Judgment :- Plaintiff is the appellant. The suit for redemption was dismissed by the trial Court 'finding that the defendants are entitled to the benefits under S.4A(1)(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. That finding has been confirmed by the lower appellate Court. 2. Contention of the plaintiff is that in view of the absence of evidence that it was the mortgagee who constructed the building in the property and also in view of the lack of evidence that the building was in existence 20 years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act the Courts below were not justified in dismissing the suit. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the evidence of P.W..2 Kamalasini (mortgagee) examined before the Land Tribunal where the matter was referred under S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act would show that it was her husband who spent the money for construction of the building and as she has admitted that she did not spend any money it cannot be held that this is a case where S.4A(1)(b) can be invoked. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the Act has to be construed in such a manner to give effect to the beneficial provisions of deemed tenancy and merely because P. W.2's husband has constructed the building it cannot be held that they are not entitled to the protection under S.4A(1)(b) of the Act. 3. S.4A confers deemed tenancy status to certain set of mortgagees. If a mortgagee or a lessee has constructed a building for his own residence in the land comprised in the mortgage and if he was occupying such building for such purpose for a continuous period of in;! less than twenty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act, he becomes a deemed tenant entitled to the benefits under the Act. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that as there can be a separate right with respect to land and building, the building constructed on the mortgaged property by P.W.2's husband cannot be taken into consideration under S.4A(1)(b) of the Act. 4. It is always the duty of the Court while construing statutes to make such construction as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The settled legal position is that the Court should lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. 4. It is always the duty of the Court while construing statutes to make such construction as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The settled legal position is that the Court should lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. To hold that the defendants are not entitled to the benefits under S.4A(1)(b) on the ground that it was P.W.2's husband who constructed the residential building in the property would be against the social context and normal notions of family life. Merely because the husband had constructed the building in the property in the possession of his wife as a mortgagee, benefits under S.4A(1)(b) cannot be denied especially when they were residing in the house together. In this context it is useful to refer to Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.Ltd, v. State of Assam (AIR 1990 SC 123) where the Supreme Court held: "The Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a Statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be sqconstrued as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "utres majis valeat quam pariat". It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness". It is the Court's duty to construe the Statute harmoniously bearing- :". mind the fact that it is meant to be operative and not inept. Nothing short of impoity should allow the Court to declare a Statute unworkable. The endeavour of the Art should be to secure the object of the statute by such, interpretation so as to make it workable. Of course, when there is a crucial omission or obvious direction in a statute in a particular manner it cannot be ignored by the Court. When in a particular case a narrow interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the statute and if the plain intention of the Legislature is defeated in that manner, the Court has to adopt a construction which would facilitate the object intended. In other words, the endeavour should be to have an effective result. In Sh. When in a particular case a narrow interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the statute and if the plain intention of the Legislature is defeated in that manner, the Court has to adopt a construction which would facilitate the object intended. In other words, the endeavour should be to have an effective result. In Sh. GopaI Chandra Ghosh v. Smt. Renu Bala Majuiidcir & Anr.(LT.1994(1) S.C. 80) the Supreme Court held: "Being seized with a beneficial piece of enactment, we have to take a view which would advance the object and purpose by the Act, which apparently is to give protection to a tenant and not to allow the law to permit throwing out of a tenant merely because of some technical violation of the statute. That this is the approach which has to be adopted would be clear from Union of India v. Philiptiago do Gcma, (1989(4) SC 529)... in which it was stated that text of a statute is not to be construed merely as a piece of prose without reference to its nature or purpose; and that if the strict grammatical interpretation were to give rise to absurdity or. inconsistency, the Court would discard such interpretation and adopt one which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature. The purpose in so far as the Act at hand is concerned is, as already noted, to give protection to a tenant. While construing such a statute, the substance of the matter has to be seen, and not merely the form. Technicalities would have no place when the Court is seized with a human problem, as is the one at hand, relatable as it. is to the earning of livelihood by the appellant by carrying on business in the shop premises. In such a case it is the heart of the matter which counts, and not the facade of it". 5. S.4a(1)(b) cannot be read in isolation. The proviso to it is to the effect that a mortgagee will not be deemed to be a tenant if he or where he is a member of a family such family was holding any other land exceeding two acres in extent on the dale of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968 in the Gazette. This would indicate that the statute has given due recognition to the family as well. This would indicate that the statute has given due recognition to the family as well. In a case where a mortgagee has constructed a building for his own residential purpose and if he is a member of the family having more than two acres of land, he would not be entitled to the benefit of deemed tenancy. The proviso is an indicative factor to hold that a narrow interpretation cannot be given while construing S.4A(1)(b). 6. As PW2 mortgagee's husband has constructed the building, hyper-technical interpretation that the mortgagee has nothing to do with the construction and the construction made by her husband cannot be taken into consideration would defeat the very purpose of the statute. As the evidence is that P.W.2 and her husband were in occupation of the residential building and as it can only be construed that P.W.2's husband constructed the building on the mortgaged property to enure to the benefit of his wife, contention of the plaintiff that a strict interpretation of S.4A(1)(b) has to be adopted to deny the benefit of the deemed tenancy is untenable. Merely because it was the mortgagee's husband who has constructed the building it is not possible to deny the deemed tenancy status to the defendants. The Courts below were justified in holding that defendants are entitled to claim the benefits under S.4A(1)(b) of the Act. 7. Defendants have adduced evidence regarding the existence of the building as on 1-1-1970. Contra evidence is absent on the side of the plaintiff. That apart, fact, finding Courts have held that the building was in existence on the crucial date. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different finding. The concurrent findings of the Courts below do not warrant interference. Second appeal is dismissed. No costs.