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1994 DIGILAW 704 (BOM)

Chandrakant Vishnu Kolhapurkar v. Shamba Suka Mandrekar and others

1994-12-13

T.K.CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS

body1994
JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J. :---The plaintiff is the petitioner. The suit filed by the plaintiff is one for injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from interfering with the possession of the suit property and also the pathway. Even though ex-parte injunction was granted at the instance of the plaintiff at the initial stage, when the defendants contested the matter the injunction application has been dismissed by the trial Court. Appeal filed against that order before the Addl. District Judge, Panaji also ended in its dismissal. 2. The respondents are not represented before me. I see from the endorsement in the file that they have refused to receive the notice issued by this Court. So I had the benefit of only hearing the counsel for the petitioner. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, the petitioner filed this revision application. The plaintiff claimed tenancy of the suit property and consequently possession also. The defendants namely, the respondents herein, contend that they are mundcars and staying in the mundcarial house which is situated in the suit property and they did not interfere in the possession of the petitioner. They also assert that the pathway in the suit property cannot be exclusively claimed by the plaintiff. It is a pathway which is being used by the respondents. The trial Court found that the plaintiff is not entitled for injunction. It is relevant to note the trial Court's order where the contention of the defendants has been extracted as follows :--- "Further it is denied that plaintiff is using the said pathway to go to the different parts of the suit property. It is also denied that the suit pathway cannot be conveniently used by the plaintiff due to the extension of the house by the defendants. The suit pathway is only used by the defendants and other occupants of the other houses of the suit property. These defendants are protected mundcars of the suit house and they are entitled to enjoyment of all the facilities such as right to way, water and light etc...." Therefore it can be seen that the contention of the respondents was that they are mundcars and that contention was taken note of by the trial Court also. But, quite surprisingly, in the concluding paragraph of the order in para 11 the trial Court completely seems to have forgotten the case set up by the respective parties. But, quite surprisingly, in the concluding paragraph of the order in para 11 the trial Court completely seems to have forgotten the case set up by the respective parties. It says : "Therefore, prima facie it will be that both the plaintiff and the defendants are the tenants and this being the factual position, in my considered opinion when both are having equal rights in the suit property, I do not see any reason why I should restrain the defendants from going ahead with the construction. ...." It is very astonishing to note that an order contains a factual position which has not been pleaded by the parties at all and the Court relied upon those unpleaded facts for rejecting the relief claimed by the petitioner. Therefore, I am quite satisfied that the Court below has committed a serious error in rejecting the application for injunction of the petitioner. He has not properly exercised his discretion in dealing with the interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. 4. The Appellate Court has also travelled in the same track. It also did not find out the errors committed by the trial Court. The main statutory purpose of an appeal provided in a statute is to correct the errors committed by the original authority so that the litigants will have an opportunity to correct the errors. But, if the appellate authority also commits the mistake the very purpose for which the appellate forum is provided in the statute will become futile. The anomalies pointed out by themselves are sufficient to set aside the impugned order in this revision application. 5. Therefore I set aside the order passed by the trial Court dated 20-11-1991 and the Appellate Court order dated 27-10-1992 and the petitioner is granted interim injunction as prayed for in Civil Misc. Application No. 287/90. 6. The revision application is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.