JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Plaintiffs have come up in appeal against the judgment and decree passed on 26th July, 1989 by Additional District Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamsala, allowing the defendants appeal and dismissing the plaintiffs suit, thereby reversing the judgment and decree passed on 5th April, 1986, by Sub-Judge First Class, Dehra. by which the suit of the plaintiffs had been decreed. The appeal was admitted on the following questions of law: 1. Whether the gift deed executed by Chinti by a registered gift deed completed the gift and became binding on Smt. Chinti and the defendant? 2. Whether the gift could not be complete unless it was coupled with delivery of possession though it was executed and registered by the donee? 3. Whether the defendant could set up the plea of adverse possession, when the title was claimed on the basis of Will of Chinti? 2. Decree for declaration as regards their title and regarding entries in the revenue record was claimed by the plaintiffs with consequential relief of injunction and in the alternative for possession. Foundation for the claim was laid by alleging that Chinti owned and possessed the suit property, who on 21st April, 1949, gifted the same in favour of Mansa Ram, the father of the plaintiffs. The gift was duly given effect to in the revenue record when mutation thereupon was duly attested and ever since Mansa Ram, their father had been coming in continuous possession of the property as an owner and on his death, they rightly inherited the property as his heirs. They questioned the correctness of the entries by alleging that Smt. Chinti was not in occupation of the property and her name had erroneously been recorded as a tenant. She was never inducted as a tenant. The defendant had now started claiming himself to be the legatee, on the basis of some oral Will, alleged to have been made in his favour by Chinti. Neither Chinti had any subsisting title to the suit property, nor the alleged Will, if any, made by her could affect the plaintiffs right over the property. Thus the plaintiffs feeling aggrieved had no option but to protect their rights by filing the suit. 3. Neither Chinti had any subsisting title to the suit property, nor the alleged Will, if any, made by her could affect the plaintiffs right over the property. Thus the plaintiffs feeling aggrieved had no option but to protect their rights by filing the suit. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendant by alleging that the suit land was owned and possessed by Chinti and she continued to be its owner till her death, where after he had succeeded to her estate, on the basis of a Will executed by her. The defendant denied that Chinti made any gift in favour of plaintiffs father. It was also pleaded that in case any gift deed is found to have been executed, the same was neither acted upon, nor possession was delivered to the donee and since Chinti was in possession of the property, she must be presumed to be the owner. It was pleaded in the alternative that in case gift is found to have been made, Chinti was in occupation of the property as a tenant and in case the tenancy is not proved, Chinti was in possession of the property continuously in assertion of her right as an owner to the knowledge of all concerned, which possession of her had ripened into full ownership thereby extinguishing all rights, title and interest of the plaintiff, if any. The parties were taken to trial on the following issues: 1. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has cause of action? OPP 6. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? OPP 7. Whether Smt. Chinti executed a valid gift in favour of pre-decessor-in-interest of the plaintiff? If so, its effect? OPP 8. Whether Smt. Chinti was not a tenant under the plaintiff? OPP 9. In case previous issue is proved in negative, whether Smt. Chinti executed a valid will in favour of the defendants, if so to what effect? OPP 10. Whether Smt. Chinti had become owner by way of adverse possession, if so to what effect? OPD 4. The original deed of gift was not produced by the plaintiffs. OPP 9. In case previous issue is proved in negative, whether Smt. Chinti executed a valid will in favour of the defendants, if so to what effect? OPP 10. Whether Smt. Chinti had become owner by way of adverse possession, if so to what effect? OPD 4. The original deed of gift was not produced by the plaintiffs. A prayer was made for leading secondary evidence under section 65 of the Evidence Act. Such a prayer was allowed on 17th March, 1984 and the plaintiffs were allowed to prove the factum of due execution of deed of gift by leading secondary evidence, which they did by proving its certified copy Ex. PW 2/A, obtained from the office of Sub-Registrar, Dharamsala. It was held that Chinti executed a valid gift in. favour of Mansa Ram. It was also held that defendant had failed to prove that Smt. Chinti occupied the property as a tenant. Her possession over the suit property was held to be permissive one. The execution of the Will by Chinti was held to be having no effect on the rights of the plaintiffs qua the suit property. Plaintiffs were held to be in possession and thus decree for declaration with consequential relief of injunction was granted. The appeal of the defendant was allowed by reversing (.he findings of fact recorded by the trial Court as regards the gift. It was held that Chinti never executed a valid gift in favour of Mansa Ram, since it was necessary at the relevant time for making gift that the same should have been accompanied by actual delivery of the possession of the property. During the pendency of the appeal, permission to adduce additional evidence was allowed when the defendant-appellant produced the original gift. It was also held that even the gift deed remained in Chintis possession, thus no title was conveyed or vested with Mansa Ram. Alternatively, it was held that Chinti by remaining in occupation of the property continuously for a period of more than twelve years before the institution of suit will be deemed to have become owner of the suit property by holding it adversely. This judgment and decree is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Alternatively, it was held that Chinti by remaining in occupation of the property continuously for a period of more than twelve years before the institution of suit will be deemed to have become owner of the suit property by holding it adversely. This judgment and decree is under challenge in this appeal. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that since the gift was made by a registered instrument, therefore, it was not necessary that it should have been followed by actual delivery of possession. The alternate submission is that even if it be assumed that delivery of possession was essential, circumstances are such, which would suggest that not only that the gift was duly accepted by the donee but the same was also accompanied by actual delivery of possession. Another submission made is that, in so far as the plea of adverse possession of the defendant is concerned, there is absolutely neither any evidence on record nor any material justifying the upholding of such a plea that Chinti held the property adversely to the plaintiff. Findings to that extent by the lower appellate Court are based on no evidence and are vitiated. In any case, the defendant having taken totally divergent pleas, it was not permissible to have held that case for adverse possession was made out. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that the circumstance that the original gift deed had not come from the custody of the plaintiffs but was produced on record by the defendant would suggest that it remained with Chinti and was never acted upon. Consequently, it is contended that even if permission to lead secondary evidence was^ allowed, there is no evidence adduced regarding the due execution and attestation of the gift deed. Smt. Chinti had disowned having made any gift m favour of Mansa Ram and the attestation on the document is not in consonance with law. Lastly, the submission made is that in order to make a valid gift, it was necessary that the same should have been followed by actual delivery of possession. The circumstance that Chinti was in possession would be sufficient to hold that the gift was not followed by delivery of possession. Thus no valid gift can be said to have been made. 7. The circumstance that Chinti was in possession would be sufficient to hold that the gift was not followed by delivery of possession. Thus no valid gift can be said to have been made. 7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having gone through the record, I am of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court deserves to be set aside. 8. The suit property is located in village Bhadal, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, which prior to the coming into force of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, formed part of the State of Punjab. It is also an admitted position that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act did not apply to the State of Punjab on the date when the gift is stated to have been made by Smt. Chinti in favour of Mansa Ram on 21st September, 1949. In case the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable on the relevant date, gift could be made orally provided it was followed by actual delivery of possession. The fact that the gift was evidenced by a registered document, will be of no consequence, since execution of a writing was not necessary under Hindu Law, in order to make a valid gift. 9. In the case of gifts by Hindus to that part in which the Transfer of Property Act did not apply, a gift could validly be made orally or in writing. But to make it a valid sift, it was necessary under the Hindu Law or even under custom that the same should be accompanied by delivery of possession of the subject-matter of the gift from the donor to the donee. In case a document was executed and the same was got registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, mere registration of the deed of gift also could not be considered to be equivalent to delivery of possession and as such delivery of document was not sufficient to pass title from the donor to the donee. Further more the actual delivery of possession was not necessary, where from the nature and character of the property, physical possession was not capable of being delivered. In order to make a valid gift, it was enough that the donor had done all that would be sufficient so as to entitle the donee to obtain possession. Further more the actual delivery of possession was not necessary, where from the nature and character of the property, physical possession was not capable of being delivered. In order to make a valid gift, it was enough that the donor had done all that would be sufficient so as to entitle the donee to obtain possession. This is, in fact, an admitted proposition and has not been disputed by the learned Counsel for the parties. A reference be made to para 358 of the Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (Fifteenth Edition), which is appearing at page 476 and reads as under: "358. Delivery of possession.—(I) A gift under pure Hindu law need not be in writing. But a gift under that law is not valid unless it is accompanied by delivery of possession of the subject of the from the donor to the donee. Mere registration of a deed of gift is not equivalent to delivery of possession ; it is not therefore sufficient to pass the title of the property from the donor to the donee. But where from the nature of the case physical possession cannot be delivered, it is enough to validate a gift if the donor has done all that he could be complete the gift, so as to entitle the donee to obtain possession." 10. The position of law has also been noticed in Mohan Lai v. Smt. Sarju, 1973 SLJ, HP 241, by a learned single Judge of this Court. The gift in Mohan Lais case pertained to a property located in Himachal Pradesh, to which section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act did not apply. It was held in that case that: "............the effect of exempting the operation of these sections is to omit these sections from the Act as if they did not exist at all, thereby giving a right to the people to effect a gift orally, and the fact would remain that in order to complete the gift it must be accompanied by possession as required by the Hindu Law. An oral gift unless it is accompanied by possession cannot be said to be a complete gift. Under Hindu Law an oral gift is permissible but it must be accompanied with possession so as to make it operative. An oral gift unless it is accompanied by possession cannot be said to be a complete gift. Under Hindu Law an oral gift is permissible but it must be accompanied with possession so as to make it operative. So in view of this, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant does not appear to be tenable that on the execution of a registered deed which undoubtedly is notice to the whole world the gift will! be operative Excepting the operation of section 123 of the T. P. Act makes the provisions of this section non-existent in so far as the people in the rural areas in Himachal Pradesh are concerned Hence, the gift must be effect in accordance with the personal law of the parties which makes it in the case of the present parties necessary to deliver the possession of the property gifted.” 11. Thus in the instant case, in order to make a valid gift it was necessary that the same should have been accompanied by delivery" of possession, even in case it is held that Chinti had executed a deed of gift Due execution of deed of gift has to be presumed in this case on the strength of the provisions of section 90 of the Evidence Act. 12. As noticed, during the proceedings in the trial of the suit, the original deed of gift was not produced. A prayer was made for leading secondary evidence. It was alleged that gift deed was executed on 21st September, 1949 and the original had been misplaced and was not traceable by the plaintiffs, who were the successors of the original donee and thus permission was sought to lead the secondary evidence. The application was opposed by the defendant The parties were directed to adduce evidence as to whether the secondary evidence can or cannot be allowed. Om Parkash plaintiff appeared as a witness and stated that the gift was made about 30/35 years ago in the year 1949. A fire broke out in their house 25/26 years ago and thereafter the original deed of gift is not available. Where after, his father procured a certified copy thereof from the office of Sub-Registrar. No evidence was adduced by the defendant, who stated that the house of the plaintiffs never got burnt. A fire broke out in their house 25/26 years ago and thereafter the original deed of gift is not available. Where after, his father procured a certified copy thereof from the office of Sub-Registrar. No evidence was adduced by the defendant, who stated that the house of the plaintiffs never got burnt. Before the lower appellate Court, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made by the defendant praying for leading additional evidence. It was stated in the application that a thorough search was made of the belongings of Chinti from where the original gift deed was traced out and the same be permitted to be adduced in evidence. The court allowed the application and permitted the defendant-appellant to tender the original deed in evidence, which was marked as Ex. DX Thus the original gift deed as also its certified copy have come on record. The question is whether it was necessary for the plaintiffs to have led any evidence to prove the contents of the original, since no evidence has been adduced as to whether Chinti did or did not execute the deed of gift in favour of Mansa Ram. 13. It is not disputed that Ex. DX is the original deed of gift and Ex PW 2/A is its certified copy. The lower appellate Court noticed that the original was in a very bad shape in a torn condition but readable though a part of it appears to have been washed or obliterated due to water action Section 90 of the Evidence Act provides that in normal circumstances where it is found that the document is 30 years old, and emanates apparently from a lawful custody and where the same is such that it is likely to have been executed, having regard to the common course of conduct and where there are no circumstances to excite to suspicion of the court such as unnaturalness and artificial surroundings the transaction, the court will draw the presumption that the document was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. It is not in dispute that the document Ex. DX is 30 years old. Even on the date, when it was tendered and produced in court, it was 30 years old. It is not in dispute that the document Ex. DX is 30 years old. Even on the date, when it was tendered and produced in court, it was 30 years old. Proof of proper custody is a condition precedent to the applicability of section 90 of the Evidence Act so that a document may be entitled to the presumption. Mere production of a document is not enough. The party producing it must give a satisfactory proof and how he came to possess the document. Though neither the defendant nor the plaintiffs have stepped into the witness box stating that how it came into the possession of the defendant-appellant but the circumstances on record are such that it must be assumed that it was with Smt Chinti. It has come in evidence and has been admitted by the plaintiffs witnesses also that the house of the defendant-appellant adjoins the house of Chinti. For a quite number of years, Hazari Lal was also staying with Chinti, who has since expired. It has also been the case of the plaintiffs that their father Mansa Ram, with a view to look after the maintain Chinti use to go and stay with her. The fact that the, document is coming from the proper custody is also not in dispute, either on behalf of the plaintiffs or on behalf of the defendant. The document thus, which the defendant had produced in court was found to have been with Chinti has to be held to be coming from proper custody to which presumption mentioned in section 90 of the Evidence Act would be applicable, namely, that the document has been executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed or attested. 14. The document states that Smt. Chinti had thumb-marked the same. It was scribed by Moti Ram, Petition-writer on 21st September, 1949 and was attested by two witnesses, namely, Sant Ram Lambardar and Hazari Lai son of Hans Raj, Khatri of Mukerian. The document is duly registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Dharamsala on the date of its execution. 15. 14. The document states that Smt. Chinti had thumb-marked the same. It was scribed by Moti Ram, Petition-writer on 21st September, 1949 and was attested by two witnesses, namely, Sant Ram Lambardar and Hazari Lai son of Hans Raj, Khatri of Mukerian. The document is duly registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Dharamsala on the date of its execution. 15. Apart from section 90 of the Evidence Act, when plaintiffs were permitted to lead secondary evidence, in the absence of the original, in the shape of a certified copy of the document, entered in Book No. 1, by virtue of sub-section (5) of section 54 of the Registration Act, the contents of the document, namely, the certified copy have to be read in evidence. No objection was raised when the document, Ex. PW 2/A, was tendered in evidence by way of secondary evidence. This certified copy of registered deed of gift thus is admissible to prove the contents of the original document. 16. The original document alongwith the certified copy would show that the donee was present at the time when the gift deed was scribed and the gift deed recites that the same had been duly accepted by the donee. At the time when the document was presented for registration by Chinti, endorsement by the Sub-Registrar is to the effect that the same was read over and explained both to the donor and the donee. The donor accepted the correctness of the same and also admitted the fact of having delivered the possession of the property in favour of the donee. It is also recited that the donee admitted that he had accepted the gift. Thus so far as the making of the gift by Chinti and its acceptance by Mansa Ram donee is concerned, it stands duly established from these two documents. 17. The next question to be considered is as to the delivery of possession, as to whether the sanie was delivered or not while making the gift. Circumstances on record are such that actual possession was delivered. Ex. P/7 is the copy of mutation No. 295, attested on 4th May, 1950. 17. The next question to be considered is as to the delivery of possession, as to whether the sanie was delivered or not while making the gift. Circumstances on record are such that actual possession was delivered. Ex. P/7 is the copy of mutation No. 295, attested on 4th May, 1950. The factum of gift that the same had been made by Chinti and accepted by Mansa Ram donee and that the donee had been put in possession was stated by the donee before the Halqa Patwari, who entered this mutation on the report of the donee on the strength of original deed of gift. This report was also fortified with Ruqa received in Tehsil office from the office of Sub-Registrar, Dharamsala that the gift had been made by virtue of registered deed. Next order of mutation is dated 26th December, 1949 that mutation be presented for the purpose of attestation in the presence of the donor and the donee alongwith the Ruqa received from the office of Sub-Registrar. On 17th March, 1950, Mansa Ram donee appeared before the Attesting Officer, who was identified by Phuman Chand, Sarbaraha Lambardar and admitted the factum of gift as also delivery of possession of the property. The donor was not present. She was asked to appear and she did appear on 4th May, 1950 She was accompanied by one Lakhu, who claimed himself to be the reversioner, entitled to succeed to the property, after her death. Chinti appears to have denied the factum of gift but to her knowledge, the Attesting Officer ordered the attestation of mutation stating that the same was evidenced by registered document and delivery of possession. Thus in the revenue record, mutation was entered and attested showing Mansa Ram to be owner in possession and thereby deleting the name of Chinti, which was to her knowledge. 18. Ex. P/l is the copy of jamabandi for the year 1950-51, in which Mansa Ram is shown to be owner-in-possession of the property, which obviously was done after the mutation had been entered and attested. Ex. P/27 is the jamabandi for the year 1955-56, which shows Mansa Ram to be the owner. One Sunder is shown to be the non-occupancy tenant under him. Thus, atleast for more than 8 years, after making of the gift, he was shown as owner-in-possession of the property. Ex. P/27 is the jamabandi for the year 1955-56, which shows Mansa Ram to be the owner. One Sunder is shown to be the non-occupancy tenant under him. Thus, atleast for more than 8 years, after making of the gift, he was shown as owner-in-possession of the property. No steps appear to have been taken by Chinti to get the revenue entries changed, in case the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant is accepted that no gift had been made or that the same was not acted upon. 19. For the first time, name of Chinti appeared in the column of cultivation in the jamabandi for the year 1959-60, Ex. P/3, showing her to be Gair Mousuri but there is no corresponding entry in the column of rent so as to clarify the status of her possession. This entry is repeated in jamabandi Ex. D/l for the year 1963-64. Again in the year 1968-69, in the jambandi, copy of which is Ex. D/5, she is shown to be in possession as Gain Mousuri. The column of rent recites that her possession is with consent of the owner, namely, Mansa Ram. This entry is repeated in the next jamabandi prepared for the year 1973-74, namely, Ex. D/4 Whereafter, the name of Chinti was shown in the column of ownership by virtue of the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. It is frankly conceded by the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant that the case of tenancy, as was pleaded, had not been proved and the same is also not pressed. Moreover, the findings of the courts below are to the effect that Chinti was not shown to have been inducted as a tenant. Thus this entry showing her to be owner is of no consequence. Her status also cannot be considered to be that of a tenant. Entry in the column of rent suggests that her possession was with the consent of owner Mansa Ram, 20. The aforementioned entries in the revenue record are such circumstances, which lead to an inference being drawn that the gift was accompanied by delivery of possession, more especially, the recitals in Ex. Entry in the column of rent suggests that her possession was with the consent of owner Mansa Ram, 20. The aforementioned entries in the revenue record are such circumstances, which lead to an inference being drawn that the gift was accompanied by delivery of possession, more especially, the recitals in Ex. P/5, which is a copy of mutation, which was entered at the instance of donee, who in the presence of the Lambardar stated that the possession had been delivered and he was in possession and Chinti when appeared before the Attesting Officer also did not refute the stand of the donee that it was he who was in occupation of, the property and it was to her knowledge that Mansa Ram was shown to be owner-in-possession of the property, in the year 1950-51 and thereafter also when the property as occupied by Sunder on behalf of Mansa Ram. 21. Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent has by making reference to the evidence on record tried to urge that it was Hazari Lal, who was staying with Chinti and he was in occupation and after his death, it was defendant, who was looking after both Chinti and Hazari Lal. The relevant period, which deserves to be taken note is the one when the gift was made and as to whether Hazari Lal was staying with her or not. Pertinent to mention here is that Hazari Lal is no other person, other than the attesting witness of the gift and he was also defendant No. 2 in the suit. He was alive on the date of filing of suit and expired during its pendency, that is, on 20th April, 1984. Strangely enough, this Hazari Lal stated nothing about the execution of deed of gift by Smt. Chinti, The statements of the witnesses are to the effect that Hazari Lal started residing with Chinti since for the last about 30 years. Defendant Som Raj stated that he started residing with Chinti since 1957, therefore, his statement as DW 1 is of no help as to whether Hazari Lal was staying with Chinti when the gift was made by her. DW 2 is Ram Dass, whose statement is also of a very vague nature, as regards period of Hazari Lals stay with her. DW 2 is Ram Dass, whose statement is also of a very vague nature, as regards period of Hazari Lals stay with her. Similar is the position as regards the statement of Rameshwar Dass DW 3, Anup Singh DW 4, Dehru Ram DW 5, Mehar Chand DW 6. Dehru Ram is the father of defendant Som Raj. Though, he stated that Hazari Lal was staying with Chinti but he was not in a position to state about the period of time. In case the gift was made in the year 1949 and according to the plaintiffs version, which is supported by PW 2 that plaintiffs* father Mansa Ram was looking after and maintaining Chinti not only before the gift was made but subsequently also. In view of the vague statement that Hazari Lai was staying with Chinti, even if it was held that he was staying with her, his stay was only somewhere after 1955-56, namely, a period of 30 years prior to the making of statement by the witness. The donor having thus divested herself of the property in the year 1949 was left with no interest in the property. Admittedly, no proceedings were taken by Chinti during her life time for revoking or getting rid of the deed of gift. 22. Submission of the learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent that since the gift made was for consideration of rendering service, therefore, in view of the decision in Ku. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1981 SC 1274, it cannot be considered to be a valid gift, has no force. Gift deed nowhere recites that it was for consideration,- which terms in view of the decision in Sonia Bhatia\ case (supra), means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee. The gift, in fact, is as per the recitals in the deed of gift, is out of love and affection, which can be said to be the motive of making the gift and not the consideration of the gift. In Sonia Bhatias case (supra), it was held that the gift is a transfer without consideration, love and affection being the only motive for making the transfer. In Sonia Bhatias case (supra), it was held that the gift is a transfer without consideration, love and affection being the only motive for making the transfer. The nature and character of a gift, as elucidated by Justice Sahay, in Debi Saran Koiri v. Nandlal Chaubey, AIR 1929 Pat 591, was quoted with approval as under : "Now, section 122 T. P. Act, defines gift as a transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor to another called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. To my mind consideration in section 122 T. P. Act, means valuable consideration and not consideration in the shape of conferring spiritual benefit to the donor. If valuable consideration be not the consideration referred to in section 122, I fail to understand how any gift can be made without consideration at all. There must be some sort of consideration in every gift, for instance, a consideration of an expectation of piritual or moral benefit or consideration of love and affection. Such consideration are not considerations contemplated in section 122. The consideration there contemplated must be valuable consideration, that is consideration either of money or of moneys worth." (Emphasis supplied) 23. Thus in view of the recitals in Ex. DX, it has to be held that the gift was without any consideration and was not invalid for any reason. The lower appellate Court non-suited the plaintiffs by holding that no valid gift was made or in any case Chinti became owner by adverse possession. Even the findings on the plea of adverse possession, on the basis of the material on record, cannot be sustained. 24. The entries in the revenue record have been noticed. Chintis possession firstly was recorded as Gair Mourusi without specifying the nature of such possession in the column of rent. Subsequently, it was shown as with the consent of the owner. Nowhere in the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant, it is shown that how and in what circumstances and when the possession of Chinti became adverse. There is also no circumstance brought on record that the nature of the possession was hostile to that of true owner Mansa Ram. The essential ingredients that nature of the possession was open, continuous, uninterrupted in assertion of her right as owner are absolutely lacking. There is also no circumstance brought on record that the nature of the possession was hostile to that of true owner Mansa Ram. The essential ingredients that nature of the possession was open, continuous, uninterrupted in assertion of her right as owner are absolutely lacking. In these circumstances, it is also not possible to accept the plea of adverse possession. 25. In view of the above, the conclusions to be drawn are that a valid gift was made by Chinti, it was followed by delivery of possession and donee Mansa Ram became owner, on whose death plaintiffs inherited the property. The Will executed by Chinti in favour of defendant subsequently has no effect on the title of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs thus were rightly held entitled by the trial Court to the decree prayed for. Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative. Question No. 3, as formulated, does not arise for consideration. 26. Resultantly, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court maintained. Appeal allowed.