S. N. SAHAY, J,, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, for issuing a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner. 2. The case of the petitioner Afaq Ahmad is that he is involved in Case Crime No. 1248 of 1993 under Section 302, I. P. C. and Section 3 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) relating to P. S. Kotwali, district Unnao. The petitioner surrendered in the court of II Addl. Sessions Judge, Unnao on November 9, 1953, on November 11, 1993 he was remanded under Section 167, Cr. P. C by the II Addl. Sessions Judge, Unnao till November 24, 1993. He was again remanded on November 24, 1993 up to December 7, 1993. The charge-sheet was submitted in the court of II Addl. Sessions Judge, Unnao on December 7, 1993. The copies were served on the accused persons on December 21, 1993 and the petitioner was remanded from December 21, 1993 to February 1, 1994. He was again remanded from February 1, 1994 to March 1994. The charge was framed on March 4, 1994 and the next date was fixed as April 16, 1994. The case was ordered to be sent to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Unnao on April 1, 1994. On that date the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate stayed the proceedings in view of the order, dated April 5, 1994 passed by this court in Writ Petition No. 1717 (MB) of 1994. The next date was fixed as July 16, 1994. The case was adjourned from time to time and on September 2, 1994 the next date was fixed as September 18, 1994 and it was directed that necessary information may be obtained with regard to the stay order. The petitioner has contended that the Court of II Addl. Sessions Judge, Unnao is not competent to take cognizance of the case unless it is committed to the Court of Session by a Magistrate and hence the proceedings on the basis of the cognizance taken by the said court on December 7, 1993 are illegal. The petitioner has also contended that after April 1, 1994 no order granting remand to the petitioner has been passed by any court and the Magistrate is also not competent to grant remand unless he takes cognizance. The petitioner has also contended that after April 1, 1994 no order granting remand to the petitioner has been passed by any court and the Magistrate is also not competent to grant remand unless he takes cognizance. Thus, according to the petitioner, his detention is illegal and without any authority of law. 3. A short counter-affidavit has been filed on, behalf of the respondents. It is stated in the counter- affidavit, which is sworn by Sri Hari Har Nath Pandey, Deputy Jailor, District Jail, Unnao, that the petitioner was received in the jail on November 9, 1993 under the warrant issued by the II Addl. Sessions Judge in Case Crime No. 1248 of 1993 of P. S. Kotwali, district Unnao and the petitioner was remanded from time to time. On December 7, 1993 again a warrant under the signature of II Addl. Sessions Judge was issued and remand has been granted from time to time. On July 13, 1994 the petitioner was remanded till August 17,1994 and lastly the petitioner was remanded on September 2, 1994 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Unnao up to September 20, 1994. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is claimed that the petitioner is in lawful custody of respondent No. 3 under judicial remand. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged at the hearing of the writ petition that the learned II Addl. Sessions Judge was not competent to take cognizance of the case without the case being committed to the Court of Session in accordance with law and, therefore, all further proceedings including the remand of the petitioner are illegal. He has relied on the judgment dated April 1, 1994 rendered by a Division Bench of this court in Writ Petition No. 60 (HC) of 1994, Irfan v. State of U. P. and others. That writ petition was filed for a writ of habeas corpus by Irfan, who is also an accused in Crime No. 1248 of 1993 of P. S. Kotwali, Unnao. In that writ petition it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the case of the petitioner is covered by the judgment of this court delivered in Criminal Revision No. 237 of 1993, Pappu Singh and others v. State of U. P. and others, decided on February 4, 1999. In that writ petition it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the case of the petitioner is covered by the judgment of this court delivered in Criminal Revision No. 237 of 1993, Pappu Singh and others v. State of U. P. and others, decided on February 4, 1999. A perusal of this judgment goes to show that Special Judge has no jurisdiction to try the case unless it has been committed to him under the provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. and he has no power to grant remand under the provi sions of Section 167, Cr. P. C. The contention of the petitioner was upheld and the writ petition was allowed by the Division Bench and the petitioner Irfan was directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. In this connection, the following observations were made : "as the controversy in the present case is covered by the judgment of the court to which view we fully agree, therefore, it can be safely said that the petitioners detention is illegal because the Special Judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case without it being committed to him under the provisions of Section 209, Cr. P. C. but the cognizance had to be taken by the Magistrate and thereafter the committal could have been made by him and in such circumstances the remand can only be given under Section 167, Cr. P. C. The Special Judge had no such power to grant the remand also. " 5. It may be mentioned that in the case of Pappu Singh cited above, learned Single Judge took the view that a Special Court specified under Sec tion 14 of the Act is essentially a Court of Session and it can exercise only such powers as a Court of Session possesses and it could not be able to take cognizance of any offence because of the restrictions placed upon it by the provisions of Section 193, Cr. P. C. In that case, it not being a Court of Magistrate, would not be competent to take cognizance of an offence under the provisions of Section 190, Cr. P. C. As a result in taking of the cognizance, the provisions of Section 190, Cr. P. C. In that case, it not being a Court of Magistrate, would not be competent to take cognizance of an offence under the provisions of Section 190, Cr. P. C. As a result in taking of the cognizance, the provisions of Section 190, Cr. P. C. would apply and it is only a Magis trate who can take cognizance of an offence under the provisions of the Act and cognizance taken by Addl. Sessions Judge is not in accordance with law. 6. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that a contrary view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in Director General of Prosecu tion, 1993 Cr LJ 760. He has strenuously urged that learned Addl. Sessions Judge was competent to take cognizance without the case being committed to the Court of Session by a Magistrate under Section 209, Cr. P. C. and the remand of the petitioner from time to time is perfectly legal and valid. He has, accordingly, contended that the detention of the petitioner in jail in pursuance of the remand orders, referred to above, is quite legal and no interference can be made. 7. In the Kerala case, which has been referred to above, two questions were referred to the High Court at the instance of the Sessions Judge under Section 395 (2), Cr. P. C. These questions were : (1) what is the correct proce dure to be followed by a Special Court when it receives a final report disclosing offences punishable under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as well as offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, and (2) if the course followed by this Court in taking cognizance of offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code also along with offences punishable under Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were (as it appears to be) wrong, what further procedure is to be followed. Separate judgments were delivered by learned Judge of the Division Bench. Separate judgments were delivered by learned Judge of the Division Bench. Justice Sreedharan referred to Section 14 of the Act and Sections 4, 5 and 26 of the Code (Code of Criminal Procedure) and held as follows : "the combined effect of the provisions of the Code referred to above is that all offences under the Indian Penal Code are to be investi gated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code, In so far as offences under laws other than, I. P. C. are concerned, the provisions of the Code apply in their full force subject to the specific or contrary provision made by the law under which those offences are to be investigated or tried. Where an enactment provides special procedure only for some matters, such procedure must govern those matters and in regard to other matters on which that enactment is silent, the provisions of the Code must be applied. " 8. Then he referred to the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 in which the following observations were made with regard to the position of Special Court: "the entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a Court of a Special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Session revolve round a mistaken belief, that a Special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Sessions. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning the court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the Court of a Special Judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as a court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Session. Under the Code it will enjoy all powers which a court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied. " 9. It was held by Senior Justice Sreedharan that from this it is clear that a Special Court is neither a Court of Session nor a Court of Magistrate. Under the Code it will enjoy all powers which a court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied. " 9. It was held by Senior Justice Sreedharan that from this it is clear that a Special Court is neither a Court of Session nor a Court of Magistrate. It is a court of original criminal jurisdiction. The Act provides for specifying a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offence under the Act. When such a Court of Session is so specified as a Special Court, it ceases to be a Court of Session as envisaged in the Code and it becomes a court of original criminal jurisdiction. When such a power is conferred on the Court of Session, which is a Special Court under the Act, that court is clothed with all authority to proceed with the case. The power as a Special Court is conferred on a Court of Session which is one in the hierarchy of courts envisaged by the Code. When such a court is seized of the dispute in so far as actual trial is concerned, it should be governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable to it as provided in the Code. The procedure for trial to bo followed can only be that prescribed in the Code since no special provision to that effect is made in the Act. In other words, so long as the Act does not make provision for the procedure to be followed by the Special Court, which is a Court of Session, its procedure regarding trial should be governed by the provision s contained in the Code. The Court of Session is one established as per the provisions contained in the Code. That court when constituted as Special Court and Act constituting it is silent regarding the procedure to be followed by it, the ordinary incidents of procedure for that court for the trial are to be followed. The Special Court is thus to take cognizance of the offence under the Act and proceed with the trial as provided under the Code. I hasten to add that Section 193 of the Code will not apply to the Special Court. 10. The Special Court is thus to take cognizance of the offence under the Act and proceed with the trial as provided under the Code. I hasten to add that Section 193 of the Code will not apply to the Special Court. 10. It was also held that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh, AIR 1957 SC 387 regard ing the meaning of the word try, as used in Section 321, Cr. P. C. , a Special Court has, for the purposes of Section 14 of the Act, not only got power to try the offences but it has got the power to make every kind of inquiry as a criminal court of original jurisdiction in terms of the provisions contained in the Code. A Special Court can take cognizance of offences on circumstances excluding one out of the four recognised modes, namely, upon commitment by a Magistrate, as set out in Section 193 of the Code. In other words, the Special Court under the Act can take cognizance of an offence for trial in any one of the remaining three other methods under the Code. If the acts alleged in the complaint constitute not only offence under the Act but also offence under the Penal Code, the Special Court should tike cognizance of that complaint even without an order of commitment by Magistrate as provided by Section 193 of the Code. In such a case, the Special Court should not only try the offence under the Act but also those falling under the Indian Penal Code. In the opinion of Justice Sreedaran, any other view on this aspect will certainly go to defeat the intention of the Legislature in enacting the Act. He also referred to the provisions of Section 20 relating to the overriding effect of the provisions of the Act and held that this also shows that the provisions contained in Section 193 of the Code cannot be of any consequence to restrict the jurisdiction of the Special Court. 11. He further opined that if the acts alleged against the accused consti tute atrocities as defined under Section 3 of the Act as also the offences under the Indian Penal Code as well, the accused can be tried for both in the same proceedings and for that no order of commitment by a Magistrate is called for. 11. He further opined that if the acts alleged against the accused consti tute atrocities as defined under Section 3 of the Act as also the offences under the Indian Penal Code as well, the accused can be tried for both in the same proceedings and for that no order of commitment by a Magistrate is called for. In view of what has been stated above, he directed the Sessions Judge to proceed with the trial of the cases for offences punishable under Section 3 of the Act as well as for offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and answered the reference accordingly. 12. A separate judgment was delivered by Senior Justice Manoharan. He agreed with the conclusion reached by his learned Colleague on the Bench. But he gave his own reasons for the same. He observed that a combined reading of Section 4 and Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will show, in the absence of any provision regulating investigation, enquiry and trial of non-I. P. C. offences, namely, offences under any other law investi gation, inquiry and trial shall be as per the Code. Since the Act does not make any specific provision for the same, normally, the provisions in the Code should apply. But Section 5 of the Code specifically saves the effect of any special law or special jurisdiction or the form of procedure prescribed therein. And Section 20 of the Act give overriding effect to the provisions therein. The search, therefore, should be to find out the effect of special law constituting Special Court and the nature of special jurisdiction conferred there under parti cularly with reference to the power to take cognizance of the offence. In spite of the constitution of the Sessions Court into a Special Court, if the Special Court continues to retain its character as Sessions Court, cognizance of the offence can be only as provided under Section 193 of the Code. In spite of the constitution of the Sessions Court into a Special Court, if the Special Court continues to retain its character as Sessions Court, cognizance of the offence can be only as provided under Section 193 of the Code. However, he took the view that a Court of Session is transmitted as a Special Court by Section 14 of the Act and such transmutation will make the Special Court another forum in nature and substance a support of this view, he relied on the following observations made in A. R. Antulays case, cited above : "the net outcome of this position is that a new court of original jurisdiction was set up and whenever a question arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code undaunted by any designation claptrap. When taking cognizance, a Court of Special Judge enjoyed the powers under Section 190. When trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Session. " 13. In the opinion of Senior Justice Manoharan, the principle will apply to Special Court under the Act also because of the effect of transmutation of the Sessions Court as a Special Court. The effect of Section 14 of the Act is to enable the Special Court to exercise original jurisdiction and, therefore, its power to take cognizance has to be controlled by Section 190 of the Code and not under Section 193 of the Code. To this extent the provisions of the Code cannot apply. It need hardly be said, the change in the character of the juris diction of the Sessions Court as a result of the notification under Section 14 of the Act is only when it exercises jurisdiction as a Special Court under the Act. The result of the same is that the Special Court can try offences under I. P. C. along with the offence under Section 3 of the Act when the conditions under Section 220 (1), (3) or (4) of the Code are satisfied. The result of the same is that the Special Court can try offences under I. P. C. along with the offence under Section 3 of the Act when the conditions under Section 220 (1), (3) or (4) of the Code are satisfied. He also observed that unless the Special Judge is competent to take cognizance without com mittal of I. P. C. offences committed in the course of same transaction, the very object of the Act will be defeated and that certainly is not the intention of the legislature. He also agreed that the word try in Section 14 of the Act is not employed in airy restricted sense and the same would include every inquiry and trial on the taking cognizance of the offence by the Special Judge. In the light of what is stated above, he concluded that when the Special Court receives a final report disclosing offence punishable under Section 3 of the Act as well as offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, it can take cogniz ance of the offences without committal. In view of the above, the second question did not arise. 14. As both the learned Judges have referred to the observations made in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 , it is necessay for proper appreciation of the matter to refer to the context in which the said observations were made. In the case of A. R. Antulay, the question under consideration was whether a Special Judge has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 on the basis of a private complaint It may be mentioned that by virtue of Section 6 (1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 it was provided that the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification to try offences described in sub-section (1) of Section 6. It was further provided in Section 6 (2) that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as Special Judge under this Act he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Addl. Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It was further provided in Section 6 (2) that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as Special Judge under this Act he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Addl. Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Section 7 coats exclusive jurisdic tion on the Special, Judge appointed under Section 6 to try the cases set out in sub-section (1) of Section 6, Section 7 (3) enlarged the jurisdiction of the Special Judge not only to try offences set out in Section 6 (1) but also to try offences other than those mentioned therein with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure be charged at the same trial. Then comes Section 8 which reads as follows : "8 (1) A Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrate. (2) A Special Judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole Court of the Special Judge deemed the Session trying cases without a jury or a Court of and the person conducting a of assessors shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor Special Jude (3-A) In particular, and without prejudice to Provisions contained in sub-season (3) the of the 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal the which such person is coned " punishment of the offence and styled as the Court of a over which he confusions have arisen by either or with a Sessions Court him with a Magic- Act, 1947 was enacted for a corruption. years rolled by and of bribery and a special forum for the showed that 1947 Act is created; the enumerated would remain a distant dream That led to the 1947 Act Law Amendment Act 1952 The enactment of the and Reasons accompanying the refers to the of Object of the Committee chaired by Dr. Bakshi review the working of the Special, appointed to make recommendations for and to bribery and corruption. Bakshi review the working of the Special, appointed to make recommendations for and to bribery and corruption. To take The relating to he more of cases handled by Magistrates 1 out of Courts. Section 6 to set Payment to appoint as many Spec State Giver-power to try the offences set out with at this stage a reference is made to Now which provides for constitution of the Cr- P- C, become clear that a new Court. Courts, it would set up and that it has to t serpentine dance of the High were four types of Criminal Courts functioning under the High Court. To this list was added the Court of a Special Judge. Now when a new court which is indisputably a Criminal Court, because it was not even whispered that the Court of Special Judge is not a Criminal Court, is set up, to make it effective and functionally oriented, it becomes necessary to prescribe its powers, procedure, status and all ancillary provisions. While setting up a Court of a Special Judge keeping in view the fact that the high dignitaries in public life are likely to be tried by such a Court, the qualification prescribed was that the person to be appointed as Special Judge has to be either a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge. These three dignitaries are above the level of a Magistrate. After prescribing the qualification, the Legislature proceeded to confer power upon a Special Judge to take cognizance of offences for the trial of which a Special Court with exclusive jurisdiction was being set up. If a Special Judge has to take cognizance of offences, ipso facto, the procedure for trial of such offences has to be prescribed. Now the Code pres cribes different procedure for trial of cases by different Courts. Procedure for trial of a case before a Court of Session is set out in Chapter XVIII; trial of warrant cases by Magistrates is set out in Chapter XIX and the provisions therein included catered to both the types of cases coming before the Magistrate, namely, upon police report or otherwise than on a police report. Chapter XX prescribes the procedure foe trial of summons cases by Magis trates and Chapter XXI prescribes the procedure for summary. Chapter XX prescribes the procedure foe trial of summons cases by Magis trates and Chapter XXI prescribes the procedure for summary. Now that a new Criminal Court was being set up, the Legislature took the first step of providing its comparative position in the hierarchy of Courts under Section 6, Cr. P. C, by bringing it on level more or less comparable to the Court of Session, but in order to avoid any confusion arising out of comparison by level, it was made explicit in Section 8 (1) itself that it is not a Court of Session because it can take cognizance of offences without commitment as contemplated by Section 193, Cr. P. C. Undoubtedly in Section 8 (3) it was clearly laid down that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, the court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. In contra-distinction to the Sessions Court this new Court was to be a Court of original jurisdiction. The Legislature then proceeded to specify which out of the various procedures set out in the Code, this new Court shall follow for trial of offences before it. Section 8 (1) specifically says that a Special Judge in trial of offences before him shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Cr. P. C. for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. The provisions for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate are to be found in Chapter XXI of 1898 Code. A glance through the provisions will show that the provisions therein included catered to both the situations, namely, trial of a case initiated upon police report (Section 251-A) and trial of cases instituted otherwise than on police report (Sections 252 to 257 ). If a Special Judge is enjoined with a duty to try cases according to the procedure prescribed in foregoing provisions he will have to first decide whether the case was instituted upon a police report or otherwise than on police report and follow the procedure in the relevant group of sections. Each of the Sections 251-A to 257 of Ib98 Code which are in the part material with Sections 238 to 250 of 1973 Code refers to what the Magistrate should do. Does the Special Judge, therefore, become a Magistrate ? Each of the Sections 251-A to 257 of Ib98 Code which are in the part material with Sections 238 to 250 of 1973 Code refers to what the Magistrate should do. Does the Special Judge, therefore, become a Magistrate ? This is the fallacy of the whole approach. In tact, in order to give full effect to Section 8 (1), the only thing to do is to read Special Judge in Sections 238 to 250 wherever the expression magistrate occurs. This is what is called legislation by incorporation. Similarly, where the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile -to go in search of the fact whether for purposes of Section 190 which conferred power a the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, Special Judge is a Magistrate ? What is to be done is that one has to read the expression special Judge in place of Magistrate, and the whole thing becomes crystal clear. The Legis lature wherever it found the area clarified it by making specific provision such as the case sub-section (2) of Section 8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in sub-section (3) that all the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. At the time when the 1952 Act was enacted what was in operation was the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It did not envisage any Court of a Special Judge and the Legislature never wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new Criminal Court which was being set up. Therefore, it conferred power (taking cognizance of offences), prescribed procedure (trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate) indicated authority to tender pardon (Section 338) and then after declaring its status as comparable to a Court of Session proceeded to prescribe that all provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code will apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1952 Act. The net outcome of this position is that a new Court of original jurisdiction was set up and whenever a ques tion arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as Court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code undaunted by any desig nation claptrap. The net outcome of this position is that a new Court of original jurisdiction was set up and whenever a ques tion arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as Court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code undaunted by any desig nation claptrap. When taking cognizance, a Court of Special Judge enjoyed the powers under Section 190. When trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Session. The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a Court of a Special Judge for a certain purpose is a Count of Magistrate or a Court of Session revolves round a mistaken belief that a Special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Session. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the Court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the Court of a Special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdic tion. As a court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the Court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied it has to function as a Court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide-bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court ot7 Session. Under the Code it will enjoy all powers which a Court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied. " 16. It will be clear from a perusal of the above extract that the Court of a Speck was held to be a new Criminal of angina Jurisdiction in addition to the Criminal Courts constituted under Section 6, Cr. P. C. and as a matter of ; act it was held that to the list of Criminal Courts functioning under the High Court under Section 6, Cr. P. C. was added the. Court of Special Judge. It was held to be a court of original jurisdiction in view of the fact that it was expressly provided in Section 8 (1) of the Act that a Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the case being com mitted to him for trial. P. C. was added the. Court of Special Judge. It was held to be a court of original jurisdiction in view of the fact that it was expressly provided in Section 8 (1) of the Act that a Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the case being com mitted to him for trial. When once n was held that the Court of Special Judge is a new Criminal Court of original jurisdiction, it was wholly unneces sary to embark upon an enquiry whether the Special Judge is a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure and indeed it was held to be fallacy of the whole approach to find out whether the Special Judge becomes a Magistrate. The provisions in Section 8 (1) of the Act that the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for the trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate and that the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate for the purpose of Sections 350 and 549 of that Code were considered to be of no consequence for the sake of establishing the identity of the Special Judge. These circumstances clearly suggests the inference that the observations in the judgment rendered in A. R. Antulays case relied upon in the Kerala case, cited above, the reference to Special Judge is a reference to the Special Judge indicated by Sections 6 and 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and the enunciation of the legal position regarding the status attributes and characteristics of a Special Judge as a court of original jurisdiction is of the kind of a Court of Special Judge set up by the statute in Sections 6 and 8 of the aforesaid Act. In other words, the observations have to be read in the light of the statutory provisions governing the establishment, powers and procedures of a Special Court. 17. In other words, the observations have to be read in the light of the statutory provisions governing the establishment, powers and procedures of a Special Court. 17. In the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atroci ties) Act, 1989, Section 2 (d) provides that in this Act unless the context otherwise requires the Special Court means a Court of Session specified as a Special Court in Section 14 and Section 2 (f) lays down that words and expres sions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Indian Penal Code shall have the meanings assigned to them respectively in the Code, or as the case may be, in the Indian Penal Code. Section 14 provides that for the purposes of speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the official Gazaette, specify for each district a Court of Ses sion to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act. The Special Court specified under Section 14 of the Act is essentially a Court of Session estab lished and constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The object of specifying a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act is for the purpose of providing for speedy trial. No provision has been made in the Act as regards the manner in which the Special Court will take cognizance of an offence under the Act nor any special provision has been made regarding the procedure to be followed by the Special Court in trying the offence under the Act. There is also no provision that a Court of Seniors, on being specified as a Special Court under the Ant, ceases to be a Court of Session and acquires a new identity and becomes a new Court of original jurisdiction. In the absence of any special provisions in the Act, all of under the Act shall, as envisaged in Section 4 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the absence of any special provisions in the Act, all of under the Act shall, as envisaged in Section 4 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It will be subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into and trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, but this provision in Section 4 (2) will be of no consequence, as no special provision has been made in the Act. The Special Court specified under Section 14 of the Act being a Court of Session will be governed by Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure m the matter of taking cognizance of offences. Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that except otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code. Normally a Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction when the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. If there is any exception, it has to be expressly provided by the Code of Criminal Proce dure or by any other law for the time being in force. Where no express provision has been made to the contrary, either in Code or in the Act, as is the case here, no departure can be made from the provisions of Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it cannot be held by implication or otherwise that the Special Court specified under Section 14 of the Act can take cognizance of an offence under the Act without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. A perusal of the express provisions con tainted in the Act when considered in the light of the scheme and object of the enactment will clearly show that the Special Court specified under Section 14 of the Act is a Court of Session and it cannot take cognizance of any offence under the Act as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code and that the Special Court shall, in the matter of trial of offence, under the Act, be governed by the provisions of the Code relating to trial of offences by a Court of Session. 18. The appropriate legislature has power to make law with respect to the administration of justice and constitution and organization of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Article 246 read with Entry 11-A of List III (Concurrent list) of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. In State of Bombay v. Narottam Dass, AIR 1951 SG 69, the obser vations made in Mool Chand Kundan Mai v. Raman Hira Lal, AIR 1949 Bom 197 were approved and it was held that the power to legislate under the afore said entry would include within its ambit legislative power in respect to juris diction and power of courts established for the purpose of administration of justice. The words appear to be sufficient to confer upon the Legislature the right to regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected with the administration of justice. The legislation on the subject of administration of justice and constitution of courts of justice would be ineffective and incomplete unless and until the courts established under it were clothed with the jurisdic tion and power to hear and decide causes. It is difficult to visualise a statute dealing with the administration of justice and the subject of constitution and organisation of courts without the definition of the jurisdiction and powers of those courts, as without such definition such a statute would be like a body without a soul. The same view has been taken in the later cases such as O. N. Mhindroo v. Bar Council, AIR 1968 SC 888 and Indu Bhushan Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1986 SC 1783 . 19. The same view has been taken in the later cases such as O. N. Mhindroo v. Bar Council, AIR 1968 SC 888 and Indu Bhushan Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1986 SC 1783 . 19. When if it is held that Section 14 of the Act purports to create a new criminal court of original jurisdiction, then it is to be expected, as indicated in A R, Antulays case, that necessary incidental and consequential provisions would also be made in the enactment with regard to the powers and procedure of the new Court with regard to the trial of the offence under the Act. Unfortunately, no special or exceptional provisions were made under the Act expressly or even by necessary implication so that the provisions contained in the Code of the Criminal Procedure were allowed to be to have their full swing on all matters concerning the trial of offences under the Act from beginning to end. With great respect to the learned Judges who have decided the Kerala case, it may be pointed out mat a reason has been given in support of the view that Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not apply to the Special Court. The power and procedure of a court of law established for the administration of justice are to be determined by legislative provisions and not otherwise as to what should or should not be done. It may be mentioned that in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Section 36 provides for the establishment of Special Courts for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences under this Act and specific provi sion has been made in Section 36-A that the Special Court may exercise the same power of remand which a Magistrate may exercise under Section 167, Cr. P. C. and the Special Court may take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. Necessary provisions have also been made with regard to the qualification, appointment and status of the Presiding Officer of the Special Court and the procedure to be followed by him in the trial of offences under the said Act as also any other offence with which the accused may be charged under the Code of Criminal Procedure at the same trial. Similar provisions have been made in Section 12-A and Section 12- AA of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 providing for constitution of Special Courts and the matters connected therewith. Where the appropriate Legis lature has omitted to make any special provision to the contrary on the subject of taking cognizance of offences by the Special Court or the procedure to be followed by it for the trial of such offences, it would be deemed that the intention of the Legislature is clear that the matter is to be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in all respects. 20. It may be stated that Section 20 of the Act provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. This provision does not enable anyone to read into it any provision which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 4 or Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions of Section 20 do not empower the Special Court specified under Section 14 of the Act to take cognizance of an offence under the Act as a court of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate and to follow any procedure other than that which is prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. For all these reasons, we are unable, with great respect, to agree with the view taken in the Kerala case, cited above. We have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pappu Singh, which is otherwise also binding on us, is a correct one. Therefore, learned 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge was not competent to take cogniz ance of the case directly on December 7, 1993 and the remand and detention of the petitioner in pursuance thereof are illegal. The contention of the peti tioner must, therefore, be upheld and he should be dealt with in the same manner in which the co-accused Pappu Singh has been dealt with in the case referred to above. 21. The contention of the peti tioner must, therefore, be upheld and he should be dealt with in the same manner in which the co-accused Pappu Singh has been dealt with in the case referred to above. 21. The writ petition is allowed and it is directed that the petitioner shall be released forthwith unless he is wanted in some 6ther case. This order will be no bar if he is re-arrested and detained again in accordance with law in Case Crime No. 1248 of 1993 of P. S. Kotwali district. Petition allowed. .