Judgment : This revision is against the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, in Crl.M.P.No. 776 of 1994 cancelling the bail order. The revision petitioner and her husband are alleged to have committed the offences under Secs. 403, 409, 420, 120-B, 471, 468 and 477-A read with Sec.34, Indian Penal Code as per the complaint of One Gabriel Pakiam in Crime No. 81 of 1994 of Lawspet Police Station, Pondicherry. The revision petitioner and her husband Sankara Narayanan are the two accused persons. They obtained an anticipatory bail on 27. 1994 from the II Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, who directed them to surrender before 8. 1994. They did not surrender within the time fixed by the court and in the meanwhile the petition was filed before this Court for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to this petitioner and her husband. This Court has passed an order on 27. 1994 staying the operation of the order of the II Additional Sessions Judge granting the anticipatory bail. On 37. 1994 the revision petitioner and her husband were arrested in Karnataka State and were remanded by the Magistrate on 8. 1994. The accused persons filed the bail petition in Crl.M.P. No. 1850 of 1994 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pondicherry, praying to release them on bail and the learned Magistrate granted them bail. As against this order of the Learned First Class Magistrate granting bail, the Inspector of C.I.D. Branch, Pondicherry, filed a petition Crl.M.P. No. 776 of 1994 before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, for the cancellation of the bail granted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate in Crl.M.P. No. 1850 of 1994. The learned Principal Sessions Judge allowed the petition of the revision petitioner. As against this order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, the second accused has come forward with this revision. 2. Before we go into the merit this revision, the preliminary objection raised by the respondent with regard to the maintainability of this revision, has to be considered. According to the learned Public Prosecutor (Pondicherry), under Sec. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order and therefore the revision against the order cancelling the bail which is interlocutory in nature, is not maintainable. 3. According to the learned Public Prosecutor (Pondicherry), under Sec. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order and therefore the revision against the order cancelling the bail which is interlocutory in nature, is not maintainable. 3. Sec. 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: "Sec.397 Calling for records to exercise powers of revision: 1. .... 2. The powers of revision conferred by Sub-sec. (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the orders on the bail application or cancellation of the bail are interlocutory in nature and as such orders cannot be challenged in revision under Sec. 397(2) of the Code, it is a bar for this revision. He draws support for his argument from a decision in T.V. Hariprasad v. State of A.P., 1977 Crl.L.J. 471, wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court has specifically held that the cancellation of the bail under Sec.437(5), Code is an interlocutory order and revision under Sec.397(2) of the Code is not maintainable even though the grant of bail can be considered by the Sessions Judge under Sec.439 of the Code. The Bench of the Orissa High Court also has taken the same view in Nilu v. State, 1983 Crl.L.J. 1590. In that case also, it was held that orders granting, revising or cancelling bail are interlocutory orders against which revision is barred under Sec.397(2) of the Code. The learned Public Prosecutor relies upon the observation of the Supreme Court also in Amarnath v. State of Haryana, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1891, wherein it is observed: "....The term interlocutory order’ in Sec. 397(2) of the Code 1973 has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders on a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Sec.397(2) of 1973 Code. Thus for instance orders, summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings, no doubt, amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Sec. 397(2) of 1973 Code." 4. The learned Public Prosecutor very much relies upon the above sentence in the decision, stating specifically, "passing orders for bail.....amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie". So, according to the learned Public Prosecutor in view of this view of various Courts including the Supreme Court, as the application for bail and also the cancellation of the bail are considered to be interlocutory orders, the revision is barred under Sec. 397(2) of the Code and therefore this revision cannot be heard. But the learned counsel for the revision petitioner Mr. Panchapagesan would contend that a mere description of these petitions as miscellaneous petitions or interlocutory petition, will not convert the nature of the order as interlocutory order and as cancellation of the bail itself is a final order, it can be challenged in the revision. To support his argument, he refers to the decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Crl.L.J. 165. The observation of the Supreme Court in that case is as follows: "10. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Sec. 482 of 1973 Code even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional powers of the High Court is impermissible". The Supreme Court further observes in paragraph 12, "12.....An interlocutory order though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." Again in paragraph 13, the Supreme Court observes, "13....In such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as invariably being converse of the words final order’. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceedings which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case, A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 1, but yet may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceedings which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case, A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 1, but yet may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Art. 134 of the Constitution yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Sec. 397(2). It is neither advisable nor possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two." The above observation came in a petition filed challenging the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the legality of the trial. As the very jurisdiction of the Court to try the offence under Sec. 500, Indian Penal Code was challenged, and the sanction given by the Chief Secretary also was challenged, not only for his non-application of mind but also for want of power to give such sanction, the Supreme Court in that case considered that even though the petition was labelled as an interlocutory petition, the point raised by the accused, if accepted, would conclude the proceeding itself and therefore though the order was rejecting the plea of the accused, it was not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec. 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. As the accused Madhu Limaye challenged the sanction granted by the Chief Secretary of Maharashtra and also the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court to try that case, if those pleas had been accepted, it would have concluded the proceeding itself. Therefore, under such situations, the Supreme Court observed that the interlocutory order sometimes may be conclusive to the subordinate matter with which it deals and the meaning of the words ‘interlocutory’ and ‘final order’ must be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. Therefore, under such situations, the Supreme Court observed that the interlocutory order sometimes may be conclusive to the subordinate matter with which it deals and the meaning of the words ‘interlocutory’ and ‘final order’ must be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. Even though in paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that it is not possible to bring out a list as to what are the interlocutory orders or the final orders in the decision in Amarnath v. State of Haryana, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1891, it is specifically mentioned in paragraph 6 of the decision that "adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports.....may, no doubt, amount to interlocutory orders". Therefore, when passing of order on the bail application has been specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court as interlocutory order, the order cancelling the bail also falls within the same category. 5. When the order of bail granted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate has been cancelled by the Sessions Judge, certainly, the accused party is entitled to move again before the Sessions Judge, who cancelled the bail, to grant the bail under Sec. 439(1) of the Code. Therefore, the order of cancellation of the bail will not be a final order, as any number of bail application can be filed and in view of this reason, the order passed by the Sessions Judge is only interlocutory order. As such nature of orders, is barred under Sec. 397(2) of the Code for revision, the objection taken by the learned Public Prosecutor certainly has force and the revision is not maintainable. 6. On the merit also, I find that the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, cancelling the bail, has to be upheld. The complainant Gabriel Pakiam, New Delhi, has alleged that he entrusted Rs. 61.16 lakhs on 20.8.1992 and 19. 1992 with this revision petitioner and her husband as an investment in Suriyamel Feeds Limited, Pondicherry. He also had received 6,27,600 shares of this company. It is the allegation that even though the company was floated in April, 1593 no manufacturing process had commenced and he came to know that the entire Rs. 61.16 lakhs he handed over, had been diverted by this revision petitioner and her husband for their personal benefits to various investments in fictitious names. It is the allegation that even though the company was floated in April, 1593 no manufacturing process had commenced and he came to know that the entire Rs. 61.16 lakhs he handed over, had been diverted by this revision petitioner and her husband for their personal benefits to various investments in fictitious names. It is also the allegation of the complainant that the shares were sold to public and this amount also has been misappropriated by these persons. So, according to this complaint, huge sum of Rs. 61.16 lakhs has been misappropriated by this petitioner and her husband diverting this fund secretly for their personal purposes. According to the prosecution, after this complaint, the accused, who were husband and wife, could not be traced and absconded. Even though anticipatory bail was granted on 27. 1994 by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, with a condition that they should surrender before the court on 8. 1994, this anticipatory bail was stayed by this Court and the accused were arrested in Karnataka on 37. 1994 and they were released on bail by the Judicial First Class Magistrate on 8. 1994. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that the accused persons have invested the money, collected from the complainant, in different places in fictitious names and there are investments in different manners and if this accused is granted bail, not only that she will withdraw the funds from the place of investment, but also may completely tamper with the evidence and in view of the huge amount involved in this white-collar offence, till the investigation is completed, the accused may not be enlarged on bail, otherwise it will completely hamper the investigation and also will lead to misdirection. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would argue that the learned Sessions Judge has given certain reasons for cancellation of the bail and according to him, these reasons, viz., the failure of the accused to surrender before 8. 1994 as per the direction while granting the anticipatory bail, and also the observation that the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate was not aware of the stay order granted by the High Court against the anticipatory bail, are all irrelevant and misconceived, because in the order granting anticipatory bail, though time was given to surrender on or before 8. 1994, the petitioner was arrested on 37. 1994, the petitioner was arrested on 37. 1994 and therefore there was no question of noncompliance of the direction of the Sessions Judge. He further argues that the High Court stayed only operation of the order granting anticipatory bail and that has nothing to do with the granting of bail to the accused persons, who were in custody and according to Mr. Panchapagesan, these ill-conceived notions have led to the prejudice in the mind of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, to cancel the order of bail, granted by the learned Magistrate. He also refers to a decision of this Court in Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue v. Srinivasan, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 40, wherein K.M. Natrajan, J., has observed that the gravity of the offence is not the criterion for the cancellation of the bail only the two material factors, viz., whether the accused will abscond and is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with the evidence, have to be taken into consideration in dealing with an application for the cancellation of the bail and the vague allegation in the petition is not sufficient reason for cancelling the bail. It is true that the gravity of the offence alone may not be a criterion for the cancellation of the bail. But in this case, the learned Principal Sessions Judge has given other reasons also for the cancellation of bail. He accepted the contention of the police that the material documents are likely to be tampered with and the deposits made in various banks in fictitious names are likely to be siphoned off by the accused if enlarged on bail. Therefore, this aspect, which is pressed by the respondent, has to be taken into consideration for a proper and quick investigation. When it is the specific case of the prosecution that the funds of the complainant to the tune of Rs. 61.16 lakhs have been misappropriated by this revision petitioner and her husband and the entire funds have been surreptitiously invested in fictitious names in different schemes in different places, naturally if the accused are enlarged, they would try to withdraw the investment or suppress or tamper with the records to sabotage the investigation. The learned Public Prosecutor represents that even the records could not be seized as they were kept away. The learned Public Prosecutor represents that even the records could not be seized as they were kept away. So, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, as the amount involved is very heavy, the investigating agency, should be allowed to proceed with the investigation without any hindrance or sabotage by the accused persons and the presence of the accused outside the custody will obliterate the scope of the investigation itself as the important records relating to the investment have to be seized from the secret places where they were kept and therefore, the cancellation of the bail is perfectly correct. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Panchapagesan would argue that the enlargement of the petitioner on bail cannot in any way affect the process of investigation as the petitioner is always prepared to cooperate in the investigation, I feel that as the investments are said to be in the name of the fictitious persons, they cannot be unearthed unless the petitioner is confined in custody, otherwise even the investigation may also be misdirected. In my considered view, the presence of the accused outside will certainly affect the secret probe to be conducted by the investigating agency. Therefore, the cancellation of the bail in this case is justified. 7. The learned counsel Mr. Panchapagesan argues that the petitioner is a pregnant woman now in the ninth month of her pregnancy and therefore taking a sympathetic view, she cannot be ordered for the custody. As the investigation has to be continued on important aspects, the sympathy to the revision petitioner comes only next. However, I feel that proper direction can be given to the State to provide all facilities to this pregnant woman to take care of her health during the period of custody. As I find that the stand taken by the respondent police in this case is acceptable, I do not find any justification to disturb the order of the court below and the revision deserves to be dismissed on merit also. 8. In the result, the revision is dismissed with the direction to the State to provide all medical facilities to the revision petitioner during the period of her confinement.