JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—This appeal has been heard with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties on the following substantial questions of law :— (1) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs for possession by redemption was within time ? (2) Whether defendants-appellants became owner by adverse possession after the period of 12 years when the mortgage came to an end ? 2. This appeal has been filed by the defendants-appellants against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No.165/1982 by Additional District Judge (I) Kangra at Dharamshala dated December 27, 1985 whereby the judgment and decree dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs-res pondents by Sub-Judge 1st Class Kangra dated April 28, 1982 was set aside and suit for joint possession was decreed to the extent of 2/3rd share of the shop in dispute. 3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly these :— "The plaintiffs-respondents filed civil suit No.12 of 1971 in the court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Kangra for possession by redemption of mortgage of one shop situate in Tika Lidwar Majra Nagrota Baguan as detailed in the Head note of the plaint. It appears that in or about the year 1924-25 the suit shop was mortgaged with possession by plaintiff No.1 Sham Lal and one Bholu predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 to Mangat Ram, predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 by an oral agreement in lieu of a debt of Rs. 500. At the time of the creation of mortgage the rent of the shop in question was Rs. 30 per annum. The case of the plaintiffs was that after settlement of the debt, the defendants were required to deliver back the possession of the shop in dispute to the plaintiffs. Mangat Ram rented the shop after creation of mortgage and had been enjoying the amount of the rent. The shop in dispute presently is stated to be on rent with Ved Prakash (defendant No. 8). After the death of Mangat Ram, the defendants have been receiving the rent of the shop. The plaintiffs pleaded that the defendants were required to settle the accounts in respect of the debt in question. They have requested the defendants in October, 1970 to settle the accounts and to deliver back the possession of the shop, but the defendants declined to do so. The plaintiffs pleaded that the defendants were required to settle the accounts in respect of the debt in question. They have requested the defendants in October, 1970 to settle the accounts and to deliver back the possession of the shop, but the defendants declined to do so. Thereafter, the plaintiffs had served the defendants with a notice which the defendants had refused to receive. Consequently, the plaintiffs have to file a suit for passion by redemption.” 4. The defendants-appellants resisted the suit. The case of defendant Nos. 1 to 7 was that the shop in dispute was in the form of ‘Tapri’ and was sold by Bholu predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 to Mangat Ram, predecessor-in interest of defendant Nos.1 to 4 for a consideration of Rs. 20 prior to 1924-25, and as such, the plaintiffs had no title in respect of the shop. It is asserted that the said Tapri had fallen down about 20/23 years back before filing of the suit and thereafter, they had reconstructed the shop by investing Rs. 10,000. In the alternative the defendants pleaded that in case the sale in question was not proved they are permanent tenants of the shop. Smt. Soma Devi defendant No. 9 pleaded that she has l/3rd share in the shop and the entire shop was sold by one Daya Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs to Mangat Ram and subsequently defendant Nos. 2 to 4 had sold half share of the shop to defendant Nos. 5 to 7. The defendants are in possession of the shop as owners. Defendant No. 8 had not contested the claim of the plaintiffs and was proceeded ex parte. 5. The trial Judge raised the necessary issues, recorded the evidence and dismissed the suit. 6. The defendants-appellants appealed to the District Court. Learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal holding the plaintiffs-respondents entitled to joint possession by redemption of the shop to the extent of 2/3rd share and passed decree in favour of the plaintiffs respondents and dismissed the appeal in respect of 1/3rd share of the shop. 7. Against the appellate-decree the defendants filed the present appeal, and plaintiffs-respondents filed cross-objection claiming possession of entire shop after mortgage money was paid. 8. Shri C.B. Barowalia, learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants raised two contentions before me. The first contention is that the suit for possession by redemption was time barred. 9. 7. Against the appellate-decree the defendants filed the present appeal, and plaintiffs-respondents filed cross-objection claiming possession of entire shop after mortgage money was paid. 8. Shri C.B. Barowalia, learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants raised two contentions before me. The first contention is that the suit for possession by redemption was time barred. 9. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to scrutinise the facts of the case. Admittedly, mortgage in question was created in or about 1924-25. The period of limitation under Article 61 of the Schedule of the old Limitation Act was 60 years. Thus, counting the period of 60 years from 1924-25 the period would have expired in 1984-85 but under the Limitation Act, 1963 the period of limitation has been curtailed to 30 years. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs-respondents would have got only 7 years from 1963 to redeem the mortgage in question and the suit was required to be filed for redemption on or before December 3l, 1970. The suit, in question, was filed on 30-12-1970, Now, the question arises whether the mortgage in question had come to an end in the year 1942 when the debt in question was to be discharged out of the income of rent of the shop. The defendants have failed to lead evidence in support of their claim that the debt had actually been discharged in the year 1942. No doubt, entries made in Jamabandi (Ex. P-6) for the year 1924-25 would go to show that the annual rent of the shop was Rs. 30 when the mortgage, was created, but, in the absence of specific evidence of the defendants-appellants to show that only the principal debt was to be satisfied and no interest was to be recovered, it is difficult to believe without knowing the exact rate of interest accrued en the debt, that the debt had been discharged in 1942. If it is taken that the principal debt had been discharged in 1942 even then the interest was also to be paid after 1942 which would have taken another 17 years to discharge the entire liability, if the interest was to be paid and calculated at the rate of 6% per annum. The rate of interest at 6% per annum on the amount of debt would have come to Rs. 30 per annum. The rate of interest at 6% per annum on the amount of debt would have come to Rs. 30 per annum. In Jamabandi for the year 1952-53 it is found mention that the rent was increased to Rs. 240 per annum in the year 1952. Till 1952 the principal debt could not have been discharged at the rate of Rs. 30 per annum. Thus, it cannot be held in the absence of any specific evidence adduced by the defendants that the debt in question had been discharged in 1942 or in any subsequent year. The defendants or anyone of them have not appeared in the witness box to substantiate their claim tint the debt was discharged in the year 1942 or subsequent thereto. It was incumbent upon the defendants to prove the manner in which they have appropriated the rent of the shop and settled the entire accounts. But on the contrary, the pleadings of the defendants would go to show that they claimed to have purchased the shop in dispute which was not proved by them. Similarly, alternative plea of defendants that they were permanent lessees is also not proved for lack of evidence. Therefore, the defendants have miserably failed to substantiate their pleadings and it is not possible to hold that the mortgage in question had come to an end in 1942. Thus, the lower appellate Court is correct in holding that the mortgage in question had not come to an end in 1942 and the plaintiffs-respondents could file suit for redemption on or before December 31, 1970 which was admittedly filed on 30-12-1970. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff was within time. 10. The next contention raised by Shri Barowalia is that the defendants-appellants admittedly, entered into the possession of the suit premises as mortgagees and remained in possession for more than 12 years and have acquired ownership by adverse possession. The question arises for consideration is whether it is a suit for redemption of the mortgage or only for possession after the mortgage had been redeemed. Admittedly, the mortgage in question is usufructuary mortgage and the same will be governed by the provisions of section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The question arises for consideration is whether it is a suit for redemption of the mortgage or only for possession after the mortgage had been redeemed. Admittedly, the mortgage in question is usufructuary mortgage and the same will be governed by the provisions of section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, under this section a suit in the case of usufructuary mortgage can be filed for recovery of possession by the mortgagor of the mortgaged property together with the mortgage deed and all documents which are in possession or power of the mortgage. The plaintiffs have proved by adducing evidence that the debt alongwith the interest was fully satisfied and despite clear notice to the defendants given in October, 1970, the defendants had failed to deliver back the possession of the mortgaged property, and in the absence of evidence of the defendants on record with respect to the date of discharge of the debt, it can safely be presumed that the liability had been discharged in October, 1970 when the plaintiffs demanded the rendition of the accounts but the defendants failed to do so. The defendants should have led evidence to prove that the mortgage-money had been discharged either in 1942 or in any subsequent year and thereafter, they have become owners of the property by adverse possession to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The defendants have failed to prove that the suit was filed after the expiry of period of 12 years from the date when the mortgage had come to an end. The defendants have not led any evidence to prove that they acquired ownership by adverse possession. The learned Counsel for the defendants-appellants relied upon Prithi Nath Singh and others v. Suraj Ahir and others, AIR 1963 SC 1041, in which it is observed :— "(7) It is to be noted that these provisions do not state when a mortgage ceases to be a mortgage. They simply describe the right of a mortgagor to redeem. Now, what is this right and, in what circumstances does it arise ? The right arises on the principal money, payment of which is secured by the mortgage deed, becoming due. They simply describe the right of a mortgagor to redeem. Now, what is this right and, in what circumstances does it arise ? The right arises on the principal money, payment of which is secured by the mortgage deed, becoming due. The right entitles the mortgagor, on his paying or tendering to the mortgagee the mortgage money to ask him (i) to deliver to him the mortgage deed and other documents relating to the mortgaged property ; (ii) to deliver possession to the mortgagor, if the mortgagee is in possession ; and (iii) to re-transfer the mortgaged property in accordance with the desire of the mortgagor. If the mortgagee receives the money and does not perform any of the three acts required of him to be done, the question arises whether this non-compliance with the demands will make the mortgage continue. The provisions of the section do not say so and there appears no good reason why the mortgage should continue. If the mortgagee is not to perform these acts the mortgagor is not to pay the amount. If, however, the mortgage money has been received by the mortgagee and thereafter he refuses to perform the acts, he is bound to do, the mortgagor can enforce his right to get back the mortgaged property and the reconveyance of that property through Court A new right to get his demands enforced through the Court thus arises as a result of the provisions of section 60 of the Act. (8) if the mortgage money has been paid and then the mortgagor goes to Court to enforce his demands, that would not be to enforce his right of redemption which was really his right to make those demands on payment of the mortgage money. The right to demand the mortgagee to do certain things on payment of the mortgage money is different from enforcing the demands subsequent to the payment of the money. This is also clear from the decree for redemption. Order XXXIV, Rule 7, C.P.C. provides for the preliminary decree in a redemption suit and the preliminary decree is to order that the account be taken of what was due to the defendant, viz., the mortgagee, at the date of decree for principal and interest on the mortgage, and other matters. This is also clear from the decree for redemption. Order XXXIV, Rule 7, C.P.C. provides for the preliminary decree in a redemption suit and the preliminary decree is to order that the account be taken of what was due to the defendant, viz., the mortgagee, at the date of decree for principal and interest on the mortgage, and other matters. Rule 9 provides that if on such accounting, any sum be found due to the mortgagor, the decree would direct the mortgagee to pay such amount to the mortgagor. If the mortgage money due has been already paid by the mortgagor and has been accepted by the mortgagee in full discharge of the mortgage deed, no occasion for such accounting arises and therefore any suit to enforce the return of the mortgage deed and to get back the possession of the mortgaged property cannot be a suit for redemption." 11. As already stated, in the present case the defendants-appellants have failed to show that the debt in question had been satisfied prior to 1958 and the suit in question was filed after the period of 12 years from the date of discharge- of the debt and the defendants had been in adverse possession of the shop for a period of 12 years prior to the filing of the suit. As such, in the face of these observations by the Supreme Court, it may not altogether be correct to refer to the suit instituted in this case as a suit for redemption. The present suit is only for recovery of possession and the debt in question was deemed to have been discharged. 12. There are also authorities to the effect that possession by a mortgagee whose mortgage had been discharged either by payment or by appropriation of the property does not by the mere act of extinguishment of the mortgage, become adverse to the mortgagor. 13. 12. There are also authorities to the effect that possession by a mortgagee whose mortgage had been discharged either by payment or by appropriation of the property does not by the mere act of extinguishment of the mortgage, become adverse to the mortgagor. 13. In Kanbi Ladha Ukeda v. Joshi Jestaram and others, AIR 1971 Guj 239, it was observed : “Thus where the person admittedly enters into possession of the suit land as a mortgage on the basis of the unregistered document and remains in possession for more than 12 years, he having so entered with the consent of the mortgagor does not acquire ownership by adverse possession................" “His admission that he entered into possession as mortgagee, though the mortgage transaction is not evidenced by a registered document, means that he entered into possession of the suit lands with the consent and permission of the plaintiffs. Therefore, having entered into possession of the lands in question with the consent and permission of the plaintiffs it is not open to him to plead acquisition of ownership by possession. Therefore, the question prescribing title to the suit property as owner by adverse possession does not arise in this case." 14. In Sankaran Parmeswaran Pillay v. Sankaran Chandrasekharan Pillay and others, AIR 1974 Ker 102, it is reiterated thus :— "A suit for possession against a mortgagee whose mortgage had been extinguished by payment of the mortgage amount is not governed either by Article 148 or by Article 142 of the Limitation Act (1908), but only by Article 144. Possession by a mortgagee whose mortgage has been discharged by the payment of mortgage money, does not by the mere act of extinguishment of mortgage become adverse to the mortgagor. It is for the contesting defendant to make out how, and from what time, his possession which started as a mortgagee, changed its character and became adverse." 15. In Gaya Parshad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and another, AIR 1984 SC 930, Bhagwati Acting Chief Justice held as under :— "Mere termination of the licence of a licensee does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession, unless and until he sets up a title hostile to that of the lieensor after termination of his licence. In Gaya Parshad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and another, AIR 1984 SC 930, Bhagwati Acting Chief Justice held as under :— "Mere termination of the licence of a licensee does not enable the licensee to claim adverse possession, unless and until he sets up a title hostile to that of the lieensor after termination of his licence. It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title. It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession. Mere continuance of unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12 years is not enough." 16. In the present case as stated above, the defendants have failed to establish their title by adverse possession by leading evidence. Their case as already stated above was that the land was sold to their predecessor for consideration of Rs 20 prior to 1924-25 and in the alternative they pleaded that they are permanent tenants of the mortgaged property. It is settled law that in order to determine what in fact the dispute between the parties to a suit is one has to look to the pleadings, issues framed in the suit and the evidence adduced. See Mahendra Mahto v. Suraj Prasad Ojha and others, AIR 1958 Pat 568. In Maya Wanti v. Rajinder Singh and another, 1988 (2) RLR 168, it is observed : "the object of the pleadings is to give fair notice to the contesting parties with respect to the case, they are required to meet and to call out the points on which the parties disagree or differ. The difference of the parties is further reduced in the form of issues which eradicate all irrelevant and undisputed questions. The intention of the parties has to be gathered from the pleadings as well as the resulting issues to be tried". The difference of the parties is further reduced in the form of issues which eradicate all irrelevant and undisputed questions. The intention of the parties has to be gathered from the pleadings as well as the resulting issues to be tried". Thus, the defendants-appellants have failed to prove that they have become owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession and the suit was filed after the expiry of period of 12 years when the mortgage had come to an end. 17. The plaintiffs-respondents filed cross-objection No.150 of 1986 under Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C. claiming that they are entitled for the possession of the entire mortgaged property. 18. Shri Praneet Gupta appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-objectors contended that one of the co-mortgagor is entitled to redeem the entire mortgaged property and the decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court excluding the l/3rd share belonging to Smt. Soma Devi defendant No. 9 is not legally sustainable. He has relied upon Ganeshi Lal v. Joti Parshad, AIR 1953 SC 1. In that case the apex Court observed as under :— "........................Where one of the co-mortgagors redeems a mortgage over the property which belongs jointly to himself and the rests, equity as embodied in the doctrine of subrogation confers on him a right to reimburse himself for the amount spent in excess by him in the matter of redemption : he can call upon the co-mortgagors to contribute towards the excess which he has paid over his own share. To compel the co-debtors or co-mortgagors to pay more than their shay of what was paid to the creditor or mortgagee is to perpetrate an inequity or injustice, as it means that the debtor who is in a position to pay and pays up can obtain an advantage for himself over the other joint debtors. Such a result shall not be countenanced by equity. Hence, such a co-mortgagor stands in the mortgagees shoes only to the extent of getting reimbursed from the co-mortgagors for their shares in the amount actually paid by him and not for the full amount due on the mortgage on the date of redemption." 19. In Variavan Saraswathi and another v. Eachampi Then and others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 201, R. M. Sahai, J. observed thus :— "6. In Variavan Saraswathi and another v. Eachampi Then and others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 201, R. M. Sahai, J. observed thus :— "6. Since the transfer in a mortgage is, only, of interest and not of the entire right and title, as takes place in sale, the mortgagor and the mortgagee can transfer or assign their interest. A mortgagor may assign or transfer the equity of redemption o may even create second mortgage. Similarly a mortgagee may assign his interest or create another mortgage. Since an assigner can pass on interest that he has, the assignee becomes holder of the same interest that a mortgagee has. In other words, he steps into the shoes of the mortgagee. But same cannot be said where a co-mortgagor or anyone on behalf of mortgagor authorised under law, pays the amount and brings to an end the interest the mortgagee had. Once the mortgage debt is discharged by a person beneficially interested in equity of redemption the mortgage comes to an end by operation of law. Consequently the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee cannot subsist What then is the status of a person paying off debt to secure the property either with consent of others or on own volition ? In law he becomes the owner, entitled to hold and passes the property. But in equity the right is to hold the property till he is reimbursed. In other words, he may hold the property in surety or he may bring the claim for contribution 7. But these rights in equity, either in favour of the person who discharges the debt or the person whose debt has been discharged, do not result in resumption of relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee ; a co-mortgagor in possession, of excess share redeemed by him, can enforce his claim against non-redeeming mortgagor by exercising rights of foreclosure or sale as is exercised by mortgagee under section 67 of the Transfer of Property Act. But that does not make him mortgagee." 20. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is well settled that one of the several co-mortgagors has right to redeem the entire property and take possession of the same and the other co-mortgagors stand in the mortgagees shoes only to the extent of getting reimbursed from the co-mortgagors for their shares in the amount actually paid by him. Smt. Soma Devi defendant No. 9 aligned herself with the defendants The claim of Smt. Soma Devi (defendant No. 9) pleaded by her in her written statement that the shop was sold in favour of defendants has not been proved by her inasmuch as she had not appeared in the witness box to strengthen her claim. The plaintiffs-respondents are entitled to the possession of full shares in the shop after the property was redeemed including the share of Smt. Soma Devi defendant. The decree passed by the First Appellate Court to this extent is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be modified. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Cross-objection is allowed and the decree passed by the First Appellate Court is modified to the extent that the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to the decree of possession of the entire mortgaged shop. The suit of the plaintiff for the possession of the shop is decreed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. -