JUDGMENT R.G. VAIDYANATHA, J.:-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 19th April 1988 in Suit No. 917 of 1972 on the file of the City Civil Court at Bombay. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed cross objections against some of the findings of the trial Court. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for both the sides. 2. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a suit against the appellants, third defendant and others for certain reliefs. For the purpose of convenience and easy reference the parties are referred to in this judgment as per their rank in the Court below. The plaintiffs case is as follows :--- Plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 are the co-owners of the property in dispute viz., plot bearing No. 29-A admeasuring 1786 sq.yds. situated at Daftary Road, Malad (East), Bombay. The entire Plot No. 29 was purchased by plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 from the previous owners under registered sale deed dated 27th May, 1959. The land was subdivided into sub-plot Nos. 29-A, 29-B, 29-BI, 29-B2 and 29-B3: The other portions were sold and the plaintiffs and the other two co-owners have retained plot No. 29-A. The plaintiffs are not aware of any action taken by the first defendant Corporation under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 except the one impugned notice recently received which is dated 14th January, 1972. The plaintiffs are not bound by service of any notice on defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiffs were entitled to receipt of notice for preparation of a scheme under the said Act. The plaintiffs had no opportunity to object to the town planning scheme. The first defendant Corporation appears to have proceeded with the finalisation of the town planning scheme and awarded it illusory compensation regarding the suit property. For the first time plaintiffs came to know of the scheme when they received the notice dated 14th January, 1972 purporting to be notice under section 89 read with section 165 of the said Act calling upon plaintiffs to vacate the suit property within 7 days. It is now learnt that the suit property has been required for allotting the same to private individuals which cannot be called as "public purpose". It is now learnt that the suit property has been required for allotting the same to private individuals which cannot be called as "public purpose". Since no notices were served on the plaintiffs, the scheme prepared by the first defendant to include the suit property violates fundamental rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. Alternatively, it is pleaded that even if the scheme is not violative, the first defendant is not entitled to enforce the impugned notice dated 14th January, 1972. By amending the plaint, the plaintiffs have now pleaded that after the said notice dated 14th January, 1972 and during the pendency of the suit more than 12 years have elapsed, and therefore, plaintiffs possession is perfected by adverse possession and defendants Nos. 1 and 4 to 6 have lost whatever rights they had by virtue of section 27 of the Limitation Act. Defendants 4 to 6 to whom the suit property is said to have been allotted have not taken steps for getting possession of the suit property within 12 years as required by law, and their rights are lost under section 27 of the Limitation Act. It is alleged that the threatened action of the first defendant to evict plaintiffs under notice dated 14th January, 1972 is illegal and unconstitutional. Plaintiffs were not given any opportunity of being heard before issuing such a notice. The suit property is not required for any public purpose, but it is being demanded for being given to defendants Nos. 4 to 6 who are private individuals. On these allegations, the suit is filed for a declaration that the notice dated 14th January, 1972 be declared as illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiffs and for a permanent injunction to restrain defendants from taking any action in furtherance of the said notice. 3. The first defendant is the City Corporation and it is also the town planning authority for Bombay City. Its defence is that the suit is not maintainable for want of statutory notice under section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The allegations that the plaintiffs were not at all aware of the scheme and that they have not received any notice are denied. That as per the records when the town planning scheme, Malad No. 1 came into force on 31st December. The allegations that the plaintiffs were not at all aware of the scheme and that they have not received any notice are denied. That as per the records when the town planning scheme, Malad No. 1 came into force on 31st December. 1969 recorded owners of the suit property were only defendants 2 and 3. It is not admitted that the plaintiffs are the joint owners of the suit property along with defendants 2 and 3. That all the required notices have been issued to defendants 2 and 3. Whatever rights the plaintiffs had are extinguished after the town planning scheme came into force on and from 31st December, 1969. The notice dated 14th January, 1972 has been issued according to rules. It is pleaded that part of the land bearing plot No. 27 belonging to defendants 4 to 6 was acquired for the purpose of forming a road in the scheme and the suit plot was allotted to them. An enquiry had been conducted by the Arbitrator and he has determined the compensation for the suit plot at Rs. 28,576/-. Since the plot had been allotted in favour of defendants 4 to 6, it is the duty of the first defendant to put them in possession of the suit plot, and therefore, the notice dated 14th January, 1972 was issued to the plaintiffs under section 89 of the Act. Since the plaintiffs name did not appear in the revenue record, no notice was given to them. The scheme prepared by the First defendant is a valid scheme. There was no necessity for earlier notice to the plaintiff prior to the notice dated 14th January, 1972. After plaintiffs amended the plaint, the first defendant filed additional written statement denying the allegations made in the amended plaint. It is also stated that defendants 4 to 6 have filed a suit against the Corporation bearing No. 6701 of 1972 for possession of the suit plot, but first defendant could not give possession of the suit plot to them in view of order of injunction obtained by the plaintiffs in the present suit. Hence it is denied that plaintiffs have perfected title by adverse possession or the rights of the defendants are lost under section 27 of the Limitation Act. 4. The contesting defendants are defendants 4 to 6. Hence it is denied that plaintiffs have perfected title by adverse possession or the rights of the defendants are lost under section 27 of the Limitation Act. 4. The contesting defendants are defendants 4 to 6. It is stated that land of these defendants bearing plot No. 27 came to be acquired by the Corporation and in lieu thereof the suit plot was allotted to them. The plaintiffs have full knowledge of the scheme as can be seen from the correspondence made by the plaintiffs Architect with the Corporation. Then the details of the scheme are mentioned in the written statement. Then these defendants applied to the first defendant for possession of the suit plot which has been allotted to them. When first defendant fixed date for handing over possession of the suit plot to them, they could not give possession in view of the order of injunction granted by the Court in this suit. Without giving the suit plot to these defendants, first defendant wanted to form a road in plot No. 27 belonging to these defendants, and therefore, they had to file Suit No. 6701 of 1972 against the first defendant and others and obtained an order of injunction. During the pendency of the suit, the first plaintiff made a representation to the State of Maharashtra about the scheme and the Government in the first instance granted the said representation. Then these defendants filed Writ Petition No. 1090 of 1981 which came to be allowed on 12th June, 1985 and the order of the Government was set aside with a .direction that all concerned parties should be heard in the matter before passing any final order. The plaintiffs have received all notices and they are fully aware of preparation of the town planning scheme. The plaintiffs even applied to the concerned authorities for sub-division of plot No. 29 into several plots and sold all the remaining plots except the suit plot. That plaintiffs are not entitled to any reliefs in the suit. That the suit is not maintainable. That the town planning scheme has been finalised as per law. After the plaint was amended, these contesting defendants have filed additional written statement denying the allegations made in the amended plaint. It is denied that plaintiffs possession has become adverse after the town planning scheme was finalised. That the notice dated 14th January, 1972 is valid and enforceable. That the town planning scheme has been finalised as per law. After the plaint was amended, these contesting defendants have filed additional written statement denying the allegations made in the amended plaint. It is denied that plaintiffs possession has become adverse after the town planning scheme was finalised. That the notice dated 14th January, 1972 is valid and enforceable. Plaintiffs have obtained an order of injunction against the first defendant not to enforce the said notice. It is denied that these defendants have lost rights under section 27 of the Limitation Act. It is prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. 5. The learned trial Judge framed the following issues:- 1. What is the value of the suit for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction? 2. Whether the State of Maharashtra is a necessary party to the suit and, therefore, the suit suffers from want of necessary party? 3. Whether the suit is in time? 4. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit is barred in view of the provisions of Maharashtra Town Planning Act, 1966? 5. Whether it is necessary for plaintiffs to serve defendant No. 1 with a notice contemplated under section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act? If yes, whether plaintiffs served such a notice to defendant No. 1? If not, whether the suit is tenable against defendant No. 1? 6. Whether plaintiffs prove their title to the suit plot No. 29-A on the material date? 7. Whether plaintiffs prove that plaintiffs are entitled to have personal notice of the formation and finalisation of the Scheme? If yes, whether such notices were served on plaintiffs? If not, what is its effect? 8. Whether plaintiffs prove that necessary notice required by law were published and served on all concerned so far as the suit plot is concerned? If not, what is its effect? 9. Whether plaintiff prove that the scheme prepared is not for public purpose or for the purpose of Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966? 10. Whether plaintiff prove that the schemes prepared and the action taken by defendant No. 1 are against Articles 14, 19(l)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India? 11. Whether the owners of the suit plot are being deprived of it without compensation? 12. Is the notice issued by defendant No. I No. TPS/M/46 dated 14-1-1972 illegal? 13. Are plaintiffs entitled to the declaration sought? 11. Whether the owners of the suit plot are being deprived of it without compensation? 12. Is the notice issued by defendant No. I No. TPS/M/46 dated 14-1-1972 illegal? 13. Are plaintiffs entitled to the declaration sought? 14. Are plaintiffs entitled to the injunction? 15. Are defendant entitled to compensatory costs? If yes, what amount? 16. What order? ADDITIONAL ISSUES 17. Whether plaintiffs prove their uninterrupted possession in defiance of right, interest and title of defendants Nos. 4 to 6 for a period of 12 years and so defendants Nos. 4 to 6 lost their right? 18. Whether plaintiffs prove that for reasons stated in the above issue suit notice is not enforceable? 6. After trial, the learned trial Judge answered almost all the issues against the plaintiffs, but answered only one issue viz. Issue No. 12 in favour of the plaintiffs and consequently answered Issues Nos. 13 and 14 also in favour of the plaintiffs. He held that the notice dated 14th January, 1972 is illegal since it is not followed by an earlier show cause notice, and therefore, it is not valid in the eyes of law. In view of the finding on Issue No. 12, he decreed the suit. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendants 4 to 6 have come up with this appeal. The learned Counsel for the appellants questioned the correctness and legality of the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 12. It is argued that there was no necessity for an earlier show cause notice prior to the notice dated 14th January, 1972 and that plaintiffs were fully aware of the proceedings which culminated in sanctioning of the final scheme. It was, therefore, argued that finding on Issue No. 12 is erroneous and liable to be set aside. Plaintiffs have preferred cross objections against the findings of the learned trial Judge on those issues which were against the plaintiffs. While supporting the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 12, the learned Counsel for respondents Nos. I and 2 contended that the trial Court erred in answering other issues against the plaintiffs. 8. Plaintiffs have preferred cross objections against the findings of the learned trial Judge on those issues which were against the plaintiffs. While supporting the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 12, the learned Counsel for respondents Nos. I and 2 contended that the trial Court erred in answering other issues against the plaintiffs. 8. In the light of the arguments addressed before me, the points that falls for determination in the appeal and in the cross objections are as follows :- (1) Whether the impugned notice dated 14th January, 1972 suffers from legal infirmity and has to be quashed? (2) Whether plaintiffs were not served with notices during the finalisation of the town planning scheme and thereby the town planning scheme in so far as it pertains to the suit property is not valid and not binding on the plaintiffs? (3) Whether taking over of the suit property from the plaintiffs and allotting the same to defendants 4 to 6 affects fundamental rights of the plaintiffs particularly with reference to Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India? (4) Whether plaintiffs have perfected title by adverse possession, and consequently whether defendants 4 to 6 have lost their rights to claim possession of the suit property? (5) What order? 9. Before considering the above points, let me briefly refer to the admitted facts in this case:- The suit property is situated in a suburb of Bombay called "Malad". As long back as 1920 there was a town planning scheme for the area of Malad and this fact is mentioned in the sale deed of 1959 under which the plaintiffs purchased the entire plot No. 29. Hence, plaintiffs cannot plead ignorance of the town planning scheme which finds a place in their sale deed. Then it appears in 1960 a resolution was passed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation regarding alteration of the town planning scheme. It is also in evidence that public notices were issued and published in the gazette calling for objections about the draft scheme. Then Arbitrator had been appointed to finalise the scheme and which ultimately was sanctioned by the Government and the town planning scheme came into force with effect from 31st December 1969. Plot No. 29 was sub-divided into number of plots. Then Arbitrator had been appointed to finalise the scheme and which ultimately was sanctioned by the Government and the town planning scheme came into force with effect from 31st December 1969. Plot No. 29 was sub-divided into number of plots. The plaintiffs and the other co-owners were permitted to sell the remaining sub plots of Plot No. 29 except the suit property viz. Plot No. 29-A. The plaintiffs were specifically informed that they should not make any changes regarding the suit plot and that it is under acquisition. It is also an admitted fact that Plot No. 27 of defendants Nos. 4 to 6 was taken over for the purpose of formation of a road. It is also common ground that in the final scheme in lieu of Plot No. 27, suit plot bearing No. 29-A came to be allotted to defendants Nos. 4 to 6. After the scheme was finalised, the competent officer issued an eviction notice dated 14th January, 1972 to the plaintiffs under section 89 asking the plaintiffs to vacate the suit property within 7 days. The object of the authority was to take possession of the suit plot from the plaintiffs and give it to the defendants Nos. 4 to 6 in pursuance of the final scheme. It is at this stage, the plaintiffs rushed to Court challenging the legality and validity of the said notice dated 14th January, 1972. POINT NO. I 10. As already stated, the impugned notice came to be issued under section 89 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Under this section, the competent authority has powers to summarily evict any persons and take possession. The only grievance of the plaintiffs so far as this notice is concerned is that prior to issuing this notice the first defendant did not issue any show-cause notice and did not give an opportunity to the plaintiffs of being heard in the matter, and therefore, the notice is contrary to the principles of natural justice, and therefore, it is illegal and invalid. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Corporation and the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that section 89 does not provide for any such prior show-cause notice. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Corporation and the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that section 89 does not provide for any such prior show-cause notice. Even otherwise, when the town planning scheme had been finalised the plaintiff were throughout aware of the scheme, and therefore, they need not be given any more opportunity before being evicted under section 89 of the Act. It was further submitted that no prejudice is caused to the plaintiffs and whatever they want to say if such a show-cause notice had been issued to them could as well say the same before this Court and point out what prejudice has been caused to them and what purpose could have been served if such a notice had been issued. 11. If the matter had to be considered on first principles, then something could be said for and against the proposition mooted before me viz., whether an earlier show-cause notice is a must before issuing eviction under section 89 of the Act. But in my view, the matter is no longer res Integra and is covered by a direct authority of the Supreme Court, and therefore, we need not consider this question on the first principle or on the question of prejudice or on the ground that plaintiffs were not party to the town planning scheme etc. Now let us see what the Apex Court has to say on this point. In A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 613, (Babubhai Co. v. State of Gujarat and others)1, the Court was concerned with the validity of section 54 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. It is an admitted fact that 1954 Act has been repealed and in its place the 1966 Act has come into force. Section 165 of the 1966 Act repeals the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. It is also not disputed that section 54 of the repealed Act of 1954 is in pari materia with section 89 of the new Act. In Babubhais case mentioned above the validity of section 54 of the old Act (corresponding to section 89 of the present Act) was challenged on the ground that it does not provide for an earlier show cause notice, and therefore, it is bad for violating the principles of natural justice. In Babubhais case mentioned above the validity of section 54 of the old Act (corresponding to section 89 of the present Act) was challenged on the ground that it does not provide for an earlier show cause notice, and therefore, it is bad for violating the principles of natural justice. The Gujarat High Court took the view that though section 54 does not prescribe for any such earlier show-cause notice, it must be deemed to have provided for such a notice and that such a notice is a must before proceeding under section 54 of the Act, and therefore, that section cannot be struck down, as being void. When the matter was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court, even the Supreme Court concurred with the view of the Gujarat High Court. The Supreme Court observed in para 8 of the reported judgment as follows :- "... Further we are in agreement with the High Court that the power conferred upon the Local Authority is a quasi-judicial power which implies that the same has to be exercised after observing the principles of natural justice, that is to say, the decision that the occupants are not entitled to occupy the plots in their occupation has to be arrived at after hearing such occupants and that too by passing a speaking order which implies giving of reasons and that ensures the application of mind to only germane or relevant material on the record eschewing material extraneous and irrelevant." Therefore, we find that the Supreme Court concurred with the view of the Gujarat High Court that a show-cause notice prior to the eviction notice under section 54 of the Act of 1954 was a condition precedent before taking summary action under section 54 of the Act. Now that the old Act of 1954 has been repealed by the 1966 Act and contains a similar provision in section 89 of the Act, we have to hold that the power conferred on the authority under section 89 of the Act for summary eviction he has to be preceded by a show-cause notice to the occupants in pursuance to the principles of natural justice. The learned trial Judge has rightly held that the impugned notice is bad in law since it was not preceded by a show-cause notice to the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge has rightly held that the impugned notice is bad in law since it was not preceded by a show-cause notice to the plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the appellants and also the learned Counsel for the first respondent Corporation contended that there was no necessity for such a notice when plaintiffs were aware of the town planning scheme or that plaintiffs would not be prejudiced in any way. In my view, all these arguments are of no avail, when the Apex Court has ruled while considering a similar provision in the Town Planning Act that such an earlier show-cause notice prior to summary eviction is a must. The learned Counsel for the City Corporation relied on 1969(3) Supreme Court Cases 392, (Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa)2, and A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 273, (K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and others)3, where it has been observed that the question whether there is violation of principles of natural justice is there or not depends upon the facts of each case. Those two cases were rendered regarding departmental enquiries. In my view, when the very same provision in the Town Planning Act has been considered and decided by the Supreme Court, we cannot and should not refer to other decisions on principles of natural justice and find out as to what is the rule and what prejudice is caused etc. While interpreting the very same rule, the Apex Court has held that such a prior notice is necessary, and therefore, we cannot and should not travel outside the Town Planning Act to other laws to find out whether there is violation of principles of natural justice or not, whether any prejudice is caused or not etc. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts. This is much more so when the law declared by the Supreme Court is with reference to summary eviction under the Town Planning Act with which we are concerned. In the case before the Supreme Court, the town planning scheme was being prepared under the 1954, Act and subsequently that Act was repealed and 1966 Act came into force and so far as the provisions of summary eviction is concerned, it is identical in both the Acts. 12. In the case before the Supreme Court, the town planning scheme was being prepared under the 1954, Act and subsequently that Act was repealed and 1966 Act came into force and so far as the provisions of summary eviction is concerned, it is identical in both the Acts. 12. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants that no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff for not issuing such a notice or the plaintiff could not have offered any explanation if such a notice had been given has no merit. The plaintiffs are very much prejudiced because their plot No. 29-A has been taken over and is being given to defendants 4 to 6. If such a notice had been issued, the plaintiffs could have pleaded with the authority that they may be allowed to retain plot No. 29-A and the compensation given to them for that plot may as well be given to defendants 4 to 6. It is true that the town planning scheme had become final. But that does not mean that the town planning scheme cannot be altered or varied. There is a clear provision in section 91 of the Act which provides for alteration. Section 91(1) of the Act reads as follows:- "(1) If after the final scheme has come into force, the Planning Authority considers that the scheme is defective on account of an error, irregularity or informality or that the scheme needs the variation or modification of a minor nature, the Planning Authority may apply in writing to the State Government for variation of the scheme." The above provision clearly provides variation in the scheme on number of grounds. In fact, the appellants themselves argued that plaintiffs had represented to the Government for release of suit plot from the town planning scheme and it was rejected by the Government. Even the learned Counsel for the City Corporation contended that the plaintiffs having approached the highest authority under the Act cannot be permitted to say that any prejudice is caused to them. In my view, the argument has no merit since the Government order does not in any way affect the rights of the plaintiffs, but on the other hand it saves the rights of the plaintiffs. In my view, the argument has no merit since the Government order does not in any way affect the rights of the plaintiffs, but on the other hand it saves the rights of the plaintiffs. Though at one stage by earlier Government order the suit land had been released to the plaintiffs, the said order was challenged by the contesting defendants by filing a writ petition in this High Court and this Court set aside that order and remanded the matter to the Government for hearing all the concerned parties and pass appropriate orders. In pursuance of the direction given by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1090 of 1981, the Government heard all the concerned parties and passed an order in the month of September, 1987. Though the Government was not inclined to allow the representation of the plaintiffs for release of the plot, the operative portion of the order saves or protects the rights of the plaintiffs to move the competent authority for variation of the scheme under section 91 of the Act. The relevant portion of the order is at page 275 of the paper book and it reads as follows :- "a) Request of the applicants, namely Smt. Vidyadevi Gupta and others to release plot No. 29-A in their favour cannot be accepted in view of the legal position. However, they would be at liberty to make an application to the Municipal Commissioner, Bombay Municipal Corporation for undertaking variation of the scheme as contained in section 91 of the M.R.T.P. Act which will be dealt by him on merits. b) ...." 13. The above order clearly says that plaintiffs had been given liberty to apply to the Municipal Commissioner for variation of the scheme as provided in section 91 and such an application should be dealt with on merits by the concerned authority. 14. Therefore, if a show cause notice is issued to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could very well place it before the concerned authority that they would be very much prejudiced if plot No. 29-A is taken away from them and whatever compensation is awarded to them regarding the suit property may be paid to defendants 4 to 6 whose land had been taken over under the scheme. If the competent authority accepts this request it can vary the scheme by virtue of the power under section 91 of the Act. If the competent authority accepts this request it can vary the scheme by virtue of the power under section 91 of the Act. But if the authority feels that at this stage it does not want to alter the scheme it can reject the request of the plaintiff. Hence it cannot be said that no useful purpose would be served by giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs of being heard before summary eviction under section 89 of the Act. That is why the Apex Court has observed not only that such a show cause notice should be issued, but the order to be passed by the authority should be a speaking order. For the above reasons agreeing with the trial Court and particularly in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Babubhais case, I hold that the impugned notice dated 14th January, 1972 is illegal and contrary to the principles of natural justice and contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court in the said case. Even now it is open to the first respondent or the competent authority to issue a show cause notice as to why the plaintiffs should not be summarily evicted from the suit property and after giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs of being heard in the matter it can pass appropriate order either rejecting or accepting the cause shown by the plaintiffs and then it can invoke section 89 of the Act to summarily evict the plaintiffs. 15. It is seen that apart from the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, the learned trial Judge has also given a finding that this impugned notice is invalid since it mentions a period of 7 days. According to the learned trial Judge minimum of 30 days time should have been given in the notice and since only 7 days time is given it is bad in law. While considering the validity of a notice in order to say that the notice is invalid or illegal, it must be shown that it violates any provision of law. The learned Counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that this finding of the learned trial Judge is not warranted by the provisions of law. While considering the validity of a notice in order to say that the notice is invalid or illegal, it must be shown that it violates any provision of law. The learned Counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that this finding of the learned trial Judge is not warranted by the provisions of law. Section 138 of the Act says that whenever any notice is to be served and if no specific time is mentioned in the rule, then reasonable time should be given. The learned trial Judge observed that in 1966 Rules since a period of 30 days is mentioned for such a notice, the same rule should apply to the previous cases also. In my view, the learned trial Judge was wrong in applying the time mentioned in 1966 Rules to the 1954 Rules, which were in force when the impugned notice came to be issued. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents has made available a copy of the 1954 Rules which were in force at the relevant time. The impugned notice was issued under section 89 of the 1966 Act which corresponded to section 54 of the 1954 Act. The new Rules came into force in 1974 and they cannot be applied since the impugned notice was issued in 1972. Since no separate rules had been framed under the 1966 Act at the relevant time we are to be guided by the 1954 Rules which were in force ill they were repealed by the 1974 Rules. In 1954 Rules, Rule 27 provided the procedure for issuing eviction notice under section 54 of the 1954 Act. It says that whenever such eviction notice is issued, it shall mention such reasonable time to be specified in the notice calling upon the party to vacate the land. Therefore, the requirement of law was to mention some reasonable time in such a notice. What is reasonable time was not defined in the 1954 Act or 1954 Rules. Hence merely because the competent authority has mentioned a period of 7 days in the impugned notice it cannot be said that it is illegal or bad in law particularly when the Rules or the Act did not make any provision providing a particular period for such an eviction notice. Hence merely because the competent authority has mentioned a period of 7 days in the impugned notice it cannot be said that it is illegal or bad in law particularly when the Rules or the Act did not make any provision providing a particular period for such an eviction notice. We cannot apply the period mentioned in the 1966 Rules to find out whether a notice issued under the 1954 Rules was valid or not. Hence that part of the finding of the learned trial Judge that the impugned notice is also bad on the ground that it mentioned a shorter period of 7 days and not reasonable period of 30 days has to be and is hereby set aside. But on merits I agree with the trial Court that the impugned notice is bad in law and cannot be enforced since it is not preceded by a show-cause notice under the principles of natural justice and as ruled by the Apex Court in the decision already referred to. Since this was the only point raised in this appeal, the appeal has to fail in view of my finding on Point No. 1. Points Nos. 2 to 4 Points Nos. 2 to 4 arise for consideration in view of the cross objection filed by the plaintiffs to the impugned judgment. At one stage, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the trial Court should not have given findings on these points. He even made a request to this Court that the Court need not record findings on these points. In my view, when parties have filed pleadings raising so many contentions and then issues are framed and evidence had been led it is the duty of the trial Court to give a finding on all the issues. Similarly in this appeal the plaintiffs who are respondents have filed detailed cross objections taking up so many points and lengthy arguments were addressed at the bar and number of authorities were cited, and therefore, it is the duty of this Court to give findings on all the points that were urged before this Court. Point No. 2 16. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs did not receive any notice under the Act regarding the town planning scheme, and therefore, the scheme is not binding on the plaintiffs. Point No. 2 16. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs did not receive any notice under the Act regarding the town planning scheme, and therefore, the scheme is not binding on the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the City Corporation and the: learned Counsel for the appellants contended that notices have been issued to all the concerned parties and plaintiffs were very much aware of the proceedings of the town planning scheme and they have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Town Planning Officer and now they are estopped from questioning the correctness of the legality of the town planning scheme. 17. As far as the oral evidence is concerned, the first plaintiff Smt. Vidyavati was examined as a second witness in the Court below. She says in her evidence that she is one of the co-owners of the suit property and she has never received any notice regarding the scheme prior to the impugned notice which of course is dated 14-1-1972 and it has come into existence few days prior to the date of the suit. In her cross-examination she admitted that her husband and son Jagdish were looking after the suit property on her behalf. She does not know if other co-owners of the suit property had received such notices regarding the scheme. Her further cross-examination on behalf of the contesting defendants shows that she does not know even the allegations in the plaint. She has simply subscribed her signature. She does not know anything about this case. She says as follows:- "Except the fact that no notice was received by my husband I do not know anything else relating to the facts of the suit. I do not know whether the suit plot is included in the town planning scheme. I do not know the division of the plot and when they were formed." Then she says that she had given a power of attorney to her husband to look after her properties. Similar is the evidence of first witness Jagdish who is son of the first plaintiff. He also says that except the suit notice dated 14th January, 1972 the plaintiffs have not received any earlier notice regarding this town planning Scheme. In cross-examination he goes on to say that he does not know Architect by name K.D. Shah. Similar is the evidence of first witness Jagdish who is son of the first plaintiff. He also says that except the suit notice dated 14th January, 1972 the plaintiffs have not received any earlier notice regarding this town planning Scheme. In cross-examination he goes on to say that he does not know Architect by name K.D. Shah. He then says that the letter dated 15-3-1963, Ex. 5 was not sent on their behalf. He also says that for the first time he came to know of town planning scheme when the impugned notice dated 14th January, 1972 was served. He does not know Architect by name D.R. Vaidya. He does not know anything about sub-division of plot No. 29. He does not know anything about the letter (Exh. 1) written by the Architect on behalf of his mother. In the very nature of things, the evidence of both P.Ws. 1 and 2 is interested since they are none other than first plaintiff and her son. Their evidence that they were not aware of the town planning scheme and they did not know anything about the scheme till 14th January, 1972 cannot be accepted and it is contrary to the admitted material which is on record. They have taken an extreme contention that they were not aware anything about the scheme till 14th January, 1972. I will presently point out that plaintiffs were very much aware about the scheme and this is evidenced by their own documents and not by the documents of defendants. As against this, the Corporation has examined its officer to show that all the formalities have been complied with under the provisions of the Act. 18. It is true that under Rule 21 a special notice has to be served by the Town Planning Officer on the person interested in the property. Now the evidence is that only names of defendants 2 and 3 had been recorded in the revenue records, and therefore, notices were sent to them. There is a presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act that all official acts have been done as required by law. The defendants have also produced some material to show that some notices have been served on the first plaintiffs husband Shankarlal Gupta and some notices have been served on defendants 2 and 3. There is a presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act that all official acts have been done as required by law. The defendants have also produced some material to show that some notices have been served on the first plaintiffs husband Shankarlal Gupta and some notices have been served on defendants 2 and 3. Though the signature as such has not been proved, it is seen that the addresses tally with the addresses of first plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3. The letters have been sent by registered post. The learned Counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that in view of section 136 of the Act, it is sufficient compliance if notices are sent by registered post. We must bear in mind that when such a big town planning scheme is taken up, notices will have to be served on hundreds of persons. That is why the requirement of law is that if notices are sent by registered posts it is sufficient compliance. In this case, the materials on record clearly show that notices have been sent by registered post to first plaintiffs husband and defendants 2 and 3. Admittedly, defendants 2 and 3 are co-owners along with the two plaintiffs. It is interesting to note that defendants 2 and 3 have not challenged the town planning scheme till today. 19. Even if it is held for a moment that notices .are not served on the first plaintiff, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, it will not invalidate the scheme as such. Section 150(l)(d) of the Act reads as follows :- "150. Validation of acts and proceedings:- (1) No act done or proceeding under this Act shall be questioned on the ground merely or (a) ..... (b) ..... (c) ..... (d) the failure to serve a notice on any person, where no substantial injustice has resulted from such failure." Further section 149 of the Act provides that any order passed under the Act shall be final and shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings. Therefore, even if notices are not served, it must be further shown that substantial injustice has resulted from the same. As far as the town planning scheme is concerned, the only grievance of the plaintiffs is that their plot bearing No. 29-A has been taken over and allotted to defendants 4 to 6. Therefore, even if notices are not served, it must be further shown that substantial injustice has resulted from the same. As far as the town planning scheme is concerned, the only grievance of the plaintiffs is that their plot bearing No. 29-A has been taken over and allotted to defendants 4 to 6. It is not as if this has been done without notice to the plaintiffs or without the fact being brought to their notice. There is intrinsic material on record to show that plaintiffs were very much aware of these facts and they did not take any action to challenge the same till they filed the present suit in 1972. 20. It may be recalled that plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 had purchased the entire plot bearing No. 29. The sale deed Ex. A itself mentions about the town planning scheme of 1919-20. Since plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 wanted to sell the property, they had to seek permission of the Town Planning Officer. They did apply to the Town Planning Officer for permission to sell plot No. 29. Plaintiffs Architect D.R. Vaidya Co. wrote a letter to the Assistant Town Planning Engineer as per Ex. 1 which is dated 12-1-1961 for permission to sub-divide plot No. 29. The first plaintiffs husband Shankarlal Gupta who was also her power of attorney holder wrote a letter as per Ex. l(a) dated 12-l-l960 to the Assistant Town Planning Engineer stating that he is the owner of plot No. 29 and since he wants to sell a portion of the plot, he requested for permission to sub-divide the plot as per the plans submitted by him. This clearly shows that first plaintiffs husband was very much aware about existence of the scheme and the necessity to seek permission of the Competent Officer for sub-division of the land etc. The Assistant Town Planning Engineer wrote a letter to the plaintiffs Architect D.R. Vaidya Co. that the plans submitted are not correct and a portion of the plot is already under acquisition, and therefore, he was asked to send a separate amended plan deleting that portion which is under acquisition. This was in the year 1961. Then what is more the plaintiffs Architect sent six copies of the amended plans and sought permission for the same. Since no action was taken, the plaintiffs engaged another Architect K.D. Shah Co. This was in the year 1961. Then what is more the plaintiffs Architect sent six copies of the amended plans and sought permission for the same. Since no action was taken, the plaintiffs engaged another Architect K.D. Shah Co. who wrote one more letter as per Ex. 4 dated 24-11-1962 to the Assistant Town Planning. Engineer, Bombay Municipal Corporation seeking permission for sub-division of plot No. 29. To this a reply was sent by the Deputy City Engineer granting permission subject to certain conditions. This is Ex. 5 dated 16-3-1963. In particular Condition No. 2 says that the construction should be done as per draft variation of the town planning scheme. Then more important is Condition No. 6 which reads as follows :- "6) That the land falling in the plot No. 29-A will not be sold to any others as in the Draft Varied Scheme T.P. Scheme No. 1 Malad, the plot No. 29-A is allotted to Shri Kakubhai Kanji and others." It is, therefore, clear that as early as 1963 the plaintiffs are made aware about the town planning scheme, about restriction on alienation of plot No. 29-A and what is more proposal to allot plot No. 29-A to Kakubhai Kanji who is none other than the third defendant in the suit. Inspite of their the first plaintiff says on oath in her evidence that till 1972 she was not aware anything about the town planning scheme. 21. Then we come to the most important document which throws light on the question which is plaintiffs own sale deed Ex. 50, dated 6-8-1964. After taking permission from the Town Planning Authority plot No. 29 was divided into sub-plots and all sub-plots except 29-A were sold under this document. To this plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 are parties. Even in the body of the sale deed it is mentioned that this plot No. 29-A is situated in Malad Town Planning Scheme No. 1. The word "town planning scheme" has occurred in 3-4 places in the body of the sale deed. Then what is more copy of the letter of the Municipal Engineer has been made a part of the sale deed by including it in Third Schedule of the sale deed itself. In the Third Schedule we find the copy of the letter of the Municipal Engineer dated 16-3-1963 addressed to the plaintiffs Architect K.D. Shah Co. Then what is more copy of the letter of the Municipal Engineer has been made a part of the sale deed by including it in Third Schedule of the sale deed itself. In the Third Schedule we find the copy of the letter of the Municipal Engineer dated 16-3-1963 addressed to the plaintiffs Architect K.D. Shah Co. In this Third Schedule to the sale deed two clauses are very relevant for our present purposes which are Clauses 4 and 6 and they read as follows :- "4) That the land falling in the road widening lines of Daphtary Road proposed to be widened to 50 and Daphtary Cross Road proposed to be widened to 44 shall be kept open and unbuilt upon and shall be handed over to the Corporation whenever required for the purpose of improving the road. 6) That the land falling in the plot No. 29-A will not be sold to any other person as in the draft varied scheme T.P. Scheme No. I Malad, the Plot No. 29-A is allotted to Shri Kakubhai Kanji and others." From the above clauses we find that plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3 through their Architect have been called upon to keep the suit property as a vacant plot and to be handed over to the Corporation for improving the road. Then more important is Clauses 6 which says that this suit plot No. 29-A should not be allotted to any other person since as per the draft varied scheme it is allotted to Kakubhai Kanji and others who are defendants 4 to 6 in the suit and who are the appellants before me. This is a document annexed to the plaintiffs sale deed in the year 1964. But even in 1972 both the first plaintiff and her son stated on oath before the Court that they were not aware anything about the town planning scheme till they received the impugned notice in January, 1972. This is a document annexed to the plaintiffs sale deed in the year 1964. But even in 1972 both the first plaintiff and her son stated on oath before the Court that they were not aware anything about the town planning scheme till they received the impugned notice in January, 1972. Having submitted amended plans and having sought permission from the town planning authority to sell the remaining plots and having been told by the town planning authority as early as 1963 that the suit plot should be kept vacant and it is proposed to be allotted to defendants 4 to 6, still in 1972 plaintiffs have come to Court with an allegation that they did not know anything about the town planning scheme and they had not received any notice and no information till January, 1972. The learned Counsel for the appellants is right in his submission that the plaintiffs are estopped from questioning the validity of the scheme since they have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the town planning scheme and sought permission to sell the remaining plots. Even though as early as 1963 the plaintiffs were told about the allotment of the suit plot to defendants 4 to 6 they did not take any action to challenge the same or to give a protest petition to the Town Planning Officer that this land should be dereserved or for any other reliefs. The probabilities are that first plaintiffs husband and other co-owners defendants 2 and 3 had received notices from the town planning authority and they participated in the scheme and hence now after lapse of long time they should not be permitted to question the validity of the scheme. 22. Ex. 64 is a notice dated 11-9-1967 addressed by the Town Planning Officer to defendants 2 and 3, plaintiffs husband Shankarlal Gupta and some others informing them that they have not appeared before the authority inspite of the previous letter and one more opportunity is now given to them to appear before them and submit any objection to the draft scheme. It is further stated in the said letter that if no communication is received from them within a fortnight, it will be presumed that they have nothing to say regarding finalisation of the scheme. It is further stated in the said letter that if no communication is received from them within a fortnight, it will be presumed that they have nothing to say regarding finalisation of the scheme. Inspite of this letter written in the year 1967 plaintiffs would have us believe that they were not at all aware anything about the town planning scheme till January, 1972. As already stated, some acknowledgments have been produced in this Court to show that the notices have been sent by registered post to defendants 2 and 3, plaintiffs husband and the acknowledgments purport to bear signatures of some persons, but the addresses are correctly written and the requirement of law is to send a notice by registered post. The acknowledgments are Exs. 52 to 55 and 63. At one stage the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that though some acknowledgments are produced, the office copies of the letters are not produced to show as to what was the nature of the letters written to them. But I have pointed out copy of one such letter is produced and it is at Ex. 64. A perusal of the record shows that under the Act an Arbitrator had been appointed and he has given an award. His award has become final. There is a provision for filing an appeal against the award of the Arbitrator to Judicial Tribunal headed by the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay. Plaintiffs have not challenged the award either by appearing before the Arbitrator or by filing an appeal as required by law. The plaintiffs were put on notice about the requirement of the suit plot for the scheme and allotment of the same in favour of defendants 4 to 6 as early as in 1963. Till 1972 they did not take any action to challenge the same. 23. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted by referring to some decisions of the Supreme Court that though the orders passed under the Act are made final, still they can be questioned in a Civil Court under section 9 C.P.C. if it is shown that mandatory provisions of the Act are not complied with. Some decisions were also cited to show that the notices under the Act are mandatory. Some decisions were also cited to show that the notices under the Act are mandatory. There is no dispute about this contention and hence it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited by the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. On facts we find that plaintiffs theory that they were not aware anything about the scheme till 1972 cannot be accepted. The plaintiffs are very much parties to the town planning scheme and they have acceded to the jurisdiction of the town planning scheme by seeking permission to sub-divide plot No. 29 and got permission to sell the remaining plots except plot No. 29-A. I have already shown that there is material on record that notices have been sent by registered post to first plaintiffs husband and defendants 2 and 3 and they did not appear before the Town Planning Officer to raise objection regarding the suit property. At least by the letter written to the plaintiffs Architect and which is a part of the plaintiffs own sale deed plaintiffs are made aware that plot No. 29-A is reserved for the road purposes and it is proposed to be allotted to defendants 4 to 6. I have already pointed out various acknowledgments produced and one copy of letter addressed to first plaintiffs husband and defendants 2 and 3 giving them an opportunity to appear before the Town Planning Officer to object to the scheme. In addition to this we have the legal presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act that all official acts have been duly performed. In this state of evidence we can safely hold that plaintiffs had full knowledge and full notice of the two planning scheme, and therefore, they cannot be permitted to say that it is bad on the imaginary ground of want of notice. Since on facts I have held against the plaintiffs, it is not necessary to consider some of the authorities cited by both the Counsel, about the necessity of a notice, the effect of want of notice, maintainability of the suit etc. For these reasons my finding on point No. 2 is in the negative. Point No. 3 24. Since on facts I have held against the plaintiffs, it is not necessary to consider some of the authorities cited by both the Counsel, about the necessity of a notice, the effect of want of notice, maintainability of the suit etc. For these reasons my finding on point No. 2 is in the negative. Point No. 3 24. It was argued that taking away the suit property and allotting it to defendants 4 to 6 is not a public purpose and taking away the property of the plaintiffs amounts to violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 14,19 and 31 of the Constitutions of India. 25. The town planning scheme has stood the test of time. The provisions of the Act have not been challenged on the ground that they are ultra vires of the Constitution. Now the challenge is that taking away ones property and giving it to another violates plaintiffs right .to hold the property and it is not a public purpose. Under the Act there is a provision for acquisition of the land in Chapter VII. Then the land will have to be acquired as provided in the Land Acquisition Act. There is no dispute that acquisition of property under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. Now the law provides acquisition of property under the provision of the Constitution, but only safeguard is that reasonable compensation should be paid to the person from whom the property is acquired. In the present case also for acquisition of the suit property compensation has been awarded. If the compensation is inadequate, then the aggrieved party has a right to ask for enhancement of the compensation. Since the property had been acquired as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules, its validity cannot be questioned on the ground that it violates the rights of the plaintiffs under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. 26. Now remains the only short question whether acquisition of the property is for a public purpose? The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs invited my attention to (1994)4 Supreme Court Cases 675, (Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madaim Gurumurthy Sastry and others)4. 26. Now remains the only short question whether acquisition of the property is for a public purpose? The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs invited my attention to (1994)4 Supreme Court Cases 675, (Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madaim Gurumurthy Sastry and others)4. In that case, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if the land of poor farmers is acquired for giving it to a private co-operative society, then it is not a public purpose. But it is clearly observed that public purpose is not capable of precise definition and each case has to be considered in the light of purpose for which the acquisition is made. The test is whether acquisition serves a public purpose or not. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs also invited my attention to A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 252, (State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh)5, where it is observed that public purpose is an implied condition for compulsory acquisition under Article 31 of the Constitution of India. There is no dispute about this.