JUDGMENT - S.D. PANDIT, J.:-Keshav Bhaskar Ghaisas, original plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 152 of 1977 on the file of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ulhasnagar, has come before this Court in second appeal. 2. Appellant-plaintiff was the tenant of the respondent-defendant landlord on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. Plaintiff took the possession of the suit premises on 24th June, 1976 and at the time of taking possession the plaintiff had deposited an amount of Rs. 3,000/- with an agreement that the monthly rent of Rs. 75/- was to be adjusted from the said deposit of Rs. 3,000/-. It is the case of the plaintiff-tenant that he had issued a notice on 16th February, 1977 informing the landlord that he was going to vacate the premises on 2nd March, 1977. Plaintiff then sent second notice on 3rd March, 1977 informing the defendant landlord that he was vacating the premises on 31st March, 1977. By the said second notice, the plaintiff asked the landlord-defendant to return the deposit of Rs. 2,250/- which was outstanding against him and to pay an amount of Rs. 80.40 p. which was due from the defendant. But the defendant did not send any reply to any of his notices and, therefore, the plaintiff filed the present suit on 2nd July, 1977 and sought a decree for Rs. 2985.40 p. by way of principal and interest. 3. The respondent-defendant landlord contested the claim of the plaintiff-appellant by filing written-statement at Exh. 16. The defendant-landlord contended that though the plaintiff-tenant was contending that he had vacated the premises on 31st March, 1977, but, in fact, the plaintiff had not handed over possession of the premises to him and even on the date of the suit, the plaintiff-tenant was in possession and occupation of the suit premises. Therefore, the plaintiff was liable to pay the rent and he, the landlord is entitled to adjust the said rent from the amount deposited with him by the tenant. The defendant-landlord thus contended that the plaintiff-tenant is not entitled to get any money decree and, therefore, his suit should be dismissed with costs. 4. In view of the rival pleadings, the trial Court settled the issues and recorded evidence for both the sides. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had vacated the premises on 30th April, 1977. 4. In view of the rival pleadings, the trial Court settled the issues and recorded evidence for both the sides. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had vacated the premises on 30th April, 1977. The trial Court negatived the contention of the plaintiff that he was entitled to claim the amount of Rs. 85.40 p. The trial Court, therefore, passed a decree for Rs. 2,175 with 6 per cent interest thereon in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the trial Court, the defendant-landlord preferred Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1982 challenging the decree passed by the trial Court. The present appellant-plaintiff before the appellate Court had filed cross-objections at Exh. 18 disputing the rejection of his claim for the amount of Rs. 85.40 p. The appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 2nd July, 1984 allowed the said appeal and rejected the cross-objections filed by the present appellant and dismissed the suit, directing both the sides to bear their respective costs. 6. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the first appellate Court, the tenant-plaintiff has come in second appeal before this Court. The learned advocate for the appellant urged before me that though the respondent-landlord had received the notice at Exh. 24 dated 31st March, 1977, he had not replied to the same. The second notice was also sent by the appellant-tenant to the landlord, but the respondent-landlord has also not replied to the same. Therefore, that conduct of the appellant-tenant along with the contents of para six of landlords notice dated 26th August, 1980 (Exh. 40) should be taken into consideration and it should be held that the appellant had vacated the premises in question. It is true that the respondent-landlord had not sent replies to the plaintiffs notices at Exh. 24 and 40, but merely because he had not sent replies to the said notices, it could not be said that the appellant-tenant had actually handed over possession of the premises to the landlord. If the contents of the notice at Exh. 24 dated 31st March, 1977 are considered, then it would be quite clear that in the said notice the appellant-plaintiff has clearly stated that unless the outstanding deposit amount is returned to him, he would not hand over the possession to the landlord. If the contents of the notice at Exh. 24 dated 31st March, 1977 are considered, then it would be quite clear that in the said notice the appellant-plaintiff has clearly stated that unless the outstanding deposit amount is returned to him, he would not hand over the possession to the landlord. As a matter of fact, in the notice dated 31st March, 1977 (Exh. 24), the appellant had made a claim of Rs. 12,335.40 p. against the respondent as stated in para 4 of the said notice. Para 4 of the said notice is as under : "4. My lock and possession shall be there till you pay Rs. 12, 325.40 p. You may take possession only after paying this amount in full." In the reply notice dated 11th September, 1980 (Exh. 30), which is a reply to the respondent-defendants notice dated 26th August, 1980 (Exh. 40), in para one, the advocate of the respondent has stated as under : "I have put my lock only as a mortgage, safety or security against the amount of Rs. 4585.40 due from him. By my registered notices to him dated 3-3-1977, 31-3-1977 and 19-7-1977, I have clearly informed him that he should pay my dues and take the possession of premises which he never did nor did he reply to my notices." Those are the averments made by the appellant in his notice. This clearly shows that the appellant had retained the possession of the premises and had not actually handed over the physical possession of the premises. Merely leaving the premises by him and going to reside at some other place would not amount to vacation of the premises and handing over the possession of the premises to the landlord. 7. The learned advocate for the appellant-tenant drew my attention to the observations of the learned trial Court pertaining to the reply of the landlord at Exh. 40. In the said reply, the advocate for the respondent-landlord has admitted that the appellant-tenant has vacated the premises. It seems that the learned trial Court had taken a stray sentence from para 6 of the said notice issued by the respondent on 26th August, 1980 at Exh. 40. Para 6 of the said notice runs as under : "6. My client says that you have left my clients tenement on 1st March, 1977 but you have put up there your own lock. 40. Para 6 of the said notice runs as under : "6. My client says that you have left my clients tenement on 1st March, 1977 but you have put up there your own lock. Though you are residing and occupying another tenement belonging to others this indicates that you are not in need of my clients tenement. But as you have put up your own lock you are bound to pay rent till the date you will not unlock it. Due to your own lock on the premises of my client he cannot let out to other person. You are therefore called upon to pay to my client the aforesaid amount including arrears of rent plus electric bills till the date you will not unlock it after deducting the aforesaid amount given as a friendly loan." If the above contents in para 6 are read, then it would be quite clear that at nowhere it contains an admission of the landlord that the tenant had vacated the premises and that he had got the possession of the premises on 1st March, 1977. 8. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, it would be quite clear that the finding of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court that the appellant-tenant had not actually vacated the premises in question and had not put the landlord in possession of the premises is quite proper and correct. It could not be said that the said finding is either perverse or manifestly erroneous, resulting into miscarriage of justice, so as to make it necessary to interfere with the same by exercising its powers under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Therefore, in the circumstances, I hold that the present second appeal deserves to be dismissed, and it does stand dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, both the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed. *****