JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by one Bhola Ram against the orders dated- 2.2.1994 passed by the Mining Engineer, Neem-ka-Thana, copies of which have been filed as Annexures 3 and 4 to the writ petition, directing the petitioner to hand over the possession of the mining area leased out to him by the Government. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant petition lie in a narrow campass. The petitioner made two applications dated 28.11.1983 for grant of mining lease under the Rajasthan Minor & Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Rules of 1977") for the mineral masonary stones near Village Modia Pahad, Tehsil and district Jhunjhunu. He was sanctioned two mining leases measuring 80 x 50 Sq. mtrs. and 100 x 60 Sq. mtrs. for a period of 10 years vide orders dated 31.7.1984, copies of which have been filed as Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. The dead rent for the mining lease was fixed at Rs. 1,200/- and Rs. 1,800/- respectively for the aforesaid areas, subject to revision after 5 years from the date of registration. The lease deeds were executed on 5.11.1984 and were registered on 15.12.1984. Subsequently the dead rent was revised from 15.12.1989 to Rs. 4,040/- and Rs. 4,360/- respectively. The petitioner had complied with all conditions of lease deed and did not commit any breach of the Mines & Minerals (Regulations and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") and the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1985 (sic 1986) (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Rules"). The petitioner has emphatically stated that he had committed no default. It has been averred that the petitioner suddenly received these two impugned letters as stated above, by which he was directed to hand over the possession of the area of mining leases to Shri Nathmal Modi (respondent No. 3). After receipt of the aforesaid orders, the petitioner made inquires and came to know that respondent No. 3 was sanctioned the mining lease for an area of 3000 x 3000 ft. in Village Modia Pahad, Tehsil and District Jhunjhunu for masonary stone on 31.7.1971 which was registered on 24.11.1971 and since the respondent No. 3 had not complied with the conditions of the lease deed, the same was cancelled on 5.7.1973. in Village Modia Pahad, Tehsil and District Jhunjhunu for masonary stone on 31.7.1971 which was registered on 24.11.1971 and since the respondent No. 3 had not complied with the conditions of the lease deed, the same was cancelled on 5.7.1973. It is pertinent to mention at this place that the lease period of the respondent No. 3 expired on 30.10.1976. However, much after the expiry of the lease period, the respondent No. 3 filed a civil suit on 7.4.1977 against the State of Rajasthan, Mining Engineer, Jaipur and Assistant Mining Engineer, Sikar, in the court of Additional Civil Judge, Jaipur, which was decreed ex-parte on 8.12.1987. In the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 (sic No. 3), the respondent No. 1 and 2 put in appearance and filed written statement and asserted that the mining lease of the respondent No. 3 was validly and rightly cancelled and the suit of the respondent No. 3 was liable to be dismissed. It was also asserted that the period of lease of respondent No. 3 had already expired and thereafter the area held by the respondent No. 3 had already been leased out to other persons. However, it appears that subsequently, the respondents (defendants) failed to appear before the Civil Court and as such the suit proceeded ex-parte. The Additional Civil Judge while decreeing the suit of the respondent No. 3 declared the order dated 5.7.1973 cancelling the lease, as illegal and directed that in pursuance of the lease deed dated 31.3.1971, the possession of the mining lease should be restored to respondent No. 3 for the remaining period of the lease, so that he may be allowed to complete the term of lease i.e. 5 years. It appears that an application under order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. read with Section 151 C. P. C. and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for setting aside the ex-parte decree were filed by the State of Rajasthan in the court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. However, the said appeal failed on 13.2.1992 and the order of the learned trial court was maintained. One of the relevant features, which has been alleged by the petitioner is that he is not a party to the suit. However, the said appeal failed on 13.2.1992 and the order of the learned trial court was maintained. One of the relevant features, which has been alleged by the petitioner is that he is not a party to the suit. It is also relevant to state that inspite of the fact that the State Government had taken a plea in the written statement before the learned Additional Civil judge that the lease held by the respondent had already been leased out to other persons, but even then he did not care to implead the petitioner as party to the suit. It has been further stated that the respondents No. 1 and 2 have no authority in compelling the petitioner to hand over the area of mining lease held by him and also have no authority to interfere in his possession over the leased area, inter alia, mainly on the ground that without cancelling the lease granted to the petitioner, the respondents had no authority to direct the petitioner to hand over the leased area to respondent No. 2, and secondly, the respondents No. 1 and 2 have violated the principles of natural justice before passing the orders dated 2.2.1994, inasmuch as no notice was given to the petitioner and, thirdly, the judgment and decree passed by the respondent No. 4 was without jurisdiction and was not binding on the petitioner as he was not a party to the suit. Lastly, on no account, the Civil Court could have passed a decree directing the respondent State of Rajasthan to hand over the possession of the leased area to the respondent No. 3, in as much as the period of 5 years had already expired before filing of the suit by respondent No. 3. 3. The counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 and on behalf of respondent No. 3. The claim of the petitioner regarding grant of lease as alleged by him has been admitted by respondents No. 1 and 2. It has also been admitted that the lease of petitioner is still subsisting. The main stand of the respondents No. 1 and 2 is that the orders dated 2.2.1994 (Annexures 3 and 4) have been issued to the petitioner in compliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on 8.12.1987. It has also been admitted that the lease of petitioner is still subsisting. The main stand of the respondents No. 1 and 2 is that the orders dated 2.2.1994 (Annexures 3 and 4) have been issued to the petitioner in compliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on 8.12.1987. The stand of the respondents No. I and 2 also is that the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court is nullity and without jurisdiction. However, since the decree passed by the Civil Court stands against them, they have issued the impugned orders to the petitioner. In substance, the averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition have been admitted by the respondents No. 1 and 2 and they have not disputed its correctness. The respondent No. 3 has also put in appearance and counter affidavit has been filed on his behalf. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 it has been admitted in an unequivocal terms that the lease deed granted to him, which was registered on 24th November, 1971, its period was for six years. It has also been admitted that the said deed was cancelled on 5th July, 1973 and the possession was also taken back on 11th July, 1973. The most glaring feature, which is undisputed from the material on record is that the respondent No. 3 filed some revision as well as some appeal against the order dated 5th July, 1973 cancelling his lease. In this connection, I would like to quote the averments made by the answering respondent No. 3 in the counter affidavit, which run as under : "Against the aforesaid wrong determination of the mining lease, the answering respondent made several representations to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and also filed a revision petition, which ultimately was rejected. The answering respondent also made a representation/appeal to the Government Department and also detailed out the entire situation therein, but nothing yielded." From the aforesaid averments, the fact which cannot be disputed is that the respondent No. 3 availed remedies available to him under the Act and the rules by way of appeal and revision, though the details of the orders in revision or appeal have neither been mentioned nor copies thereof have been produced in the court by the answering respondent. The respondent No. 3 has mainly based his claim on the ex-parte judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in his favour and on the strength of that judgment and decree, he has tried to support the impugned orders dated 2.2.1994 passed by the Mining Engineer, Neem-Ka- Thana. 4. I have heard Shri Ajeet Bhandari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 and 2 as also Mr. A.K. Bajpai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3. 5. The main ground of attack to the validity and correctness of the orders dated 2.2.1994 passed by the respondent No 2 i.e. the Mining Engineer, Neem-ka-Thana, Annexures 3 and 4 is that the said orders have been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. No notice of any kind was ever given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2 before passing the impugned orders and the impugned orders deserve to be quashed on this ground alone. He further contended that the period of lease of the petitioner, which was granted to him on 31.7.1984 has not been determined so far nor cancelled and the petitioner is still holding subsisting lease and before determination of the lease of the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 had no authority to direct the petitioner to hand- over possession of the mining lease to respondent No. 3. In para 7(a) of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, it has been stated "it is denied that the order dated 2.2.94 is without jurisdiction or is in violation of the principles of natural justice." Nothing has been brought on record or even averred that any notice or any kind of opportunity was afforded to the petitioner before passing the impugned order dated 2.2.1994. The case of the petitioner is rather strengthened from the averments made in this very paragraph to the effect "it is however admitted that the lease of the petitioner is subsisting", which indicates that the lease of the petitioner has not been determined. Therefore, the stand taken by the petitioner is that unless his lease is cancelled or determined, he cannot be compelled to hand over the possession of the lease area to respondent No. 3 The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the petitioner, in my opinion, has sufficient force and deserves to be accepted. Therefore, the stand taken by the petitioner is that unless his lease is cancelled or determined, he cannot be compelled to hand over the possession of the lease area to respondent No. 3 The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the petitioner, in my opinion, has sufficient force and deserves to be accepted. Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 has made futile efforts to support the impugned orders dated 2.2.1994 on the ground that since a decree has been passed in favour of respondent No. 3, there was no alternative before the respondents to order the petitioner to hand over possession of the area to respondent No. 3. Respondents No.1 and 2 have also tried to blow hot and cold at the same time. In one breath, they have taken the stand that they had no option but to pass the impugned orders in view of the decree passed by the Civil Court, and in the second breath, it has been emphatically argued by the learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that the Civil Court could not have passed the decree directing the respondent No. 3 to complete the period of five years, inasmuch as the period of lease of the respondent No. 3 had already expired on 30th October, 1976. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that so far as the judgment and decree of the Civil Court is concerned, the same is a nullity and is not enforceable against the petitioner on the grounds; (a) that petitioner was not a party to the suit (b) that the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 is a special statute, in which complete machinery for redressal of the wrong done to the respondent No. 3 has been provided and once the respondent No. 3 has availed the remedies available to him under the rules, he had no right to approach the Civil Court and consequently, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to annul the order of the State Government cancelling the lease of respondent No. 3 and moreso, in directing the petitioner to hand over the lease area to respondent No. 3 after expiry of the lease. It is relevant to state at this stage that- the respondent No. 3 was granted lease for a total period of 5 years, which expired on 30th October, 1976. It is relevant to state at this stage that- the respondent No. 3 was granted lease for a total period of 5 years, which expired on 30th October, 1976. The respondent No. 3 invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court after expiry of the lease, inasmuch as the suit was filed by him in 1992. It is pertinent to mention that there was no lis between the respondent No. 3 qua respondents No. 1 and 2 or even the petitioner and the period of lease of the respondent No. 3 having come to an end on 30th October, 1976, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to direct the respondents to hand over the area of the lease for completing five years, inasmuch as the period of 5 years had already expired in the year 1976. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent No. 3 had filed an appeal before the State Government as contemplated under rule 44(1), which fact has been admitted in para 8 of the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 3. Petitioner's counsel further contended that the order passed by the appellate authority under rule 44(1) of the rules is appealable and an appeal can be filed to the Government under rule 44(2). Counsel for the petitioner further contended that finality has been attached to the order passed in appeal by rule 44(4) and as such the order passed in appeal against the respondent No. 3 became final and the same could not have been quashed under the common law in the Civil Court. 7. Though it is not very clear from the record as to whether the respondent No. 3 preferred one appeal or two appeals, but the averments made in para 8 of the counter affidavit indicate that the respondent No. 3 availed two remedies as already mentioned hereinabove. From the aforesaid facts and discussions made above, I have no hesitation in holding that the respondent No. 3 availed remedies available to him under the Rules of 1977. From the aforesaid facts and discussions made above, I have no hesitation in holding that the respondent No. 3 availed remedies available to him under the Rules of 1977. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to the fact that even the order passed by the State Government in appeal was revisable by the Central Government under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulations & Development) Act, 1957 and if the respondent No. 3 was aggrieved against the appellate order passed by the State Government, he could have availed that remedy and instead of availing the said remedy and after waiting for about 8 years from the date of dismissal of the appeal of respondent No. 3 and also after expiry of the lease period, he approached the Civil Court in the year 1992. On the aforesaid premises, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the respondent No. 3 travelled half way under the Rules and without approaching the Central Government, which he could have, tried to agitate the matter before the Civil Court. From the arguments and the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, I am of the definite view that the impugned orders dated 2.2.1994 Annexures 3 and 4 are violative of the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained on this ground alone. 8. The next debatable question that has arisen in the instant petition for adjudication is, as to whether in the circumstances and facts of the present case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted? 9. Mr. A. K. Bajpai, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 contended that the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court is not a nullity and is binding on the petitioner as well as respondents No. 1 and 2. The main thrust of his argument is that inspite of the fact that respondent No. 3 availed remedies available to him under the special statute against the order cancelling his lease, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not ousted. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on some decisions of the Apex Court.'In the said series the first case cited is Sardar Singh V/s Sardar Singh, 1990 (4) SCC 90 . In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1987. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on some decisions of the Apex Court.'In the said series the first case cited is Sardar Singh V/s Sardar Singh, 1990 (4) SCC 90 . In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1987. The facts in brief appears to be that auction sale for recovery of arrears in default as arrears of land revenue was made, in which 25 percent of the price was paid by the auction purchaser initially and the balance of 75 percent of the sale price was paid after expiry of 15 days from the date of initial payment, which was in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Section 88 of the said Act and the confirmation of sale and issue of sale certificate pursuant thereto by the revenue authorities, was held without jurisdiction. It appears that Section 158(2) contained prohibition for exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court. For applying the said principle in the instant case, I would like to refer Section 158(2) of the aforesaid Act as mentioned in the said judgment : "Sec. 158(2). A Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters, namely : (xiv) Any claim connected with, or arising out of, the collection by the Government or the enforcement by the Government of any process for the recovery of land revenue or any sum recoverable as an arrears of land revenue; (xv) any claim to set aside, on any ground other than fraud, a sale for recovery of an arrears of land revenue or any sum recoverable as an arrears of land revenue." In the aforesaid case, a suit was instituted for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from taking possession of the land sold in public auction on the strength of the sale certificate issued on March 12, 1966. The validity of this document was challenged on the ground that the sale was void since the auction purchasers had failed to deposit the balance of the sale price within the time allowed by section 88 of the Act. As the sale was void, the subsequent acts of confirmation of the sale on February 21, 1966 and issuance of the sale certificate on March 12, 1966 by the concerned authorities were of no avail to the auction- purchasers. As the sale was void, the subsequent acts of confirmation of the sale on February 21, 1966 and issuance of the sale certificate on March 12, 1966 by the concerned authorities were of no avail to the auction- purchasers. The owner of the land, therefore, contended that the auction- purchasers were not entitled to possession under the sale certificate which was wrongly issued by the concerned authorities after the sale had become void in the eye of law, and on the aforesaid facts, the Apex Court held that Section 158(2) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act was not attracted and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not ousted. The Apex Court also concurred with the following observations of the High Court : "As his property had been sold by the revenue authorities without jurisdiction he had the right to file the suit in the civil court and which had the jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is an established principle of law that if the act of the parties under any Act is without jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded." With respect, I would like to mention that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case would also not apply to the instant case as the facts are entirely distinguishable. 10. The other case cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 is Raja Ram Kumar Bharagava V/s Union of India, AIR 1988 SC page 752 . The aforesaid case related to the recovery of interest on the refund of income tax. The facts of the aforesaid case briefly are that one Shri Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava was assessed in the capacity of Kartha of Hindu Undivided Family for the Income and Excess Profit Taxes for the assessment year 1947- 48. Pursuant to the order of assessment dated 23.9.1951 made by the Income Tax Officer, as modified by the Appellate orders dated 155.1952 and 27.3.1957 of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income- tax Appellate Tribunal, respectively, a sum of Rs. 2,57,383.87 was recovered from him on 27.3.1957 under threat of coercive process. The assessee's case was that he met this obligation by raising funds from the Central Bank of India Ltd. On the mortgage of his properties incurring heavy liability towards interest on the mortgage loans. 2,57,383.87 was recovered from him on 27.3.1957 under threat of coercive process. The assessee's case was that he met this obligation by raising funds from the Central Bank of India Ltd. On the mortgage of his properties incurring heavy liability towards interest on the mortgage loans. Subsequently, the quantum of both the taxes came to be substantially reduced pursuant to the consequential orders, dated 16.9.1966 made under section 66(5) of the 1922 Act and under section 66(5) read with Section 21 Excess Profit Tax Act, 1940 respectively giving effect to the orders of the High Court in certain references under Section 66(1) of the Act. A sum of Rs. 2,01,146.62 and a sum of Rs. 19,126.16 became refundable by way of income- tax and Excess Profit Tax, respectively, on such recomputation of the income. The aforesaid amounts were refunded on 17.12.1966 and 9.12.1967 respectively. The question which arose, whether the plaintiff assessee was entitled for payment of interest on the said refund under section 66(7) of the 1922 Act. In this connection, their Lordships of the Apex Court held as under : "Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that whatever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno-flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil courts' jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre- existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts' jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions the civil courts' jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered in Dhulabhai's case." 11. From a perusal of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, if flows to my mind that a person who avails remedies available to him under the special statute and after loosing battle under the special statute, he cannot be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the same relief. From a perusal of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, if flows to my mind that a person who avails remedies available to him under the special statute and after loosing battle under the special statute, he cannot be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the same relief. The aforesaid dictum lays down that a person can elect as to which of the remedies he should avail as the two remedies have been held to be concurrent by the Apex Court, but in the instant case, once the respondent No. 3 applied his option in availing remedies under the special statute and having met his water- loo could not be permitted to agitate this matter again before the Civil Court and as such the said case, in my opinion, does not help the respondent No. 3 at all and is squarely distinguishable. 12. Yet another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 is Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons V/s The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 . In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court was ceased of the matter relating to the dispute under the Madras General Sales Tax Act and in that connection, their Lordships held as under : "In dealing with the question whether Civil Courts' jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there is a general presumption that there must be a remedy in the ordinary civil courts for a citizen claiming that an amount has been recovered from him illegally and that such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indications to the contrary. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not by assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said statute." 13. With respect, I would mention that in the instant case the respondent No. 3 has already availed the remedy under the special statute. With respect, I would mention that in the instant case the respondent No. 3 has already availed the remedy under the special statute. The respondent No. 3 might have remedy under the ordinary civil court for redressal of wrong done to him but in the instant case, he has already availed the remedy available to him under the special statute and I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying that the said case is also of no assistance to respondent No. 3. 14. The last case relied by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 is Gurbax Singh V/s Financial Commissioner, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 167 . In the aforesaid case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were ceased of the controversy arising out of Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955. I have carefully perused the facts of the aforesaid case and I am of the considered view that the said case also does not give any strength to the case of respondent No. 3. 15. On the question of exclusions of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, I would like to refer to the judgment and the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dhulabhai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 . In the aforesaid case, their Lordships of the Apex Court were considering the provisions of law relating to assessment and it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not excluded on the facts and circumstances of the case. While decided the aforesaid case, their Lordships of the Apex Court have laid down principles regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, which are very significant and of paramount importance for the guidance of the entertainment of the suit by the Civil Courts, which are as under : "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not deceives to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right for a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision s to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 16. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 16. From a perusal of the above quoted judgment of the Apex Court, it appears that the Apex Court has mentioned the circumstances and the facts ex-haustibly, in which a litigant can invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court inspite of the fact that he has remedy under the special statute. I have given my earnest consideration to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court and applying the principles contained in the case of Dhulabhai V/s State of M.P. (supra), I am of the definite view that on the facts of the present case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted and the respondent No. 3 after having availed remedies under the special statute and specially after the expiry of the term of lease and that too after 8 years, could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Civil Court committed an error in granting relief to the respondent No. 3 and moreso, in my opinion the judgment and decree qua the petitioner is nullity and cannot be enforced as he was not a party to the suit. 17. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have also carefully perused the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments cited above, and consequently, I hold that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are tenable and the impugned orders Annexures 3 and 4 passed by respondent No. 2 cannot be sustained and deserve to be quashed. 18. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 2.2.1994, Annexures 3 and 4 to the writ petition are quashed, and the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 are restrained from interfering in any manner whatsoever in the mining operations of the petitioner from the area leased out to him under the lease dated 31.7.1984. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******