K. Shivashankar Bhat ( 1 ) THE petitioner applied for the Retail Outletdealership at Chant Road, Faridabad Districtk, Haryana State in response to an advertisement dated 21/01/1987. The petitioner is a handicapped person andthe relevant Scheme was for the physically handicapped who was not less than 21years of age and more than 50 years of age. According to the petitioner his incomewas far below Rs. 50,000. 00 per annum. The petitioner was successful and Retailoutlet Dealership was granted to him, as per letter dated 23/11/1987. According the petitioner he made an arrangement for running the Outlet byspending some amount and providing for the cleaning of the machines andestablishing the machines on the land, etc. When the site was about to be madeready petitioner received a letter dated 7/03/1988 from the first respondentstaling that the date of birth of the petitioner mentioned in the application form was26. 12. 1965 and as per the Matriculation certificate the petitioner s date of birth was30. 10. 1969. Hence he was below 21 years of age. Consequently, the grant of thedealership was withdrawn. This is under challenge. ( 2 ) THE petitioner asserts that his date of birth was 26. 12. 1965 and the date ofbirth shown in the Matriculation certificate was got corrected and he has producedthe corrected matriculation certificate also. According to the petitioner he was notgiven any opportunity to dispell the inference drawn by the first respondent beforecancelling the Dealership and the principles of natural justice were thus violated. ( 3 ) THE rival applicant has come on record as the second respondent. In thecounter affidavit she has asserted that the petitioner has manipulated the correction in the Matriculation certificate and according to her the petitioner s date ofbirth (26. 12. 1965) as stated, is not at all correct. She has produced a few documentsto substantiate her contention that there was no entry of the birth of the petitioneron the date referred by the petitioner in the relevant Register. ( 4 ) THE basic question is whether the cancellation of the Dealership given to thepetitioner was preceded by a proper enquiry. 1965) as stated, is not at all correct. She has produced a few documentsto substantiate her contention that there was no entry of the birth of the petitioneron the date referred by the petitioner in the relevant Register. ( 4 ) THE basic question is whether the cancellation of the Dealership given to thepetitioner was preceded by a proper enquiry. Learned Counsel for the secondrespondent contends that though the principles of natural justice as such were notcomplied with, this is not a case where this Court should set aside the order havingregard to the documents produced by the second respondent and that no usefulpurpose will be served by directing the first respondent to go into the questionafresh after considering the objections, if any, of the petitioner against cancellation. According to the learned Counsel for the second respondent the facts are indisputable having regard to the documents produced by the second respondent. ( 5 ) I do not think that the facts could be considered as indisputable. To whatextent the documents produced by the petitioner and the documents produced bythe second respondent are to be considered and appreciated are matters for the factfinding authority and not for this Court to go into. Admittedly no show causenotice was issued to the petitioner. If the petitioner had been notified of theproposal to cancel the Distributorship, petitioner would have placed sufficientmaterial before the first respondent to show that his date of birth was December,1965. It is for the fact finding authority like the first respondent to accept theexplanation or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and the natureof the documents produced. Mr. Tandon learned Counsel for the second respondent urged that the register of births is the best evidence and the petitioner will notbe able to sustain his date of birth as 23/12/1965 without producing it atthe relevant time. Again it is for the first respondent to consider this question as towhether the evidence produced by the petitioner is sufficient or not to accept hisassertion. Having regard to the nature of the dispute raised by the secondrespondent it will be fair hear to her before the 1st respondent decides the question. ( 6 ) MR. Again it is for the first respondent to consider this question as towhether the evidence produced by the petitioner is sufficient or not to accept hisassertion. Having regard to the nature of the dispute raised by the secondrespondent it will be fair hear to her before the 1st respondent decides the question. ( 6 ) MR. Tandon relied on a decision of the Supreme Court OGLA Tell is andothers v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, 1985 (3) SCC 545 in supportof his contention that this Court need not always remit back the matter to the factfinding authority only because principles of natural justice were not complied with. Learned Counsel referred to para 51 of the report which reads as follows:normally, we would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford anopportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed bythem on pavements or footpaths should not be removed. But, the opportunity which was denied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an amplemeasure, both sides having made their contentions, we are of the opinion thatthe Commissioner was justified in directing the removal of the encroachments committed by the petitioners on pavements, footpaths or accessoryroads. As observed in S. L. Kapoor, "where on the admitted or indisputablefacts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty ispermissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance ofnatural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice butbecause Courts do not issue futile writs . Indeed, in that case, the Court didnot set aside the order of super-session in view of the factual position statedby it. But, though we do not see any justification for asking the Commissionerto hear the petitioners, we propose to pass an order which, we believe, hewould or should have passed, had he granted a hearing to them and heardwhat we did. ( 7 ) THE above passage in no way supports the proposition advanced by Mr. Tandon. The Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in S. L. Kapoor scase which itself shows that when facts are admitted or indisputable only then thecourt may decide the question straightway instead of remitting back the matter. Further, the opening word in the above observation itself shows that "normally"the matter shall have to be sent back to the fact finding authority. Further, the opening word in the above observation itself shows that "normally"the matter shall have to be sent back to the fact finding authority. It has to be bornein mind that this Court is primarily concerned with the process involved whilearrive at decision by the administrative/quasi-judicial bodies and and it is not forthis Court to give a finding on the merits of the dispute except under exceptionalcircumstances. The Court has to examine the procedure adopted by the authorityand if the Court finds any error therein the Court would direct the concernedauthority to reconsider the matter. ( 8 ) IN the result this writ petition is allowed. The impugned letter of the firstrespondent is set aside. The first respondent or its appropriate bodies are directedto reconsider the question afresh after hearing both the petitioner and the secondrespondent within three months from today. Counsel for the first respondentstates that this dispute shall have to be placed before the Oil Selection Board. Firstrespondent shall to take expeditious steps to place the matter before the said Boardfor its recommendations after hearing both the parties. ( 9 ) RULE made absolute.