Laxmi Narain Swami v. State of Rajasthan — 1994 DIGILAW 649 (RAJ)

Honble SINGH, J. — These nine writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 14.6.1994 passed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under section 139 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") curtailing the period of exemption under section 36(1-B) of the Act from the period of one year to 15.6.1994 or till new election,whichever is earlier, and the order dated 15.6.1994 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur under Section 36(1-B) of the Act appointing District Magistrate as Administrator for a period of one year or till the new elections of the Board of Directors of Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. of various districts. In all the above 9 petitions, order dated 14.6.1994 passed by the State Government and the order dated 15.6.1994 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur have been challenged and the date of the orders in all the writ petitions is same. (2). Since the question involved in the above noted writ petitions is similar, they have been heard togather for the purpose of admission with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Advocate General Rajasthan, appearing for the State and the learned counsel for other respondents. For the purpose of deciding the controversy involved in these petitions, in my opinion it is not necessary to narrate the facts of all the cases as they are almost identical, but for knowing the nature of controversy, the facts as unfolded in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.3674/94 are being enumerated. (3). In short, the facts are that Sawaimadhopur-Tonk Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd., Sawaimadhopur is a duly registered Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of the Act. Petitioner Laxmi Narain Swami is a member of the Board of Directors of the respondent Sangh and was elected as such on 24.8.1990 along with 8 other members. He was subsequently elected as Chairman of the Sangh on 25.8.1990. According to Bye-law No. 19(2) of the registered Bye-lows of the sangh, the term of elected Board of Directors is 3 years. Bye-law No.l9(2) runs as under: — ^^lapkyd e.My ds fuokZfpr lnL;ksa dk dk;Zdky rhu o"kZ dk gksxkA** (4). He was subsequently elected as Chairman of the Sangh on 25.8.1990. According to Bye-law No. 19(2) of the registered Bye-lows of the sangh, the term of elected Board of Directors is 3 years. Bye-law No.l9(2) runs as under: — ^^lapkyd e.My ds fuokZfpr lnL;ksa dk dk;Zdky rhu o"kZ dk gksxkA** (4). Rule 34(2) of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules, 1966 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Rules") provides that the members of the committee shall continue in office for such period as may be specified in the bye-laws and since bye-law No.l9(2) of the Sangh prescribes the term as 3 years, there is no manner of doubt that the petitioners term as Director was for a period of 3 years i.e.from 24.8.1990 till 24.8.1993. (5). Section 36(1-B) of the Act provides for the provision of appointment of administrator to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding two years or till a new committee is constituted, whichever is earlier. Since the controversy involved in these writ petitions is squarely relates to section 36(1-B) of the Act, it appears proper to quote the aforesaid section in extenso, which runs as under "36(1-B) If, before the expiry of the term of the committee as specified in the bye-laws, a new committee is not constituted, the Registrar may appoint a Government servant as administrator to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year or till a new committee is constituted, whichever is earlier. Explanation:— A member of the committee for which an administrator is appointed under this sub-section shall not be deemed to be disqualified under sub-section (7) of section 34." (6). Section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules have empowered the State Government to grant exemption to any co-operative society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act by general or special order. Section 139 of the Act runs as under: "The Government may, by general or special order, exempt any co- operative society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications as may be specified in the order." (7). Section 139 of the Act runs as under: "The Government may, by general or special order, exempt any co- operative society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications as may be specified in the order." (7). Rule 110 of the Rules runs as under: — "Rule 110- Power to exempt from rules: The Government may by general or special order, exempt any society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of the rules or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications and on conditions as may be specified in the order." (8). From the facts stated above, it is abundantly clear that the term of the elected Board of Directors of the Sangh was to expire on 23.8.1993 and it is alleged that since the State Government was not in a position to hold elections of the Board of Directors of the Sangh, before expiry of the term in the State Government issued two orders dated 24.8.1993 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules,by which the State Government exempted the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies and District Cooperative Dairy Unions from the provisions of Section 36(1-B) of the Act and rule 34(2) and (6) of the Rules for one year or such time till the elections are held, whichever is earlier. Copies of the aforesaid two orders issued under section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules have been enclosed with the writ petition as Annexures 1 and 2. A perusal of the orders dated 24.8.1993, Annexures 1 and 2 shows that Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies and District Cooperative Dairy Unions were exempted from the provisions of section 36(1-B) and Rule 24(2) and (6) for one year or such time till the elections are held, whichever is earlier. From the aforesaid two annexures, it is apparent that though the term of the elected body of the Sangh came to an end on 23.8.1993, the said body could function by virtue of exemption granted by order dated 14.6.1994, till 23.8.1994. From the aforesaid two annexures, it is apparent that though the term of the elected body of the Sangh came to an end on 23.8.1993, the said body could function by virtue of exemption granted by order dated 14.6.1994, till 23.8.1994. It has also been alleged that the order dated 24.8.1993 passed by the State Government under Section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules was modified by order dated 14.6.1994, according to which the State Government exempted the District Cooperative Dairy Unions from the provisions of Section 36(1-B) of the Act only up to 15.6.1994, meaning thereby that the period of one year as mentioned in the order dated 24.8.1993 was curtailed and was to in force till 15.6.1994 only and the orders impugned in these writ petitions were issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies on 15.6.1994 appointing administrators for a period of one year or till new elections for the societies are held. The petitioner feeling aggrieved against the orders dated 14.6.1994 and 15.6.1994 issued by the State Government and the Registrar, Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur separately has approached this court for issuance of writ of certiori for quashing the aforesaid orders. The petitioner has also filed an application for grant of interim relief to the effect that the operation of the orders dated 14.6.1994(Annexures 3 and 4) issued by the State Government and the order dated 15.6.1994 issued by the Registrar Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur may be stayed and the elected Board of Directors of the Sangh may be allowed to look after the affairs of the Sangh till the disposal of the writ petition. (9). Caveat has been filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and reply to the stay application filed by the petitioner has been filed on behalf of the contesting respondents, in which the main plea raised by the respondents, is that the impugned order dated 15.6.1994 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies has already been given effect to and the District Magistrate, Sawaimad-hopur has already assumed charge on 16.6.1994 and as such the petitioner was not entitled to grant of any interim relief. In the reply filed by the respondents to the stay application,certain facts have been mentioned by way of additional , pleas. In the reply filed by the respondents to the stay application,certain facts have been mentioned by way of additional , pleas. To my mind certain facts mentioned therein appear to be relevant for the purposes of understanding the scheme/conslitution/election of the Cooperative Societies relating to the milk in the State of Rajasthan and as such some of the facts narrated in the reply are extracted. There are three type of cooperative Societies relating to milk in the State of Rajasthan, namely (1) Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Society Ltd., (2) District Milk Producers Cooperative Unions and (3) the Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Faderation. The members of such Primary Cooperative Societies elect their management committee and according to its bye-laws the term of the elected Managing Committee is three years. Persons elected to the Management Committee are generally known as the Members of the Managing Committee and they elect one of them as Chairman. The Chairman of such Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies, which are operative in the area of District Cooperative Milk Producers Union, elect the Managing Committee of such Union and the members so elected in turn elect one of them as the Chairman of the Managin Committee of the Union and generally this management of the committee is called the Board of Directors. Such Unions, some times are for more than one Revenue Districts also, and in Rajasthan, the member of such unions is 16.The elections to constitute the Managing Committee of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies were held in December, 1988 and their term had expired in December, 1991. The Board of Directors in the District Milk Cooperative Unions were fully constituted by August, 1991 except in one district where the District Milk Cooperative Union, the Board of Directors was constituted on 31.5.1991. Thus the elections for the constitution of Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Society Ltd. in the State of Rajasthan as well as District Unions ought to have been held on or before or soon after the expiry of their term. However, for one reason or the other, the same could not be held because of certain amendments which were considered proper regarding the constitution of the Managing Committee. One such amendment was made in section 33 by the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act,1992 (Act No.2 of 1992). However, for one reason or the other, the same could not be held because of certain amendments which were considered proper regarding the constitution of the Managing Committee. One such amendment was made in section 33 by the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act,1992 (Act No.2 of 1992). Since the elections of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies were not held, it was not possible to hold elections of the District Milk Cooperative Unions also. It has been stated that in view of the aforesaid facts, the State Government issued orders dated 24.8.1993. It has also been stated by the respondents that after the elected Government took over the administration of Rajasthan on 4.12.1993, its attention was invited about holding of elections and after deliberations of the whole matters at various levels, a decision was taken by the Government to hold such elections and further it was also considered proper by the Government that with a view to ensure free and fair elections, the extended term of the District Milk Cooperative Union be also modified so as to confine the period upto the limited time in all the 16 milk cooperative unions and it is in this back-ground that the extended period was curtailed by order dated 14.6.1994 till 15.6.1994 and it has been alleged that since the extended period thad already expired on 14.6.1994, the Registrar invoked his powers under section 36(1-B) of the Act and appointed Administrators in all the Union by order dated 15.6.1994. (10). I have heard Shri B.L. Sharma, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. B.P. Agrawal, learned Advocate General appearing , for Respondents. (11). The first and most serious argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that once the Government in exercise of its power under Section 139 of the Act and rule 110 of the Rules granted exemption to the provisions of section 34(1- B) of the Act and rule 34 (2) and (6) of the Rules for a period of one year by order dated 24.8.1993, the State Government had no power to curtail the period from one year to 15.6.1994 under section 139 of the Act. There is no lis between the parties that the State Government had power by virtue of Section 139 of the Act to exempt Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies and District Cooperative Dairy Unions from the provisions of Sections 36(1-B) of the Act and similarly, under Rule 110 of the Rules, it had power to grant exemption from the provisions of Rule 34(2) and (6). The aforesaid power has not been challenged in these writ petitions as the claims of the petitioners for continuance in the offices after their term is it self based on the power exercised by the State Government under Section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules. The vires of section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules have also not been challenged by the petitioners and rightly so. However, the learned Advocate General has informed the court that the validity of section 139 of the Act and Rule 110 of the Rules was once tested in D.B.Civil Writ Petition No.622/88 Sultan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1) and the Division Bench of this court by the Judgment rendered on 5.09.1988 held that the provisions of section 139 of the Act and rule 110 of the Rules were valid and not ultra vires of the Constitution. The contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the State Government had no power to curtail the period from one year to 15.6.1994 by the impugned order dated 14.6.1994 seems to be wholly fallicious and devoid of any merits. If the State Government had power to grant exemption from certain provisions of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act to the Cooperative Societies under section 139 of the Act and rule 110 of the Rules as in the case of the petitioners, the State Government was fully competent to have curtailed the period from one year to 15.6.1994 and the petitioners cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time and in my opinion, this power is inherent in the power conferred under sec. 139 of the Act and has validly been exercised and I find no illegality or any arbitrariness in the order dated 14.6.1994 passed by the State Government. (12). 139 of the Act and has validly been exercised and I find no illegality or any arbitrariness in the order dated 14.6.1994 passed by the State Government. (12). The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned orders dated 14.6.94 and 15.6.94 have been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that once the State Government granted exemption to the petitioner-societies from the provisions of section 36 (1-B) of the Act and Rule (2) and (34) of the Rules for a period of one year or till the new elections are held,whichever is earlier, the State Government should have afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioners before passing the impugned order dated 14.6.1994 confining exemption till 15.6.1994. It was further contended that the power vested in the Government was to promote the principle of self help, which is sine-gue-non for formation of cooperative societies and by curtailment of the period, the State Government has rather frustrated the object of self help and in this view of the matter, an opportunity of hearing was essential to the petitioners. In support of his contention Mr.Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Registrar, Cooperative Societies and another Vs.K. Kunjabmu and others (2). Perusal of the facts of the said case indicates that Section 60 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act (6 of 1932) conferred power on the State Government for exemption of societies from application of the provisions of the Act or application with modification. It appears that the High Court of Kerala had struck down section 60 on the ground of excessive delegation of power. However, in the appeal filed by the State of Kerala, the Apex Court held that Section 60 is not void on the ground of excessive delegation. To my mind, the said case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of not much assistance except for the proposition that it is the duty of the Government to promote the policy of self help. The dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case has not been disputed and cannot be disputed. (13). The other case, on which reliance has been placed- by the learned counsel for the petitioners is Ram Pyare Chaudhary V/s State U.P. and others (3). The dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case has not been disputed and cannot be disputed. (13). The other case, on which reliance has been placed- by the learned counsel for the petitioners is Ram Pyare Chaudhary V/s State U.P. and others (3). In the aforesaid case, the Court was ceased of the interpretation of section 29(4) of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. In that case the dictum laid down is that the court must remove the administrator if appointed illegally and renstate the elected members, even though only few months remained for ecipiry of administrators term. I think the controversy involved in the instant case is entirely different and distinguishable, therefore, this case also does not supply any strength to the petitioners case. (14). Learned counsel for the petitioners then placed reliance on State of Mysore V/s Allum Karibasappa and others (4). A perusal of the facts of that case indicates that the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 54 and 120 of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 superseded the entire committee of management of the Bellary District Cooperative Central Bank, including the President and the Vice President and deprived the committee of their right to manage the affairs of the Cooperative Society without issuing a notice to it. The action of the Government was held to be ultra vires and in violation of the principles of natural justice and the notifications were set aside on the ground that section 30 of the Act contemplates notice where the State intends to supersede the management. This is not the situation in the present case as there is no such mandate under the Act which requires any reasonable opportunity of hearing before exercise of the powers under section 139 of the Act and rule 110 of the Rules and as such the said case also is of no help to the petitioners. (15). Lastly, the counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice, heavily relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kuldeep Srivastave & two others V/s State of Rajasthan and others (5). (15). Lastly, the counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice, heavily relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kuldeep Srivastave & two others V/s State of Rajasthan and others (5). Before I proceed to consider the law laid down by the learned Single Judge of this court, I would like to narrate the facts of the case as well as the controversy involved in the aforesaid case. Shri Kuldeep Srivastava was a member of Kota Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. Kota and was elected as one of the members of the Board of Directors of that Bank on February 13, 1987 along with 8 other members, the total number of elected Directors being 9. He was further elected as Chairman of the Bank on February 14, 1987. Thus the period of three years expired on February 14, 1990. There were bye-laws of the respondent Bank and under bye-law No.26(2) every member of the Board of Directors even after the expiry of period of three years till fresh Board of Directors is duly elected, shall continue to work. Apart from bye-laws 26(1) and (2) Rule 34(2) of the Rules also provides that the members of the Committee shall continue in office for such period as may be specified by bye-laws or until another Committee is constituted. Bye-laws (1) and (2) was in respect of Land Development Bank and so far as Central Cooperative Banks were concerned the only provision in the relevant bye-law was that the period of elected member of the Board of Directors shall be three years and there was no specific or express provision that even after the expiry of aforesaid period of three years, members shall continue to work till such time as a fresh Board of Directores/Committee is constituted. A decision was taken by the State Government on April 30, 1990 that the Board of Directors/Committee of such primary Cooperative Land Development Banks where the period of three years for which they were elected, expired, but no fresh election has taken place should be removed and fresh election has taken place should be removed and fresh election should be held and till then Administrator be appointed. The State Government in accordance with the powers conferred by sec. The State Government in accordance with the powers conferred by sec. 139 of the Act read with rule 110 of the Rules also made an order on the same day i.e. April 30, 1990 after taking the aforesaid decision that in such of Primary Land Development Bank as aforesaid the procedure contained in section 36(1) of the Act and rule 34(2) of the Rules for removal of the Committee or its members by the Registrar shall not be applicable. In other words, the procedure prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 36 as well as rule 34(2) of the Rules for removal of the Committee or its members in exercise of the powers under section 139 of the Act had been exempted. After the aforesaid order was made by the State Government, the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies issued an order dated May 2/3, 1990 dissolving/superseding the Board of Directors with immediate effect and appointed Additional Collector (Development),Kota as Administrator to manage the affairs of the respondent Bank. The petitioners then challenged the aforesaid orders. For deciding the controversy in the instant case, it is proper to incorporate the provisions of Section 36(1) and 36(6) of the Act as they stand. "36. Removal of Committee or member thereof. The petitioners then challenged the aforesaid orders. For deciding the controversy in the instant case, it is proper to incorporate the provisions of Section 36(1) and 36(6) of the Act as they stand. "36. Removal of Committee or member thereof. (1) If, in the opinion of the Registrar the committee of any cooperative society or any member of such committee persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it or him by this Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members, or wilfully disobeys directions issued by the Registrar for the purpose of securing proper implementation of cooperative production and other development programmes approved or under-taken by the Government, or is otherwise, not discharging its or his functions properly, the Registrar may after giving the committee or the members as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity to state its or his or his objections, if any, by order in writing, - (a) remove the committee and appoint a Government servant as an administrator to manage the affairs of the society and shall submit his report justifying the removal of the committee, to the State Government within a period of fifteen days from the date of removed of the committee; or (b) remove the member and get the vacancy filled up for the remainder or the term of the outgoing member, according to the bye-laws. (1-A) Where a committee is removed under sub-section (1)- (a) any member of the committee so removed may appeal to the State Government against the decision of the Registrar removing the committee, within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of removal; (b) the State Government, after perusing the report of the Registrar and where an appeal has been filed against the order of the removal of a committee, alter hearing the appellant, shall, within a period of three months from the date of the order of removal of the committee pass an orderly confirming the removal of the committee; or (ii) accepting the appeal getting aside the order of removal, (c) if the State Government confirms the order of removal of a committee, it may allow the Administrator to continue or may nominate another committee, and where the State Government accepts the appeal, and sets aside the order of removal, the committee, so removed shall start functioning to all intents and for all purposes, as if it had never been removed. (d) the Administrator appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall cease to hold office immediately upon the nomination of another committee or upon the setting aside of the order of removal, as the case may be. The nominated committee shall cease to hold office upon the expiry of the remainder of the term of the elected committee removed under clause (a) sub-section (1); Provided that the State Government may, by order, extend the period of office of a nominated committee for such time not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order; and (e) the State Government may delegate its powers of nomination of a committee under clause (c) to such officer of the State Government and in relation to such cooperative society as may be prescribed." "36 (6) Before taking any action under sub-section (1) in respect of a cooperative society, the Registrar shall consult the financing bank to which the society is indebted." (16). The orders were challenged mainly on the ground that the orders passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur were in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice; secondly, the Registrar was required to exercies his own discretion, which the statute has vested in him, but he acted mechanically without applying the mind. The orders were challenged mainly on the ground that the orders passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies Rajasthan, Jaipur were in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice; secondly, the Registrar was required to exercies his own discretion, which the statute has vested in him, but he acted mechanically without applying the mind. Learned single Judge was of the opinion that the petitioners were entitled of being heard before an order under section 36 of the Act was passed. Learned Single Judge was also of the view that the Registrar did not apply his own mind and acted on the dictum of the Government. But in the present case, the facts are entirely different, inasmuch as power under section 36(1-B) of the act has been exercised. The Explanation added to section 36(1-B) is also of much significance inasmuch as it lays down that if an administrator is appointed under this sub-section. meaning thereby sec. 36(1-B), a member of such committee shall be deemed to be disqualified under sub- section (7) of section 34. Section 36(1A) deals with the cases where actions are taken against the societies on some allegations of negligent/default/performance etc., which amounts to stigma and in that case, the principle of applying natural justice may be applied but if under section 36(1-B) a new committee is not constituted before expiry of the term as specified in the bye- laws, the Registrar has been authorised to appoint Administrator and a member of such committee would not be disqualified under sub-section (7) of section 34 and as such the orders passed in the present case cannot be held to be invalid on the ground that they have been passed without affording any opportunity. (17). From the above, it appears that when the learned Single Judge decided the case of Kuldeep Srivastava (supra), Section 36 (1-B) and explanation had not seen the light of the day. (18). (17). From the above, it appears that when the learned Single Judge decided the case of Kuldeep Srivastava (supra), Section 36 (1-B) and explanation had not seen the light of the day. (18). Learned Advocate General, on the contrary contended that after the decision of the learned Single Judge of this court in Kuldeep Srivatavas case in 1990, much water has flown, as by the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1991 new section, namely section 36(1-B) was inserted and the newly added section came into force w.e.f. 31.08.1990- In view of the fact that after the decision of this court in Kuldeep Srivastava (supra) since new section 36(1-B) was added in section 36, the dictum laid down by this court in the aforesaid case, to my mind is no more a good law and the most potent weapon in the armoury of the counsel for the petitioners has failed to cut any ice. (19). Learned Advocate General has also invited my attention to an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court rendered on April 11, 1994 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.228/94 Surender Kumar Gupta Vs.State of U.P. & 3 other connected writ petitions, which were disposed of by a common judgment. A photo- stat copy of the judgment has been produced before me. A perusal of the facts of the said case indicates that the term of elected President/Chairman of different local bodies in the State of U.P. (U.P. Municipalities notified areas and town areas), which is 5 years, the State Government by Notification extended the period for six months or till the new elections, whichever is earlier as provided under sec. 10(A) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, However, before expiry of extended period of six months, an Ordinance was promulgated by the Government of U.P. in exercise of the powers under Article 213"of the Constitution, according to which, the President/Chairman and other elected body of the aforesaid local bodies ceassed to function from 19.01.1994. The said ordinance was challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the same was ultra vires and the court came to the conclusion that the Government was competent to dissolve the Municipalities even during the extended term. (20). The said ordinance was challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the same was ultra vires and the court came to the conclusion that the Government was competent to dissolve the Municipalities even during the extended term. (20). From the facts stated above, it is abundantly clear that in the case of Surendre Kumar Gupta (supra) the Local Bodies were disolved during the term of extended period, whereas in the present cases the extended term had already been curtailed by order dt. 14.6.94. On the basis of this judgment, the learned Advocate General vehemently urged that the impugned orders passed by the State Government and the Registrar cannot be held to be invalid. (21). From the narration of the facts and the discussions made hereinabove, the position boils down to this that the petitioners term had come and end, but because of the exemption granted by the State Government under Section 139 of the Act read with rule 110 of the Rules relating to Section 36(1-B) and rule 34(2) and (6) the petitioners were allowed to continue in the office. The petitioners have enjoyed the fruits of their offices from 24.8.1993 till 15.06.1994 without being elected, i.e. for a period of about 10 months. The term of the petitioners was to expire in the month of August, 1993 and the elections should have been completed by 24.08.1993.. It has been stated by the answering respondents in the reply filed to the stay application that the elections of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies could not be held because of certain amendments, which were considered proper regarding the constitution of Managing Committee. One such amendment was made in Section 33 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1992 (Act No. 2 of 1992) published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 17.3.1992 and unless the elections of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies were held, it was not possible to hold elections of the District Milk Producers Cooperative Unions also. One such amendment was made in Section 33 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1992 (Act No. 2 of 1992) published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 17.3.1992 and unless the elections of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies were held, it was not possible to hold elections of the District Milk Producers Cooperative Unions also. It is also a matter of history that the State Assembly was dissolved in December, 1990 by the President of India in exercise of its power under Article 356 and the State Government was placed under presidential rule and since the elections could not be completed before the term, the order dated 24.8.1993 was issued by the State Government granting exemption from the provisions of Section 36(1-B) for one year or till the elections are held, whichever is earlier. After the President rule, the elected Government was installed in office on 4.12.1993 and a decision was taken by the elected Government to hold elections as early as possible, so that the management of the societies may be handed over to the mewly elected bodies and in order to ensure fair and free elections, the extended term of District Dairy Cooperative Unions was ourtailed by order dated 14.6.1994. (22). After careful considerations of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned orders dated 14.6.1994 and 15.6.1994 Annexures 3 and 5 to the writ petitions cannot be held to be invalid on the ground that they have been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and in view of the provisions of Section 36(1-B) and more-so that the petitioners term had expired, they were continuing on the basis of the extended order by the Government, they were not entitled to any opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned orders. (23). The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned orders dated 14.6.1994 and 15.6.1994 have been passed mala fide. (23). The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned orders dated 14.6.1994 and 15.6.1994 have been passed mala fide. It is well settled law that if any order is to be challenged on the ground of mala fide, it has to be specifically pleaded and has to be proved by cogent evidence, The bald assertion of mala fide cannot be the foundation for declaring any order to be invalid on the ground of mala fide, particularly when no bias or malice has been pleaded against any authority in the instant cases and as such, this submission also deserves to be discarded summarily. (24). The other ground on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to challenge the validity of the impugned order passed by the Registrar is that the Government of Rajasthan had delegated the powers of Ragistrar, Cooperative Societies to the Managing Director, Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Faderation, Jaipur and as such the Registrar ceased to have any jurisdiction and the order could be passed only by the Managing Director, Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Faderation, Jaipur. This contention has also been seriously disputed by the learned Advocate General, who submitted that the Managing Director of the Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Faderation, Jaipur has been appointed under section 3 of the Act to assist the Registrar and thereafter the powers of the Registrar have been conferred on him. The Registrar in exercise of his powers under section 3 (3) of superintendence and control, has issued order dated 13.9.91 that the persons appointed to assist him and who were conferred with the powers of Registrar, cannot exercise the power to appoint the Administrator under section 36(1-B) of the Act and they will be required to send their proposals in that behalf to the Registrar. A copy of the aforesaid order dated 13.9.1991 has been filed as Annexure R/3 to the short reply submitted on behalf of the respondents. Learned Advocate General has also submitted that it is not a case in which it can be said that the delegator and delegatee have exercised powers simultaneously and the said order cannot be held to be invalid on this ground. (25). Learned Advocate General has also submitted that it is not a case in which it can be said that the delegator and delegatee have exercised powers simultaneously and the said order cannot be held to be invalid on this ground. (25). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above contention also, but I am of the opinion that the said objection raised on behalf of the petitioners to invalidate the impugned order dated 15.6.94 passed by the Registrar cannot be sustained and deserves to be thrown out board. (26). Before parting with the case, I would like to observe that in my opinion the management of the elected bodies should not be allowed to be managed by the beaurocrates for a long period and the anxiety on the part of the Government should be to hand over the management to the elected bodies of the Cooperative Societies as early as possible. Even learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that they would welcome early elections of the Cooperative Societies. Learned Advocate General has made a statement at the bar that the respondents have already started the process of holding elections of the managing committee of the Primary Milk Producers Cooperative Societies in the State of Rajasthan. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the respondents may be directed to complete the elections from primary level to the district level within a period of one month, but according to the learned Advocate General it is not possible to complete the elections from primary level to district level within such a short time and even the counsel for the petitioner has also suggested that in any case the respondents should not be allowed to post-pone the elections for more than 3 months. Learned Advocate General has given solemn assurance to the Court that the elections from primary level to the district level shall be completed within a period of 4 months. In view of the statement made by the learned Advocate General that the election process has started, I see no reason why the elections cannot be completed within, a period of 3 months from today. In view of the statement made by the learned Advocate General that the election process has started, I see no reason why the elections cannot be completed within, a period of 3 months from today. I, therefore, direct that the elections for Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. In the State of Rajasthan should be completed within a period of three months from today, so that the management of the societies should be handed over to the newly elected bodies. (27). For the reasons stated above, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to make out a prima facie case for invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court and the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed in limin with the directions to the respondents No.l and 2 to hold elections for Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. in the State of Rajasthan within a period of 3 months from today. The interim orders passed in writ petitions No. 3526/94 and 3568/94 stand discharged.