By means of this application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Shri Hauzel Haukung has challenged the validity of the order of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Govt of Manipur. dated llth February, 1994 contained in Annexure A/10 and made a prayer for quashing the same. 2. I have heard Mr. Ng Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. RK Sanajaoba Singh, the learned counsel appealing on behalf of the respondents. 3. The only question that falls for decision in this case is whether the disciplinary authority, namely, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to pass the impugned order contained in Annexure A/10 without furnishing a copy of the report of the enquiring officer to the petitioner, namely the delinquent official. 4. A disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner on the allegation that while functioning as Cashier of the Divisional Forest Office, Southern Forest Division Office Churachandpur during the period from 8.6.87 to 31.3.89 he violated the Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 inasmuch as that he violated the order/instructions of the superior authority in encashing an amount of Rs 2.70 lakhs belonging to the Govern­ment with some ulterior motive. Tue matter was assigned to some enquiring officer who after making necessary enquiry as per the procedure held the petitioner guilty of the charge that was framed against him. On the basis of the enquiry report the disciplinary authority namely, the Principal Conservator of Forest passed the impugned order. 5. The only point of criticism advanced by Mr. Ng Kumar Singh, the learned-counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is chat the impugned order is bad in law and that cannot be sustained simply because no copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. In support of his contention Mr. Kumar has placed reliance in a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 . ln the aforesaid judgment their Lordships held under para 13 that : "Disciplinary inquiry is quasi-judicial in- nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. Ramzan Khan, reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 . ln the aforesaid judgment their Lordships held under para 13 that : "Disciplinary inquiry is quasi-judicial in- nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facts do make, the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the Forty Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with ;the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delin­quent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse materialist Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishment also far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter,-if the delin­quent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected.” 6. The next decision referred to by Mr. Kumar is the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & others vs. B. Karnnakar & others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . In this judgment also their Lordships examined the scope of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and held : "The proviso to Article 311 (2) in effect accepts two successive -stages ef differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the .inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy on the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard. to the charges leveled against him. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy on the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard. to the charges leveled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges leveled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice." 7. It would, therefore, be quite apparent from the decisions referred to above that the delinquent official is entitled to get a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer when Enquiry Officer is an officer other than the disciplinary authority. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the Enquiry Officer who submitted (he report of the disciplinary proceeding is an officer other than the disciplinary authority. 8. Mr. RK Sanajaoba, the learned counsel appearing on behalf 6f the respondents also submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions a 'delmquent official is entitled to get a copy of the report of Enquiry Officer in case the report goes against him and on the basis of that report his departmental authority awards any sort of punishment. 9. But what he has contended quite strenuously is that this requirement of furnishing copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer can be dispensed with if the delinquent official is given post decisional hearing after furnishing copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent official. In support of his contention Mr. Sanajaoba has referred to a decision of this Court reported in (1993) 1 GLR 204 [1992 (2) GLJ 475], The other decision referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents is of the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India which is most popularly known as Bhopal Gas Disaster case reported in AIR 1990 SC 1480 . 10. So far as the case of (1993) 1 GLR 204 [1992 (1) GLJ 475] is concerned I find that this a case in respect of acceptance of some tenders. 10. So far as the case of (1993) 1 GLR 204 [1992 (1) GLJ 475] is concerned I find that this a case in respect of acceptance of some tenders. Actually the Court was not called upon to give a decision in respect of the provisions laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Similarly, in the case of Bhopal Gas Disaster case the Court was not called upon to give a decision as to the scope and ambit of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. So, these two decisions do not appear to be applicable to the present case. 11. Mr. Kumar in support of his contention has also placed reliance upon a decision rendered in the case of KI Shephard & others vs. Union of India & others reported in AIR 1988 SC 686 . In this case their Lordships observed in para 16 of the judgment that there is no jurisdiction to think of a post-decisional hearing. On the other hand, the normal rule should apply. 12. So, upon consideration of all the facts, circumstances and the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order of Principal Chief Conservator of Forest dated 11th February, 1994 contained in Annexure A/10 is not tenable in law and accordingly it is quashed. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner has already been furnished with a copy of the enquiry report and hence no fresh copy of the enquiry report is required to be supplied to him. The petitioner is, therefore, granted 10 days time from today to submit his reply, if any, to meet, explain and controvert the enquiry report to the disciplinary authority who in turn must dispose of the matter after affording fair opportunity to the petitioner to meet the report of the Enquiry Officer within a period of two weeks from the date of submission of the reply of the petitioner. 14. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. But under the circumstances I make no order as to costs.