JUDGMENT M.S. Vaidya, J - This is a Criminal Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the externment order dated 10/5/1993 passed against the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad and the confirmation of the said order by the Government of Maharashtra under orders dated 19th August, 1993. The petitioner has been externed under section 56 (1) (b) of the Bombay Police Act, for a period of two years from the districts of Aurangabad and Jalna. 2. The petitioner is a resident of Hanuman Nagar, Garkheda, Hussain Colony, Aurangabad and he carried on there the business of bricklaying and trading in that commodity. 3. On a report received by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cantonment area, Aurangabad, he issued under section 59 of the Bombay, Police Act, 1951 to the petitioner, a notice dated 8.1.1993. The averments in the Notice were that a reliable information was received and a report was submitted against the present petitioner to the effect that he had been attempting or was about to use force and intimidation for the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code, that the witnesses were not willing to come forth because of apprehension of danger of physical harm to their bodies or property of giving evidence against the petitioner and that, therefore, it was necessary to extern him from the district of Aurangabad and the adjoining districts of Jalna, Parbhani, Beed, Jalgaon and Ahmednagar, for a period of two years. The petitioner was called upon to appear before the Asst. Commissioner of Police, Cantonment area, Aurangabad on 18.1.1993 at about 10.00 a.m., either personally or through are preventative. It was, further, averred that the following offences were registered against him. Crime Nos. Under Sections 1. 202/90 354, 323, 279, 337 of I.P.C. 2. 377/90 324 324 and 504 of I.P.C. 3. 380/91 341 and 504 of I.P.C. 4. 70/92 324 of I.P.C. 5. 325/92 354 of I.P.C. 6. NC Case No: 859/92 504 and 506 of I.P.C. In addition, two Chapter cases bearing No. 3/92 and 49/92 initiated under section 110 (e) (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also referred to. It was not said in the Notice that on account of registration of the aforesaid offences and Chapter cases, it was felt necessary to extern him. It was not said in the Notice that on account of registration of the aforesaid offences and Chapter cases, it was felt necessary to extern him. But, it was averred in addition to that there were averments of the type detailed below against him: (i) The petitioner has been a resident of Garkheda area and has been carrying on the trade of brick-laying and selling. He has been a 'Gund' and a person of bullying tendencies and that he has created a terror in the minds of the population in Hussain Colony within the precincts of Garkheda and in Hanuman Nagar area, by behaving in a high-handed manner and by indulging in the acts of 'Gundaism'. It is, further, averred that he has been habitually teasing girls who were passers-by on the road and that he had been threatening the offended persons with murder after assaulting him if at all somebody is about to lodge a complaint Consequently, it was averred, none dared to come forth openly to give evidence or to lodge complaints against him. DID: 7TH FEBRUARY, 1994 (ii) That the petitioner considers himself to be a 'Dada' in the locality and he compels, in the evening, the hotel-keepers to close their hotels. He threatens with the help of his associates the persons who refused to close the hotels and causes damages to the hotels. However, no hotel-keeper dares to report such offences at the police Station on account of the bullying pressure operated by the petitioner. (iii) The petitioner always carries a naked sword in his hands while being drunk all the time and ensures to create a terror in the aforesaid area. He also catches hands of girls passing by the road and tease them. Such girls do not report the incidents at Police Station to avoid bringing them to disrepute. The petitioner has been a party to use force and give threats for the purposes of creating alarm and terror in the minds of the inhabitants of Hussain Colony, Hanuman Nagar Garkheda. Such activities constitute offences punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The petitioner appeared before the Assistant Commissioner of Police at Aurangabad, in response to the aforesaid Notice and filed his Written Statement, denying the allegations made against him in the said Notice. Such activities constitute offences punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The petitioner appeared before the Assistant Commissioner of Police at Aurangabad, in response to the aforesaid Notice and filed his Written Statement, denying the allegations made against him in the said Notice. He explained that out of the crimes listed in the Notice, the former Assistant Commissioner had made inquiry into the offence registered at Crime No. 202/90 and had found that the complainant-Sumanbai had stated before him that the aforesaid complaint was lodged at the instance of the enemies of the petitioner and on account of some misunderstanding. Therefore, he contented that in respect of the aforesaid offence, the matter stood closed at the instance of Sumanbai. As regards the Crime No. 377/90, he stated that he was acquitted in that case as the complainant Dagdu Kaduba Khatre himself had not stated anything against the accused in that ease. This matter also was considered by the former Assistant Commissioner of Police and the matter stood closed so far as that offence was concerned. In respect of the third offence at Crime No. 380/91, he stated that the matter was compounded in the Court on 9.3.1992 and the complainant had stated that the complaint was lodged due to misunderstanding at the instance of the enemies of the petitioner. In respect of the fourth offence at Crime No. 70192 it was contended that the same was lodged at the instance of one Shakeel and the same had got to be overruled. In respect of the fifth offence at Crime No. 325192, he contended that the first informant - Aatti Kotecha had relations with one Shakeel and that the complaint was lodged at his instance. He contended, this was a false complaint and the matter had been closed at the level of Jawahar Nagar Police Station. As regards offence at Crime No. 859/92 and the two chapter cases, referred to in the notice, he stated that they were based upon false information given to the police. It was also contended that Chapter cases could not form basis of an externment proceeding. Then, he referred to several certificates produced by him and the resolutions stating that he was a person of good behaviour and was a gentleman. It was also contended that Chapter cases could not form basis of an externment proceeding. Then, he referred to several certificates produced by him and the resolutions stating that he was a person of good behaviour and was a gentleman. As regards the averment in the Notice regarding commission of rape on a daughter of a tenant, his contention was that one Sheikh Shakeel Buddhan, had instigated the woman to speak orally about the assault etc. and there was no inquiry at the Police Station nor any complaint. He submitted that the averment was founded on imaginary facts. In connection with the averment regarding the hotel-keepers and shop owners, he denied the averments and produced several certificates of the shop-keepers and hotel-keepers. The averments in para 4 regarding terror generated by his unruly conduct, he contended that the said averments were false and that it was not true that the witnesses were not coming forward to give evidence against him. In respect of Mr. Shakeel, he said he had lost the election in the Corporation and that, therefore, he was submitting false applications against the petitioner who had canvassed against him. In pursuance of this Written Statement, the petitioner examined about 12 witnesses before the Entering Authority. 5. After considering the material placed before him the learned Deputy Commissioner of Police proceed to pass the impugned internment order. It may be noted here itself, that the externment order itself refers specifically to the period between 1990 to 1992 in the context of the alleged four items of mis-behaviour on the part of the petitioner and had also specified in the order that the said mis-behaviour was in the area of Hussain Colony, Garkheda, Hanuman Nagar. The order had recorded the subjective satisfaction of the Dy. Commissioner of Police to the effect, that there was a strong possibility of there being danger caused at the instance of the petitioner to the safety and security of the property and the person of the inhabitants of the locality. The order stated specifically that the assaults on the inhabitants fell within the scope of Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, and the acts of causing injuries or, molesting women or administering threats of life did fall within Chapter XVII, of the Indian Penal Code. The order stated specifically that the assaults on the inhabitants fell within the scope of Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, and the acts of causing injuries or, molesting women or administering threats of life did fall within Chapter XVII, of the Indian Penal Code. It was recorded that the area of which the petitioner was the inhabitant, was a very sensitive area in which persons from various communities were the inhabitants. It recorded the subjective satisfaction of the Dy. Commissioner of Police that on account of the activities of the petitioner, a terror was prevailing among the inhabitants and was likely to increase gradually. The order, then, made a reference to the criminal cases and Chapter cases registered against the petitioner and concluded that they could indicate the criminal and terrorist tendencies of the petitioner and that it was, therefore, necessary to extern him. It also recorded that though the petitioner was given ample opportunity to explain his contentions, he did not avail adequately of the opportunities given to him. Consequently, the externment order stated that the petitioner was externed for a period of two years from the area of the Commission rate of Aurangabad and the area of Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad (Rural) and from the area of Jalna district. 6. The matter was carried in Appeal to the Government and the petitioner was given an opportunity to place his case before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority delivered a judgment dated 19.8.1993 confusing the externment order. A copy of that judgment and order is placed on record. 7. The Appellate Authority referred to the statements of the witnesses recorded on behalf of the petitioner as also to his statements and the Written Statement submitted in the matter. The learned Appellate Authority noted the contention of the petitioner that the Chapter cases and criminal cases at Crime Nos. 202/90 and 377/90 would not be considered for the purposes of externment order and had pointed out that the registration bf Indian Penal Code cases and Chapter cases was not the main ground for the externment of the appellant. He also noted that the final results of the former proceedings were never placed on record for perusal of the Authority in question nor was it stated how the previous externment proceeding had come to an end. He also noted that the final results of the former proceedings were never placed on record for perusal of the Authority in question nor was it stated how the previous externment proceeding had come to an end. The Appellate Authority considered Crime No. 377/90 in which the complainant himself had not supported the prosecution story and had compounded the matter with the petitioner. He had also noted that a Crime No. 380/91, the complainant and the appellant had compromised the matter and that Crime No. 202/90, the complainant had not even deposed against the appellant. In Crime No. 70/92, only the complainant had come forward to depose against the appellant and non else. In Crime No. 325/92, again, the witnesses other than the complainant were declared hostile. The Appellate Authority pointed out that it was mainly in relation to the latter allegation in the show-cause notice that it was mentioned that the witnesses were not willing to come forward and the satisfaction on that point of the Entering Authority was recorded in the final order he, therefore, held that there was no question of non-application of mind by the DCP. A reference was made to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner before the Appellate Authority that the cases in which he was acquitted before the issue of the notice should not have been taken into consideration for passing the externment order. In that context, the Appellate Authority observed that even though mentioned in the show-cause notice, they have been deleted from consideration at the time of passing of the final order and only the cases pending at the time of the show-cause notice have been considered by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and, further, that therefore, it could not be said that the cases in which the appellant had been acquitted prior to the issue of the show-cause notice have been wrongly considered by the Dy. Commissioner of Police, while passing the order of externment. The learned Appellate Authority also considered the submission made on behalf of the petitioner before him that cases which were included in the earlier notice and which were dropped, could not be considered for passing the externment order. On perusal of the former notice dated 28/1/1991 and the notice in the present case, he found that the only common case was Cr. No. 202/90. Probably, Cr. On perusal of the former notice dated 28/1/1991 and the notice in the present case, he found that the only common case was Cr. No. 202/90. Probably, Cr. No. 377/90 also was referred to in the previous notice, but the learned Appellate Authority had not made a reference to that Finally, the Appellate Authority found that pendency of a major case was not really the ground for externment, but there were other cases and allegations which had been considered by the Dy. Commissioner of Police, while passing the externment order. 8. Mr. Karmarkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, attacked the externment order as well as the judgment of the Appellate Court on three grounds. In the first place, it was contended that the orders were indicative of total non-application of mind by the authorities below, because, the notice as well as the externment order did not refer to acquittals or the reasons of acquittals. Secondly, it was contended that the explanation giver by the Appellate Authority about the pendency of the cases and the acquittals was not very satisfactory because, none had said that the compromises were brought about by force. The next contention of Mr. Karmarkar, was that the allegations even in, sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) in the Notice were vague, in as much as, they did not indicate the period and the place at which the petitioner had misbehaved accordingly. Finally, he submitted that the order in question was excessive, because it was not necessary to extern the petitioner, in an event, from both the districts of Jalna and Aurangabad, in as much as, it was nobody s case that the petitioner had indulged in any illegal activities in the District of Jalna. He submitted that an excessive order so passed by the Entering Authority could not be corrected by this Court as this was not a Court sitting in Appeal over the matter and that consequently the entire order had to be quashed and set aside. 9. A number of rulings were cited, both by the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned APP. On considering those rulings carefully, we find that the following proposition Emerged from those rulings: - In Re: Govind Pandurang Phalke1 (Division Bench), the period of illegal activities of the externee as well as the place were indicated in the notice, though in broad terms. On considering those rulings carefully, we find that the following proposition Emerged from those rulings: - In Re: Govind Pandurang Phalke1 (Division Bench), the period of illegal activities of the externee as well as the place were indicated in the notice, though in broad terms. While considering the validity of the notice and the externment order, it was observed: (i) Section 56 does not provide that the movements or the acts of the propose externee should also be the movements or the acts in presentiae or in the approximate or immediate past. (ii) Therefore, the only relevant consideration is whether a particular activity or movement of the person concerned causes or is calculated to cause alarm, and it is left to the satisfaction of the Entering Authority whether such activity or movement of the person concerned, in fact, causes or is calculated to cause alarm. Such a conclusion must of course be bona fide. (iii) It is not necessary that the general allegations should be particularized. But, it is true that the general nature must be if such a nature as to gave him a reasonable opportunity of tendering explanation regarding them. (iv) Thus the test is whether the person concerned was given a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding the material allegations against him and if that is satisfied it is futile to consider whether proper particulars were given This decision was referred to by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Mehbubkhan2 but it was not commented upon in view of the observations in that ruling. 10. The validity of provisions contained in Sections 56 to 59 came to be challenged in Hari Khemu Gawli v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay3. In that case, three specific instances of acquittal and discharge for want of evidence were relied upon besides the wrest of the externee for a fourth offence. The proposal for externment was founded on those averments only. The person was ordered to be externed from the State of Maharashtra. The Supreme Coon held: (i) A person cannot be ordered to be removed out of State. (ii) The absence of provisions like Advisory Board etc does not effect the validity of the provisions. (iii) The law of externment was precaution any and, therefore, founded on suspicion. The person was ordered to be externed from the State of Maharashtra. The Supreme Coon held: (i) A person cannot be ordered to be removed out of State. (ii) The absence of provisions like Advisory Board etc does not effect the validity of the provisions. (iii) The law of externment was precaution any and, therefore, founded on suspicion. The Coon is the least appropriate Tribunal to investigate into the circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be based. (iv) The section provides sufficient safeguards by entrusting the work of senior officials and Magistrates and the person proceeded against is not "prosecuted" but is "kept out of harm's way". The proceeding is not akin to the detention proceeding and the provisions are not akin to the detention law. (v) The authority charged with the duty of passing the orders has to examine the information led before him. (vi) As the police are also charged with the duty to prevent crime, it cannot be said that the provision militates against the principle that the prosecutor should not be a Judge. (vii) It is not a general proposition of law that a previous order of discharge of acquittal cannot be taken into account by the authorities while dealing with a case for orders u/s 57 of the Bombay Police Act It is not for the Supreme Coon to examine afresh in an objective way the materials and to be satisfied that the order was correct. Though the judicial scrutiny of the externment order is not ruled out, the grounds available to the extreme are necessarily very limited. The relevant provisions were, therefore, upheld by the Supreme Court. 11. In Bhagubai Bhandari v. District Magistrate Thana4 somewhat similar questions were raised and decided on the application of the aforesaid principles and the petitions were dismissed. In the context or averment that the witnesses were not willing to come for to give evidence on account of the terror, it was laid down in that ruling that all the witnesses need not be proved unwilling to come forth. It was enough if some of them were unwilling. This ruling was followed later on the last mentioned point by the Supreme Court in Pandharinath v. State of Maharashtra5. 12. It was enough if some of them were unwilling. This ruling was followed later on the last mentioned point by the Supreme Court in Pandharinath v. State of Maharashtra5. 12. In State of Gujarat v. Mehbubkhan (supra), the notice and the externment order did indicate the period of illegal activity and the area in which the said activity was allegedly being carried out. Hence, on facts, it was held that the notice was not vague. The facts of the case indicate also that Written Statement was filed by the extender before the Magistrate and he had, examined witnesses also. Therefore, in fact, there was nothing to show that the internee was misled or prejudiced on account of the alleged vagueness in the notice or the order. The State Appeal was allowed and the Supreme Court upheld the externment order. It was, further, laid down in this ruling that the contention that in the absence of particulars, no contentions could have been raised by the internee in Appeal was also repelled following the ruling in Hari Khemu's case (supra). On this point, this ruling was followed later on in Pandhranith v. State of Maharashtra (supra). 13. In Pandharinath v. State of Maharashtra (supra), it was laid down that the Externing authority must decide the period for which the order is to operate and the territories to which it should extend, pointing out, further, that it depends on the nature of the data collected in each case and general formulation is possible, what was to be ensured was that there should not be greater restraint on personal liberty than is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In this context, the Supreme Court made reference to the decision in Balu Shivling v. D.M. Pandhapur6 in which the externment was from three districts when the activity of the person was limited only to one village and there was no easy mobility between the districts. But, on facts of the case, it was held that the externment of the appellant-Pandharinath from Greater Bombay and Thana district was valid because of the mobility of the population of the areas and the easy means of transport. The fact that an externment order was excessive in its operation was one of the grounds in Pandhrinath from case for consideration. The fact that an externment order was excessive in its operation was one of the grounds in Pandhrinath from case for consideration. But the observations made in that context, were considered by the Division Bench of this High Court in Umar Mohammad Malbari v. K.P. Gaikwad7, and it was held that if the order was excessive, the High Court had no jurisdiction to correct the order while exercising the writ jurisdiction because, it was not an Appellate Court. The only course open, it was held, was to quash and set aside the order. 14. Apart from these leading cases, references were made to several other rulings also. In Abdul Kadir v. Sub divisional Magistrate8, (Division Bench (Puranik and Saldhanha JJ.) in particular, the following observations were referred to: "Dealing with the fast submission advanced by Mr. Patil, namely, that as far as the present notice is concerned it suffers from the vice of vagueness, Mr. Kothari has submitted that both the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently taken the view that as long as the general and material particulars are set out that the notice in question would pass the test of legal scrutiny. There is no dispute with regard to this proposition, but it is also essential that while setting out the charges against the person concerned, that the time, the date, the place, the nature of the incident, etc. should be circumscribed within such reasonable limits that it would be possible for the person concerned to adequately meet those charges." It was submitted, on the basis of the aforesaid observations, that it was necessary in the present case to indicate the aforesaid particulars, particularly in respect of the four allegations made in sub paragraphs (1) to (4) of the Notice. 15. It is difficult to subscribe to that submission because as pointed out above, in re: Govind Pandurang's case (supra), a division Bench of this Court had held that it was not necessary that general allegation should be particularised, though the general nature must be of such a nature as to give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering explanation regarding them. Again, in Bar; Khemu's case (supra) and, in State of Gujarat v. Mehbubkhan (supra) also such submissions were repelled by the Supreme Court. Again, in Bar; Khemu's case (supra) and, in State of Gujarat v. Mehbubkhan (supra) also such submissions were repelled by the Supreme Court. Indeed, in Abdul Kadir's case (supra), itself when it was pointed out, on facts, that the show-cause notice referred to certain incidents and the authority had also indicated the case that were pending against the petitioner, the Division Bench had come to the conclusion that the contention urged on behalf of the extreme on the point of vagueness could not be accepted. Indeed, when the constitutionality of the provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court and when, as held by the Courts, general material allegations were sufficient for enabling the extending authority to take further steps, it could not be said that for want of detailed particulars, the notice or the externment order suffered from vagueness. 16. A reference may be made, again, to the text of the Notice dated 8.1.1993 which was issued, against the petitioner, The Notice did indicate that what was being considered was the criminal and terrorist tendency of the petitioner in the years 1990 to 1992, on the basis of registration of Several cases against him. It was, in that contact that the averments in sub paragraphs (1) to (4) came in. They indicated that such illegal and terrorizing activities were being carried on persistently in Hussain Colony, Garkheda, Hanuman Nagar. Thus, the periods as well as the places were sufficiently indicated in the notice as also the nature of the activities in general terms. 17. Coming, then, to the extreme order, para 2 of that order clearly averred I.P.C. that the activities in the year 1990 to 1992 were being considered from the area of Hussain Colony, Garkheda, Hanuman Nagar. The subjective satisfaction of the Extending Authority was also recorded on the basis of evidence tendered before him. The learned A.P.P. made available to us the original file as well, though that was not necessary because, it was distinctly laid down by the Supreme Court that it was not for the Court to satisfy itself subjectively about the correctness of the allegations. The aforesaid file did contain several statements in support of the averments. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of Mr. Karmarkar that the Notice as well as the externment order were bad on account of vagueness. 18. The aforesaid file did contain several statements in support of the averments. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of Mr. Karmarkar that the Notice as well as the externment order were bad on account of vagueness. 18. The second contention was about the non-application of mind. It was urged with some tenacity that the cases which had ended in acquittal or, which were compounded were also indicated in the Notice as well as in the externment order, as pending cases. Nyae Pervist It was submitted that when while considering the previous notice the entering authority had taken into account those cases, it was legally not permissible to consider that case again, for the purposes of passing an externment order. In this context, it is necessary to note the distinction between a Notice or an order founded on such previous registration of crimes and or the convictions or acquittals therein and, it is another thing to refer to that factual aspect as a circumstance, on the basis of which it was thought that the petitioner had a terrorizing or criminal tendency. The Appellate authority has indicated this distinction in his order and, to our mind it appears that he was right there. In the present case, the order is not founded on the mere regulation of offences or the pendency of cases or the acquittal or conviction secured therein, though the previous instances are indicated only to show how the externing authority or the reporting police authority had reason to believe that the petitioner did possess a terrorizing and criminal tendency. Abdul Kadir's case (supra) could not be a authority on this point because, it appears that, in that case, the order was, probably, founded the criminal cases itself. Non-application of mind was indicated by mention of two acquittals named as pending cases as also from the reproduction of the ingredients of Section 56 with an appendage "I am satisfied that". Such is certainly not the case in the present proceeding From the Written Statement filed by the Petitioner before the Externing authority itself, it is very clear that it was not the case of the petitioner that no such cases were ever filled against him. Such is certainly not the case in the present proceeding From the Written Statement filed by the Petitioner before the Externing authority itself, it is very clear that it was not the case of the petitioner that no such cases were ever filled against him. He had his own explanation about the reasons of termination of those proceedings is does not appear from the record that the witnesses who were not examined in the cases in which the acquittals came in despite the recording of the evidence of complainant or on account of the compromise, were not for the reasons for which the notice of externment was issued to the petitioner. In any event, the Written Statement did not indicate that it was the contention of the petitioner that on account of the vagueness of allegations in the notice of experiment, he had suffered any prejudice while putting on his case before the entering authority. It was not his case even at this stage, that due hearing was not given to him in respect of the cases in which he was acquitted on account of composition with the complainant or on account of inability of the prosecution to examine all the witnesses in those criminal cases. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the Entering authority had not applied his mind to that aspect of the case. The use of the word Nyae Pervist is the notice as well in the experiment order could, possibly, indicate the cases in which the police had charge sheet him thereby indicating that the cases were not merely private cases. In this very context, it may be noted that in the externment notice, allegation No. 2 pertained to a rape on some girl. But, while passing the final order of externment that was not even taken into account by the Entering authority. This elimination could not have occurred unless mind was applied to that fact Again, it is pertinent to note that in the Written Statement the petitioner did not contend that no such case was ever sought to be made out against him. In para 9 of his Written, Statement, he submitted that Shakeel Sk. Buddhan, had instigated one lady to say orally in respect of the assault etc. In para 9 of his Written, Statement, he submitted that Shakeel Sk. Buddhan, had instigated one lady to say orally in respect of the assault etc. This plea in the Written Statement itself shows that the petitioner was not only aware of the person who was out to make such averment, but also of the fact that she had not lodged the complaint and the police could not, therefore, make any inquiry into the matter. Under such circumstances, we do not think that the challenge to the impugned order on the ground of non-application of mind can be sustained. 8TH FEBRUARY, 1994 19. In this context we also observe that the provisions of Section 56 to 58 of the Bombay Police Act, have been examined by the Supreme court more than once to assess the Constitutionality or otherwise of those provisions and few tile reasons recorded by the Supreme court their Lordships have considered that those provisions did not violate fundamental rights the principles of natural justice are, as pointed out by the supreme Court, supervening see Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat9 But the above-mentioned decision in re: Govind Pandurang and Hari Khemu's case have indicated that all that the Courts had to do in such matters was to consider whether or not, a proper opportunity was given to a proposed externee to represent his case before the concerned authorities and that as the law of externment was precautionary and, therefore, founded on suspicion of the authorities concerned with maintenance of law and order situation, the Court were the least appropriate Tribunals to investigate into the circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory must be based. It was sought to be contended before us that when there were acquittals and compositions of cases filed against the petitioner, the presumption was of innocence and that, therefore it was not proper for the authorities to consider those cases for any purpose. The presumption of innocence is ordinarily. In context of prosecutions and not in the matter of preventive actions. There is no presumption of law that every activity of an individual is innocent or law-abiding or conducive to maintenance of law and order. The presumption of innocence is ordinarily. In context of prosecutions and not in the matter of preventive actions. There is no presumption of law that every activity of an individual is innocent or law-abiding or conducive to maintenance of law and order. The nature of the activity is to be inferred from outward manifestations of we conduct and consequences there of It may therefore, be wrong to found the orders of externment only on counting the number of previous prosecution launched against the proposed externee or, on stale prosecution. But, it is probably not wrong to infer that a person against whom several prosecutions (particularly those not arising from personal property rights) are launched is a person having criminal tendencies. A notorious dacoit of old times, appearing in a particular area after a long time in the company of his former associates may give one a reasonable apprehension of his proposed unlawful activity and it cannot a that under such circumstances, the authorities concerned with maintenance of law and order situation should not be apprehensive of his illegal activities so as to induce them to take steps for preventing the activity of such a notorious person of criminal tendencies. It is now, high time also to note that compromises in criminal cases do not necessarily indicate that nothing of criminal nature had happened when the prosecution was launched. It is a known fact that compromises are arrived at in criminal matters on several considerations. In an inquiry of a present type the burden of proving that the compromises were arrived at bona fide and not out of fear complex or, that nothing of criminal nature had happened and that the case was instituted due to some factors, such as, misunderstanding etc. would be, ordinarily, on the person who had brought about the compromises. It is in this light that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Bari Khemu's case (supra) to the effect that it was not a general proposition of law that a previous order of discharge or acquittal could not be taken into account by the authorities while dealing with an order under section 57 of the Bombay Police Act, are to be appreciated. The authority dealing with the proceedings under sections 56 to 58 of the Bombay Police Act, are required to decide, whether or not, the preventive action contemplated by the aforesaid provisions were called for in view of the situation prevailing at the time of considering the case vis-a-vis the criminal tendencies exhibited by the proposed extreme and the criminal activities indulged in by him. 20. Three more rulings which were cited before us in this context, may be referred to briefly because, it appears that mostly they were decisions on facts of the case before this Court. In Abdul Wahab v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate Malegaon10, it is specifically noted in para 3 of the report of the judgment that the respondents in that matter had not filed any returns opposite the Writ Petition. No particular law point was discussed or involved in that case and of application of mind by the authority was the only ground on which the imposed order was set aside. It is also to be noted that in facts of that case, the Court had felt like accepting the submission on behalf of the petitioner that Section 56 (1) (b) of the Bombay Police Act, would not be attracted in a case that was compromised in as much as in a compromise in the question of at witnesses being afraid of giving evidence at the Court did not/arise. This is not a case in which circumstances under which the case was compromise were ever placed on record before the Court. On the facts of the case, presumably, previous 8 offences, out of which some were lodged by the petitioner's wife herself, and some other compounded cases were the foundation of the order. It does not appear to be the contention [even of the state] in that case urged or answered that the criminal tendencies of the person were evident from the first information reports lodged against him and that they had caused an apprehension that he would be indulging in the criminal activity. On the second ground referred to above, it was held, on facts, that the contention that witnesses were not coming forth to give evidence had no sound basis. The second ruling cited before us was Subhash Ganu Bhoir v. K.P. Raghuwanshi11. On the second ground referred to above, it was held, on facts, that the contention that witnesses were not coming forth to give evidence had no sound basis. The second ruling cited before us was Subhash Ganu Bhoir v. K.P. Raghuwanshi11. In para 4 of the report of the judgment itself indicates that, in that matter also, this Court had proceeded in the absence of any reply filed by the respondents. This Court had found that the petitioner was a social worker and that the acquittals in the eases lodged against him previously were honourable acquittals. There was no question for consideration as to, whether or not the criminal cases lodged against him would indicate his criminal tendencies. Under such circumstances, certain observations were made which are founded on the facts of the case rather than on any principle of law. The third case was Ram Narayan Patil v. The State of Maharashlra12. Para 6 of the report of the judgment indicates that, in this case also, the Public Prosecutor had to mention before the Court that he had no opportunity perusal the relevant papers to find out certain factual details because, the Investigating officer did not remain present in the Court to instruct him. It appears that the Court had adjourned the matter on prior occasions for the same reasons and the Court was not inclined to grant further adjournment It was on this back-ground that the Court had decided the case with the available material. The facts indicate that the three criminal cases which were referred to substantiate the allegation that the witnesses were not coming forth to give evidence were only the disputes over private rights over the water in a well. The witnesses were specified by the prosecution and yet none had said why the witnesses had not attended the trials in respect of those offences. It was under such circumstances that the material was found insufficient for upholding the experiment order. 21. The facts of the present case are not like any of the aforesaid three cases. The case is contested by the State by filing appropriate affidavit and the original record of the proceeding is made available to this Court. On that basis, it is not possible for us to conclude that this was a case of non-application of mind or that it fast a case of vague allegations. 22. The case is contested by the State by filing appropriate affidavit and the original record of the proceeding is made available to this Court. On that basis, it is not possible for us to conclude that this was a case of non-application of mind or that it fast a case of vague allegations. 22. The last ground which was urged by Mr. Karmarkar for challenging the impugned order was that the order in question was excessive. Mr. Karmarkar, pointed out at length, how all the allegations pertained to the area which is known as Hussain Colony, Garkheda, Hanuman Nagar and that the said area had nothing to do with the District of Jalna. He submitted that there was no justification whatsoever for entering the petitioner from district of Jalna as well. Therefore, relying upon the ruling in Umar Mohammad Malbari v. K.P. Gaikwad (supra), he submitted, that the excessive order could not be sustained and that the order as a whole deserved to be quashed and set aside. 23. In reply to this, the learned A.P.P. submitted that formerly Garkheda, ChikaIthana, Karmad and Shekta, were four adjoining villages in the proximity of the city of Aurangabad and that, out of them first two have come within the area of the Police Commission rate at Aurangabad and the remaining two have remained in the area controlled by the Dy. Superintendent of Police (Rural) Aurangabad. The distance between proper Aurangabad and Shekta is said to be but 30 kms. Next to that is the area, which comes under the Badnapur Police Station in Jalna district and the distance between proper Aurangabad and Badnapur, was about 36 kms. Thus, he indicated that the places were in close proximity of each other and they were mainly on a State highway. It is also pointed out that both Aurangabad and Jalna and the villages from those districts I abutting the State Highway have been growing n fast particularly, due to increase in industries and It trade and that the means of conveyance between it Arungabad and Jalna, have beep prompt, regular and manifold. It was submitted that there were private as well as Service plying between Aurangabad and Jalna. Both the Aurangabad and Jalna are connected by railway also. Besides, there are taxi services plying regularly between Aurangabad and Jalna and the intervening places. It was submitted that there were private as well as Service plying between Aurangabad and Jalna. Both the Aurangabad and Jalna are connected by railway also. Besides, there are taxi services plying regularly between Aurangabad and Jalna and the intervening places. If such transport facilities are quick enough, interment of a particular person from the district of Aurangabad and not from the district of Jalnar would virtually mean that there was not externment at all because, in the light of circumstances aforesaid, it not possible for a person having criminal tendencies to carry on his criminal activities from such a short distance as well. It would not even be possible for the police machinery to trace and locate if any secret visits were made from one place to another for prosecution of I such criminal activities. Indeed, under somewhat similar circumstances, the Supreme Court had upheld in Pandherinath v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the externment of a person allegedly carrying on criminal activities in Greater Bombay, from the Greater Bombay as well as the whole, of district Thane. The mobility of the teeming population was the main consideration, which had led the Supreme Court to consider how such an externment order was justifiable. Somewhat similar would be the case in the context of the present petitioner. It is not, therefore, possible for us, sitting as a Co. to say that the apprehension of the police authorities responsible for regulating Aurangabad district were unreasonable in thinking that the externment of the petitioner should be from Aurangabad district as well as the district of Jalna. Under such circumstances, we do not consider the externment order excessive order in the facts and circumstances of this case. 24. In result we find no substance in the Writ Petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. Writ Petition dismissed. 1.A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 61 (DB). 2. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1468. 3. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 559. 4. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 585. 5. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 630. 6. 71 BLR 79. 7.1988 M.H.L.R. 1586. 8.1991 (1) Bom. C.R. 589. 9. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1471. 10. 1992 Crl. L.J. 326. 11. 1987 (1) Bom. C.R. 425. 12. 1987 (1) Bom C.R. 471.