JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J. - By moving this application, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the appointment of Respondent No. 2 as the sole arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes, which have arisen and for the adjudication of which respondent No. 1 had initially nominated respondent No. 2 as his arbitrator. 2. Before dealing with the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, some undisputed facts, which emerge from the pleadings of the partes may be stated. The work for the construction of Branch Office-cum-Investment Building at Shimla, after inviting tenders was allotted by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 on 25th May, 1993. The work was commenced on 8th June, 1983 and was completed on 30th April, 1986. A formal agreement was entered into between the parties on 16th August, 1994, which also contains clause 39 pertaining to the settlement of disputes through arbitration. 3. On 30th October, 1992, respondent No. 1 through his letter Annexure R/1, requested the Chief Engineer Life Insurance Corporation of India, New Delhi for giving a decision on his claims, which was one of the prerequisites before seeking adjudication through arbitration. Through letter dated 28th January, 1993, Annexure R/6 Chief Engineer, intimated respondent No. 1 that nothing is due and payable. Thus there was rejection of the respondent's claim by the Chief Engineer of the Corporation and consequently within the terms of the arbitration clause, respondent No. 1 exercised his option in nominating Mr. R. K. Makkar, Superintending Engineer, Himachal Pradesh Housing Board, Shimla, to be his arbitrator and an intimation to that effect was conveyed to the petitioner through letter Annexure R/2 dated 20th February, 1993. Petitioner responded to respondent's letter on 5th March, 1993 by saying that detailed reply would be sent but the respondent's claim was not acceptable to the petitioner. On 17th March, 1993, through letter Annexure R/4, Mr. R. C. Makkar expressed his inability to Act as an arbitrator. Admittedly, no intimation was given of this communication to the petitioner by the respondent till 14th June, 1993. 4. On 29th May, 1993, petitioner responded to the respondent's letter dated 20th February, 1991 through which respondent had nominated Mr. R. C. Makkar as an arbitrator and took up a stand that respondent's claims were not justified. Admittedly, no intimation was given of this communication to the petitioner by the respondent till 14th June, 1993. 4. On 29th May, 1993, petitioner responded to the respondent's letter dated 20th February, 1991 through which respondent had nominated Mr. R. C. Makkar as an arbitrator and took up a stand that respondent's claims were not justified. Petitioner did not nominate its arbitrator and the respondent was informed that since his letter dated 20th February, 1993 did not disclose as to whether any dispute or differences had arisen amongst the parties, therefore, it was not necessary to appoint an arbitrator. 5. On 14th June, 1993, letter Annexure P-3, was addressed to the petitioner by respondent informing that since Mr. Makkar had expressed his inability to act as an arbitrator, therefore fresh nomination had been made by him by supplying the vacancy by appointing Mr. M. L. Bansal, Chief Engineer (Retd). In the same communication, respondent informed the petitioner that its stand that no disputes were in existence was not correct, since substantial disputes had arisen and the only method to resolve the same was by having resort to the arbitration clause. The petitioner was also informed that in case a nomination of its arbitrator is not made within 15 days of the receipt of the letter, he would be requesting Mr. Bansal to proceed and adjudicate the disputes as a sole arbitrator. 6. No communication was received by respondent No. 1 from the petitioner and on 10th July, 1993 by sending letter Annexure P-4, the petitioner was informed that Mr. M. L. Bansal will now act as a sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes. Copy of this letter was also sent to Mr. Banal. 7. On 28th July, 1993, letter Annexure P-5 was sent by the petitioner to the counsel for respondent No. 1, in response to his communication dated 10th July, 1993 and apprised that the petitioner was agreeable to nominate its arbitrator, namely, Mr. V. R. Vaish, Chief Engineer, CPWD and also informed that because of the administrative delays, petitioner could no earlier agree for the appointment of an arbitrator. A request was made that respondent be asked not to proceed with the matter before Mr. Bansal as the sole arbitrator, since the petitioner had now agreed and appointed a second arbitrator for proceeding with the matter in respect of the alleged differences and disputes. 8. A request was made that respondent be asked not to proceed with the matter before Mr. Bansal as the sole arbitrator, since the petitioner had now agreed and appointed a second arbitrator for proceeding with the matter in respect of the alleged differences and disputes. 8. On 7th August, 1993, Mr. M. L. Bansal entered upto the reference as a sole arbitrator and through letter Annexure P-6 called upon the petitioner as well as respondent No. 1 to file their respective statement of facts and claims within a period of 15 day of the receipt of the letter and informed them of the next date of hearing, i.e., 26th September, 1993. On 14th August, 1993 Respondent No. 1 refuted the petitioners' right to nominate Mr. Vaish as the second arbitrator, in view of Mr. Bansal having already been appointed as the sole arbitrator. Thus the petitioner feeling aggrieved approached this court on 17th September, 1993 by filing this petition seeking the setting aside of appointment of Mr. Bansal as the sole arbitrator and praying that it be a lowed to appoint and nominate its arbitrator and the arbitrator be permitted to proceed as if Mr. Vaish had rightly been nominated by the petitioner as its arbitrator and Mr. Bansal as respondent's arbitrator. 9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that because of the long administrative channels, petitioner could not act promptly in making appointment of its arbitrator. Respondent No. 1 though had received intimation dated 17th March, 1993 from Mr. Makkar expressing his inability to act as an arbitrator but did not apprise the petitioner about the same. The letter 14th June, 1993 was received in the receipt branch on 18th June, 1993, where after it was sent to the relevant branch and after the matter was discussed at various levels at length, the appointment of Mr. Vaish was made on 28th July, 1993 and thus there was no inordinate delay and there has been no inaction on the part of the petitioner and since nothing substantial had been done in the matter, therefore, it was a fit case where discretion as contained in the proviso to clause (b) of Section 9 deserves to be exercised by setting aside the appointment of Bansal as the sole arbitrator. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Bhogal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has made reference to letter Annexure R-5 dated 29th May, 1993 as also Annexure P-2 and pointed out that the petitioner has been highly negligent and infact has no intention to make an appointment of the arbitrator. I, was only after communication dated 10th July, 1993 was sent that the petitioner abruptly work up and nominated its arbitrator. It has also been contended that the appointment of an arbitrator, infact, was made on 20th February, 1993, but no action there after was taken by the petitioner in making the appointment of an arbitrator its part. After the vacancy of the arbitrator appointed by respondent No. 1 occurred, the same was to be filled up by respondent. The petitioner had nothing to do with it. When the petitioner failed to avail the opportunity respondent No. 1 had no option except to request Mr. Bansal to proceed ahead with the work of sole arbitration. 11. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called as 'the Act'), deals with the power of parties to appoint new arbitrator or in certain cases a sole arbitrator. It also gives jurisdiction to the court to set aside the appointment of the sole arbitrator in certain eventualities. The section reads as under : "9. Power to party to appoint new arbitrator or in certain cases, a sole arbitrator. Where an arbitration agreement provides that a reference shall be to two arbitrators, one to be pointed by each party then, unless a different intention is expressed in the agreement. The section reads as under : "9. Power to party to appoint new arbitrator or in certain cases, a sole arbitrator. Where an arbitration agreement provides that a reference shall be to two arbitrators, one to be pointed by each party then, unless a different intention is expressed in the agreement. (a) if either of the appointed arbitrators neglects or refuse to act, or is incapable of acting or dies, the party who appointed him may appoint a new arbitrator in his place; (b) if one party fails to appoint an arbitrator either originally or by way of substitution as aforesaid, for fifteen clear days after the service by the other party of a notice in writing to make the appointment, such other party having appointed his arbitrator before giving the notice, the party who has appointed an arbitrator may appoint that arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator in the reference and his award shall be binding on both parties as if he had been appointed by consent : Provided that the court may set any appointment as sole arbitrator made under clause (b) and either on sufficient cause being shown, allow further time to the defaulting party to appoint an arbitrator or pass such other as it thinks fit. Explanation. - The fact that an arbitrator or umpire, after a request by either party to enter on and proceed with the reference, does within one month comply with the request may constitute a neglect or refusal to act within the meaning of Section 8 and this section." Reading of the above provision would show that it applies to the agreements under which reference is to be made by the parties to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party. If either of the two arbitrators, either neglects or refuses to act or is incapable of acting or dies, a right is given to the party, who appointed him to supply the vacancy by appointing a new arbitrator in his place. Clause (b) says that if either of the party had either initially failed to appoint an arbitrator or for a period of 15 clear days, after the receipt of the notice in writing, from the other party making appointment of an arbitrator, fails to appoint its arbitrator, the other party becomes entitled to and may appoint its arbitrator as a sole arbitrator in the reference. 12. 12. Proviso to Clause (b) deals with the jurisdiction vested in the court for setting aside the appointment as the sole arbitrator on sufficient cause being shown and allowing further time to the defaulting party to appoint an arbitrator. Since clause (b) is in the nature of a penalty for the defaulting party, which failed either to initially make an appointment of its arbitrator or make further defaults in not making the appointment even within a period of 15 days, after the receipt of the notice, subsequently, when the vacancy is supplied by the opposite party, the proviso appears to have given a wide discretion to the court in setting aside the appointment of the sole arbitrator and since there is nothing in the proviso, except on satisfaction of a sufficient cause being shown, necessarily the same deserves to be exercised in a judicial manner. 13. This proviso in relation to panel clause (b) came to be considered by a single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Messrs Kamani Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Jabalpur and another (AIR 1964 M.P. 268). It was held that it really enables the court to condone delay and in that way there is a board analogy between the Proviso and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which the court is competent to condone limitation. For exercising discretion, it was held that the court should see whether there is justification on equitable grounds and the setting aside of the appointment is really calculated to promote equity and good conscience. It was further held that : "..... The moment defaulting party satisfies the court that he has not been obstructive or evasive and has acted with due diligence, the appointment of sole arbitrator should be set aside. The other party may be entitled to compensate him for any inconvenience resulting from the defaulter's failure to appoint in time. But he cannot try to take an advantage which would be unconscionable except in the three social circumstances already mentioned. Nor need the court test it by the closeness with which it would test an application for condonation of delay, and ask for an explanation for the delay of each single day." A Division Bench of the Patna High Court followed the ratio of the decision in Kamani case (supra) in Satya Narayan Agarwal v. Baidyanath Mandal and others. 14. Nor need the court test it by the closeness with which it would test an application for condonation of delay, and ask for an explanation for the delay of each single day." A Division Bench of the Patna High Court followed the ratio of the decision in Kamani case (supra) in Satya Narayan Agarwal v. Baidyanath Mandal and others. 14. The language of the provision is couched in such a manner, which leaves no manner of doubt that wide discretion is left with the court, which is to be exercised on sufficient cause being shown. The petitioner's case has been that it was due to long administrative channels, where files have to be dealt with, the delay occurred and the action could not be taken within the time limit for making the appointment or nomination of it arbitrator. It is also stated that in two separate buildings, various branches are located in Delhi and the file had to move from one branch to another and due to cumbersome procedure even opinion had to be sought. By referring to various notes, Mr. Sharma contends that there has been no action on the part of the petitioner and before the sole arbitrator entered upon the reference, appointment of Mr. Vaish was made. Mr. Bhogal on the other hand, contends that infact the entire intention of the petitioner has been to create obstacles in the expeditious disposal of dispute through arbitration. By not agreeing to the appointment of arbitrators and in refuting the respondent's claim, it unnecessarily delayed the arbitration process. The appointment was made by the petitioner only on receipt of the Respondent's communication dated 10th July, 1993 intimating that Mr. Bansal had been requested by him to proceed as a sole arbitrator. 15. No doubt that there are various nothings proceed on record, which do suggest that at lower level in the petitioner's hierarchy, he stand taken was that the respondent had already been informed that his claims are not justified and since pre-final bills as well as final bills had been submitted after more than three and six years, respectively, therefore, it was a time barred case in which there was no need to appoint an arbitrator by the petitioner, for which legal advice was also sought to be taken, which was accordingly rendered. Thus no appointment of arbitrator was made. Thus no appointment of arbitrator was made. The last nothing on the file is dated 19th July, 1993, whereafter another nothing has been made that respondent's claim cannot be turned down simply on the grounds of its being barred by limitation and thus there cannot be any lawful justification in withholding the payment, if the same are due and, therefore, arbitrator should be appointed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner had not acted with due diligence in making the appointment or that it acted with matice. When the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 9 of the Act refers to sufficient cause, there is no reason why liberal approach be not adopted and the same principles, as enunciated in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others (AIR 1987 SC 1353), be not applied namely, the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The apex court also noticed the difficulties, which are faced when the matter had to be dealt with in various branches of public undertakings companies or by the State Departments and held that pedantic approach should not be made and to doctrine of 'sufficient cause' must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred since the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 16. In the instant case, as noticed above, the vacancy was filed in by respondent No. 1 on 14th June, 1991. Intimation was sent to the petitioner. The affidavits exchanged amongst parties do say that the file was being dealt with from one level to another. Conflicting views were being expressed by some of the officers in the petitioner's hierarchy Decision ultimately was taken for nominating Mr. Vaish as an arbitrator. It was done before Mr. Bansal entered upon the reference as a sole arbitrator. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that sufficient ground is made out for the exercise of the discretion in setting aside the appointment of Mr. Vaish as an arbitrator. It was done before Mr. Bansal entered upon the reference as a sole arbitrator. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that sufficient ground is made out for the exercise of the discretion in setting aside the appointment of Mr. Bansal as a sole arbitrator but subject to the payment of costs to the opposite party. 17. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The appointment of Mr. Bansal as sole arbitrator is set aside and the petitioner is permitted to appoint is arbitrator, which it has a ready done by nominating and appointing Mr. V. R. Vaish. 18. Both the arbitrators, the one nominated by the petitioner and the other by respondent, namely, Mr. V. R. Vaish and Mr. M. L. Bansal, respectively will now proceed to dispose of the disputes, which have arisen amongst the parties in accordance with law. The petitioner is burdened with costs of the respondent, which are quantified at Rs. 15,00/-. Petition allowed.