JUDGMENT 1. - This application under Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 has been filed with a prayer that the Official Liquidator be directed to consider the claim of Rs. 7,00,860/- as preferential claim. 2. By an order dated 4th August, 1992, the said claim was considered as ordinary claim under section 530 of the Companies Act and the claim of interest after winding-up was also rejected. The dispute is in respect of the alleged supply of Polyester and Viscose Staple Fibber to blend and spin and return the blended spun yarn to the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that M/s Jaipur Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (in liquidation) was supplied the yarn for doing the job in accordance with agreement entered into according to which the viscose fibre was to be purchased by the company in liquidation on behalf of the petitioner and they were to charges only 11.50 per kg. as job charges for the blended yarn and further a sum of Rs. 1.50 per kg. towards sorting and drawing charges. Twenty bales of staple Fibre of net weight 4000 kgs. worth Rs. 3.20 lacs were supplied to the company in liquidation and another 20 bales of poster fibre weighing 4125 kg. of the value of Rs. 3.30 lacs were also dispatched taken out from M/s Vico Silk Mills. This latter was first sent to the Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and as they were not in a position to do the job, then it was dispatched to the company in liquidation on 30th June 1981. The blending was to be done in the ratio on 48:52. The claim of the petitioner is that the title, ownership and property in the viscose and staple fibre and the blended yarn always vested with it and the company in liquidation was only the trustee. A sum of Rs. 69,331.40 and Rs. 31,500/- in respect of job charges was remitted to the company in liquidation. An irrevocable letter of credit of British Bank of Middle East, Bombay for Rs. 1,14,500/- was already submitted out of which purchase of viscose fibre was made for Rs. 31,500/- and subsequently 3000 kg. of viscose fibre was purchased by the company in liquidation against the letter of credit. The petitioner has received 4887.5 kg. of viscose fibre against the total of 8471 kg. 1,14,500/- was already submitted out of which purchase of viscose fibre was made for Rs. 31,500/- and subsequently 3000 kg. of viscose fibre was purchased by the company in liquidation against the letter of credit. The petitioner has received 4887.5 kg. of viscose fibre against the total of 8471 kg. of polyester and 4000 kg. viscose fibre. 3. On behalf of the Official Liquidator, it is submitted by Shri G.K. Garg, that the provisions of Section 446 are not applicable and under Rule 164 of the Company (Court) Rules, appeal could have been preferred within 21 days. An application No. 249/84 was filed earlier in which the directions were given to the Official Liquidator for considering the claim of the petitioner within a period of two months and the said claim having already been decided by the Official Liquidator under the provisions of Section 446(2) of the Act in the petition, the present application not being in respect of a fresh claim cannot be entertained. It is also submitted that the petitioner has failed to produce necessary documents inspite of opportunities being given to produce its claim as preferential one in accordance with the provisions of Section 530(1) of the Act. The various factual submissions have also been denied. 4. So far as remedy by way of appeal under Rule 164 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 is concerned, the petitioner has not availed the said remedy within the time stipulated under the said rule. The only question which has to be determined is as to whether the application under section 446(1)1446(2) is maintainable or not. The provisions of said sections are as under : "446(1):- When a winding up order has been made or the Official Liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of winding up order, shall be proceeded with, against the company, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose. (2) The court which is winding up the company shall notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company; (b) any claim made by or against the company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India); (c) any application made under section 391 by or in respect of the company; (d) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in course of the winding up of the company; whether such suit of proceeding has been instituted, or is instituted, or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the order for the winding up of the company or before or after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960." 5. The provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 446 has contemplated that after the winding up order or the appointment of the Official Liquidator as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceedings shall be commenced and if pending at the date of winding up order it can be proceeded against the company only with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose. The present is not a case as no leave is sought and no legal proceedings are pending in any court and, therefore, the provisions of Section 446(1) are not applicable. 6. So far as provisions of Section 446(2) are concerned, it has over riding effect on other provisions and the court is having the jurisdiction under clause (a) to entertain any suit or proceedings by or against the company. Under Clause (b) to section 446(2), the claim made by or against the company can be entertained. 6. So far as provisions of Section 446(2) are concerned, it has over riding effect on other provisions and the court is having the jurisdiction under clause (a) to entertain any suit or proceedings by or against the company. Under Clause (b) to section 446(2), the claim made by or against the company can be entertained. The provisions of clause (c) are not relevant and under clause (d) the question of priorities or of any other question what-so-ever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in the course of winding up of the company, whether suit or proceeding has been instituted or is instituted or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the order for winding up of the company or before or after the commencement of Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960 can be entertained. It may be observed that S.B. Civil Company Application No. 249/94 was filed by the petitioner under section 446(2) in which a statement was made on behalf of the Official Liquidator that the claim of the petitioner is being deciding by him within a period of two months and, therefore, the said petition was not decided. After that claim was decided rightly or wrongly the petitioner should have filed an appeal under Rule 154. No reason have been explained as to why the appeal was not preferred. The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 have given the power to the liquidator for examining the proof of date lodged with him and on that basis, further investigation can be made. The claim could be admitted or rejected in whole or in part after notice to the creditors and if the creditor is dissatisfied with the decision of the liquidator, an appeal can be filed u/R. 164. The power under section 446(2) cannot be exercised as a substitute of the appellate power. The various clauses of sub-sec. (2) of section 446 have conferred the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding by or against the company or in respect of any claim made by or against the company or even on the question of priority. Section does not contemplate that the order of the Official Liquidator passed under Rule 163 which could have been challenged by way of appeal under Rule 164 could be challenged under section 446(2) of the Act. 7. Section does not contemplate that the order of the Official Liquidator passed under Rule 163 which could have been challenged by way of appeal under Rule 164 could be challenged under section 446(2) of the Act. 7. The power which has been conferred under Section 446(2) would be in respect of any suit or proceedings by or against the company or any claim made by or against the company or the application under section 391 by or in respect of the company. Clause (d) of section 446(2) contemplates that any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever whether of law or fact which may relate to or arise in course of the winding up of the company can also be considered by this court. The power under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 446 is wide enough to cover any directions and the provisions of section 446(2) also over- ride the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The Companies Act is a special Act and, therefore, the provisions contained in the Act or Rules made thereunder will override the general provisions of other Act. It is an established principle of law that if there are express provisions in a statute then inherent power to that extent stands abrogated. The provisions of rule 164 contemplate an appeal against the order passed by the Official Liquidator under rule 163 of the Companies (Court) Rules. It is not in dispute that the order was passed by the Official Liquidator under rule 163 and therefore the only way in which the order passed by the Official liquidator could have been challenged was to file an appeal under rule 164. It is interesting to note that this court has to power under Section 446(2) as well as rule 164 but the question arises that if the procedure prescribed under rule 164 is not followed then whether the power under Section 446(2) could be exercised or not. In respect of the matters which are specifically enumerated under Section 446(2) the power could be exercised e:g. for determining the priority of the claim of any creditor, etc. In respect of the matters which are specifically enumerated under Section 446(2) the power could be exercised e:g. for determining the priority of the claim of any creditor, etc. but the wordings of Section 446(2) 'any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact which may relate to or arise in the course of winding up of the company' have to be interpreted in the light that such question could not be challenged in any other proceedings under the Companies Act or the Rules made thereunder. Rule 164 prescribes the remedy by way of appeal and if the remedy is provided under the rules, the power cannot be exercised to by-pass the procedure which has been prescribed. No reason has been given as to why the procedure prescribed under rule 164 has not been followed. There could have been an argument that this court has power to hear the appeal as well as inherent power under Section 446(2), and therefore the petition may be considered as an appeal, but that argument also cannot be entertained as the petition was not filed within 21 days and no application for condonation of delay was filed. The power under Section 446(2) was exercised in this case earlier and direction was given to the Official Liquidator to determine the claim of the petitioner. Once the claim has been determined the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to file an appeal and not to invoke inherent power again. The contention of the learned counsel that the matter should be adjudicated under Section 446(2) cannot be accepted. 8. In these circumstances, the application having no force is dismissed.Application Dismissed *******