Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. The only question that arises in these writ petitions/is whether the petitioners, who belong to backward classes, can claim the benefit of age relaxation, absence of ceiling on the number of attempts in the competitive examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission as are extended to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The prayer in all these writ petitions is for issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records on the file of the Union Public Service Commission relating to the Notification of Civil Services Examination, 1994, dated 1st January, 1994 and quashing the same and directing the respondents to afford the other Backward Communities equal treatment with regard to age relaxation and absence of ceiling on the number of attempts in the Competitive Examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission as are granted to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Of course, the actual prayer in the writ petitions is not properly or happily worded. But the substance of the prayer is as set out above. 2. The case of the petitioners rests on a recommenda- tion made in the report of the Second Backward Classes Commission, popularly known as “Mandal Commission” and also some observation contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. It is also argued that the source of power for making reservation in services under the State is found in Art.16(4) of the Constitution of India, which is common to all backward classes of citizens including the Scheduled Castes (S.Cs.) and Scheduled Tribes (S.Ts.) and no distinction can be made between the S.Cs. and S.Ts. on the one hand and the other backward classes (O.B.Cs.) on the other. It is, therefore, contended that whatever concessions are extended to the S.Cs. and S.Ts. should also be extended to the O.B.Cs 3. Several passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 occurring in paragraphs 58, 351, 361, 388, 400, 402, 405, 409, 410, 470, 593 and 700(1)are relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners. We do not think it necessary to refer to them in detail in this judgment in the view we are taking on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions. 4. We do not think it necessary to refer to them in detail in this judgment in the view we are taking on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions. 4. It is also argued that such concessions have been given by National Institute of Homeopathy, National Institute of Mass Communication, The Shipping Corporation of India Limited and Mazagon Dock Limited, as well as the State Governments of Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. It is, therefore, contended that the Union Public Service Commission is bound to grant the same benefits as are extended to the S.Cs. and S.Ts. such as age relaxation and absence of ceiling on attempt in the competitive examinations to the O.B.Cs. also. 5. On the other hand, the respondents, who are the Union Minister for Social Welfare the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension Affairs and the Union Public Service Commission contest the claim of the petitioners on the merits besides challenging the maintainability of the writ petitions. Their contentions are as follows: .(1) No reliance can be placed on any passage in the Report of the Mandal Commission as the entirety of the Report has not been accepted by the Government. .(2) The passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the petitioners’ counsel cannot be torn out of their context and used for the purpose of this case. Our attention is drawn to other passage in the judgment in support of the contentions of the respondents. .(3) The Supreme Court has, in the aforesaid case, given a categorical direction in paragraph 123(C) that any and all objections to the criteria that may be evolved by the Government of India and the State Governments in pursuance of the direction contained in Clause (B) of para 123 of the judgment as well as to the classification among backward classes and equitable distribution of the benefits of reservations among them that may be made in terms of and as contemplated by Clause (1) of the Office Memorandum dated 25th September, 1991 as explained in the judgment, shall be preferred only before the Supreme Court and not before or in any other High Court or other court or tribunal. It was also directed that any petition or proceeding questioning the validity, operation or implementation of the two office Memorandums impugned in that case viz., the office memorandum dated 13th August, 1990 and the Office Memorandum dated 25th September, 1991, on any grounds whatsoever shall be filed or instituted only before the Supreme Court and not before any High Court or other Court or Tribunal. Hence, the writ petitions in this Court are not maintainable. (4) Pursuant to the directions given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case in paragraph 123(B) of the judgment, the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training), excluded the ‘creamy layer* from the O.B.Cs. in modification of their official memorandum dated 18. 1990 and 29. 1991 and issued a further office memorandum dated 22nd October, 1993. In paragraph 4 thereof, it was stated that ‘“No other relaxation /concession is admissible to O.B.Cs. There is no provision for any relaxed standard to be applied in the case of O.B.Cs.” That memorandum has not been challenged by the petitioners. Hence, the prayer in these writ petitions is not sustainable. .(5) The judgment of the Supreme Court does not hold that the O.B.Cs. must be treated on par with S.Cs. and S.Ts. On the other hand, the judgment recognised that the S.Cs. and S.Ts. are the most backward among the backward classes. Hence, the O.B.Cs. cannot be equated with the S.Cs., S.Ts. in the matter of reservations. .(6) The grant of age relaxation to O.B.Cs. in the Civil Service Examination, 1994, is not within the purview of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the writ petitions against the first respondent are not maintainable. .(7) The provision for age relaxation and other benefits to O.B.C. candidates is a matter for subjective satisfaction of the State and cannot be claimed as a matter of right by the O.B.C. candidates. The Supreme Court had also observed in the judgment that the court must give due regard to the judgment of the executive, co-equal wing of the State, and approach the measure in the spirit in which it is conceded. .(8) Rules have been framed for Competitive Examination - Civil Services Examination to be held by the Union Public Service Commission in 1994 and published in the Gazette of India. Extraordinary Part I- Section 1, dated 1st January, 1994. .(8) Rules have been framed for Competitive Examination - Civil Services Examination to be held by the Union Public Service Commission in 1994 and published in the Gazette of India. Extraordinary Part I- Section 1, dated 1st January, 1994. The petitioners not having challenged the validity of the Rules, cannot seek mandamus to the Union Public Service Commission to grant certain benefits which are not provided in the Rules. .(9) The matter is governed by the provisions of Sec.14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and Sec.28 of the Act bars the Jurisdiction of this Court in relation to the matters governed by the Act. .(10) A similar writ petition with a similar prayer was filed in the Delhi High Court in W.P.No.750 of 1994 and it was dismissed on 4. 1994. When the order was challenged in the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.7999 of 1994, the court dismissed the same stating the law thus: “Whether any concession in any form are to be extended to the backward classes is a matter of policy for the Government to consider. This Court cannot go into this question.” In view of the said judgment, these writ petitions are not maintainable. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to some of the passages in the judgment of the Supreme Court in support of his contentions. We do not think it necessary to refer to them in view of the fact that this Court has no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the case. As rightly pointed out by the respondents, the direction contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, in paragraph 123 (C)to which we have already made reference all petitions or proceedings can be filed or instituted only before the Supreme Court and not before any High Court or other Court or Tribunal. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the direction of the Supreme Court cannot have the effect of depriving any party of the benefit of Art.226 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept the said contention. Under Art.141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared, by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The directions contained in paragraphs 123 (C) of the judgment of the Supreme Court is absolute and admits no exception. We are unable to accept the said contention. Under Art.141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared, by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The directions contained in paragraphs 123 (C) of the judgment of the Supreme Court is absolute and admits no exception. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that this Court has no jurisdiction and the petitioners should approach only the Supreme Court, if they have any grievance against the action of the Central Government or the Union Public Service Commission. 7. Further the ruling of the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.7999 of 1994 places the matter outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the court. The ruling in that case will also bar the considerations of the merits in this case. 8. We are also of the view that these writ petitions are not maintainable inasmuch as the petitions have failed to challenge the validity of the Official Memorandum dated 9. 1993 and 210. 1993 issued in pursuance of the directions of the Supreme Court and the validity of the Rules by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, for the competitive examination-Civil Services Examination. This Court cannot ignore the Rules and issue mandamus to the Union Public Service Commission to act contrary to the said Rules. 9. As regards the objection to jurisdiction based on the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The Chairman Railway Recruitment Board v. Ruban Peter, (1990)1 M.L.J. 373 , in which it has been held that the Act will apply only to proceedings instituted by persons who are in service of the Government. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the judgment requires reconsideration as the relevant provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act have not been properly construed. It is wholly unnecessary for us to decide the question in the present case, as we have taken the view that the writ petitions are not maintainable on the grounds set out earlier. 10. The first of the writ petitions was presented on 21. 1994 and admitted on 2. 1994. It is wholly unnecessary for us to decide the question in the present case, as we have taken the view that the writ petitions are not maintainable on the grounds set out earlier. 10. The first of the writ petitions was presented on 21. 1994 and admitted on 2. 1994. The petitioners therein had filed W.M.P.No.2921 of 1994 praying for an interim direction to the respondents to permit the petitioners to appear in the Civil Services Examination, 1994, extending the age relaxation upto 33 years and allowing any number of attempts for the said examination without any ceiling upto the age of 33 years and the result of the said examination need not be published until further orders pending disposal of the writ petition. In that petition, the court passed an order on 2. 1994 observing that the direction prayed for by the petitioner could not be granted. However, the court issued a direction to the Union Public Service Commission to supply application forms to the petitioners and receive the filled in application forms from them without prejudice to its rights and contentions in the writ petition. Similar orders were passed in the writ petitions filed subsequently. Thus, the petitioners filed their applications with the Union Public Service Commission for writing the examination. Though there was no orders by this Court granting permission to the petitioners to write the examination, the Union Public Service Commission issued hall tickets to the petitioners and also some persons who belong to backward class but have not filed writ petitions and permitted them to write the examination. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in view of the permission granted by the Union Public Service Commission to write the examination, the respondents have lost their right to contest the writ petitions and the same have to be allowed. An additional affidavit has been presented during the course of the hearing on behalf of the petitioners raising the aforesaid contention. After issue of hall-ticket, it is stated therein: “The same disables them from blowing hot and blowing cold. It also proves beyond doubt that the sending of the hall-tickets is clear conceding of our case.” In our opinion, the argument is one in despair. After issue of hall-ticket, it is stated therein: “The same disables them from blowing hot and blowing cold. It also proves beyond doubt that the sending of the hall-tickets is clear conceding of our case.” In our opinion, the argument is one in despair. It is admitted that on the eve of the examinations, the petitioners were moving this Court to get specific directions permitting them to write the examinations and the Union Public Service Commission thought it better to allow them to write the examination subject to the result of the writ petitions. That will not give rise to any rule of estoppel and prevent the respondents from contesting the writ petitions. 11. In the view expressed by us above that the writ petitions are not maintainable they are hereby dismissed. All the miscellaneous petitions filed for interim direction are also dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.