JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - This is an appeal u/s 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by the insurer. 2. This appeal has been filed beyond period of limitation with delay of 52 days. When notice in limitation matter was sent to petitioner-claimants, they appeared and filed two applications for directing insurer to deposit entire awarded amount with interest up-to-date and to release a portion of the amount to meet the marriage expenses of one of the daughters, namely, Jayanti Sahu, aged 18 years, who is one of the claimants. Accordingly, in view of urgency, I heard not only the limitation matter and the two petitions but also the appeal on merits on which the directions may depend. 3. Let me consider the question of limitation first. An appeal u/s 173(1) of the Act is to be filed within ninety days. There being delay of fifty-two days, appellant is required to explain each day's delay after ninety days. Award in this case was made on 4.5.1992. Therefore, appeal is to be filed within 2.8.1992. This appeal has been filed on 22.9.1992. Thus, cause of delay for the period between 2.8.1992 and 22.9.1992 is to be explained. It is stated that copy of judgment was sent to appellant's Regional Office wherefrom intimation was sent to appellant's office at Cuttack to prefer the appeal on 9.6.1992. This is within the period of limitation and no explanation is required. Usual practice is that the copy is to be kept in the custody of an individual member of the staff. In absence of any explanation it is safe to presume that copy received from Regional Office remained in custody of the person who received it. He is the best person to explain the fate of the copy received. Unfortunately, the custodian of the copy has not filed the affidavit. Administrative Officer has filed affidavit on the basis of records. Such records which are the best evidence have not been produced. It is stated that the file was misplaced somewhere in the office of the appellant at Cuttack and could not be traced till 20.9.1992. Circumstances under which the file was misplaced and whether it is on account of negligence of the custodian or someone else is not disclosed. Filing of appeal within the time fixed is of utmost importance. It is stated that the file was misplaced somewhere in the office of the appellant at Cuttack and could not be traced till 20.9.1992. Circumstances under which the file was misplaced and whether it is on account of negligence of the custodian or someone else is not disclosed. Filing of appeal within the time fixed is of utmost importance. If some officer is negligent, he should have been proceeded against. If negligence of such officer is covered or condoned, appellant is to suffer for the same unless it is explained why the negligent officer is protected. In an office which is regularly maintained, misplacement of file is not a normal feature. Disclosure of facts to the court assists administration and does not affect it. In absence of full disclosure, I am constrained to draw adverse inference against appellant that there was no just cause for misplacement of file which if disclosed would not lead to a conclusion of sufficient cause. 4. On the facts disclosed it is not possible to draw an inference that there was sufficient cause for delay. If there would be merit in the appeal I might give opportunity to the appellant to make full disclosure indicating circumstances under which the file was misplaced and traced out. Therefore, let me examine the merits of the appeal. 5. Award is challenged mainly on two grounds-(i) Determination of the age of the deceased by the Tribunal is not correct and (ii) penal interest ought not to have been awarded. 6. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that post-mortem report indicates that the deceased was aged 47 years at the time of his death. Tribunal having determined the age at 45 years has made a surmise which is not acceptable. This submission has no force. Insurer had not made enquiry about the age of the deceased independently before filing of the written statement. It has depended upon the postmortem report. A post-mortem report is opinion of the person who conducted the same. Formation of opinion about age of deceased is based on data available at the time of post-mortem examination. It is not very accurate. There may be variance. From same materials one expert may come to conclusion that it is 45 years and another that it is 47 years. Margin of variance of two years in expert opinion about age is permissible. It is not very accurate. There may be variance. From same materials one expert may come to conclusion that it is 45 years and another that it is 47 years. Margin of variance of two years in expert opinion about age is permissible. In such circumstances, if Tribunal formed an opinion that deceased was aged 45 years, it cannot be said to be unreasonable. Accordingly, this ground has no substance. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case where insurer has not examined the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination to justify that his opinion relating to age of the deceased is to be accepted, Tribunal has jurisdiction to form an opinion about the age independently. 7. The other ground of attack is award of penal interest. Grievance is made that the Tribunal has got no power to direct payment of interest at higher rate if no payment is made within time stipulated by Tribunal since the same is penal in nature. Whether a direction is penal in nature would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. Wrong way of expression which apparently looks to be penal in nature may not actually be penal. No sooner insurer issues a policy it takes the responsibility of indemnifying the owner in respect of accident caused by a vehicle as per terms of the policy. Insurance of a vehicle is mandatory. Insurer which being a government company is an authority under the Constitution carries on welfare activities of the State in matters of insurance for which the same has been nationalised. No sooner it is brought to notice of the insurer that it is insurer of a vehicle which caused accident, implied duty is cast on it to make an enquiry and discharge liability by paying compensation. Where it reasonably feels that it may not be liable, there is no such duty. But dependants in case of death have lost the dependency. Deprivation of dependency in terms of money calls for compensation in whatever name it is called. If the money would have been paid immediately without waiting for adjudication, the same could have been invested to carry interest at 12 per cent per annum. Therefore, award of interest at 12 per cent per annum for the period deprives the claimants of the amount till payment. Statutory payment of interest is to begin not before filing application claiming compensation. Therefore, award of interest at 12 per cent per annum for the period deprives the claimants of the amount till payment. Statutory payment of interest is to begin not before filing application claiming compensation. However, direction to pay interest is discretionary. Where claimant has been cause of delay in finalisation of adjudication, Tribunal has discretion to refuse to compensate for nonpayment for that period. Therefore, if the Tribunal would have directed payment of interest at 12 per cent per annum, it would not have been penal. To motivate the insurer for early payment if it directed that in case payment is made within a month interest would be payable at 6 per cent per annum, it is a benefit given to the insurer and amounts to rebate rather than penalty. Though wrongly worded, Tribunal really intended to give benefit to the insurer in this case by stating that in case the amount is deposited within one month, it would get benefit of 6 per cent interest annually. This would be the correct interpretation on the facts and in the circumstances of this case and there is no force in contention of learned Counsel for appellant. 8. In this case, when I called upon the learned Counsel for the appellant to satisfy me that it has applied to the Tribunal for extension of time to deposit the amount on account of its intention to prefer appeal, it is stated that there is no record to that effect. A fair insurer who is aggrieved by the interest ought to have taken extension of time. Any authority fixing a time limit has also implied power to extend the same. Therefore, insurer ought not to have been a Judge of its own cause. Where officers of insurer through whom it acts became negligent in moving for extension, difference in interest paid shall be realised from them by initiating disciplinary proceedings. This would not only protect public funds but also alert other officers to be vigilant in future. My view is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta 1993 CCJ 1100 (SC). Thus, both on merits as well as on the ground of limitation, I am satisfied that there is no scope for interference with the impugned award. 9. My view is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta 1993 CCJ 1100 (SC). Thus, both on merits as well as on the ground of limitation, I am satisfied that there is no scope for interference with the impugned award. 9. Coming to the applications to direct the appellant to deposit the amount and to direct for disbursement of a portion thereof, I am inclined to hold that the Tribunal should deal with the matter and not the appellate court, which has no statutory power to give such directions. Procedure has been provided under the statute for recovery of the amount awarded. Neither Tribunal nor the appellate court can give a direction not provided in statute non-compliance of which may lead to far-reaching consequences. However, it is fair on the part of the insurer to comply with an award to further benevolent object of the statute. If amount is deposited with Tribunal, it can consider how best interest of claimants can be protected. It may direct that the entire or portion of the amount payable is to be invested. Therefore, Tribunal should hear the claimants in the matter of disbursement. At that stage, if it is brought to notice of the Tribunal that one of the claimants is to be married, it may examine whether the proposed marriage would be valid in law since no statutory authority would assist another to violate law. I have no doubt that Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction judicially. 10. In view of what I have stated above, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed and appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with liberty to claimants to move the Tribunal in respect of the applications filed in this Court. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed