K. S. Mahadevan v. Mrs. Meenakshi — 1994 DIGILAW 684 (MAD)

Judgment :- GULAB C. GUPTA, J. 1. This is defendants appeal under clause (15) of the Letters Patent read with Order 36, Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules challenging the legal validity of the judgment and the preliminary decree dated 3.5.1990 passed by the Honourable Mr. Justice Maruthamuthu in C.S. No. 45 of 1989. 2. The respondents/plaintiffs had filed the suit for partition and possession of their 2/21 share in the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B of the plaint and for rendition of accounts of business mentioned in Schedule C of the plaint and separation and payment of their 2/21 share. It was alleged that the suit properties are the self-earned properties of K.S. Subramanian, who died on 25.1.1986. He had three sons Kunjithapatham, who predeceased him and is represented by the respondents/plaintiffs and the appellants K.S. Mahadevan and Ramani and four daughters viz., appellants 2, 3, 4 and 6. The present respondents are the widow, son and daughter of Kunjithapatham. It was alleged that the respondents had earlier filed a Civil Suit No. 64 of 1970 in this Court for partition and possession of their share in the properties mentioned in the said suit. It was their claim in the said suit that those properties were joint family properties inherited by Subramaniam from his father and hence the respondents had a share in the same. The appellants and Subramaniam however defended the suit and claimed that all the properties mentioned in the plaint of the said suit were self-acquisitions of Subramaniam. The suit however ended in an agreement between the parties on 7.11.1977 and was decreed in terms of the said compromise. As a result of the said compromise decree the respondents were paid a sum of Rs. 75,000/- in full and final settlement of all their claims. Their claims according to the respondents-plaintiffs included not only the share in the properties but they also claimed in relation to the arrears of salary and other service claims of Kunjithapatham. The agreement, according to the respondents/plaintiffs fully establish that the properties now involved in the present suit were the self-acquired properties of Subramaniam. Since Subramaniam died intestate on 25.1.1986 leaving the suit properties they claim 2/21 share in the same and prayed for a decree. The appellants filed their written statement and contested the said claim. The agreement, according to the respondents/plaintiffs fully establish that the properties now involved in the present suit were the self-acquired properties of Subramaniam. Since Subramaniam died intestate on 25.1.1986 leaving the suit properties they claim 2/21 share in the same and prayed for a decree. The appellants filed their written statement and contested the said claim. The admitted that the properties mentioned in the Schedules A and B of plaint belonged to late Subramaniam, but denied that the business in Schedule C had any connection with him. The appellants further pleaded that the compromise decree passed in C.S. No. 64 of 1970 had settled the claim of the respondents/plaintiffs in the property of late Subramaniam who had consented to pay Rs. 75,000/- in full quit of all claims of the respondents. The appellants therefore, submitted that the respondents/plaintiffs are estopped from making a claim over again. They also stated that their suit was barred by the principles of res judicata. 3. The learned single judge framed the issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties and gave opportunities to them to adduce evidence. Thereafter, on consideration of the submissions of the parties the learned single judge held that the earlier decree did not operate as res judicata . According to the learned judge, the compromise decree specifically accepts that the late Subramaniam was the absolute owner of the suit properties and therefore a cause of action in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs arose in 1986 when Subramaniam died intestate leaving the properties in question. The learned single judge further held that the respondents/plaintiffs could not have any claim in the properties of Subramaniam on the date of the compromise and the said compromise does not cover the future claim, The learned single judge was of the view that payment of Rs. 75,000/- was made for admitting that the properties in dispute were absolute properties of Subramaniam and were realty paid out of sympathy and grace. The respondents/plaintiffs by accepting the said amount had only given up their right for partition as claimed by them in the suit. On this finding a preliminary decree had been passed and is under challenge in this appeal. 4. That the respondents are the legal heirs of Kunjithapatham who was the son of Subramaniam is not in dispute. The respondents/plaintiffs by accepting the said amount had only given up their right for partition as claimed by them in the suit. On this finding a preliminary decree had been passed and is under challenge in this appeal. 4. That the respondents are the legal heirs of Kunjithapatham who was the son of Subramaniam is not in dispute. It is therefore admitted that the respondents are the heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and entitled to succeed to the estate of Subramaniam along with the appellants who are his other heirs. The appellants have however submitted that the respondents having accepted Rs. 75,000/- in full settlement of all claims over the property of Subramaniam were not entitled to any share now. If the properties in question were self-earned properties of Subramaniam the respondents/plaintiff would have no interest or share therein during the lifetime. Indeed Subramaniam would be entitled to bequeathe or otherwise transfer the said property to anyone. In such a situation the right of the parties to the self-earned properties of late Subramaniam had arisen only when be had died intestate and leaving his self-earned property. This clearly indicates that there was not even are mote possibility on 7.11.1977 of any one inheriting estate of Subramaniam. It may also be kept in mind that the respondents had claimed those properties as the joint family properties and interest therein from the date of birth of Kunjithapatham. It may, therefore, be examined whether the compromise decree dated 7.11.1977 covers the claim of the respondents and thereby makes the present suit not only barred by res judicata but also devoid of substance. A perusal of the said decree would indicate that late Subramaniam was to pay Rs. 75,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree till realisation in full quit of all the claims of the plaintiffs including those items of houses described in the plaint Schedule VII. The agreement further provides that late Subraminam as the full owner of all the suit properties shall not alienate any of the same except for discharging the decree until the decree is discharged. The question requiring consideration is whether the phase “in full quit of all the claims of the plaintiffs” would include a claim of succession arising on the death of Subramaniam and in the event of his leaving some of the properties? The question requiring consideration is whether the phase “in full quit of all the claims of the plaintiffs” would include a claim of succession arising on the death of Subramaniam and in the event of his leaving some of the properties? The purpose of interpretation of a document is to ascertain the intention of the parties which has to be gathered not only from the language us ed but also from the context in which the agreement has been signed by the parties. In other words the text and context rule is the most appropriate rule for discovering the intention of the parties in such cases. As regards context it is apparent that there was a dispute between the parties about the true nature of the suit properties. The respondents had claimed that the suit properties are the joint family properties but late Subramaniam claimed that the properties were self-acquired. This dispute was settled on consideration of Rs. 75,000/- and hence it is not open to the respondents now to contend that the properties were joint family properties or that Kunjithapatham had interest in the said property from his birth. The claim on behalf of the respondents in that suit was as a legal representative of Kunjithapatham and not in relation to the right as a heir of Subramaniam. As regards their inheriting the estate of late Subramaniam they could not hope to do so on that date. Not only that there was no possibility of Subramaniam dying in the near future there was also no possibility of his leaving anything for being inherited by the respondents/plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, the claim in the present suit would not be within the contemplation of the parties on the date of the last agreement and, therefore, the said agreement could not cover the present claim. This interpretation would, therfore, make the principle of res judicata inapplicable. In this connection, it is also important to remember that the claim of the respondents/plainitiffs now is under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act as heirs of Subramaniam. They are not claiming anything through Kunjithapatham. It may be that they are the heirs of Subramaniam only because they were related to late Kunjithapatham and the Hindu Succession Act makes them the heirs of Subramaniam only because of that relationship. They are not claiming anything through Kunjithapatham. It may be that they are the heirs of Subramaniam only because they were related to late Kunjithapatham and the Hindu Succession Act makes them the heirs of Subramaniam only because of that relationship. In spite of it, the law creates a direct relationship between the respondents and Subramaniam and hence the nature of their claim now is different from the claim in the earlier suit. Because of this the earlier agreement could not have covered this claim. These reasons in our opinion are in addition to the reasons given by the learned single judge which need not be repeated. 5. In view of our conclusion aforesaid the respondents would be entitled to succed to the properties of late Subramaniam together with the appellants and would, therefore, be entitled to claim partition and possession thereof. In this view of the matter the impugend decree in so far as the properties in Schedules A and B is held to be in accordance with law. The appeal fails in respect of these properties and is dismissed to that extent. 6. The responents/plaintiffs have further claimed that the business mentioned in Schedule C of the plaint was also the business of late Subramaniam. But this fact was denied by the appellants, who had specifically pleaded that Subramaniam had separated himself from the business which he was doing before his death and hence had no share in the same from the date of his death. These contentions have not been investigated by the learned single judge nor is there any finding about it. In spite of it, a Commissioner had been appointed for taking account of the business. This is not in accordance with law. The Commissioner could only be appointed if the leanred single judge had reached the finding that the business was also that of late Subramaniam. In order to reach the said finding it was necessary for the learned single judge to examine the appellants submission whether the late Subramaniam had separated himself from the business. In this view of the matter, the impugned decree in so far as the business in Schedule C is concerned cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. In order to reach the said finding it was necessary for the learned single judge to examine the appellants submission whether the late Subramaniam had separated himself from the business. In this view of the matter, the impugned decree in so far as the business in Schedule C is concerned cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. The learned single judge will frame specific issues in relation to the rival claims of the parties about the business in Schedule C and try and decide the same in accordance with law. The appeal partly succeeds and is allowed as such. The case will go back to the learned single Judge for decision about the business in Schedule C. No. costs.