and had given his statement on 22. 1994 involving V.S. Ramakrishnan, brother of the detenu Vaidyanathan in the import of material. He had then stated that imported material used to be disbursed to others as per instructions of the detenus Vaidyanathan. In his statement dated 13. 1994 he informed that 120 rolls of label cloth which were available in their factory, were part of 200 rolls received from M/s. Goyal Dresses. It was on the basis of this statement that 120 rolls of label cloth were seized on 13. 1994 under Sec. 10 of the Customs Act. Apparently, the earlier statement of Venkateswaran on 22. 1994 did not involve M/ s. Goyal Dresses with which the detenu Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal are said to be connected. This appears to be the reason why his statement was again recorded on 13. 1994. But for his statement dated 13. 1994 the detenu Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal would not have been connected with the activities of M/s. Best Fabrics. This statement was, therefore, very vital to the formation of the subjective satisfaction in relation to the detenus Om Prakash Goyal and Bharat Bhooshan Goyal. The explanation that the statement has not been relied upon but only referred to cannot really be accepted, being the ipso dixit of the Detaining Authority. Indeed the non-consideration of his statement would adversely affect the subjectives satisfaction in relation to the above named detenus and create a serious infirmity in their detention. Be that as it may, the document having been referred to in the grounds, it is not possible to acceipt the explanation. There is therefore, detial of both parts of the constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) to the detenu. 25. As regards non-supply of incriminating documents mentioned in para 3 it is sufficient to mention that no such document is described or relied upon in this para. There is therefore, detial of both parts of the constitutional guarantee under Art.22(5) to the detenu. 25. As regards non-supply of incriminating documents mentioned in para 3 it is sufficient to mention that no such document is described or relied upon in this para. A fair reading of this paragraph along with other parts of the grounds would indicate that it is only a statement of fact. A similar statement is contained in para 5 also. Mentioning of the words ‘incriminating documents’ in these paragraphs cannot lead to the conclusion that those documents were relied upon the formation of subjective satisfaction. Indeed if subsequent paras of the grounds are perused, it will be apparent that some incriminating documents have been relied upon and all of them were seized during the search mentioned in para 2 of the grounds. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in the submission of the detenus in this behalf. 26. Mr.B. Kumar, learned counsel for the detenu Vaidyanathan, made a similar complaint in relation to non-supply of statement of Om Prakash Goyal dated 15. 1994 allegedly stated in para 35 of the grounds and non-supply of relaxation petition filed by Ravindra Singhal referred to in para 34 and adjudication order dated 12. 1994 mentioned in para.36. We have read para 35 of the grounds but have failed to find any statement of Om Prakash Goyal mentioned therein. Similarly we have not found any reference to the relaxation petition or the High Court’s order in para. 34. These documents are however mentioned in para 37 of the grounds by way of narration of events. The said para does not indicate that they have been considered in any manner by the Detaining Authority. It must, therefore, be held that these documents are not vital to the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and hence their non-supply would not in any way affect the validity of the detention. .27. It has been very strenuously urged that some of the documents supplied to the detenus were illegible and could not be used by them for any purpose. It is, therefore, submitted that supply of such documents is only an empty formality sufficient to vitiate action. It may be mentioned that the detenus in their representation dated 6. .27. It has been very strenuously urged that some of the documents supplied to the detenus were illegible and could not be used by them for any purpose. It is, therefore, submitted that supply of such documents is only an empty formality sufficient to vitiate action. It may be mentioned that the detenus in their representation dated 6. 1994 made grievance about some illegible documents as a result of which readable copies of .those documents were made available to them. The respondents have admitted that large number of documents as mentioned in the representation were illegible but submitted that they were not vital and, therefore, illegibility has no effect on the order of detention. In spite of it, it is admitted that the document page 665 was illegible and was vital document as it related to transaction referred to in para 36 of the grounds of detention. It is however submitted that the material contained in this document is available in several other documents supplied to the detenus and, sufficiently produced in para 36 of the grounds, It is, therefore, submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the detenus by its non-supply. In the alternative it is submitted that the ground based on this document is severable from other grounds and hence impugned detentions would not be affected. Reliance is placed on Sec.5-A of the COFEPOSA Act for the purpose. As regards prejudice, which seems to be the main basis of the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General, it can be considered only in relation to the constitutional and legal rights of the detenu and not generally. The constitutional and legal right of the detenu is to receive the grounds including the basis of these grounds to exercise the right of making an effective representation. Since this guarantee remains violated by non-supply of readable documents, the detenu’s right remained prejudiced and hence their detention would be vitally affected. The question requiring consideration is whether para 36 to which this document relates, can be separated from the rest without causing any damage to the subjective satisfaction of me Detaining Authority? Having gone through the grounds from beginning to the end, we are unable to grant the benefit of Sec.5-A of the Act to the respondents. The question requiring consideration is whether para 36 to which this document relates, can be separated from the rest without causing any damage to the subjective satisfaction of me Detaining Authority? Having gone through the grounds from beginning to the end, we are unable to grant the benefit of Sec.5-A of the Act to the respondents. The grounds clearly indicate that the continued course of conduct of the detenus during the years 1992-94 has led to the formation of subjective satisfaction of the authority, which has considered as many as 13 instances, which amounted to smuggling of goods by the detenus. The subjective satisfaction of the authority is not reached on each of the 13 instances but is the cumulative effect of all of them. The document at page 665 relates to transaction in September, 1993 referable to invoices of August, 1993 and if taken out of consideration would, break the link vital to connect the recent cases with the past. In such a situation, the basic requirement of Sec.5-A that a person should have been detained on two or more grounds cannot be said to have been satisfied. This would, in our opinion, introduce another infirmity in the impugned order. .28. Yet another important document, which is illegible is the document at page 393 referred to in paras 20 and 33(a) of the grounds. The document has been used to hold that the word “cotton” affixed to the word “fabric” has been deleted in the copy given to the customs and, therefore, the import has been made by fabricating this document. This document is wholly illegible. We have been shown the original of it and find that the word “cotton” has been scored out. Originally the import of “man-made cotton fabrics” was permitted but, deletion of the word “cotton” would permit import of “man-made fabrics” and this widen the scope of import. This in our opinion, is very important and vital document. Indeed, it is the only document where fabrication is alleged against the detenus. Simply because the document at page 392 which is a copy of this document is supplied, the constitutional requirement of supplying legible copy of this document would not be satisfied. The document at page 392 does not indicate any fabrication which is the crux of the matter. Indeed, it is the only document where fabrication is alleged against the detenus. Simply because the document at page 392 which is a copy of this document is supplied, the constitutional requirement of supplying legible copy of this document would not be satisfied. The document at page 392 does not indicate any fabrication which is the crux of the matter. Under the circumstances, non-supply of this document would vitally affect the detenu’s right to receive grounds as also the right of making effective representation under Art.22(5) and introduce an infirmity in the order of detention. 29. As regards other documents, we have gone through each and every one of them to ascertain the extent of illegibility and its impact on the detenu’s rights under Art.22(5) in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohamed Ahamed Ibrahim’s case, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 778, we find nothing that may adversely affect the exercise of these rights. The only document of some substance is at page 9, which is a licence relating to import of label tape. This illegibility being in the licence is not of any consequence as the details contained therein are available in other documents. This document is produced only to show that the Bill of lading had been antedated which is sought to be proved by production of a fax message dated 210. 1993. Under the circumstances, the document even if illegible will have no bearing on the right of the detenu under Art.22(5). .30. The learned counsel for the detenu Om Prakash Goyal thereafter submitted that the name of this detenu appears only in paras 15, 33(c), 33(d), 35 and 39 of the grounds and their contents are not sufficient to reasonably reach the subjective satisfaction about his involvement in smuggling justifying his preventive detention. It is emphasised that if the aforesaid paragraphs are considered in the context of his statement appearing in para 15 of the grounds which statement has not been held to be wrong, it will be clear that there is no material whatsoever for recording any subjective satisfaction for his detention. It is, therefore, submitted that it is a case of total non-application of mind and subjective satisfaction being based on no material the resultant order deserves to be quashed. The impugned order is therefore alleged to be the result of colourable exercise of powers. It is, therefore, submitted that it is a case of total non-application of mind and subjective satisfaction being based on no material the resultant order deserves to be quashed. The impugned order is therefore alleged to be the result of colourable exercise of powers. The learned Additional Solicitor General in reply submitted that the statements of the detenu Om Prakash Goyal ((D-73) and (D-602)) Fax dated 13. 1993 (D-547), Fax dated 19. 1993 (D-569) Fax dated 10. 1993 (D578) and (D-615) and (D-628) sufficiently establish involvement of this detenu in smuggling and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the authority is not vitiated in any manner. In State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2005, has been held that the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Art.226 is entitled to see whether the order of detention has been passed on any materials before the Detaining Authority. If it is found that the order has been passed by the authority by the materials on record, the court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not which is the function of an appellate authority. It can only examine the material on record to ascertain whether the order of detention has been based on no material, and while so doing it can not apply the standard of “proof beyond reasonable doubt.” Applying this principle in Ramveer Jatav v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 63, it was held that “grounds” should be such as to reasonably infer that detention was justified. In mis case the detention was based on one ground only which, according to the court, was not sufficient to justify detention. In the instant case the detenu has been detained not because he was himself engaged in smuggling, but because he Was found abetting smuggling of goods. A person who abets smuggling is also responsible in law for smuggling. Under the circumstances, this Court’s jurisdiction is only to examine whether the material mentioned above can reasonably justify the order of detention. .31. The detenu Om Prakash Goyal gave his statement on 12. 1994 that he has stopped going to the factory of M/s.Goyal Brothers for the last nine months and was, therefore not aware of any import by the said firm. He also stated that he has advised his son not to import. .31. The detenu Om Prakash Goyal gave his statement on 12. 1994 that he has stopped going to the factory of M/s.Goyal Brothers for the last nine months and was, therefore not aware of any import by the said firm. He also stated that he has advised his son not to import. This statement is claimed to be false because, of the Fax messages sent by him within the period of nine months. The Fax message dated 10. 1993 sent within 9 months is D-570 asking one Ganshyam as to why tafetta was not sent by September and asking for the shipment details of the same. The reply from Ganshyam was marked to this detenu in his capacity as the Managing Director of the firm. Yet another Fax message D-628 is dated 2. 1994 sent to Sam Chung in seoul. These are the only two Fax messages indicating involvement in the business of M/s.Goyal Dresses during the period of nine months. These two messages cannot by any stretch of imagination, be held sufficient to contradict this detenu’s statement. Then the 13 instances of smuggling for which preventive detention has been ordered, he would not be involved in all of them only because of these two Fax messages. These Fax messages also do not indicate that this detenu was trying to induce others to engage in smuggling. There is also no material on record to indicate that this detenu had knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of other detenus. Apparently, therefore, these two documents would not reasonably justify the subjective satisfaction that this detenu was involved in abetting smuggling. Then as long as his statement that he was not actively involved in the business is not disbelieved, there would be no compelling necessity to order his detention. In this connection decision of the Supreme Court in Binod Singh v. D.M.Dhanabad, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2090, deserves mention as in this case the court held that there should be a Rational Nexus between the object of the order as contemplated by the Act and the materials on record. It can also not be overlooked that the detention is ordered not as a punishment for post activities but as a means of preventing his future involvement in such activities. It can also not be overlooked that the detention is ordered not as a punishment for post activities but as a means of preventing his future involvement in such activities. Under the circumstances, the fact that the detenu did not actively engage himself in the business of M/s.Goyal Brothers was an important consideration and should have received attention of the Detaining Authority. It is, therefore, a case of total non-application of mind to a vital and important aspect of the matter. Since the aforesaid is the only material against this detenu, the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority must be held to be based on no materials. Exercise of an important statutory power in such a situation can legitmately be criticized as colourable exercise of power. This conclusion, in our opinion, is sufficinet to vitiate the detention of this detenu. 32. The learned counsel for the detenus have also streneously urged that the “grounds” do not establish any case of “smuggling” and, therefore, the power under Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act could not have been exercised by the Detaining Authority. It is, therefore, submitted that since the Detaining Authority has overlooked this important legal aspect of the matter, the impugned orders are vitiated. It cannot be doubted that the purpose of an order under Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is to prevent a person from engaging in or abetting smuggling. Sec.2(e) of the COFEPOSA Act defines “smuggling” to have the same meaning as in Sec.2(39) of the Customs Act. Sec.2(39) of the Customs Act defines smuggling as an act or omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under Sec. 111 or Sec. 113. It is submitted that as long as the goods imported under various licences were not liable to be confiscated under the provisions of the Customs Act, the import would not amount to smuggling. It is particularly submitted that all goods which are subject matter of investigation have been cleared and transported to the factory where most of them have been used. This clearance has been done under valid orders passed by the authorities under the Customs Act. As long as these orders are not reviewed, there would be no occasion for confiscation under Sec. 111 of the said Act. This clearance has been done under valid orders passed by the authorities under the Customs Act. As long as these orders are not reviewed, there would be no occasion for confiscation under Sec. 111 of the said Act. It is the grievance of the detenus that this important legal aspect of the matter has not received any consideration of the Detaining Authroity and hence the detention is vitiated. Reference has been made to Secs. 17 and 47 of the Customs Act, which deal with assessment of import duty and charges payable in relation to the import and thereafter clearance of goods under order of the authorised officer. With reference to these provisions it is submitted that imports under question have been cleared as per orders of the competent authority and, therefore, there remains nothing to be confiscated. Since the goods cannot now be confiscated, there would be no legal justification for holding that the detenus were involved in smugglings. Reliance has been placed to a decision of this Court in East-West Exporters’ case, (1993)68 E.L.J. 319. The learned Additional Solicitor General however submitted that the detenus are involved in 13 import transactions involving clearance of goods on false declaration in respect of value of goods and by tampering with import documents. This would amount to violation of the terms of import licence and render the goods liable to confiscation. It is however admitted that the goods have been released under Sec. 17(4) of the Customs Act and have been taken out from the Customs and consumed. In spite of it, it is submitted that the goods are liable to be confiscated. The Delhi High Court in Jain Shudh Vanaspati Limited and others v. Union of India, (1982)10 E.L.T. 43 had held that once the goods have been permitted to be brought out of Customs after an order passed in that behalf by the competent authority the finality attaches to the said order and as long as the same is not set aside in accordance with law. The goods so cleared would not be liable to be confiscated. This Court in Madanlal Steel Industry Ltd v. Union of India, (1991)56 E.L.T. 705 agreeing with the aforesaid decision-had held that even in a case where the goods have been cleared from the Customs, the possibility of its being confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act cannot be ruled out. This Court in Madanlal Steel Industry Ltd v. Union of India, (1991)56 E.L.T. 705 agreeing with the aforesaid decision-had held that even in a case where the goods have been cleared from the Customs, the possibility of its being confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act cannot be ruled out. The court has laid down conditions under which it could be done. It is therefore, clear that the possibility of confiscation should be real and existing. Nothing whatsoever has been done in this case towards the confiscation of the goods in question. It is, therefore, not possible to assume that the goods in question are liable to be confiscated. The possibility may arise only when some action has been taken to review or rescind the orders clearing those goods in accordance with law or proceeding under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act are initiated. There is nothing on record to indicate that any such action has been taken by the Customs Authority in that direction. As long as finality remains attached to the orders, the goods would not be liable to be confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act. See Union of India v. Sampat Raj, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1417 (Para 20). East West Exporters’ case, (1993)68 E.L.J. 319 also follows the aforesaid law and logic. Be that as it may, the question that should necessarily arise for consideration of the Detaining Authority is whether the goods are liable to be confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act? Since the Detaining Authority has not addressed itself to this important aspect of the matter, it is a case of non-application of mind to an important material violating Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. 33. Then, it cannot also be ignored that what is relevant in cases of preventive detention is whether there is any “compelling necessity” to resort to the provisions of the Act. This is more so in cases where the alleged smuggling is done on the basis of a valid licence issued by the respondent- Government and the imported goods have been cleared by the Customs Authorities by passing an order in this behalf. This is more so in cases where the alleged smuggling is done on the basis of a valid licence issued by the respondent- Government and the imported goods have been cleared by the Customs Authorities by passing an order in this behalf. The power under Sec.3(l) of the Act is to be exercised not as a measure of punishment where punishment cannot otherwise be awarded under normal law of the land but only with a view to preventing the detenu from carrying on prejudicial activities in future. In a case where the Central Government exercise effective control on the activities of the detenus not only while granting licence but also through the customs authorities, the consideration, of “compelling necessity” would be of utmost importance. The grounds in the instant case do not indicate anything on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority about the compelling necessity is based. A mere statement that it was necessary to exercise the power under Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act with a view to preventing the detenus from engaging in smuggling and abetting smuggling of goods in future as appearing in para 42 of the grounds cannot by itself be accepted as sufficient to indicate any compelling necessity in this behalf. Apparently, therefore, this important aspect of the matter has not received consideration of the Detaining Authority and, therefore, it is a case of non-application of mind to a vital aspect of the matter. 34. The learned counsel for the detenus have also made several other submissions about the vagueness of the grounds, consideration of voluminious materials within 24 hours which is an impossibility and non-communication of order rejecting representation by the State Government. This Court does not find them any substance and is otherwise of the opinion that they do not affect the impugned orders of detention. 35. To summarise, it is the conclusion of this Court that: 1. Non-supply of copies of statements of Rajesh Bansali dated 12. 1994 referred to in Para 20 and the statement of Venkateswaran dated 13. 1994 referred to in para 25 deprives the detenus of their rights under Art.22(5), besides violating Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. 2. Supply of illegible copies of the document at pages 393 and 665 has the effect of defeating the detenus’ right under Art.22(5). 3. 1994 referred to in Para 20 and the statement of Venkateswaran dated 13. 1994 referred to in para 25 deprives the detenus of their rights under Art.22(5), besides violating Sec.3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act. 2. Supply of illegible copies of the document at pages 393 and 665 has the effect of defeating the detenus’ right under Art.22(5). 3. that the detention of Om Prakash Goyal is bad for non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority to the fact that he was no longer involved in the business of M/s. Goyal Dresses since last about nine months and, therefore, his detention is contrary to Sec.3 of the COFEPOSA -Act. 4. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that detenu Om Prakash Goyal was abetting smuggling by other detenus is not based on any material on record and hence there is no compliance of Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, 5. The detention of the three detenus is also illegal and vilative of Sec.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act for non-consideration of the question whether the imported material was liable to be confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act so as to hold that the detenus were involved in smuggling, and 6. there is no satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority about the compelling necessity of ordering preventive detention of the detenus. Since these findings are sufficient to vitiate their detention, these writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The orders of detention against the detenus are hereby quashed. They are directed to be set at liberty forthwith if not otherwise required in accordance with law.