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1994 DIGILAW 715 (MP)

TRANSWAYS OF INDIA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

1994-09-23

A.R.TIWARI

body1994
ORDER A. R. Tiwari, J. - The petitioner is the proprietary concern. Liluram s/o. Ramswaroop is its proprietor. It is registered under the Shops and Establishment Act (annexure P/1). The "petitioner" is engaged in the business of transport of goods on charges from one place to another through its own trucks as also trucks hired by it for that purpose. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on October 9, 1992, the officer of the Sales Tax Department, seized certain loose papers from one V. R. Singh, a person employed as a clerk by the petitioner. These papers manifested the activities of transport of certain goods. On the basis of these papers, the Deputy Sales Tax Officer, served notice (annexure P/2) on the petitioner to furnish the information under rule 36 framed under section 29 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The petitioner contended that the aforesaid notice was without authority of law as the petitioner was not a dealer in terms of the law. The authorities did not accept the contention. Thereafter, the Sales Tax Officer passed the order dated March 15, 1993 under section 36-A(2) of the aforesaid Act imposing the penalty of Rs. 18,48,015 (annexure P/5). The Sales Tax Officer, thereafter, issued demand notice for recovery of the aforesaid amount (annexure P/6). Aggrieved by the order dated March 15, 1993 (annexure P/5) and the demand notice dated March 19, 1993 (annexure P/6), the petitioner has filed this petition seeking quashment. The respondents have filed the reply in oppugnation. I have heard both the sides. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that entire action is without authority of law and, thus, without jurisdiction. According to him, the petitioner is not the dealer in terms of section 2(d) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and as such notice under section 29 and order under section 36-A(2) of the aforesaid Act against the petitioner are impermissible under the law. The counsel urged that the petitioner acted only as a transporter and was not a dealer and as such no tax or penalty was leviable against or imposable on the petitioner. He, therefore, prayed for quashment of order as also demand notice particularised as above. The counsel urged that the petitioner acted only as a transporter and was not a dealer and as such no tax or penalty was leviable against or imposable on the petitioner. He, therefore, prayed for quashment of order as also demand notice particularised as above. The counsel has placed reliance on [1993] 91 STC 321 (SC); (1993) 4 SCC 380 (State of Haryana v. Sant Lal) to contend that transporter was not liable to furnish any information and was also not liable to pay any tax or penalty. The Government Advocate, on the other hand, has contended that objection of the petitioner is non-meritorious. According to him, the action and demand are in conformity with law. His further contention was that the remedy of appeal or revision was available to the petitioner and in view of the existence of alternative remedy, resort to writ jurisdiction was not proper. Government Advocate has placed reliance on AIR 1994 SC 754 (State of U.P. v. Labh Chand). It is not disputed before me that the petitioner could have filed the appeal or revision against the order impugned in this writ petition. In AIR 1992 SC 2279 (Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi) it is held that resort to articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not proper when more satisfactory solution is available on the terms of the statute itself. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I deem it proper to leave the matter for decision of the authorities indicated under the Act because in my view, this is not a matter to be dealt with under writ jurisdiction. In [1993] 90 STC 477 (SC); AIR 1994 SC 1697 (K.B. Handicrafts Emporium v. State of Haryana) it is held as under : "We must make it clear that in a petition under article 32 of the Constitution, it is not our province to go into facts. As repeatedly emphasised by this Court, the question whether a particular sale is an intra-State sale, an inter-State sale, an export sale within the meaning of section 5(1) or a penultimate sale within the meaning of section 5(3), or otherwise, is always a question of fact to be decided by the appropriate authority in the light of the principles enunciated by courts. In these circumstances, we content ourselves by declaring the law and leave it to be applied by the appropriate authorities. In these circumstances, we content ourselves by declaring the law and leave it to be applied by the appropriate authorities. Counsel for the petitioners says that all the sales effected by all the petitioners are inter-State sales. May be, or may not be. We leave the matters to be disposed of by the authorities under the Act in the light of the law declared by this Court in Murli Manohar [1991] 80 STC 79 (SC); (1991) 1 SCC 377 , Hotel Balaji [1993] 88 STC 98 (SC); (1993) AIR SCW 3 and in this judgment." In this view of the matter, I do not find it necessary to express any opinion on merits of the matter. The petitioner is, therefore, granted liberty to avail of the remedy available to it by way of appeal or revision. In case such proceeding is initiated by the petitioner within 15 days from today, the same shall be treated as within limitation and the concerning authorities shall decide the same on merits in conformity with law, bearing in mind the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Sant Lal [1993] 91 STC 321; (1993) 4 SCC 380 . With grant of liberty as above, this petition stands finally disposed of without any order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.