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1994 DIGILAW 690 (BOM)

Gajanan R. Neelpawar & others v. State of Maharashtra & others

1994-12-02

H.W.DHABE, R.M.LODHA

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JUDGMENT - LODHA R.M., J.:---Batch of these seven writ petitions involving common question of law, has been heard together and all these writ petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. All the petitioners in all these petitions are aggrieved by the rejection of their applications for renewal of their leases for minor mineral on the ground that the said areas are recorded as Zudpi Jungle and permission of the Central Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act is necessary and since the permission has not been obtained, leases for renewal cannot be renewed. Facts of the individual petitioner are not required to be gone into in view of the controversy raised in these writ petitions. Suffice it to say that in all writ petitions, the petitioners were granted mining leases for minor minerals initially and these leases have already been renewed once at the option of the lessees. The petitioners applied for renewal of the renewed leases and as stated above, the renewal has been refused on the ground that the mining area concerning those leases is recorded as Zudpi Jungle and permission of the Central Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 was necessary and since that permission has not been obtained, mining operations cannot continue and the renewed leases cannot be renewed. 3. The Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Collector has submitted that the question whether the area concerned is Zudpi Jungle or not, need not be gone into in these writ petitions, because even otherwise, the petitioners who were granted lease for carrying on operation in the minor minerals initially, have already exercised the right of one renewal permissible under Rule 16 of the Maharashtra Minor Mineral Extraction (Vidarbha Region) Rules, 1966 (for short, the 'Rules of 1966') and there is no further right of renewal and, therefore, the Collector has not committed any illegality in rejecting the application of the petitioners for renewal of the leases which were already renewed for one period at the option of the lessees. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966, the period of the mining lease cannot exceed ten years except with the approval of the Government and in none of the cases the Government has approved grant of lease exceeding ten years and the lease is only renewable at the option of the lessee for one period, not exceeding the duration of original lease and in all seven writ petitions the petitioners have got lease renewed for one period having the duration of the original ease and therefore, they have no right of renewal for more than one period. The learned Assistant Government Pleader also submitted that in the initial lease deeds, there was a covenant of renewal of lease for one period at the option of the lessee and thereafter in the renewed lease, there was no renewal clause. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners on the other hand submitted that there is no prohibition in Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966 for renewal of the lease for more than one period though the lessee has right of renewal at his option for one period only. The learned Counsel strenuously urged that the lessor can renew the lease as many times as it wants and such right is inherent. The learned Counsel for the petitioners did not dispute the factual aspect that in all the writ petitions the lessees have exercised their right of option for one period for the duration of the original lease and in all these writ petitions the Collector has rejected the applications filed by the petitioners for second renewal. However, the learned Counsel strenuously urged that renewal of lease is nothing but a grant of fresh lease and therefore, Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966 did not come in the way in granting the second renewal of the lease and in this connection the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in (Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish)1, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2609. 5. Rules of 1966 have been made by the Government of Maharashtra in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. 5. Rules of 1966 have been made by the Government of Maharashtra in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. These Rules extend to Vidarbha Region of the Maharashtra State. Under the Rules, "mining lease" means a lease to mine quarry, bore, dig and search for, win, work and carry away any minor mineral specified therein. Chapter II of the Rules of 1966 deals with grant of mining lease in respect of land in which minerals belong to the Government. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1966 provides for restrictions on grant of mining lease. According to Rule 4, every application for mining lease in respect of any land in which the minerals belong to the Government, shall be made to the Competent Officer and shall contain the particulars mentioned therein. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that every application shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100/- and by certified copies of relevant extracts of the Record of Rights pertaining to the lands in respect of which the mining lease is applied for and also by a certificate of financial standing of the applicant from a revenue officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar or from any banking company in the State of Maharashtra as defined in the Banking Companies Act, 1959 or a Co-operative Bank registered or deemed to be registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Rule 5 of the Rules of 1966 provided that on receipt of an application under Rule 4, the Competent Officer on making such inquiries as he deems fit, may sanction the grant of a mining lease to the applicant or refuse to sanction it and where the mining lease is granted, the formal lease shall be executed in form 'A' attached to the Rules. Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of 1966 make a provision for refund of fee in the event of refusal to grant mining lease and intimation of the refusal to be given to the applicant. Under Rule 8, register of applications for mining leases is required to be maintained under the said rule. Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of 1966 make a provision for refund of fee in the event of refusal to grant mining lease and intimation of the refusal to be given to the applicant. Under Rule 8, register of applications for mining leases is required to be maintained under the said rule. Under Rule 9 the applicant is required to deposit as security a sum equal to 50 per cent of the annual dead rent fixed for the lease for due observance of the terms and conditions of the lease. On grant of mining lease by the Competent Officer, survey and demarcation of the area granted under the lease is made at the expense of the lessee as required under Rule 10 of the Rules of 1966. Register of Mining Leases needs to be maintained by each Competent Officer specifying the particulars mentioned in Rule 11 which include, date of renewal and date of determination of the lease. According to Rule 12 the registers maintained by the Competent Officers under Rules 8 and 11 are open to inspection by any person on payment of fee. Rule 13 of the Rules of 1966 provides for restrictions on area of mining lease. Period of mining lease is prescribed under Rule 16 and provision for transfer of mining lease is contained in Rule 17 of the Rules of 1966. Every mining lease, under Rule 18, is required to include the conditions mentioned in the said rule. Rule 19 deals with rights of lessee for the purposes of mining operations and Rule 20 provides that the lessee may determine the lease at any time by giving not less than six months notice in writing to the Competent Officer. Chapter V of the Rules of 1966 containing Rules 33, 34, 34-A and 34-B provide for appeal, revision and review. 6. After having surveyed the Rules of 1966, Rule 16 which is relevant and material for consideration of these writ petitions may be reproduced, which reads as under:--- "16. Period of mining lease.---(1) The period for which a mining lease may be granted shall not, except with the approval of Government, exceed 10 years. The lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease. Period of mining lease.---(1) The period for which a mining lease may be granted shall not, except with the approval of Government, exceed 10 years. The lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease. (2) At the time of renewal of the lease, the lessee shall be entitled to surrender any part of the leased area. (3) When renewal is granted--- (i) royalty and surface rent shall be charged at the rates in force at the time of the renewal, and (ii) dead rent shall be charged at such rates as the Collector may fix within the limits specified in Schedule II to these Rules in force at the time of the renewal. (4)(i) An application for renewal of the lease shall be made at least sixty days before the date of expiry of lease and shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100/-. (ii) Where the renewal of the lease is refused in respect of any part or the whole of the lease area, the reasons therefore shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. (iii) If an application for renewal of a lease has been made within the prescribed period, but is not disposed of before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period of three months or till such date on which the applicant is informed about the refusal to grant the renewal of the lease." 7. A look at Rule 16 would show that the period for which a mining lease may be granted, shall not exceed ten years, unless the Government has approved the grant of mining lease for more than ten years. It further makes it clear that the mining lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease. Thus, under the said rule at the option of the lessee, lease can be renewed once for the period not exceeding the duration of original lease. It further makes it clear that the mining lease shall be renewable at the option of the lessee for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease. Thus, under the said rule at the option of the lessee, lease can be renewed once for the period not exceeding the duration of original lease. The fact that lessee has right for renewal of lease for one period not exceeding the duration of original lease, it is made abundantly clear that lease can be renewed only once at the option of the lessee and the period of renewal shall not exceed the duration of the lease granted initially. The right of renewal once at the option of the lessee does not mean that there is right of renewal in perpetuity at the option of the lessor. The reason being that option of renewal once cannot be taken to mean an option for renewal after renewal. Renewal of the lease is not a right inherent under law. Unless right of renewal of mining lease for more than once was provided under the Rules or under the lease deed, the lessee cannot claim right to renewal, because the lease is determined by efflux of time limited thereby. The petitioners have not chosen to file before this Court the lease deeds granting them the mining lease initially nor have produced the lease deeds renewing the initial lease for the duration of the original period of lease. However, it is not, disputed by the learned Counsel for petitioners that though in the original lease deeds, there was a convenant providing that the mining lease shall be renewable at the option of lessee, for one period not exceeding the duration of the original lease, but in the renewed lease deeds, there is no such convenant that lease shall be renewable. Obviously, no such convenant could have been there in the renewed lease deed because Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966 only provides for renewal of lease once at the option of the lessee for a period not exceeding the duration of original lease. The petitioners have not refuted the definite stand set out by the Collector concerned in its return that there was no renewal clause in the renewed lease deeds and sanction orders. The petitioners have not refuted the definite stand set out by the Collector concerned in its return that there was no renewal clause in the renewed lease deeds and sanction orders. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also admitted that there is no approval of the Government on the basis of which the petitioners can claim the grant of mining lease for a period exceeding ten years. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the mining leases granted to them having been already renewed at the option of the lessees for the duration of the original lease could be further renewed. The language of Rule 16 is clear, specific and unambiguous which provides that the lease shall be renewed for one period not exceeding the duration of original lease at the option of lessee. This means that the lessee has right of renewal of lease once at his option upto the period of duration of the original lease and once that renewal of lease has been granted at the option of the lessee, the lessee has no right of further renewal. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has strenously urged that the renewal of lease is really the grant of fresh lease. He strongly relied on the Delhi Development Authority's case (supra) wherein the Supreme Court observed, "A renewal of lease is really the grant of fresh lease. It is called a renewal simply because it postulates the existence of prior lease which generally provides for, as of right, in all other respects which is really a fresh lease." We fail to appreciate how the aforesaid observations or the ratio of the said judgment has any application on the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Supreme Court in that case was construing convenants 9 and 10 of the lease deed in question which reads as under:--- "9. The lessor will at the request and cost of the lessee at the end of the term hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at the end of each such successive further term of years as shall be granted, execute to the lessee a new lease of the premises hereby demised by way of renewal for a further term as follows:- (a) At the first renewal ---Twenty years. (b) At the second renewal ---Twenty years. (b) At the second renewal ---Twenty years. (c) At the third renewal ---Thirty years: Provided always that each such renewed term of year as shall be granted shall not with the original term of the years and any previous renewals exceed in the aggregate the period of ninety years. 10. The rent of the said premises hereby demised is hereby expressly made subject of enhancement on the second renewal shall not exceed one hundred per cent of that reserved at the first renewal. Leases renewed for the third period provided for in the last preceding clause may be granted at the then prevailing market rate of rents for building land in the vicinity." With reference to the aforesaid covenants the question before the Apex Court was, whether the convent 9 could apply before the termination of the period of 90 years, because the contention by the defendants before the Supreme Court was that proviso to convenant No. 9 makes the enhancement clause operative within the admitted period of 90 years, because the 'original term' mentioned therein not only stands for initial period of 90 years, but also includes the period of renewals within it. Construing the said convenants 9 and 10 in the light of the lease deeds read as a whole, the Apex Court held that convenant No. 9 operates only at the end of term of 90 years and convenant No. 9 could not apply before the termination of initial period of 90 years. However, in the cases before us, we are neither concerned nor called upon to examine the convenants in the lease deed like the convenants 9 and 10 which were before the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. The language of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966, as observed, is very clear and specific, and it does not entertain any ambiguity. In our view, therefore, the decision of the Apex Court in the Delhi Development Authority's case (supra) has no application or relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Collector committed illegality or any error in rejecting the applications for renewal of the leases which were already renewed once at the option of the lessees for the duration of the original lease deeds. 9. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Collector committed illegality or any error in rejecting the applications for renewal of the leases which were already renewed once at the option of the lessees for the duration of the original lease deeds. In view of our conclusion that the petitioners have no right of seeking further renewal after they had already exercised their right of renewal once as provided under Rule 16, the question whether the mining area in question is Zudpi Jungle or not need not be gone into and rejection of the renewal applications made by the lessees after they had already got the leases renewed once and these was no clause of the renewal in the existing lease deeds, was proper by the Collector and does not require any interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Upshort of the aforesaid discussion is that all the writ petitions filed by the petitioners deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged and the interim orders passed by this Court during the pendency of writ petitions are vacated. Petitions dismissed. -----