Judgment : This revision was heard as the Bar for respective parties requested to dispose the main revision itself along with miscellaneous petition as it fails within a short compass for consideration. 2. The order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Periyakulam in I.A.No.41 of 1991 in O.S.No.2 of 1987 on 10. 1992 is the subject-matter of challenge in this revision which has emerged from an application filed under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by and on behalf of the revision petitioner herein who is the first defendant in the suit. The two respondents herein filed a suit O.S.No.2 of 1987 before the trial court under O.7, Rule 1, Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the relief of framing a scheme for the administration of the Theni Chatram Trust and its properties and removing defendants 1 “ to 4 from trusteeship and along with the suit they have filed a petition and obtained the leave to sue as provided under Sec.92 of the Code. 3. Aggrieved at the granting of the leave to sue by the trial Judge pending disposal of the suit, the revision petitioner filed an application I.A.No.41 of 1991 under Sec.151 of the Code, challenging the impugned order above referred to, by contending inter alia that the impugned trust even assuming as a public trust in the name of Thani Chatram, to invoke Sec.92 of the Code, the basic elements of direct interest for the respondents since totally lacking in this case, leave to sue cannot be granted and when granted, it has to be cancelled, and for the said relief the application was filed. 4. The next ground on the basis of which the impugned order was attacked by and on behalf of the revision petitioner is, that the respondents are the residents of Madras town and they are doing independent avocation there itself and as such they have no interaction of any kind either to have an interest in the trust or chatram or its root property under the pretext of the public trust, and that therefore, Sec.92 of the Code cannot be invoked. Nextly it was contended that the leave to sue for the respondents granted by the trial court in I.A.No.8 of 1987 on 1. 1987 was without either any notice or serving of any summons on either of the defendants. Nextly it was contended that the leave to sue for the respondents granted by the trial court in I.A.No.8 of 1987 on 1. 1987 was without either any notice or serving of any summons on either of the defendants. Therefore, the impugned order is totally without any legal jurisdiction. The next contention was that the suit property does not form part of any trust, much less a public trust, and that therefore, the plaintif’s cannot be allowed to have any remedy for the reason of the suit property or the chatram is not a public trust at all, and that in any event the concept of public trust has not been proved either in the pleadings or by docu-ment. and that therefore the leave granted to sue for the respondents herein was sought to be cancelled in this application. 5. The said application was resisted by and on behalf of the first respondent by filing a counter-affidavit justifying the grant of leave to sue by the trial court in favour of the respondents. That would mean that the filing of the present suit is well within the legal framework, and that therefore, it was prayed that the application above referred has to be dismissed. Considering the rival contentions and the reliefs claimed in the context of Sec.92 of the Code and based on a case tew decided in R.M.Narayana Chettiar v. N.Lakshmanan Chettiar, (1990)2 L.W. 468. The learned trial Judge has rejected the petition and accordingly dismissed the same by passing the impugned order on 10. 1992. Aggrieved at this, the present revision has been filed. 6. I have heard Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and on the contrary I have heard Mr.R.Gandhi, learned senior counsel who controverted every point both legally and factually. In the light of the above rival position the only point that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned order passed by the trial Court I.A.No.41 of 1991 on 10. 1992 suffers from any legal impropriety, erroneous view and if so, is it liable to be set aside. 7. To appreciate the point in its proper perspective, it is worthwhile to extract the provision of law viz., Sec.92 of the Code, which runs as follows: ”92. 1992 suffers from any legal impropriety, erroneous view and if so, is it liable to be set aside. 7. To appreciate the point in its proper perspective, it is worthwhile to extract the provision of law viz., Sec.92 of the Code, which runs as follows: ”92. Public Charities: (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree — .(a) removing any trustee; .(b) appointing a new trustee; .(c) vesting any property in a trustee; .(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; .(d) directing accounts and injuries; .(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; .(f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; .(g) settling a scheme or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require." 8. Since sub-clauses (2) and (3) of the above section of law are unnecessary for the purpose of the instant case, the same has not been extracted hereunder. 9. A casual reading of this section clearly postulates the fact that to get a leave to sue by the Advocate-General or two or more persons under this section of law, they have to prove that they have an interest in the trust which is direct in nature and if such nexus is established, then the court is empowered to grant the leave to sue such of the persons for the reliefs as adumbrated in the above section of law. Perhaps this aspect has been mainly dealt with by the learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner by contending that direct interest is totally lacking in this case, which would mean, according to him, that since the plaintiffs who are admitteldy the residents of the Madras town have no nexus or interaction of any kind either direct or indirect on the date of filing the suit, they cannot come within the category as clearly spelt out in the section of law. .10. In T.R.Ramachandra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni, I.L.R. 42 Mad. 360, in which one of the ancestors of the learned senior counsel was the party, a Full Bench of this Court while dealing with the scope of Sec.92 of the Code has held as follows: ."Interest’ under Sec.92 of the Code denotes an interest which is substantial and not sentimental or remote it must be a present and substantial and not a remote and fictitious or purely illusory interest. The definition of ‘interest’ in Sec. 15 of the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863) cannot be used as a guide in interpreting the word as used in Sec.92 of the Code. The English decision under Lord Romilly’s Act, which lay down that the petitioners under the Act must have an interest which is clear or direct, should be a guidance in interpreting the provisions of Sec.92 of the Civil Procedure Code." 11. In P.Sivagurunatha Pillai v. P.Mani Pillai,A.I.R. 1984 Mad.328, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the scope of Sec.92 of the Code has held as follows: "The interest for filing a suit for framing of a scheme in respect of a choultry should be real, substantive and an existing interest though it need not be a direct one. The mere residence of the plaintiff in the locality where the choultry is situate is not enough. Even the fact that the plaintiff might have belonged to the family entitled to the hereditary trusteeship of the temple would not clothe the plaintiff with the interest of such a nature as to enable him to maintain a suit under Sec.92." It is worthwhile to note that the above law pronounced by the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred case is almost identical to the facts of the case. .12. In Md.Khan Sahib v. Kadir Batcha Sahib, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. .12. In Md.Khan Sahib v. Kadir Batcha Sahib, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 466, a Division Bench has held as follows: ."In order to entitle a plaintiff to sue under the Sec.92 he must have a clear interest in the particular trust over and above that which millions of his countrymen may be said to have by virtue of their religion. The words "interest in trust" must mean a clear interest, that is to say, a present and substantial and not a remote and fictitious or purely illusory interest and further that interest, if the provision is not to be altogether illusory, must arise from some special relation in which the plaintiff stands to the endowment in question as compared with the whole body of religious community throughout India. Proof of residence in the neighbourhood of the institution will, no doubt be one way of establishing possession of an interest on the simple ground that those who live near to the institution will be most likely to take advantage of its benefits. The test of locality is only to be applied in relation to actual user of the temple or mosque by the inhabitants residing close to it. The question is a pure question of fact, and must be left to the court to decide on a consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in C.Kalahasti v. R.Sukantharaj, 88 L.W. 577, has also observed as follows: "The whole object Sec.92 is to prevent people from interfering by virtue of the section with the administration of charitable trusts merely in the interest of others and without any real interest of their own 42 Mad. 360 (F.B.) - Per Wallis, C.J.). All that the majority of the Full Bench meant to say was that the plaintiff must stand on a special relationship with the trust as distinct from the rest of the community in respect of the suit trust, so that he may have a particular direct relationship with the institution. To hold that any member of the public, who may have a distinct or indirect connection or relationship with the institution, is a person having interest in the trust, would dilute the requirement of Sec.92. To hold that any member of the public, who may have a distinct or indirect connection or relationship with the institution, is a person having interest in the trust, would dilute the requirement of Sec.92. The general interest a person, as a Hindu, may have in a temple in that he might possibly worship in the temple, would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy the requisite that he must be a person who has an interest in the trust. In other words, something more than the generality of interest, which he had, should be established as a kind of a special factor to establish interest as is required by Sec.92. “ 14. The Supreme Court R.M.Narayana Chettiar v. N.Lakshmanan Chettiar, (1990)2 L.W. 468, while defining the scope of Sec.92 has held as follows. ”It is not obligatory on the part of a Court, that before granting leave to institute a suit as required under Sec.92 of the C.P.C., it should give an opportunity to the respondents to show cause against the grant of such leave, and it cannot be said that leave granted without such opportunity having been given is void. Although, as a rule of caution courts should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said section to institute a suit, the court is not bound to do so. If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law. Having in mind, the objectives underlying Sec.92 and the language thereof, it appears that, as a rule of caution, the court should normally unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Sec.92 to institute a suit. The desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Sec.92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. The desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Sec.92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Such a construction of the provisions of Sec.92 of the Code would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the court even though the circumstances might warrant such relief being granted. A plain reading of Sec.92 of the Code indicates that leave of the court is a pre-condition or a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all.“ 15. The above legal pronouncement made by the Supreme Court would provide a detailed answer to one of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the revision petitioner that without ordering the notice to revision petitioner/ defendant, granting of the leave to sue to the respondents herein is not valid in law and in the light of the above position I am not inclined to accept and countenance the said contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner. 16. In the light of the above legal ratio enunciated by the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, to consider the point that arises in this case, the pleas taken in the plaint are to be noted for the purpose of proper adjudication of the point in hand, which are extracted as hereunder. ‘‘The chatram was founded for the Welfare of the public and is a public charity like wayfarers and Brahmins. Any member of the public can, thus move for correcting the maladministration and safeguarding the trust and its assets. This suit is accordingly brought on behalf of the public, interested in its welfare. Brahmins have a stake in its upkeep as the zamindars expressly refer to them as one of the main beneficiaries in the deeds referred to in para 5. Other communities are equally interested, as could be seen from the deeds supra. This suit is accordingly brought on behalf of the public, interested in its welfare. Brahmins have a stake in its upkeep as the zamindars expressly refer to them as one of the main beneficiaries in the deeds referred to in para 5. Other communities are equally interested, as could be seen from the deeds supra. Thus the plaintiff a Brahmin vitally interested in the trust and who is a resident of Theni and would be the person benefiting as wayfarer. Thus the suit is brought under Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing a scheme after removal of the defendants 1 to 4 from the administration and entrusting it to proper hands for future administration and recovery of alienated properties....” It is noticed that the address of both the plaintiffs were given as, Solaimalai Ayyanar Kovil Street, Bangalaredu, Theni, Periyakulam-1. However, in the witness box on 9. 1992 when the first plaintiff was examined as P.W.1, he has admitted that they are the permanent residents of the Madras City and they have been attending their avocation only at Madras and not at the place where the suit property is situate. The substratum of the evidence claimed by P.W.1, the first respondent, no doubt clearly reveals that the respodents have no direct interaction or nexus with the chatram or the trust of the suit property. A copy of the document viz., the trust deed was brought to my notice by the learned senior counsel which has been marked as Ex.B-9 dated 5. 1877. The following passage extracted from the said document is worth of every consideration in this case. A copy of the document viz., the trust deed was brought to my notice by the learned senior counsel which has been marked as Ex.B-9 dated 5. 1877. The following passage extracted from the said document is worth of every consideration in this case. The above passage written in Tamil was mainly relied upon by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents herein to say that the plaintiffs being belong to the Brahmin Community and their origin and native place being Theni, the place in which the suit property situates, though migrated subsequently are deemed to have a direct or indirect interest in the same, and that therefore not allowing anybody to stay in the chatram and not performing any charities as referred to, will give a cause of action for the plaintiffs to file the suit, and that the leave to sue granted in favour of the respondents is justified and cannot be refused and that therefore, the impugned order passed by the court below is totally on par with the law. 17. With great constraint and respect, I am totally unable to endorse my view with the contentions of learned senior counsel Mr.R.Gandhi, to sustain the impugned order passed in this case, for the simple reason that the basic concept clearly spelt out in Sec.92 of the Code still remains to be established even on the basis of the documentary or oral evidence adduced in I.A.No.41 of 1991. On the other hand, the substantive, real and total interest which are the very basis for filing the suit after getting the leave to sue under Sec.92 of the Code are totally lacking in this case and the plaintiff/ respondents have miserably failed to establish the said fact as clearly provided by the judicial pronouncement above referred. There was no direct or indirect interest which the respondents/ plaintiffs possess as per the pleadings of the plaint or the affidavit filed in the application. In the absence of the same, I am not in a position to accept the very contentions raised on behalf of the respondents herein. 18. There was no direct or indirect interest which the respondents/ plaintiffs possess as per the pleadings of the plaint or the affidavit filed in the application. In the absence of the same, I am not in a position to accept the very contentions raised on behalf of the respondents herein. 18. Even assuming that the trust is a public trust for arguments sake, a careful and casual reading of Ex.B-9, the so called agreement entered into by the ancestors of the defendants would clearly mean that they have maintained the chatram and performed the annadhanam not only to the wayfarers but also the Brahmin community on those days and that would not mean in the context that the chatram or its properties are dedicated to for the conspicuous and specific purpose of public charities. The maintenance of the chatram or the choultry was agreed and undertaken by the parties to the document only for the purpose of allowing the wayfarers and the members of the Brahmin community of 19th century and to provide them food and whereas it doesnot mean that the said property or the other had been fully dedicated to and granted to the public charities. Therefore, for the limited purpose of deciding the present revision, I may confine myself with the observation that there is some force in the arguments advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner that the element of public trust so as to attract the ambit of Sec.92 of the Code also is absent in this case. 19. The decision in Swami Paramatmanand Saraswathi v.Ramji Tripathi, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2141 was relied on behalf of the respondents herein for the following pronouncement made by the Supreme Court: "(A) A suit under Sec.92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentiond in the section. Such a suit can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or that the direction of the court is necessary for the administration of the trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are mentiond in the section. If the allegation of breach of trust is not substantiated or if the plaintiff has not made out a case for any direction by the Court for proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under the section would fail. If it is clear that the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights of any other person or persons in whom they are interested, then the suit would be outside the scope of Sec.92. It is not every suit claiming the reliefs specified in the section that can be brought under the section, but only the suits which, besides claim-ingany of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights and in deciding whether a suit falls within Sec.92 the Court must go beyond the reliefs and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the purpose for which the suit was brought when the right to the Office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for on that basis, the suit falls outside Sec.92." 20. Having incorporated the decision of the Supreme Court in the above referred case law, I am put to every surprise as to how this decision would render any help to the respondents herein. But, on the other hand, it is needless to say that the case of the revision petitioner has been totally vindicated and substanti-ated by the decision referred to above. But, on the other hand, it is needless to say that the case of the revision petitioner has been totally vindicated and substanti-ated by the decision referred to above. 21.For all the reasonings aforementioned,the case laws quoted and in the context of the rival contentions submitted on behalf of the respective parties herein, I am fully satisfied to hold that the main and basic ingredients which are necessary to obtain the leave to sue with regard to a property which assumes the character of a public trust are totally lacking in this case, and that therefore, the reasoning given by the learned trial Judge in the impugned order is clearly outside the scope of the above legal pronouncement and as such it is liable to be interfered with. In my considered view, the plaintiffs viz., the respondents herein might have been the casual visi-tors of the locality of the suit property, but that does not mean in any way provide a cause of action for them for the reasons of their permanent residence and avocation to invoke Sec.92 of the Code to file a suit with regard to the suit property. However,itis rather unfortunate the learned trial Judges has totally overlooked the said legal aspect and for the said reason, Iam fully satisfied to hold that the impugned order is liable to be interfered with by setting it aside. No other arguments were advanced on behalf of the respective parties, except the arguments that have been referred to above. 22. In the result, the civil revision petition succeeds and stands allowed, and consequently the impugned order passed by the lerned Subordinate Judge at Periyakulam in I.A.No.41 of 1991 in O.S.No.2 of 1987 on 10. 1992 is hereby set aside and the leave to sue granted by him in I.A.No.8 of 1987 is hereby revoked. However, there will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Consequently, all the C.M.Ps. are dismissed as unnecessary.