JUDGMENT - A.P. SHAH, J. :---This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution raises some interesting questions relating to the interpretation of provisions of the Goa Panchayat Raj Ordinance, 1994 (for short 'the Ordinance') which was holding the field only for a short while from April 20, 1994 till July 9, 1994 when it was replaced by the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act'). The facts leading up to this petition may be briefly narrated before examining the questions raised in this petition. 2. Respondent No. 4 is a Village Panchayat established under section 3 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Village Panchayats Regulation, 1962 (for short 'the Regulation of 1962'). The said Panchayat consists of 9 members. The petitioner and the respondent Nos. 5 to 12 are the members of respondent No. 4. The petitioner was elected as Sarpanch, that is, Chairman of respondent No. 4 on April 6, 1992. 3. Seven members of respondent No. 4, namely, respondent Nos. 5 to 11, gave a notice of motion of no-confidence against the petitioner on April 8, 1994 wherein it was stated that these members had no-confidence in the petitioner as Sarpanch due to certain reasons and requested the Secretary of respondent No. 4 to take necessary decision at the earliest. 4. The relevant portion of Rule 2(1) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Village Panchayats motion of no-confidence against Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch Rules, 1963 ('Rules' for short) read thus:- "Any member or members of a Panchayat who desires or desire to move a motion of no-confidence against the Sarpanch or the Deputy Sarpanch shall give notice thereof to the Secretary in the form appended thereto." 5. Rule 3 provided that a motion of which a notice has been given under sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 shall be considered by the Panchayat at the next ordinary meeting held after the expiry of seven days from the date of its receipt by the Secretary but before the expiry of fifteen days from the said date. Then Rule 4 provided that if an ordinary meeting of the Panchayat is not due at any time during the period in which a motion of no-confidence can be considered by the Panchayat under Rule 3, the Secretary shall convene a special meeting of the Panchayat for considering the motion during such period. Then Rule 4 provided that if an ordinary meeting of the Panchayat is not due at any time during the period in which a motion of no-confidence can be considered by the Panchayat under Rule 3, the Secretary shall convene a special meeting of the Panchayat for considering the motion during such period. Since the ordinary meeting of the Panchayat was not due, the Secretary by his notice dated April 17, 1994 convened a special meeting of the Panchayat on April 22, 1994 to consider the no-confidence motion moved by the respondent Nos. 5 to 11. 6. Before we advert to an important entraining event, that is, of promulgation of the Ordinance, it is required to be stated that the no-confidence motion was carried by 2/3rd majority in the meeting held on April 22, 1994. 7. On April 20, 1994 the Governor of Goa promulgated the Ordinance in question to replace the then enactment relating to Panchayats by a comprehensive legislation. The Ordinance came into force on April 19, 1994. Section 51 of the Ordinance which deals with no-confidence motion against Sarpanch and Deputy Sarpanch reads as under :--- "Every Sarpanch of a Panchayat shall forthwith be deemed to have vacated his office if a resolution expressing on a no confidence in him is passed by a majority of not less than two thirds of the total number of members of the Panchayat at a meeting specially convened for the purpose and ratified by simple majority in a Gram Sabha at a meeting specially convened by the Director within 30 days for this purpose : Provided that no such Gram Sabha meeting shall be convened unless a notice requisitioning for such a meeting is signed by not less than one-fifth of the total number of its members." 8. Section 245 of the Ordinance which is a Repeal and Saving section provided thus :-- "The Goa, Daman and Diu Village Panchayats Regulations, 1962 (9 of 1962) is hereby repealed ; Provided that such repeal shall not affect--- (a) the previous operation of the said Regulation or anything duly done or suffered there under; or (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said Regulation; or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the said Regulation; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such rights, privilege, obligations, liability, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed : Provided that further,--- (a) subject to the preceding provisions, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment or delegation made, tax, fee or cess imposed, notification, order, instrument or direction issued, rules, regulations forms, bye-laws or Schemes framed, certificates obtained, permits or licences granted or registration effected) under the said Regulation shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act." "(b) ... ... ... " "(c) ... ... ... " "(d) ... ... ... " 9. The Ordinance was replaced on July 9, 1994 by the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1993. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Act provides that section 245 shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from April 20, 1994, while the remaining sections shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in Official Gazette, specify and different dates may be specified for different provisions of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Act provides that section 245 shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from April 20, 1994, while the remaining sections shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in Official Gazette, specify and different dates may be specified for different provisions of the Act. Section 245 of the Act so far as it is material for the purpose of this petition and which is similar to section 245 of the Ordinance reads thus:- "The Goa, Daman and Diu Village Panchayats Regulations, 1962 (9 of 1962) and the Goa Panchayat Raj Ordinance 1994 (Ordinance No. 2 of 1994) is hereby repealed; Provided that such repeal shall not affect --- (a) the previous operation of the Goa, Daman and Diu Village Panchayats Regulations, 1962 (9 of 1962) or the said Ordinance or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said Regulation; or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the said Regulation; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such right, privilege, obligations, liability, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed: Provided that further, --- (a) subject to the preceding provisions, anything done or any action taken (including any appointment or delegation made, tax, fee or cess imposed, notification, order, instrument or direction issued, rules, regulations forms, bye-laws or Scheme framed, certificates obtained, permits or licences granted or registration effected) under the said Regulation or the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act." 10. By an order dated August 31, 1994 the Collector of North Goa held that the Office of the Sarpanch of respondent No. 4 fell vacant in terms of section 23 and 24 of the Regulation of 1962 from the date of issue of the said Order and appointed the Block Development Officer, Tiswadi, to exercise the powers and perform the functions and duties of the Sarpanch/Chairman of the Panchayat until the new Chairman or Deputy Chairman is elected. 11. The petitioner seeks to question the legality and validity of the order of the Collector dated August 31, 1994 mainly on the ground that the resolution of no confidence was not valid as the same was not ratified by the Gram Sabha in accordance with section 51 of the Ordinance and therefore the petitioner prays for quashing and setting aside the said order and alternatively the petitioner seeks a declaration that the resolution of no confidence is null and void. 12. Mr. Usgaonkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that although the notice of no-confidence motion was given prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, the resolution expressing want of confidence in the petitioner was passed when the Ordinance was in force. Mr. Usgaonkar further urged that as per section 24(2) of the Regulation of 1962 the Sarpanch could be voted out by a simple majority whereas as per section 51 of the Ordinance the Sarpanch could be voted out by 2/3rd of the total number of members of the Panchayat at a meeting specially convened for the purpose and ratified by simple majority in a Gram Sabha at a meeting specially convened by the Director of the Panchayat within 30 days. Mr. Usgaonkar submitted that in view of section 51 of the Ordinance, the resolution could not operate without the same being ratified by the Gram Sabha and, therefore, according to Mr. Usgaonkar the impugned resolution was of no effect. Mr. Usgaonkar submitted that the ratification of the said resolution expressing no-confidence was a sine qua non. 13. Mr. Bhobe learned Government Advocate and Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. Usgaonkar the impugned resolution was of no effect. Mr. Usgaonkar submitted that the ratification of the said resolution expressing no-confidence was a sine qua non. 13. Mr. Bhobe learned Government Advocate and Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 5 to 11 in reply firstly contended that the no-confidence motion having been moved during the subsistence of the earlier enactment, namely, the Regulation of 1962 and the notice convening the meeting also being issued when the said Regulation was in force, the no-confidence motion has been rightly passed in accordance with the provisions of the said enactment as the provisions of section 245 of the Ordinance and particularly Clauses (b) and (d) thereof specifically saves pending proceedings in respect of the rights and the liabilities accrued or incurred under the old enactment and such proceedings are liable to be continued as if the new Act had not been passed. It was next contended by Mr. Bhobe and Mr. Desai that the requirement of ratification by Gram Sabha as contained in section 51 of the Ordinance is only directory and the question of such ratification would arise only in the event of requisition being made by 1/5th members of the Gram Sabha for convening a meeting of the Gram Sabha in accordance with section 51 of the Ordinance. It was urged that since admittedly no requisition was made by the requisite number of members of the Gram Sabha, ratification by the Gram Sabha was not necessary. Lastly it was urged by Mr. Bhobe and Mr. Desai that admittedly the resolution of no-confidence was carried by 2/3rd majority and, therefore, the validity thereof is not liable to be questioned even under the Ordinance. 14. Having regard to the rival submissions the first question which falls for our consideration is whether the proceedings for removal of the petitioner which commenced under the enactment of 1962 were saved by the Repeal and Saving Clause which has been incorporated in section 245 of the Ordinance. On perusal of the provisions of the said section, it is seen that it embodies the principle of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act deals with the consequences of the repeal of an enactment. On perusal of the provisions of the said section, it is seen that it embodies the principle of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act deals with the consequences of the repeal of an enactment. It provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes place or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed, or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed, or affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed, or affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. It also provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. Thus whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the abovementioned consequences laid down in section 6 will follow unless, as the said section itself says, a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In other words unless a contrary intention is evinced in the repealing Act, the continuance of rights and liabilities shall be presumed. In (State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh)1, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84 B.K. Mukherjee, J., speaking for the Bench observed:- "In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of inquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. The line of inquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment." The decision in Mohar Singh's case was followed in (T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras)2, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 701. 15. On a bare perusal of section 245 it is seen that the Legislature has virtually incorporated the entire section 6 of the General Clauses Act in section 245 clearly providing that the rights or liabilities acquired or accrued under the old Act shall not be affected and any legal proceedings in respect of such rights and liabilities shall be continued as if the new Act has not come into force. As already indicated the notice of motion of no-confidence was issued and the meeting for considering the no-confidence motion was convened when the old statute was in operation and having regard to the broad principles laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which have been ad verbatim reproduced in section 245 of the Ordinance, it can be safely assumed that the legislative intention was not to affect those proceedings which were already commenced and the same were to be continued and concluded as if the Ordinance had not come into force. 16. Mr. Usgaonkar, however, drew our attention to the second proviso to section 245 and more particularly Clause (a) thereof which provides that anything done or action taken under the old Regulation shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Ordinance and relying upon the said provision it was urged by Mr. 16. Mr. Usgaonkar, however, drew our attention to the second proviso to section 245 and more particularly Clause (a) thereof which provides that anything done or action taken under the old Regulation shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Ordinance and relying upon the said provision it was urged by Mr. Usgaonkar that the requisition for no-confidence motion and the issuance of notice for convening the meeting to consider the said motion must be deemed to have been taken under the Ordinance and therefore the subsequent procedure is also required to be followed under section 51 of the Ordinance. Mr. Usgaonkar placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Bishambhar Nath Kohli and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others)3, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 573 where the Supreme Court considered the effect of sub-section (3) of section 58 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 31 of 1950. 17. In Bishambhar's case the question was whether the Custodian General had the power to entertain the petition under section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of 1950 challenging the order passed by the Deputy Custodian on October 12, 1949. There the Order was passed by the Deputy Custodian under section 6 of Central Ordinance 12 of 1949. By sub-section (6) of section 30 of the said Ordinance, any order passed by the Custodian, Deputy Custodian, Additional Custodian, Assistant Custodian or an authorised Deputy Custodian was declared final and not liable to be called in question in any Court by way of Appeal or Revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. On October 18,1949 the Governor General issued Ordinance 27 of 1949 called "The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949". Section 27 of the said Ordinance Vested the Custodian General with revisional powers. On October 18,1949 the Governor General issued Ordinance 27 of 1949 called "The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949". Section 27 of the said Ordinance Vested the Custodian General with revisional powers. By sub-section (1) of section 55, Ordinance 12 of 1949 was repealed and by sub-section (3) it was provided that notwithstanding repeal of Ordinance 12 of 1949 or of any corresponding law, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by Ordinance 27 of 1949 and any penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to be penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under Ordinance 27 of 1949 as if Ordinance 27 of 1949 were in force on the day on which such thing was done, action taken, penalty incurred or proceeding commenced. This Ordinance 27 of 1949 was repealed by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 31 of 1950. By section 27 revisional jurisdiction was conferred upon the Custodian General in terms similar to section 27 of Ordinance 27 of 1949. By sub-section (1) of section 58, Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 27 of 1949 was repealed. Sub-section (3) of section 58 read as follows: "The repeal by this Act of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 or the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property Regulation or of any corresponding law shall not affect the previous operation of that Ordinance. Regulation or corresponding law, and subject thereto, anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that Ordinance, Regulation or corresponding law, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken." The Supreme Court held that the Custodian General had the power to entertain the revision application filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Shah, J., as he then was, speaking for the Bench observed:--- "By Ordinance 27 of 1949 a proceeding commenced under Ordinance 12 of 1949 or anything done or action taken in the exercise of the powers conferred under that Ordinance must be deemed to be a proceeding commenced, thing done and action taken under the former Ordinance as if that Ordinance was in force on the date on which the proceeding was commenced, thing was done or action was taken. Under section 58(3) anything done or action taken in exercise of the power conferred under Ordinance 27 of 1949 is similarly to be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the power conferred by or under Act 31 of 1950, as if the Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken. By this chain of fictions, things done and actions taken under Ordinance 12 of 1949 are to be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred under Act 31 of 1950, as if that Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action taken. The order passed by the Deputy Custodian under section 6 of Ordinance 12 of 1949 was, therefore, for the purpose of this proceeding, to be deemed an order made in exercise of the power conferred by Act 31 of 1950 as if that Act were in force on the day on which the Order was passed." 18. In our considered opinion the decision in Bishambhar's case has no application to the facts of the present case. In Bishambhar's case the question was whether the order passed under the old Act should be deemed to be an order under the New Act so as to invoke the revisional powers conferred under the new Act. However, we are dealing with completely different situation in this case where the only question is whether the proceedings started in respect of the removal of the Sarpanch are liable to be continued in accordance with the old Act. In our opinion a mere reading of the first proviso to section 245 shows that the intention of the Legislature is to save the pending proceedings which are liable to be continued and concluded in accordance with the old enactment. In our opinion a mere reading of the first proviso to section 245 shows that the intention of the Legislature is to save the pending proceedings which are liable to be continued and concluded in accordance with the old enactment. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the proceedings initiated for the removal of the Sarpanch were saved by virtue of section 245 and thus there is no illegality attached to the resolution of no-confidence. 19. Even otherwise we do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Usgaonkar that under section 51 of the Ordinance a motion of no-confidence could not become effective unless it was ratified by the Gram Sabha. On a careful scrutiny of section 51 it is seen that the provision relating to the ratification by Gram Sabha is only directory and the question of such ratification will not arise unless a meeting of Gram Sabha is convened by a written requisition by at least 1/5th members of the Gram Sabha. It is no doubt true that section 51 speaks of ratification by the Gram Sabha, but the proviso to the said section clearly provides that such meeting can be called only on a requisition of 1/5th members of the Gram Sabha. It is thus clear to us that if the meeting of the Gram Sabha is not convened within 30 days in accordance with the proviso to section 51, the resolution of no-confidence motion will automatically become effective. It is required to be stated that section 4 of the Ordinance provides that all persons whose names are for the time being entered as electors in the electoral roll shall be deemed to constitute the Gram Sabha for the Panchayat. Thus the object for introducing the provision of ratification appears to be to give power to the electors to reject the no-confidence motion; provided they decide to convene a meeting by requisite number of one-fifth. Any other interpretation will defeat the very object of enacting section 51 for passing no-confidence motion against the Sarpanch or the Deputy Sarpanch. Thus the object for introducing the provision of ratification appears to be to give power to the electors to reject the no-confidence motion; provided they decide to convene a meeting by requisite number of one-fifth. Any other interpretation will defeat the very object of enacting section 51 for passing no-confidence motion against the Sarpanch or the Deputy Sarpanch. It will mean that the Sarpanch or the Deputy Sarpanch will continue to hold the office in spite of the fact that he has lost confidence of the 2/3rd of the members of the Panchayat and even though there is no move by the electors for the purpose of convening a meeting of the Gram Sabha within the prescribed period for the purpose of considering the ratification of the no-confidence motion. Therefore, Mr. Usgaonkar's plea that the resolution of no-confidence is bad in law for want of ratification by the Gram Sabha must be rejected. 20. Lastly Mr. Usgaonkar pointed out that under the new Act it is the Director and not the Collector who has got power to appoint an officer to hold the charge till the new Sarpanch or Deputy Sarpanch is elected and in that behalf he drew our attention to the provisions of section 49 of the Act. Mr. Usgaonkar contended that the order of the Collector appointing the B.D.O. for holding the charge of the office of the Sarpanch is without jurisdiction. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the contention of Mr. Usgaonkar since we feel that the interest of the parties will be protected if the interim order dated September 29, 1994 whereunder the B.D.O. is permitted only to run the day-to-day administration of the Gram Sabha, is continued till the fresh election is held in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, we direct the Government of Goa and the Director of Panchayat Administration to hold the election for the post of Sarpanch of the respondent No. 4 within six weeks from this date. Till the election takes place, the interim order of September 29, 1994 shall continue. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.