C. A. RAHIM, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been directed against the judgment and order dated 1. 10. 1991 passed in criminal Case No. 94/91 passed by the learned Magistrate and the judgment and order dated 11. 11. 1992 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 479/91. Execution proceeding No. 110/83 was continuing since long and after change of status due to divorce an application was filed by the husband before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of the execution proceedings and the same was rejected on 1. 10. 1991. ( 2 ) A revision was preferred by the petitioner before the Court of Sessions and by an order dated 11. 11. 1992 the Addl. Sessions Judge, Basti, dismissed it on the ground that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter called as the Act) has no retrospective operation. Both the Courts below referred Section 7 of the said Act wherein it has been provided that every application of a divorced woman under Section 125 or under Section 127 Cr. P. C. pending before a Magistrate on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of by the such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Accordingly, both the Courts below held that since the present Act has no retrospective operation and hence the case decided prior to the date of enforcement of this Act, i. e. 19. 5. 1986 will not be guided by the provisions of this Act. In those cases provisions of Cr. P. C. will be applicable and proceeding under Section 128 Cr. P. C. is legally maintainable. This is the grievance of the petitioner in this writ petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel has submitted that paramount consideration was not that the Act has retrospective operation but should have that after commencement of this Act whether a divorcee will be guided by the Cr. P. C. or the present Act. P. C. is legally maintainable. This is the grievance of the petitioner in this writ petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel has submitted that paramount consideration was not that the Act has retrospective operation but should have that after commencement of this Act whether a divorcee will be guided by the Cr. P. C. or the present Act. He has referred Section 3 of the Act wherein it has been stated with a non-obstan te clause that a divorced woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision of maintenance for the period of iddat by her former husband and that an amount equal to mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage and all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage as gift or dahej. So according to him due to change of the status at the commencement of this Act i. e. , on 19. 5. 1986, she cannot claim maintenance from her former husband under Section 125 Cr. P. C. ( 4 ) TO strengthen his contention he has referred a decision reported in (Mohammad Yameed v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , 1992 A. Cr. R. 85 : [1992 (1) All India Hindu Law Reporter 395 (Delhi)] wherein it has been held by Honble Mr. Justice Palok Basu that on combined reading of the provisions contained in Sections 3, 4 and 7 it transpires beyond doubt that a Muslim Woman cannot maintain her application under Section 125 Cr. P. C. , or under Section 127 Cr. P. C. or even getting execution of the order under Section 128 Cr. P. C. after the said Act came into force. He has also held that it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the Act is prospective or retrospective in its operation, the reason being that once a married woman assumes the character of a divorced woman, the provisions of Cr. P. C. will apply only to the extent permissible under section 4 of the said Act. He has also held that it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the Act is prospective or retrospective in its operation, the reason being that once a married woman assumes the character of a divorced woman, the provisions of Cr. P. C. will apply only to the extent permissible under section 4 of the said Act. ( 5 ) SECTION 4 of the said Act further provides that for maintenance a divorced Muslim lady who has not re-married, is entitled to receive her maintenance allowance from the persons who would inherit her property after her death and the maintenance allowance should be reasonable and fair having regard to the status and standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and also considering the means of such relatives, be it her children, her father, her brother or anybody else. A provision has also been made in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 the Act that if a divorced muslim woman is unable to maintain herself and finds no support from her relatives, due to their incapacity, the Magistrate may direct the State Waqf Board to pay such maintenance according to her status. So it appears that the complete procedure has been enacted for the maintenance and support of a divorce. ( 6 ) A provision has also been made under Section 3 (3) for the enforcement of the maintenance and mahr due from the husband by issuing a warrant, if necessary, and also by awarding sentence of imprisonment to the husband for non-payment. So here also complete procedure has been enacted for enforcement of her right to receive such maintenance. The provisions of cr. P. C. , will come in-operation only where the said Act is silent. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent has referred a decision Faizuddin Khan v. Addl. Sessions judge, Etah and Ors. , 1990 ALT 365, wherein it has been provided that the said Act being not retrospective in operation cannot invalidate the order of maintenance passed by the learned magistrate under the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P. C. which has already become final prior to the commencement of the Act i. e. , on and from 19. 5. 1986. , 1990 ALT 365, wherein it has been provided that the said Act being not retrospective in operation cannot invalidate the order of maintenance passed by the learned magistrate under the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P. C. which has already become final prior to the commencement of the Act i. e. , on and from 19. 5. 1986. The said aspect has been discussed in muhammad Yameeds case (supra) and decided that inspite of the fact that the order was passed prior to the enactment of the said Act it cannot be enforced after commencement of this Act, since the status has been changed and since it is barred under Section 3 of the said Act. ( 8 ) AFTER going through both the decisions, I find that the approach of Mohammad Yammeeds case is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, and it is not necessary to see whether the Act has any retrospective operation. The question would be whether a divorced muslim lady can rest on an order passed under the provisions of Section 125 Cr. P. C. even after the Act is enacted. The answer would be that after said enactment all the orders passed prior to enforcement of the said Act becomes inoperative. Accordingly I find that the proceedings in execution Case No. 110 of 1983 under Section 128 Cr. P. C. has lost its force on the day divorce was affected that is on 25. 3. 1987. So the respondent No. 3 entitled to get maintenance for the iddat period along with other dues such as Mahr and dehej etc. , so the orders passed by the learned Magistrate on 1. 10. 1991 and by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 11. 11. 1992 in revision be set aside. ( 9 ) THE Writ Petition is allowed. The judgment and orders dated 1. 10. 1991 and 11. 11. 1992 passed by respondents Nos. 2 and 1 are hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Stay orders are vacated. .