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1994 DIGILAW 706 (MAD)

C. P. Gupta & Co. , represented by Managing Partner C. P. Gupta v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, Madras

1994-09-06

MISHRA

body1994
Judgment : 1. Petitioner herein has claimed to have purchased from one Jamshid Dinsha Italia on 21.1.1979 the leasehold right of the land in Door No. 25, New door No. 2, General Patters Road, Mount Road, Madras-2 and the ownership of the superstructure thereon, the land belongs to Sri Parthasarathy Swami Temple, Triplicane, Madras. It is said that the temple administration had leased the said land to one Dinshaw Dadabhai Italia. On 10.3.1979, the petitioner wrote to the trustee (Fit person) of Sri Parthasarathy Swami temple intimating the purchase of the superstructure with the leasehold right and sent by cheque the rent of the land to the temple. The temple authorities, however, did not accept the cheque. The petitioner wrote to the temple authorities about his tenancy rights and on 15.5.1979 offered to purchase the land on which the superstructure stood, the extent being about 2 grounds 141-1/16 Sq. feet. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition before the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, purportedly under S. 34(1) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Endowments Act, 1959 (for short “the Act”) praying for directions for the sale of the said land, the sale being beneficial to the temple. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department (first respondent) requested the Collector of Madras, to assess the market value of the land and on 10.12.1980, the temple authorities considered the petitioners application offering to purchase the land and passed a res olution that the land could be sold to him (petitioner) for Rs. 2,15,000/- after permission from the first respondent under S. 34(1) of the Act. The temple authorities in the said resolution, it is alleged by the petitioner, considered in detail the benefit that would have accrued to the temple out of the said sale, in as much as the temple had been getting Rs. 1,236/- per annum from the land, whereas by sale and deposit of the sale amount in the Bank, the temple would get Rs. 21,500/- per annum, which could increase the income of the temple by about twenty times. 2. There is reference to some earlier court proceedings between the temple and the original lessee, to which I shall advert later. 1,236/- per annum from the land, whereas by sale and deposit of the sale amount in the Bank, the temple would get Rs. 21,500/- per annum, which could increase the income of the temple by about twenty times. 2. There is reference to some earlier court proceedings between the temple and the original lessee, to which I shall advert later. It is, however, asserted by the petitioner that the temple authorities realised that as a tenant, the petitioner enjoyed the right under S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, and that he was entitled to purchase the land. Following the provisions of the Act (Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act) and the Rules framed thereunder, the Commissioner fixed 28th February, 1981 for enquiry. Inspite of, the petitioner has alleged, due publication, no objections were forthcoming. The Commissioner, accordingly, took up the matter for consideration, granted permission to the temple authorities to sell the land to the petitioner, which order, it is said, was also notified in the Gazette. Notwithstanding the above, the petitioner has alleged, the Commissioner has reopened the entire matter by issuing a notice dated 21.5.1981. The reason for reopening is said to be a mistake in the description of the road as General Peters Road, instead of General Patters Road. According to the petitioner, after the completion of the enquiry and sanction of the above, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter for the reason of a clerical mistake in the description of the road which clerical mistake should have been corrected, instead of reopening the matter. As a consequence of the above, although the petitioner tendered the full value of the sale consideration on 28.5.1981, oh 1.6.1981 the pay orders and cheques were returned to him. After the second notice, one Hariram Engineering Constructions filed their objections on 27.8.1981 as well as one Dinesh C. Seth. The Commissioner fixed 22nd August, 1981 for holding the enquiry. The petitioner objected to any enquiry for fresh sale. The first respondent-Commissioner, asked him to offer Rs. 1,25,000/- per ground, so that he would consider the sale of the land to him. The Commissioner fixed 22nd August, 1981 for holding the enquiry. The petitioner objected to any enquiry for fresh sale. The first respondent-Commissioner, asked him to offer Rs. 1,25,000/- per ground, so that he would consider the sale of the land to him. There have been some negotiations as to the rate per ground for the sale of the land and according to the petitioner, some order has been passed in the note-file of the first respondent to sell the land to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 1,50,000/- per ground. The said order, however, has not even been issued and the petitioner has come to this Court. 3. The petitioner impleaded only the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, as a party-respondent. The temple represented by its present Executive Officer, however, applied for being added as a party-respondent in WMP. No. 6607 of 1994 to oppose the petition, and alleged inter alia that the land stood leased to one Jamshid Dinsha Italia, who had put up a superstructure on the land without any permission from the owner, that is, temple. He was paying a rent of Rs. 193/- only per month to the temple. His successors-in-interest without the consent of the temple seemed to have sold the superstructure to the petitioner under an alleged sale deed dated 22.1.1979. But, the temple had/has not recognised the petitioner as its tenant and had/has not received any rent from him, since the temple never inducted the petitioner as a tenant. Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. (India) Limited has also applied for being added as a party-respondent. They have claimed that they have been a tenant in occupation of the land and the superstructure under Italias and have been paying rent to them. Besides the above objection, they have also stated that there has been already a litigation in which the petitioner acknowledged their existence upon the land as a tenant and demanded rent and moved for fixation of fair rent. On behalf of the temple, however, it is specifically stated that they (Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. (India) Limited) are not recognised as tenants under the temple as the temple never consented for any such tenancy in their favour under Italias or under it. 4. To appreciate, however, the successive proceedings and the alleged presence of Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. (India) Limited (the temple and Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. Wrenn Bennett & Co. (India) Limited) are not recognised as tenants under the temple as the temple never consented for any such tenancy in their favour under Italias or under it. 4. To appreciate, however, the successive proceedings and the alleged presence of Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. (India) Limited (the temple and Messrs. Wrenn Bennett & Co. Ltd. are added as party-respondents in the instant petition as respondents 3 and 2 respectively), I may refer to the sale deed allegedly executed on 22.1.1979 by jamshid Dinshaw Italia in favour of the petitioner which is described in the sale deed as a partnership firm consisting of (1) Dr. C.P. Gupta, son of Basantlal Gupta and (2) Mrs. Kasthuri Gupta, wife of Besanthlal Gupta, carrying on business at No. 71 (new) Santhome High Road, Madras. The property is described as Dinroze Estate consisting of lands and superstructures thereon comprised in premises bearing Door Nos. 1/16, 2/16 etc., Mount Road, Madras and Nos. 24, 25 etc. General Patters Road, Madras-2. etc. etc. in R.S. Nos. 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 108 and 109, Madras-2 measuring 5 cawnies 5 grounds and 1979 Sq. feet. It is also stated that the Estate was acquired by the vendor as per the sale deed dated 6.1.1935 registered as Document No. 53/1935 and the sale deed dated 21.11.1930, registered as Document No. 2472 of 1930 and as follows: “Whereas the site alone of a portion of the property described in Schedule-A hereunder viz. premises bearing door No. 25 (new No. 2) General Patters Road, Madras-2 belongs to Sri Parthasarathy Swami Temple of Triplicane, Madras and has been taken on lease by the predecessors in title of owners of the said Dinroze Estate (The Court of the City Civil Judge, Madras) in Original Suit No. 87 of 1928 by order dated 7th May, 1929 has described the leased property as under. ..” “All that piece and parcel of land bearing Municipal Door No. 18, General Patters Road, Mound Road, Madras, measuring East-West 77 feet and from north to south on the Eastern side 40 ft. and 5 inches and on the western side 40 ft. 4 inches and another piece from East-West 38 ft. and from North to south on the eastern side 31 ft. and on the western side 39 ft. amounting in all to two grounds and 341-1/16 sq. ft. and 5 inches and on the western side 40 ft. 4 inches and another piece from East-West 38 ft. and from North to south on the eastern side 31 ft. and on the western side 39 ft. amounting in all to two grounds and 341-1/16 sq. ft. with trees thereon and comprised in Survey No. 311 and A.P.C. No. 1645 and Collectors certificate No. 2352 dated 14.8.1974 as described in Schedule-B) who have put up superstructure on the said leased land and who have been given protection under the then The Madras City Tenants Protection Act and who are now entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act.” After detailed descriptions how the vendor succeeded to the title to the superstructure and how under a deed of release, the estate of Italias was divided, the deed of sale is executed, the consideration being Rs. 2,75,000/- on a declaration as follows: “The vendors do hereby declare that they are the absolute owners of the property herein conveyed and described in the Schedule ‘D’ hereunder and that no one else has any right, title or interest therein and that they are entitled to dispose of the same in the manner hereby done.” “And the vendors do hereby covenant with the purchasers that notwithstanding anything omitted or knowingly suffered by the vendors the purchasers shall and may at all times hereafter possess fully and quietly possess and enjoy the said property and receive the rents and profits thereof without any let or hindrance, interruption, eviction claim or demand whatever from or by the vendors or any person, persons lawfully and equitably claiming from, under or in trust for the vendors or their predecessors-in-title.” And the vendors do hereby further declare and covenant with purchasers that there are no encumbrances, attachment, lien or mortgage, charge, dispute claim or demand over the property mentioned in Scheduled-D hereunder and that the same is not the subject matter of any acquisition proceedings or proposals connected with any scheme commenced or prepared by any Govt. Central or State or any suit litigation or proceedings or Court attachments and that the same has not been offered as security before any Cou rt, Tribunal or Revenue authorities and agree with the purchasers that they will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the purchasers against all losses, damages, claims, costs, expenses, liabilities, whatsoever, which the purchasers may be put to or sustain by reason of my defect in title, claim or dispute that may be put or raised by any person concerning to the property mentioned in Schedule ‘D’ hereunder. “In the event of any property or part thereof being lost to the purchasers on account of the claim by any member of the family and/or the legatees under the will and Testament dated 10.12.1959 of late D.D. Italia, the first vendor herein” and his son Dr. S.J. Italia shall indemnify the purchasers against any such loss.” “And the vendors do hereby undertake and assure the purchasers that in case the purchasers are deprived of the whole or any part of the property hereby sold by reason of any action at Law any defect found subsequently in the title of the vendors or any encumbrances or charges on the same to which the sale is not subject the vendors shall repay the amount of the sale price or any part of it as shall bear the same proportion to the whole property as the case may be.” “The vendors do hereby covenant that the purchasers are entitled to all the easementary rights appurtenant to the premises number 25 new Door No. 2, General Patters Road, Madras-2.” “And the vendors do hereby declare and state that no vacant possession of the property hereby conveyed shall be given to the purchasers, but however they shall procure attornments of tenancies from the existing tenants in favour of the purchasers on and from the date of sale.” 6. The conveyance, thus, recognised the title of the temple in the land bearing old Door No. 25, and new Door No. 2, General Patters Road, Madras, yet claimed possession and enjoyment as absolute owners thereof, purportedly transferring only the easementary rights and appurtenants to the said premises. Thus, the vendors Italias conveyed to the vendee-the petitioner only easementary rights thereunder. The deed of transfer also recognised the presence of tenants in some parts of the estate. Whether the second respondent - Messrs. Thus, the vendors Italias conveyed to the vendee-the petitioner only easementary rights thereunder. The deed of transfer also recognised the presence of tenants in some parts of the estate. Whether the second respondent - Messrs. Wrenn Benett & Co. (India) Limited is existing as tenant under Italias, however, is a separate issue. 7. The lease of a property has received a significant definition under the Transfer of Property Act, which says, a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. This is di stinct from the definition of the word ‘sale’ under the Transfer of Property Act, which means a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid or part-promised. The rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee are stated under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. As one of the rights of the lessee in Cl. (j) of S. 108(B), it is said, “The lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The lessee shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to the lease; “nothing in this clause shall be deemed to authorize a tenant having an untransferable right of occupancy, the farmer of an estate in respect of which default has been made in paying revenue, or the lessee of an estate under the management of a Court of Wards, to assign his interest as such tenant, farmer or lessee.” This, however, is subject to the condition that there is no contract to the contrary between the landlord and the tenant. 8. I propose to proceed in the instant case with the assumption that Italias had obtained lease of property. 8. I propose to proceed in the instant case with the assumption that Italias had obtained lease of property. But, since the property has belonged to (it is not disputed) a religious and charitable endowment, the leasehold has to be determined in accordance with the Act (Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959), the Act which held the field at the time the alleged transfer by Italias to the petitioner and the predecessor Act which held the field at the time the alleged lease was executed on behalf of the temple in favour of Italias. It has always been a rule that religious institutions in general and Hindu public religious and charitable endowments in particular, have either been under the management of representatives of the denominations or the trustees appointed by the founders of the institutions/endowments. Art. 26 of the Constitution of India has recognised, subject to public order, morality and health, that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The property dedicated to an idol, however, vests in the idol and since the idol is a perpetual minor, in the sense that someone is required to manage its affairs, those who administer its properties are called trustees or managers or by other names but with respect to the properties belonging to the idol, enjoy the powers akin to that of a trustee. All those who hold a property in trust for another, however, are subject to the laws of trust and in case of a religious trust, it has always been a property finally under the control and supervision of the sovereign, that is, the Crown before independence, and after the independence the State. The Crown before Independence which held the ultimate management introduced the Religious Endowments Act, 20 of 1863, to relieve the Board of Revenue and the local agents Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and the Presidency of Fort St. The Crown before Independence which held the ultimate management introduced the Religious Endowments Act, 20 of 1863, to relieve the Board of Revenue and the local agents Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and the Presidency of Fort St. George in Madras, from the duties imposed on them, that is, so far as the duties embrace the superintendence of lands granted for the support of Mosques or Hindu Temples and for other religious uses and provided in S. 3 thereof that in case of every mosque, temple or other religious establishment, the power vested in and exercised by the Government or any Public Officer, the Government made special provisions and in S. 4 thereof declared that such powers would be transferred to such trustee, manager or superintendent. This was followed by Act VI of 1980 and by successive enactments and in due course by Act II of 1927 which was in force at the time of the alleged lease to Italias, and the latest, that is the one in force presently being Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959. There has never been any doubt as to the rule that transfer of any property belonging to a religious institution was ordinarily not permitted and the trustees were/are not encouraged to effect any transfer mainly for the reason that managements and functions as to the affairs of the denominations or charities for religious purpose were/are required to be performed in accordance with the I wishes of the founder or the donor. The transfers of immovable property belonging to a religious institution were/are permitted only in exceptional cases, when such transfer is necessary for the discharge of obligations of the trust and for the benefit of the trust. The trustees were in the past subjected to a strict adherence to the above obligations and desisted from transfering any property belonging to a religious trust and the state and the authorities appointed for the above purpose exercised effective control so that the properties belonging to any religious trust were not squandered. Specific provisions for this purpose were made in the successive Endowments Act. Act II of 1927 received an amendment by Act XII of 1935. Specific provisions for this purpose were made in the successive Endowments Act. Act II of 1927 received an amendment by Act XII of 1935. S. 44-B (which was operative at the time of the alleged lease to Italias) provided inter alia that any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage, and any lease for a term exceeding five years, of the whole or any portion of any inam granted for the support or maintenance of a math or temple or for the performance of a charity or service connected therewith and made confirmed or recognised by the British Government shall be t null and void. A similar provision has been retained in Act 22 of 1959 as well under S. 41 thereof. The provisions contemplate resumption by the Collector of the District and the restoration of such property to the trust by the Collector in cases of any null and void transfer, that is, transfers without permission of the Member, Board of Revenue before 1935 Amendment Act and after 1935 Amendment Act, of the competent authority under the Act. 9. Italias have acknowledged in the sale I deed that they were lessess of the land and that the land belongs to the third respondents temple. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents have brought on the records of this case any material to show that the alleged leasehold was not in respect of the inam lands and that the transfer by lease of the land by the third respondent-temple to Italias was sanctioned by the competent authority. In the sale deed under which Italias are alleged to have transferred to the petitioner several other properties has recognised the lease, but has made no reference at all either of the period of lease or in case it was a lease for a period of more than five years, it had been obtained after the sanction of the appropriate authority. In fact, the sale deed has made no mention of the commencement of the lease or the duration of the lease. The lessor, we have seen, can create in the lessee only such interests which he possessed on the date of the transfer in favour of the transferee, that is, the lessee. In fact, the sale deed has made no mention of the commencement of the lease or the duration of the lease. The lessor, we have seen, can create in the lessee only such interests which he possessed on the date of the transfer in favour of the transferee, that is, the lessee. If Italias had no surviving interest in the land, which they claimed to hold as the leasehold on the date of the alleged transfer in favour of the petitioner, they could not transfer the same to the petitioner. The petitioner, in the absence of such materials, cannot claim to be a valid transferee of the land, which admittedly belonged/belongs to the third respondent-temple. I am not in the instant case to examine why the third respondent-temple in the City of Madras, which has received a great fame far and wide for its unique idol of Sri Parthasarathy Swami has been denied a proper Trust Board and a scheme for the management of its properties and is left only in the hands of the Executive Officer, who is appointed by the Government of the State. On many occasions such Executive Officers are found lacking in the understanding of the matters of a charity or endowment and the purpose for which the charity or endowment is created, for, I am informed at the Bar that the Executive Officer is functioning as the Fit Person to manage the affairs of the third respondent-temple only under an interim order of a Bench of this Court pending a proceeding in respect of the settlement of a scheme for the management of the affairs of the temple. I have for the said reason refrained from considering the role of the Executive Officer as the trustee or manager of the properties of the temple. The Executive Officer never thought it necessary to follow the dictates of the Act when he resolved to recommend to the Commissioner under Act 22 of 1959 for the sale of a valuable piece of immovable property belonging to the temple to the petitioner. He accepted without any demur that Italias were lessees and the petitioner succeeded Italias as the transferees of the leasehold interest of Italias. He accepted without any demur that Italias were lessees and the petitioner succeeded Italias as the transferees of the leasehold interest of Italias. He ignored altogether the fact that no purchaser could decide, whether the transfer of any immovable property belonging to a religious institution would be beneficial to it and the Act has never acknowledged any purchasers application to the Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, for permission to purchase or sanction the same. The decision whether any immovable property belonging to the religious institution should be disposed of, is required to be taken by the trustee or manager and that too, when it is absolutely necessary and without which transfer the interests of the trust would suffer. He (Executive Officer) received a proposal from the petitioner, it appears, through the Commissioner and framed a resolution in the name of the trust just to fulfil the formality, without which the Commissioner could not proceed. The Executive Officer, who in the service heirarchy is much lower than the Commissioner and who, for all purposes, is under the control of the Commissioner, has acted in perversion. The Commissioner himself accepted the proposal in disregard to the scheme of law and the purpose for which he was empowered to sanction any transfer of immovable property belonging to a religious trust. He acted almost as a go between among the parties and the Executive Officer, when he entertained the application of the petitioner for purchase of the property belonging to the temple and called upon the Executive Officer to take a decision, whether the same would be sold to the petitioner. His successor reopened the proceeding for the reason that he felt that the purchase money on which the sale was finalised was inadequate. The petitioner who had until then seen through the transaction and succeeded in getting the so-called resolution of the trust by the executive officer in his favour and also the approval/sanction of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, was not ready to accept even a marginal increase in the price of the land and the successor of the Commissioner decided to re-open the sale and to advertise the property for sale. 11. 11. The sole ground on which the petitioner has claimed some kind of tenancy right in the land is based on his claim that the petitioner has succeeded as lessee of Italias who by a sale deed transferred their interest in the land to it. The petitioner has claimed ownership in the superstructure which, according to it, was transferred by Italias under the said sale deed. The Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, which applies to the tenancy in the City of Madras contains a definition of ‘tenant’ in relation to any land to mean a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and to include any such person to continue in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement under sub-section (3) of S. 1 and who or any of his predecessors in interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building, notwithstanding that such person was not entitled to the rights under the Act by reason of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act or a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief had been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to S. 12 of the Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants (Amendment) Act, Tamil Nadu Act of IV of 1972 disentitled such person and his heirs from claiming the rights under the Act. We have no information on record in the present case as to what was the stipulation of land between Italias and the temple, for, the land according to Italias, was a leasehold in their possession. We do not also have anything available to show that the temple and Italias had settled certain terms and conditions of lease. S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is invoked only when a suit is filed by the landlord to eject the tenant and on application of the tenant, the Court directs the lessor to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the Court. S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is invoked only when a suit is filed by the landlord to eject the tenant and on application of the tenant, the Court directs the lessor to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the Court. No such situation has arisen for the petitioner to invoke S. 9 of the said Act. I do not propose to comment as to the claim of the petitioner for the superstructure on the land for the simple reason that the second respondent in the instant proceedings has claimed that it was inducted as tenant upon the land and the superstructure by Italias. The second respondent has come forward with a case that Italias had no right of any sort in the superstructure and the alleged sale of the superstructure to the petitioner by them is not valid. According to them, since they have enjoyed the superstructure as tenants under Italias, on Italias leaving the scene after introducing the petitioner as transferees would entitle them to claim tenancy in the land under the temple. I refrain from going into any details of this aspect of the controversy, as the second respondent, Wrenn Benett & Co. and the petitioner are contesting separately in independent proceedings for their respective rights and any adjudication in this behalf in the instant proceedings may prejudice either. I feel, however, necessary at this stage to observe that in case it is found that Italias had no subsisting interest as a lessee in the land, or inspite of the so-called lease that Italias had from someone representing the trustees, no valid leasehold right was created in them, then, neither the petitioner as transferees of the interest of the lessee from Italias, nor the so-called tenants under Italias, the second respondent, can claim any protection as tenant under the temple and their, possession shall be wholly unauthorised and illegal. The third respondent-temple shall be entitled in such a situation to evict them in accordance with law. I am of the view that it is necessary that the competent authorities in the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board should take notice of this aspect of the matter and the Collector of the District may start necessary proceedings to remove the unauthorised occupants from the land in question. 12. I am of the view that it is necessary that the competent authorities in the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board should take notice of this aspect of the matter and the Collector of the District may start necessary proceedings to remove the unauthorised occupants from the land in question. 12. Having considered the case in all aspects that I have felt necessary and in respect of which the learned counsel for the parties have addressed the Court, I am of the considered view that the petitioner does not have any legal right to claim transfer by sale in his favour the land in question. The Commissioner has committed no error in reopening the so-called proceedings for sale. He shall be well advised to take notice of the clear perversion of the scheme of law in this behalf and tell categorically to the petitioner that their application is fit to be rejected. Since the parties have addressed themselves before me on this aspect. I am inclined to hold that the petitioner cannot claim sale by virtue of their application before the Commissioner and any resolution on that basis by the Executive Officer of the temple. If at all, any occasion to sell the land arises, it will be for the trustees of the third respondent-temple, at present the Executive Officer, to decide in accordance with law and seek sanction for the sale from the competent authority. When the proceedings for hearing started, the Court felt concerned why the Commissioner entertained the petitioners application and why he followed a procedure which is unknown to law, why the Executive Officer of the temple completely ignored the requirements of law and blindly accepted the case of the petitioner that they were lessees of the successors of Italias by virtue of a sale of land and superstructure by them. In course of the hearing, however, the Court was informed that the Executive Officer has been changed and the then Commissioner has been transferred and a new incumbent has joined in his place. I do not for the said reason issue any specific orders, except to tell both the Executive Officer and the Commissioner that their powers are circumscribed by the principles of law and they are dutybound to act in the interests of the temple only and not in the interest of any other person. I do not for the said reason issue any specific orders, except to tell both the Executive Officer and the Commissioner that their powers are circumscribed by the principles of law and they are dutybound to act in the interests of the temple only and not in the interest of any other person. No purchaser who will come with an offer will decide the requirements of the temple. The Executive Officer shall be well advised to take notice of such provisions of law which alone will permit a transfer of immoveable property belonging to a religious trust. The Commissioner shall enhance the position of his office by abiding by the rules of law and not transgressing the limitations laid down by law in this behalf. 13. The respondents have objected to the locus standi of the petitioner on the ground that at the relevant time, the petitioner - firm was not a registered firm and thus, they were not entitled to sue in the name of the firm. They have also pointed out that the firm, which was allegedly involved in the transaction was said to have C.P. Gupta and another person as partners whereas C.P. Gupta has claimed to constitute a new partnership. I do not think, however, any necessity of going into this question in the instant proceeding. Since I have found no merit in the petition, the petition is dismissed with costs payable to the third respondent-temple. Hearing fee Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees two thousand and five hundred).