JUDGMENT D.P. Sood, J.—In this Regular Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1976 (shortly hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the judgment and decree dated 27-5-1985 of the learned District Judge, Una, no substantial question of law has been framed at the time of admission of this appeal, vide the order dated June 27, 1985. Thus, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after having satisfied myself that various substantial questions of law, the discussion of which would be made in subsequent paras, arise for the determination of this Court. 2. Smt. Pali was the owner of the suit land. She filed the instant suit for declaration simplicitor on .September 27, 1978. The relief sought for is that she is the owner in possession of the suit land and as a consequential relief, she has prayed for issuance of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering into her possession of the suit land. In the alternative, a prayer for possession has also been made. 3. The basis for seeking the reliefs aforesaid detailed in the plaint, are that she being an old lady unable to more, used to get the suit land cultivated through Shri Jiwan, defendant No. 4 (PW 3), her son-in-law and is continuing to be in cultivable possession of the suit land as owner. She asserted that defendants 1 to 3, asserting themselves to be tenants-at-will, got a decree for possession behind her back in their favour and against defendant No. 4 in Civil Suit No. 192/1976, decided on 18-5-1977 by the Senior Sub-Judge, Una which decree was confirmed by the then District Judge, Una vide his judgment and decree dated March 22, 1979. This decree despite being invalid, ineffective and not binding upon her rights, has cast a cloud on her title. These circumstances culminated into the filing of this suit. 4. Defendant No.4 admitted the claim in his written statement filed separately. However, defendants 1 to 3 resisted and contested the suit by raising a preliminary objection with respect to the minority of defendant No.1. On merits, they admitted the plaintiff to be owner but claimed that they continue to be in physical possession of the suit land as her tenants-at-will. Defendant No.4 admitted the claim in his written statement filed separately. However, defendants 1 to 3 resisted and contested the suit by raising a preliminary objection with respect to the minority of defendant No.1. On merits, they admitted the plaintiff to be owner but claimed that they continue to be in physical possession of the suit land as her tenants-at-will. It was further averred that as defendant No. 4 illegally dispossessed them from the suit land about three years back i. e. from the date prior to the filing of the written statement in the instant lis which conduct of defendant No. 4 led to the filing of the earlier suit. According to them, the instant suit has been got instituted by defendant No. 4 in collusion with the plaintiff, his mother-in-law. It was also contended that in the circumstances, the suit to set aside the aforesaid decree is not maintainable for the reason that the plaintiff neither applied for being impleaded as a party in the earlier suit nor contested the claim of the defendants 1 to 3. 5. In her replication, the plaintiff simply reiterated the allegations made in the plaint and controverted the contentions raised by the defendants. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed various issues. After the framing of the issues, Smt. Pali expired on 25-10-1979. Her L. Rs., that is, S/Sh. Jagdev Singh and Gurbachan Singh, legatees were substituted on the basis of a will executed by said Smt. Pali in their favour in the year 1973 The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for vide its judgment and decree dated 18-5-1977, which was successfully assailed by defendants 1 to 3 resulting into dismissal of the suit in its entirety, while reversing the trial Courts judgment. The first appellate Court framed the following two points : 1. Whether the previous decree for possession in favour of the appellants is binding upon the plaintiffs (respondents 1 and 2) ? 2. Whether the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the owners in possession of the suit land ? And decided them in negative vide the impugned judgment which has now been assailed in this second appeal. The substantial questions of law pointwise are : 1. 2. Whether the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the owners in possession of the suit land ? And decided them in negative vide the impugned judgment which has now been assailed in this second appeal. The substantial questions of law pointwise are : 1. Whether findings in the previous suit not inter-parties could be used against the plaintiff and the learned District Judge has given an essentially wrong approach to this legal proposition on the basis of the evidence, adduced by the parties ? 2. Whether the findings of the first appellate Court is vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence in the shape of testimony of PWs 1 to 4 reflecting the factum of relinquishment of tenancy rights by defendants 1 to 3 coupled with plea of their dispossession resulting into cultivation of the suit land by defendant No. 4 ? 3. Whether in the absence of a suit for possession having been brought against the alleged dis-possession of a tenant, the tenancy rights stood extinguished ? 7. In order to decide the aforesaid questions, it would be relevant to detail certain material facts, emerging from the record. The factum of collusive decree having been obtained by defendants 1 to 3 against defendant No. 4 in the earlier suit, has not been set up by the plaintiff in her pleadings Also, the factum of relinquishment of tenancy rights during the year 1967, as they have emerged for the first time in the testimony of PWs 3 and 4, has also not been made the ground of attack by the plaintiff in her. pleadings despite defendants 1 to 3 having taken a specific stand that they continued to be in possession of the suit land as tenants-at-will under Smt. Pali, the original plaintiff. Smt. Pali died during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court on October 25, 1979. The factum of the execution of the will by Smt. Pali in favour of sons of Jiwan, defendant No. 4 (PW 3) has also not now been assailed by the contesting defendants. The instant suit has been filed by the plaintiff after the decision in the earlier suit had become final. Apart from it, an application for correction of entries was filed by the present plaintiffs (sons) against Sh. The instant suit has been filed by the plaintiff after the decision in the earlier suit had become final. Apart from it, an application for correction of entries was filed by the present plaintiffs (sons) against Sh. Jiwan-defendant No. 4 (father) only on 17-7-1981 before the Revenue Officer, who passed an ex parte order directing the correction of the entries on 18-8-1981. Allegations in that application were that Jiwan, defendant No. 4 in the instant suit, has been recorded as tenant contrary to the factual position existing at the spot. As relationship of the applicant with respondent was not disclosed nor the latter contested the application, an ex parte order directing the correction of entries was passed. What probative Value has to be attached to this order subsequent to the decree passed in the earlier suit or in view of the relationship of the parties thereto, would be considered in subsequent paras. 8 Points 1 and 2 are inter-connected and intrinsically mixed up together. The decision of both depends upon the discussion of common evidence, emerging from the record. Accordingly, I proceed to decide them together. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant, relying upon the observations made in Bhagabat Sahu v. Parbati Samal and others, AIR 1982 Orissa 186 ; Hem Chandra Bhaduri and others v. Puma Chandra Sarkar and others, AIR 1934 Cal 788 and Kumar Gopika Raman Roy v. Atal Singh and others, AIR 1929 PC 99, has vehemently urged that the cardinal principle is that no-one should be held bound or affected or prejudiced by the existence of any judgments, orders or decrees, to which he was not a party or privy. In other words, as per him, judgments in personas, are not, except under section 43 of the Evidence Act, admissible either for or against strangers in proof of the facts adjudicated. That is to say, a previous judgment which is not inter-parties, is admissible in evidence under section 43 read with sections 11 and 13. Though such a judgment does not operate as res judicata, it is to be treated as an evidence to be used for certain limited purposes and to be considered alongwith other evidence if needed any other evidence exists. But in no case, such judgment, not inter-parties, can be dealt with to discuss the basis of its decision. Though such a judgment does not operate as res judicata, it is to be treated as an evidence to be used for certain limited purposes and to be considered alongwith other evidence if needed any other evidence exists. But in no case, such judgment, not inter-parties, can be dealt with to discuss the basis of its decision. On the strength of the above said legal position, it has been pointed out that Smt. Pali was not a party to the earlier instituted suit inter se the defendants and, thus, the adjudication about tenancy of defendants 1 to 3 upon Smt. Pali, is neither binding nor legally admissible in respect of the fact so established to conclude that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties to the instant lis. The question, that is canvassed, has two facts : (i) Whether Smt. Pali, the original plaintiff in this suit, was a party to the earlier suit or property represented ? and (ii) Whether the findings as to the tenancy as will of defendants 1 to 3 in the earlier suit is binding upon Smt Pali ? I have already pointed out that predecessor in interest of the present plaintiffs 1 to 3 (Smt. Pali) was not a party to the suit. However, their father Sh. Jiwan Singh (defendant No. 4) was proceeded against in the earlier civil suit who had raised the plea that he was assisting Smt. Pali (original plaintiff) in the cultivation of the suit land. He further pleaded in that suit that defendants 1 to 3 were tenants-at-will of the suit land and during the year 1967, they had relinquished tenancy rights. Earlier suit for a decree of possession of the suit land was filed by defendants 1 to 3 on the ground that defendant No. 4 had forcibly ousted them from the suit land. In these circumstances, the trial Court had concluded that defendants 1 to 3 continued to be tenants over the suit land without impleading Suit. Pali (since deceased) in the array of defendants. 10. In these circumstances, the trial Court had concluded that defendants 1 to 3 continued to be tenants over the suit land without impleading Suit. Pali (since deceased) in the array of defendants. 10. The normal rule is that judgment, not inter-parties, is not binding on the person who is not a party to the suit but as observed in the case of Atma Ram v. Smt. Parsini and others, AIR 1979 P & H 234, that previous decision, although not inter-parties, has high probative value and was relevant and admissible under section 13 of the Evidence Act. This view is also supported by catena of case law, i.e. Ganga Sagar v. Inam Ilahi, AIR 1946 Lah 387 ; Hira Lal v. Shivlal, (1969) 71 Punj LR 735 ; Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh, AIR 1931 PC 89 ; Kesho Prasad Singh v. Mt. Bhogjogna Kuer, AIR 1937 PC 69 ; Nataraja Pillai v. Subbaraya Chettiar, AIR 1950 PC 34 ; Smt. Venkatratnam v. Venkatanarasayamma, AIR 1964 AP 109 and Mahabir Mahton v. Mt. Sonmati Kuer, AIR 1964 Pat 66. 11. No doubt, the findings in the earlier judgment is not binding upon Smt. Pali (since deceased) and this finding alone cannot be made the basis for the decision of this case, yet the findings being a relevant and admissible piece of evidence, can be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence to the other evidence adduced by the parties in this behalf, I am not in agreement with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that earlier judgment has been made basis for the decision of this case and in that view the finding in the earlier suit with respect to the tenancy claimed by defendants- 1 to 3, has been made binding upon the original plaintiff. In this situation, this Court has to decide as to whether the plaintiff has been able to prove her claim that she continued to be in cultivable possession of the suit land and that defendants 1 to 3 were never inducted as tenants-at-will. I need not repeat the proved circumstances emerging from the record of this case detailed in the preceding paras. Suffice it to state that pleadings of the plaintiffs are at variance with the proof adduced by them. I need not repeat the proved circumstances emerging from the record of this case detailed in the preceding paras. Suffice it to state that pleadings of the plaintiffs are at variance with the proof adduced by them. In their pleadings, the plaintiffs have not set up the case of the defendants having relinquished the tenancy rights over the suit land during the year 1967. This fact has emerged in the testimony of PWs 3 and 4 for the first time. The same plea had been raised by defendant No. 4 Jiwan Singh (PW 3) in his earlier suit. On the contrary, defendants 1 to 3 have consistently pleaded that they being tenants-at will continued to be in cultivable possession of the suit land till the time they were ousted therefrom by defendant No. 4 and whereafter they had filed the earlier suit in question. Thus, the matter as to the status of defendants 1 to 3 was directly and substantially in issue in between the defendants inter se, the judgment in the earlier suit although not inter-parties, being relevant and admissible on the fact in issue in the instant case, can be read as a corroborative evidence. In addition to this fact, admittedly Smt. Pali, plaintiff, did not appear as a witness, she having died during the pendency of this suit. Her L. Rs, now plaintiffs-appellants, .have inherited the suit land pursuant to the will executed by their predecessor in the year 1973 since prior to the filing of the earlier suit which fact was also known to defendant No. 4, Sh, Jiwan Singh, the father of the plaintiffs. Gurbachan Singh (PW 4) has really admitted the claim of the defendants being tenants of land at one time. In this view of the matter, it was for the plaintiff have pleaded and proved the factum of relinquishment of tenancy rights. The only statement to this effect is that of PWs 3 and 4 which amounts to admission in their favour without making a specific claim in their pleadings in the instant case. Plaintiffs were obliged to prove this fact by leading cogent and convincing evidence. The first appellate Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and the law applicable thereto and consequently reversed the findings of the Court below. Plaintiffs were obliged to prove this fact by leading cogent and convincing evidence. The first appellate Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and the law applicable thereto and consequently reversed the findings of the Court below. I am in full agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate Court and affirm the view so taken by it. Points 1 and 2 stand disposed of in terms of the above. 12. Now adverting to point No.3 as to whether in the absence of a suit for possession having been brought against the alleged dispossession by defendants 1 to 3 (tenants), their tenancy rights stood distinguished, it is to be noted that because of the forcible dispossession by defendant No. 4 Sh. Jiwan Singh, the earlier suit was filed by defendants 1 to 3 and that too for decree for possession. That stands decreed in their favour. That is a legal and valid decree and it can be executed by the successful party in accordance with law. Therefore, it was not necessary for defendants 1 to 3 to have brought a separate suit for possession, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In this view of the matter, this point is also decided. 13. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed, impugned judgment and decree dated 27-5-1985 of the learned District Judge is upheld Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this appeal. As regards mesne profits directed to be deposited by the appellants vide order dated September 25, 1985, the defendants/respondents 1 to 3 (L. Rs. of Bishan Dass and S/Sh. Banta Ram and Baldev) are held entitled to receive the same pursuant thereto and consequent to the decision of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.