Judgment :- Thanikkachalam, J. The detenu is the petitioner herein, who challenges the legality and the validity of the order of detention dated 212. 1993 passed against him by the 1st respondent in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (as amended) (Central Act 52 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) with a view prevent him from smuggling goods and prays for issue of writ of habeas corpus for his production before this Court, to be set at liberty. 2. The facts leading to the passing of the impugned order of detention are as under: The detenu Thiru Kandavel, holder of Singapore Passport No. 1755995-H, dated 3. 1990, a passenger bound for Singapore by AI 406 was interpreted on suspicion at Aerolbridge of Madras International Airport by the Air Intelligence Officer. On suspicion that he might have kept concealed some foreign currency either in his baggage or in his person, he was questioned, in the presence of witnesses as to whether the detenu was carrying any foreign currency to which the detenu replied in the negative. Thereafter the detenu was asked to produce his baggage for examination. The detenu opened his green and black coloured shoulder bag for examination. It was found to contain 42 numbers of US $ 100 and 9 numbers of US $ 50. Thereafter, when the detenu was questioned as to whether he had shock-in baggage, he replied in the negative. The air-ticket of the detenu, however, confirmed this fact. Hence, the detenu was taken to the Customs Visadex room and during the course of personal search in the presence of witnesses foreign currencies of various denominations and Master Card U.S. travellers cheques were recovered from his purse. Further search revealed two paper packets kept concealed inside the shoes worn by the detenu, one from each leg, each contained huge amounts of various foreign currencies. Further search of the detenu resulted in the recovery of two bundles of Bank of Oman Limited, Visa travellers cheques each bundle stuffed into the socks worn by the detenu. From one bundle Visa travellers cheque worth $ 6,500 were recovered and from the other bundle Visa travellers cheque of U.S. $ 635C0 were recovered. All these travellers cheques were found issued in various names other than that of the detenu. 3. From one bundle Visa travellers cheque worth $ 6,500 were recovered and from the other bundle Visa travellers cheque of U.S. $ 635C0 were recovered. All these travellers cheques were found issued in various names other than that of the detenu. 3. Under Sec. 11(2)(v) of the Customs Act, 1962, read with Sec. 13(1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 export of foreign currencies and travellers cheques without permission from the Reserve Bank of India is prohibited. Various foreign currencies and travellers cheques amounting to Rs. 33,43,811 were attempted to export out of India unauthorisedly by way of concealment and without declaration. The list of such foreign currencies are as follows: Foreign currency in cash: 1. U.S.$ 4,650 2. Swiss Franc 500 3. Japanese Yen 10,000 4. Bahrain Dinar 20 5. Australian Dollar 850 6. French Franc 2,900 7. Oman Riyals 325 8. Kuwait Dinar 180 9. UAE Dirhams 12,200 10. Singapore Dollar 1,300 11. Quatar Riyals 3,600 12. Saudi Riyals 6,800 113. Malaysian Dollar 2,050 114. England Pounds 985 Travellers Cheques: 1. U.S. $ 500 x 2 41,000 2. U.S. $ 1,000 x 50 50,000 91,000 On 211. 1993 the detenu gave a voluntary statement before the customs authorities in English. He admitted that on several occasions he came to India and brought gold and silver and cleared those goods on payment of duty. He further stated that he was indulging in smuggling activities under the influence of one Hubaithullah. He also admitted that he was attempting to export various foreign currencies as and traveller’s cheques out of India unauthorisedly by way of concealment and without declaration. 4. Under Sec. 113(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Sec. 67 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 the travellers’ cheques and various foreign currencies were confiscated. Hence the detenu was arrested on 211. 1993 and produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras who remanded him to judicial custody. After follow-up action, the impugned order of detention was passed. .5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu submitted as under: The detention order was passed while the detenu was in the jail as a remand prisoner from 211. 1993 and the detention order is illegal and unwarranted since he is already confined in jail and therefore there is no necessary for preventing him from indulging in the illegal activities mentioned in the grounds of detention. 1993 and the detention order is illegal and unwarranted since he is already confined in jail and therefore there is no necessary for preventing him from indulging in the illegal activities mentioned in the grounds of detention. Detaining authority has stated that there is likelihood of the release of the detenu on bail. The said satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly imaginary and erroneous. The above assumption was not correct and proved to be wholly incorrect because his bail application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate. Though the bail petition was dismissed on 112. 1993, it was not placed before the detaining authority till 212. 1993 by the Customs authorities. Failure to place and deliberate suppression by the sponsoring authority to place a vital document renders the detention illegal. 6. The customs authorities have chosen not to supply the bail dismissal order. The failure on the part of the customs authorities to place all the materials to the detaining authority which have a bearing on the subject-matter of detention vitiated his detention and the practice of selective omission by the customs authorities rendered the detention illegal. 7. The detention order was passed while the detenu was in jail amounts to double detention. The detenu was a remand prisoner and there is no prospect of being released on bail. The detaining authority has totally failed to consider that the detenu is a foreigner and the decision of this Court in similar and identical cases which are relevant and to the effect that a foreigner should not be released on bail but the customs authorities must expedite filing of the charge-sheet and proceed further to prosecute. The detaining authority is unaware of this legal aspect and failed to take notice of the law in this aspect. The mere recital that there is likelihood of release on bail would amounts to non-application of mind and therefore the detention is illegal. 8. The passport of the detenu was seized by the customs authorities and it was handed over to the custody of the court. Therefore, the detenu was effectively prevented from going over to Singapore or any overseas countries. The detaining authority has not considered the seizure of his passport in the grounds of detention and there is no whisper about the consequences that would follow and account of the seizure of his passport. Therefore, the detenu was effectively prevented from going over to Singapore or any overseas countries. The detaining authority has not considered the seizure of his passport in the grounds of detention and there is no whisper about the consequences that would follow and account of the seizure of his passport. Unless there is a reference to the seizure of his passport has already been seized, it cannot be presumed that the detaining authority has considered the above aspects and arrived at his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, the detention is illegal and invalid. .9. The detenu’s wife came to India-immediately after his arrest she came to India from Singapore carrying eight months baby in her womb. She met the Customs Collector along with a counsel and made request for the early hearing of the case. They presented a petition on 12. 1993 and 112. 1993 to the Collector of Customs and the Collector has fixed an earlier date without issue of any show cause notice. But this crucial factor was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority. If this important factor was brought to the notice of the detaining authority he would not have clamped the order of detention. 10. In the grounds of detention it is stated that the detenu is a Surveyor. He is not a Surveyor, but he is a Technician. This shows that the detaining authority has not prepared the grounds. On the other hand, the detaining authority has simply copied the written proposal and passed the order mechanically. Therefore, the order of detention is bad. The detenu sent a representation to the first respondent detaining authority on 11. 1994 through the third respondent. But the same has not yet been disposed off. The 1st respondent has not forwarded the report to the 2nd respondent within 10 days as contemplated under Sec. 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act. Therefore, the order is bad. .11. By way of additional grounds, the learned counsel for the detenu submitted as under: The detenu had sent a representation to the 1st respondent in which a request was made to forward a copy of the representation to the Central Government. In considering the representation the 2nd respondent prima facie appears not to have acted with expedition required. .11. By way of additional grounds, the learned counsel for the detenu submitted as under: The detenu had sent a representation to the 1st respondent in which a request was made to forward a copy of the representation to the Central Government. In considering the representation the 2nd respondent prima facie appears not to have acted with expedition required. The 2nd respondent is bound to satisfy this Court that this representation was duly considered by the competent authority and decision taken thereon without any avoidable delay. The 1st respondent has not followed proper and correct procedure. On behalf of the detenu a request had been made for adjudicating the case on 2. 1994 a written submission which was his defence in the adjudicating proceeding was filed before the adjudicating authority in O.S.No.209/93-RD. The said written submissions made by the counsel for the detenu is no doubt a relevant and vital material, which would have been forwarded and placed before the Advisory Board. From the records it appears that the said communication filed on behalf of the detenu before the adjudicating authority on 2. 1993 had not at all been forwarded and placed before the Advisory Board when it had its meeting on 12. 1994. The Advisory Board has therefore been deprived of opportunity of considering one of the very vital documents in favour of the detenu. From the prison the detenu had sent a very detailed letter explaining his version of the events in his letter dated 2. 1994. The Government had chosen to characterise the same retraction, but it is not simpliciter retraticm. This representation has been belatedly rejected by the Government on 23. 1994. This vital document ought to have been placed before the Advisory Board for its consideration. Failure to place this vital material which would have an effect on the opinion of the Advisory Board has rendered the proceeding before the Advisory Board not in accordance with law and the constitutional mandates. The Government can have no discretion of placing or not placing the material before the Advisory Board. This would be so irrespective of the question whether the materials had come at a particular time or not. This document dated 2. 1994 and 2. 1994 should have also been considered by the Government at the time of passing the order of confirmation. This would be so irrespective of the question whether the materials had come at a particular time or not. This document dated 2. 1994 and 2. 1994 should have also been considered by the Government at the time of passing the order of confirmation. Exfacie these have not been taken into consideration and therefore the confirmation also becomes invalid. The proceedings of the Advisory Board have not been; fair and are not in accordance with the constitutional mandate. The detenu was called first and later he was asked to wait outside. The Customs authorities including the Superintendent of Customs were called inside and have apparently been heard. The detenu was denied his right of representation by an advocate of his choice. The Advisory Board had heard highly placed officials with deep knowledge of pr0ventive detention thereby resulted in discrimination and unfair treatment. The detenu had requested that he be provided with assistance of an advocate, but this request has not been considered nor any reply received by the detenu and non-consideration of this vital aspect by the Advisory Board itself rendered the proceedings invalid. The detaining authority has merely copied certain written proposals/written brief/draft grounds that had been placed before the detaining authority and the Government itself have not formulated the grounds which is an indispensable requirement of the Constitutional mandates. The petitioner calls upon the respondent to produce and make available the details of the proposal received by the Government and when the Additional documents were received and when and by whom the decision was taken to detain the detenu and when the grounds were formulated in accordance with the said decision and when the grounds were ultimately approved and by whom. It is essential to furnish these details as the burden of justifying the detention order as having been in accordance with the Constitutional mandate is on the detaining authority. Hence, it was submitted that the detention order is liable to be set aside. .12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent submitted as under: As the detenu had neither declared the abovesaid foreign currencies nor the detenu was in possession of a valid permit to export the same from India, the abovesaid currencies and travellers’ cheques were seized under a mahazar for action to be taken under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and Customs Act. The detenu voluntarily confessed to the offence before the Customs Officers and it is only an afterthought and to escape from the clutches of law that the detenu has now come forward with a fabricated version that he was tortured and asked to give a statement. The quantum of money seized is so high that this respondent is able to draw a reasonable prognosis that the detenu is likely to commit such acts in the future and even a single solitary incident is enough to warrant a detention under the COFEPOSA Act. A copy of the mahazar was furnished to the detenu and the same was acknowledged by him. 13. The detenu is likely to move a subsequent bail application and bails are granted in such cases after some time. Hence the allegation that he is not likely to be released on bail is untenable. It is true that the order rejecting the bail was not placed before the detaining authority. However, the same was supplied to the detenu through the detaining authority in response to his representation vide Government Letter No. 1116/94-A, Public (Law & Order-D), Department dated 2. 1994. The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that non-placement of the bail dismissal order before the detaining authority does not vitiate the detention order. .14. Bails are granted even in the case of foreign nationals who are alleged to have committed offence the penal laws of this country. It cannot, therefore, be contended that an order of detention cannot be passed against a foreigner on the assumption that he will not be released on bail. The passport of the detenu was impounded and the same is before, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, E.O.II, Egmore. In spite of this fact, there is a compelling necessity to detain him since there is a possibility for the detenu to get a false passport and leave the country. The impounding of the passport is reflected in the remand application filed before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore. It is stated that the detenu’s wife met the Collector of Customs and requested him to expedite the proceedings. The adjudication proceedings against the detenu is different from detention under COFEPOSA Act and the non-placement of the same does not in any way vitiate the order of detention. However, copies of the same were furnished to the detenu as requested in his representation. The adjudication proceedings against the detenu is different from detention under COFEPOSA Act and the non-placement of the same does not in any way vitiate the order of detention. However, copies of the same were furnished to the detenu as requested in his representation. The mere inadvertent mention of the profession of the detenu will not in any way alter the offence committed by the detenu. The representation of the detenu dated 11. 1994 was received by the respondent on 21. 1994 through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras. Parawar remarks were called from the sponsoring authority on the same day 21. 1994. 21. 1994 and 21. 1994 were holidays. The file was sent to the Public (SC) Department on 21. 1994. 21. 1994 was holiday. A note for circulation was submitted to the Under Secretary, Public on 21. 1994. The Under Secretary, Public approved the file on 21. 1994. The Secretary, Public approved the file on 21. 1994. 21. 1994 and 30.1.1994 were holidays. The Secretary Law approved the file on 31. 1994. The Minister for Law approved the file on 2. 1994. The representation of the detenu was rejected and communicated in Government letter No. 1116/94-A, Public (Law and Order-D), Department, dated 2. 1994. From this it would be seen that there is no delay in considering the representation of the detenu. This respondent has reported the facts to the 2nd respondent on 212. 1993 which is within the stipulated period of time. It was, therefore, pleaded that no case was made out by the detenu to declare the order of detention as illegal. .15. Learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent made the following submissions: .The detenu’s representation was forwarded by the Government of Tamil Nadu, Public (Law & Order) Department vide their letter dated 21. 1994 was received in the COFEPOSA unit of the Ministry on 31. 1994. On receipt of the representation, the same was placed before the considering authority who directed to call for the comments of the sponsoring authority. The comments were called on 2. 1994. Sponsoring authority furnished the comments which were received in the Ministry on 12. 1994. The case was processed and submitted to Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) on 12. 1994. Joint Secretary is an officer empowered by the Finance Minister vide Order No. 685/14/84, Cus.VIII, dated 24. The comments were called on 2. 1994. Sponsoring authority furnished the comments which were received in the Ministry on 12. 1994. The case was processed and submitted to Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) on 12. 1994. Joint Secretary is an officer empowered by the Finance Minister vide Order No. 685/14/84, Cus.VIII, dated 24. 1991 to consider the representation made by or on behalf of the detenu against the detention orders passed by the State Governments. Joint Secretary considered and rejected the representation as being devoid of merits. A memo dated 13. 1994 intimating the detenu about rejection of his representation by the Central Government was also issued on 12. 1994. Thus there was no delay in considering the representation by the competent authority of the Central Government. .16. The State Government passed an order against the detenu on 212. 1993 made a report under Sec. 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 on 212. 1993 itself but the same was received in the COFEPOSA Unit on 1. 1994. The report was made on 212. 1993 within the stipulated period of ten days as required under the Act. Joint Secretary to the Government of India has been empowered by the Finance Minister vide F.No.685/14/84-Cus. VIII, dated 24. 1991 under Rule 3 of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 to exercise the powers vested in the Central Government under Sec. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974. Joint Secretary considered the report on 11. 1994 and found no reason to interfere with the findings and conclusions reached by the State Government. It is also borne out by the official notings on record. The report was considered expeditiously by the competent authority of the Central Government and the mandatory provisions were complied with. It was therefore pleaded that the complaints made by the detenu are unwarranted. .17. According to the learned counsel for the detenu, the detenu was in the jail as remand prisoner from 23. 1993. Since he is already confined in jail, the detention order under COFEPOSA Act is illegal. There is no necessity for preventing the detenu from indulging in the illegal activities mentioned in the grounds of detention. According to the detaining authority if the detenu is released on bail, he would against indulge in smuggling activities. Therefore, in order to prevent him from indulging in such illegal activities, he must be detained in prison. There is no necessity for preventing the detenu from indulging in the illegal activities mentioned in the grounds of detention. According to the detaining authority if the detenu is released on bail, he would against indulge in smuggling activities. Therefore, in order to prevent him from indulging in such illegal activities, he must be detained in prison. Learned counsel for the detenu submitted that the bail petition moved by the detenu was rejected and dismissed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore the detaining authority could not have entertained any subjective satisfaction for detaining the detenu in the prison. It was further submitted that though the bail petition was dismissed on 112. 1993 it was not placed before the detaining authority till 12. 1994, by the customs authorities. Hence it was submitted that failure to place this information by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority is illegal and would vitiate the detention order. The customs authorities did not supply the bail dismissal order. The customs authorities failed to place all the materials before the detaining authority. The practice of selective omission by the customs authorities rendered the detention illegal. According to the learned counsel for the detenu there is no prospect of detenu being released on bail. Since the detenu is a foreigner and his passport was impounded, he cannot leave this country. In the grounds of detention there was no mention about the seizure of the passport. Since the passport had already been seized it cannot be presumed that the detaining authority has considered the above aspect and arrived at his subjective satisfaction. 18. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent the detenu is likely to move bail application and bail order may be granted in any one of such applications. Therefore, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor there is always a possibility of the detenu moving several bail applications and in any of such bail applications, there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail. Thereafter, it was submitted that the detenu is not likely to be released on bail cannot be accepted. It was accepted that the order rejecting the bail was not placed before the detaining authority. But a copy of the order was supplied to the detenu through the detaining authority, as per the Government letter dated 12. 1994. Thereafter, it was submitted that the detenu is not likely to be released on bail cannot be accepted. It was accepted that the order rejecting the bail was not placed before the detaining authority. But a copy of the order was supplied to the detenu through the detaining authority, as per the Government letter dated 12. 1994. It was further submitted that the non-placement of the bail dismissal order before the detaining authority by that itself would not vitiate the detention order. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor pointed out that bails are granted even in the case of foreign nationals. Therefore, it cannot be said that bails are not granted in the case of a foreign national. The Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the passport of the detenu was impounded and the same is before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Egmore. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor there is a possibility that the detenu getting a false passport and leave the country. Therefore, there is compelling necessity to detain the detenu. Impounding of the passport is reflected in the remand application filed before the Magistrate. Therefore, this fact would have knows to the detaining authority. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 88: (1991) 1 S.C.C. 128 : A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1540: 1991 Crl.L.J. 2058, Hawabi Sayeed Arif Sayeed Hanif v. L. Hmingliana, 1993 S.C.C.(Crl.) 304: (1993) 1 S.C.C. 163 , Vijaynarayan Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984)3 S.C.C. 14 : 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 361, Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985)4 S.C.C. 332: 1985 S.C.C. (Crl.) 514, Sujaj Paul Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986)4 S.C.C. 378 : 1986 S.C.C. (Crl.) 452, Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1986)4 S.C.C. 416 : 1986 S.C.C. (Crl.)419. Placing reliance on these decisions counsel for the petitioner submitted that the letter of preventive detention being a drastic and hard law, must be strictly considered and should not ordinarily be used for clipping the wings of an accused, if criminal prosecutor would suffice. Ordinarily, a detention order should not be passed merely on the ground that the detenu who was carrying on smuggling activities was likely to be enlarged on bail. Ordinarily, a detention order should not be passed merely on the ground that the detenu who was carrying on smuggling activities was likely to be enlarged on bail. In such cases the proper course would be to oppose the bail application if granted, challenge the order in the higher forum but not circumvent it by passing an order of detention merely to supersede the bail order. If a person is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released therefrom, the power of detention should not ordinarily be exercised. There must be cogent material before the officer passing the detention order for inferring that the detenu was likely to be released on bail. This inference must be drawn from material on record and must not be the ipso dixit of the officer passing the detention order. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with the duty of maintaining law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts to protect the fundamental freedom of the citizens. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail the concerned authority must satisfy himself and that satisfaction must be reached on the basis of cogent material that there is a real possibility of the detenu bring released on bail and further if released on bail the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. 20. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent the authority did not sit over the proposal after receiving it, but was activity perusing the material, collecting the material and was following the criminal case against the petitioner diligently on being fully satisfied about the necessity of detaining the petitioner he passes the impugned order. The authority was aware of that the bail petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. He was of the opinion that the possibility of his filing subsequent bail applications and is released on that basis could not be ruled out. In view of his past record, the detention of the petitioner was found absolutely, essential. The authority was aware of that the bail petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. He was of the opinion that the possibility of his filing subsequent bail applications and is released on that basis could not be ruled out. In view of his past record, the detention of the petitioner was found absolutely, essential. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 1: 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1: A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261 and Briendra Kumar Rai alias Virendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India, (1993)1 S.C.C. 272 : 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 324. 21. In Smt.Azra Fatima v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1763, the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (46 of 1988) held as under: "We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties on the above point. The latest decision of this Court on the above point is Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1990)3 S.C.C. 309 : A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1202 decided on 4th April, 1990 in which all the earlier case decided by this Court have been considered including the cases of N. Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1989)3 J.T. 478 : 1989 Crl.L.J. 2190: A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2027 and Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelwat v. Union of India, (1990)1 S.C.C. 746 : 1990 Crl.L.J. 1232: A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was observed in Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal’s case, that no decision of this Court has gone to the extent of holding that no order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the case of a detenu who is already in jail. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the case of a detenu who is already in jail. The counsel for the detenu in the above case "strongly relied on Smt.Shahsi Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1988)1 J.T. 83 : A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 596 and Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985)4 S.C.C. 232 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 315 and contended that the bail application could be opposed if moved or if enlarged the same can be questioned in a higher court and on that ground the detention order should be held to be invalid. The Court negatived the above contention by observing that in N. Meera Rani’s case, a Bench of three Judges noted the above observations in Smt.Shahsi Aggarwal’s case and Ramesh Yadav’s case and it was said that they were made on the facts of those particular cases. The Court further held in the above case that on the material relied upon by the detaining authority it could not be said that there was no awareness in the mind of the detaining authority about the detenu being in custody and that if he is released on bail he is likely to indulge in the prejudicial activities." On considering the facts of the above said case, the Supreme Court further held as under: "Thus the material placed before the detaining authority and the facts mentioned in the grounds of detention clearly go to show that the detaining authority was fully aware that the bail application filed by the detenu had been rejected by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court, Bombay. The detaining authority was also conscious of the fact that the two other detenus who were arrested and detained in the same raid had already been released on bail. The antecedents of the detenu which were clear from his own statement went to show that he was initiated in drug trafficking in 1984 and employed as a delivery boy on Rs. 30 per day and within a short span of four years the detenu himself started buying and selling Narcotic Drugs and amassed huge movable and immovable properties in Bombay. In the present raid itself Heroin and Mandrax tablets worth Rs. 1,13,42,000 were seized from the ownership and possession of the detenu. 30 per day and within a short span of four years the detenu himself started buying and selling Narcotic Drugs and amassed huge movable and immovable properties in Bombay. In the present raid itself Heroin and Mandrax tablets worth Rs. 1,13,42,000 were seized from the ownership and possession of the detenu. Not only that the detenu was using three vehicles for transportation of these narcotic drugs. The detaining authority after taking into consideration the above materials placed before him, arrived at the conclusion that the detenu being in judicial custody may under the normal law of the land be granted bail and in a position to continue to pursue his nefarious activities. The detaining authority in these circumstances considered it necessary to invoke the law of preventive detention under the Act to prevent the detenu from indulging in his prejudicial activities in future. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the order of detention was illegal on the ground that it was passed while the detenu was already in custody." 22. In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, (1992)1 S.C.C. 1 : 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1: A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261, the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Sec. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, having regard to the various decisions on this point set down the conclusions as under: .(1) A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody. .(2) When such awareness is there then it should further appear from the grounds that there was enough material necessitating the detention of the person in custody. This aspect depends upon various considerations and facts and circumstances of each case. If there is a possibility of his being released and on being so released he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity then that would be one such compelling necessity to pass the detention order. The order cannot be quashed on ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and that if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a higher court. The order cannot be quashed on ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and that if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a higher court. (3) If the detenu has moved for bail then the application and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant material. The question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody. .(4) According the non-supply of the copies of bail application or the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu’s right of being afforded a reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art. 22(5), when it is clear that the authority has not relied or referred to the same. .(5) When the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making in effective representation. Only when the detaining authority has not only referred to but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstances amount to violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Whether in a given case the detaining authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds which aspect can be examined by the Court. .(6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu." 23. In Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1990)3 S.C.C. 309 : A.I.R.1990 S.C. 1202, after reviewing all the relevant cases including Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelwat v. Union of India, (1990)1 S.C.C. 746 :1990 Crl.L.J. 1232. In Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1990)3 S.C.C. 309 : A.I.R.1990 S.C. 1202, after reviewing all the relevant cases including Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelwat v. Union of India, (1990)1 S.C.C. 746 :1990 Crl.L.J. 1232. A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196, the Supreme Court held as under: "It could thus be seen that no decision of this Court has gone to the extent of holding that no order of detention can validity be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances therefore the facts and circumstances, of each case have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the order of detention passed in the case of detenu who is already in jail." 24. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 88: (1991) 1 S.C.C. 128 : A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640: 1991 Crl.L.J. 2058, after considering all the earlier decisions dealing with the detention of a person in custody, the Supreme Court held that "from catena of decisions referred to above, it seems clear thus that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed, (i) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) if he has reasons to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him, (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity, and (iii) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher forum. 25. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher forum. 25. In M. Mohamed Sultan v. Joint Secretary of Government of India, Finance Department and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2222, while considering the provisions of Sec. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, the Supreme Court held that "the application for relaxation of the conditions of bail submitted by the petitioner and the order dated October 31, 1989 relaxing the conditions of bail passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the said application were not material documents and were not required to be considered by the detaining authorities. The non-consideration of the same by the detaining authority would not, therefore, impair the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority and would not vitiate the order of detention. For the same reason the non-supply of the copies of the same to the petitioner would not result in denial of the right of the petitioner to make representation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution.“ 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Har Bhajan Singh v. Union of India, wherein the Delhi High Court held that the order made on the bail application is a material and vital document which must be placed before the declaring authority and if such a document is suppressed, the order of declaration cannot be sustained”. 27. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Khilal Asghar v. Union of India, 1990 Crl.L.J. 1. In that case, it was held that the order of detention cannot be sustained and accordingly it was quashed. The reason for coming to such conclusion are stated as under: “The lapse on the part of the respondents is not getting an affidavit of the detaining authority placed on record, cannot thus be condoned. In the result, we are left only with that what is apparent on the record in the grounds of detention. Here we have only a bald assertion that”if you are released on bail, you will indulge in the aforesaid activities.“(Paragraph 8). In the result, we are left only with that what is apparent on the record in the grounds of detention. Here we have only a bald assertion that”if you are released on bail, you will indulge in the aforesaid activities.“(Paragraph 8). There is no averment to the effect that the petitioner was trying to get out on bail by moving applications. The factual position is that for about 7 months before the order of detention, the petitioner had not at all move any petition for bail, and his earlier petitions for bail had been successively rejected. There was thus no imminent possibility of his being released from jail. He was already facing trial for his alleged involvement in the activity of purchase of heroin that had been seized and for which he had been arrested on 6th April, 1987 and continued to be in custody thereafter”. Therefore, the decision rendered in the abovesaid case on the peculiar facts arising therein would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 28. Reliance was also placed upon another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Riva Deneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and others, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 354. According to the facts arising in that case the statement made by the detaining authority merely speaks of a possibility of the detenu’s release in case he moves a bail petition. It neither says that such release was likely or that it was imminent. Evidently the statement falls short of the requirement enunciated by this Court in Kamarunnisa. Even in me return filed in this petition, the authority has not stated (in response to Ground B of the writ petition) that there was material before him upon which he was satisfied mat the petitioner was likely to be released or that such release was imminent. It is under these circumstances the detention order was quashed. 29. Therefore, it remains to be seen mat the subjective satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority on consideration of relevant material depends upon the facts arising in each case. According to the facts arising in the present case, the petitioner is a foreign national. In January, 1993, during his third visit to India he brought five kilograms of gold and cleared it on payment of duty. According to the facts arising in the present case, the petitioner is a foreign national. In January, 1993, during his third visit to India he brought five kilograms of gold and cleared it on payment of duty. In October, 1993, when he visited India again, he brought 100 kgs. of gold and cleared it on payment of duty. The gold was handed over to the person who identified the petitioner with the help of petitioner’s photograph. Similarly silver was handed over at Airport itself. On both these occasions travel expenses were met by the persons who handed over gold and silver and the petitioner did not know the name and address of the person who has received the gold and silver. The petitioner was attempting to export foreign currencies and travellers’ cheques out of India unauthorisedly by way of concealment and without declaration amounting to Rs. 33,43,810. While arriving at the subjective satisfaction to detain the petitioner under the COFEPOSA Act, the State Government have taken into consideration all the facts and materials referred to an relied upon in me grounds mentioned in the order. The petitioner himself gave a voluntary statement before the customs authorities admitting his smuggling activities. The bail application filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The bail application and the copy of the order rejecting the bail were supplied to the petitioner. The antecedents of the petitioner clearly shows that if he is released on bail he will again indulge in smuggling activities. Even though he is a foreign national it is stated that courts are releasing foreign national on bail, as can be seen from the prior history. It is to be remembered that placing rejection of the bail order before the detaining authority would not by itself vitiate the detention order. Therefore, considering the prior history of the detenu, his statement before the Customs Authorities, the huge amount of foreign currencies and travellers’ cheques which he attempted to export outside India unauthorisedly and without declaration and the mahazar seizing the articles the detaining authority came to the subjective satisfaction that mere is likelihood of release of the petitioner from the custody and the possibility of making an application for bail again by the petitioner is not ruled out, the detaining authority concluded if he is released on bail he again indulge in smuggling activities and therefore it is imminent to detain him under custody. Even a solitary incidence may manifest potentiality of detenu in activities of smuggling. Further merely on ground that there were no antecedents, the detention order cannot be quashed. Thus applying the principles adumbrated in Kamarunnissa’s case, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 88: (1991) 1 S.C.C.128: A.I.R.1991 S.C. 1540: 1991 Crl.L.J. 2058 and Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik’s case, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261: (1992) 1 S.C.C. 1 : 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1, we are of the opinion that there is awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that the detenu is in custody at the time of service of the order of detention on him and cogent and relevant materials and fresh facts had been disclosed which necessitated the making of an order of detention. 30. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the bail application and the order passed thereon were not supplied to the petitioner. But the 1st respondent submitted that the bail application and the order passed thereon were supplied to the detenu through the 3rd respondent in response to the representation as per the Government Letter dated 2. 1994. The decision of the Supreme Court pointed out that the non-placement of the bail dismissal order before the detaining authority does not vitiate the detention order. In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, (1992)1, S.C.C. 1: 1992 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1: A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261, it was held that, “if the detenu has moved for bail then the application arid the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant materials. The question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody. Accordingly, the non-supply of the copies of bail application or the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu’s right of being afforded a reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art. 22(5) when it is clear that the authority has not relied or referred to the same. When the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. When the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Only when the detaining authority has not only referred to but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstances amount to violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India, Whether in a given case the detaining authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the court.” According to the detenu in the present case the bail petition and the bail order were not placed before the detaining authority. If that is so, the detaining authority would not have consideration the same. In such a case the respondent need not supply the bail order and the bail petition copies to the detenu. .31. According to the petitioner he sent a representation to the 1st respondent with a request to forward a copy of the same to the Central Government. The 1st respondent has not sent such a copy to the Central Government as required. A request was made by the petitioner for adjudicating the case. On 2. 1994 a written submission which was defence in the adjudicating proceedings was filed before the adjudicating authority. The said written submission was not forwarded and placed before the Advisory Board when it met on 12. 1994. Therefore, the Advisory Board was deprived of opportunity of considering one of the vital documents in favour of the detenu. From the prison the petitioner has sent a detailed letter dated 2. 1994. This representation has been rejected by the Government on 23. 1994. This document was not placed before the Advisory Board. The documents dated 2.2,1994. and 2. 1994. were not considered before passing the confirmation order. The petitioner was not given an opportunity to represent his case by an advocate of his choice. The details with regard to the fact that when the grounds were ultimately formulated and by whom were not furnished. 32. The representation of the detenu dated 11. 1994. was received by the respondent on 21. 1994, through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras. The petitioner was not given an opportunity to represent his case by an advocate of his choice. The details with regard to the fact that when the grounds were ultimately formulated and by whom were not furnished. 32. The representation of the detenu dated 11. 1994. was received by the respondent on 21. 1994, through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras. Parawar remarks were called for from the sponsoring authority on the same day. Since 21. 1994 and 21. 1994. were holidays the parawar remarks were received from the sponsoring authority on 21. 1994. On the same date the file was sent to Public (SC) Department. Since 21. 1994. happens to be a holiday, the file was returned from the department on 21. 1994. The Under Secretary approved the file on 21. 1994. The Secretary, Public approved the file on 21. 1994. Since 21. 1994 and 30.1.1994 were holidays, the Secretary, Law approved the file on 31. 1994. The Minister for Law approved the file on 2. 1994. The representation was rejected and communicated to the detenu in Government Letter dated 2. 1994. Therefore, there is no delay in considering the representation sent by the detenu. This respondent has reported the facts to the 2nd respondent on 212. 1993. within the stipulated date. .33. The detenu’s representation forwarded by the Government of Tamil Nadu in their letter dated 21. 1994. was received by the COFEPOSA Unit of the Ministry on 31. 1994. The same was placed before the considering authority who directed to call for comments from the sponsoring authority. The comments were called on 2. 1994. Sponsoring authority furnished the comments which were received in the Ministry on 12. 1994. The case was processed and submitted to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) on 12. 1994. Joint Secretary is an officer empowered by the Finance Ministry (vide: order No. 685/14/64 Cus. VIII, dated 24. 1991) to consider the representation made by or on behalf of the detenu against the detention orders passed by the State Government. The Joint Secretary considered and rejected the representation since there is no merits. A memo dated 12. 1994 intimating the detenu about the rejection of his representation by the Central Government was also issued on 12. 1994. Therefore, there was no delay in considering the representation by the competent authority of the Central Government. 34. The State Government passed an order against the detenu on 212. A memo dated 12. 1994 intimating the detenu about the rejection of his representation by the Central Government was also issued on 12. 1994. Therefore, there was no delay in considering the representation by the competent authority of the Central Government. 34. The State Government passed an order against the detenu on 212. 1993. and made a report under Sec. 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 on 212. 1993. This was reconsidered by the COFEPOSA Unit 1. 1994. The State Government made the report on 212. 1993 within the stipulated period of ten days. The Joint Secretary who is empowered to consider the same, considered the report and rejected the same on 11. 1994. Thus the report was considered by the competent authority of the Central Government expeditiously. 35. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, the Supreme Court held that, ‘according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself, no person who is detained under any law, which provides for preventive detention can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice or to be defended by him. In view of this, it cannot be held by the application of abstract, general principles or on a priori considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. Since the constitution, as originally enacted, itself contemplates that such a right should not be made available to a detenu it cannot be said that the denial of the said right is unfair, unjust or unreasonable. .36. In Johney D’Couto v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 109, the Supreme Court held, "the rule in A.K. Roy’s case, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710 made it clear that the detenu was entitled to the assistance of a ‘friend’. The word friend used there was obviously not intended to carry the meaning of the term in common parlance. One of the meanings of the word ‘friend’, according to the Collins English Dictionary is "an ally in a fight or cause: supporter." The term ‘friend’ used in the judgments of this Court was more in this sense than meaning "a person known well to another and regarded with liking, affection and loyalty. One of the meanings of the word ‘friend’, according to the Collins English Dictionary is "an ally in a fight or cause: supporter." The term ‘friend’ used in the judgments of this Court was more in this sense than meaning "a person known well to another and regarded with liking, affection and loyalty. A person not being a friend in the normal sense could be picked up for rendering assistance within the frame of the law as settled by this Court. The Advisory Board has, of course, to be careful in permitting assistance of a friend in order to ensure due observance of the policy of law that a detenu is not entitled to representation through a lawyer. As has been indicated by this Court, what cannot be permitted directly should hot be allowed to be done in an indirect way. Sundararajan, in this view of the matter, was perhaps a friend prepared to assist the detenu before the Advisory Board and the refusal of such assistance to the appellant was not justified. .37. It was submitted that in the grounds of detention there was some discrepancies in stating the nature of work done by the detenu in Singapore. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that it is merely by in advertance the mistake occurred. If there is any material discrepancies that would be relevant for the purpose of considering the validity of the detention order and not otherwise. The so called mistakes as pointed out by the counsel for the detenu would not by itself vitiate the order of detention. While considering this aspect, the Supreme Court in Pushpadevi v. M.L. Madhavan, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1784, held as under: ."The Government must ensure that the constitutional safeguards of Art. 22(5) read with Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the COFEPOSA are fully complied with. In the instant case, there was no infraction of the constitutional safeguards contained in Art. 22(5). There was no failure on the part of the Government to discharge its obligation under Art. 22(5) as the relevant record of the Enforcement Directorate clearly show that there was sufficient material for the formation of the subjective satisfaction for the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority under Sub-sec.(k) of Sec. 3. of the Act and they also show that the detenu was afforded a reasonable opportunity for making an effective representation against his detention. of the Act and they also show that the detenu was afforded a reasonable opportunity for making an effective representation against his detention. Therefore, the order of detention passed against the detenu could not be said to be illegal and void." 38. According to the learned counsel for the detenu a written submission dated 2. 1994 made before the adjudicating authority was not placed before the Advisory Board which met on 12. 1994 and written submissions dated 2. 1994 and 2. 1994 should have been considered by the Government at the time of passing the order of confirmation. .39. The written submission dated 2. 1994 relates only to adjudication proceedings which are initiated by the customs authorities separately. It is not the requirement of law that the documents which are related to the adjudication proceedings should be placed before the advisory board. Hence, there has neither been an infraction of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India nor for that matter any prejudice has been caused to the detenu. 40. According to the counsel for the petitioner, a letter of retraction dated 2. 1994. has not been placed before the Advisory Board. The letter of retraction was sent by the detenu through the jail authorities directly and was received by the Assistant Collector of Customs on 2. 1994. The Assistant Collector of Customs informed the detaining authority about the receipt of the letter sent by the detenu. The information letter is dated 22. 1994. The detaining authority requested the Assistant Collector of Customs to forward this letter. It was forwarded by the Assistant Collector and received by the detaining authority on 13. 1994. Files show that a note was put up on 13. 1994. It was approved on the same date by the Secretary, Public and the file was sent to Law Department who in turn returned the file on 13. 1994. On 13. 1994 a further note was sent on 13. 1994 to Public (SC) Department. The file was again returned on 13. 1994. A note for circulation was put up and the Under Secretary approved the file. Thereafter, the Additional Secretary and the Secretary approved the note. The Minister of Law approved the note on 23. 1994 and it was communicated to the detenu. The detenu received the communication dated 23. 1994 on 23. 1994. All these facts are already stated in the foregoing paragraphs. In para. Thereafter, the Additional Secretary and the Secretary approved the note. The Minister of Law approved the note on 23. 1994 and it was communicated to the detenu. The detenu received the communication dated 23. 1994 on 23. 1994. All these facts are already stated in the foregoing paragraphs. In para. 11 of the counter filed by the first respondent it is clearly stated that the representation sent by the detenu through the Superintendent of Jail was rejected and communicated to the detenu by letter dated 2. 1994. Therefore, the representation of the detenu which he is entitled to make under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been duly considered by the detaining authority and the same was rejected. Hence the non-placement of the letter of retraction dated 2. 1994. before the Advisory Board has neither vitiated any provision of law nor for that matter any prejudice has been caused to the detenu. This is especially so when the representation has been duly considered and rejected by the State Government. .41. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner that the letter dated 2. 1994 and the written submission made before the adjudicating authority should have been taken into consideration by the State Government before confirming the order of detention. The requirement of law is only to the effect that any representation from the detenu seeking to challenge the orders of detention, if received well in advance before the meeting of the Advisory Board should be considered. It is not the contention of the counsel for the petitioner, that there was non-consideration of the representation of the detenu which was received by the State Government before the order of confirmation was passed. 42. According to the counsel for the petitioner, legal assistance was not made available to the detenu during proceedings before the Advisory Board. The Supreme Court has clearly held that while the detenu can have the right to be represented by a friend, he cannot have the right to get assistance from advocate in such proceedings. 43. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Constitution of the Advisory Board is illegal. Art. 22(4) as it stands now does not contemplate that the Chairman of the Advisory Board shall be a sitting Judge of the High Court. 43. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Constitution of the Advisory Board is illegal. Art. 22(4) as it stands now does not contemplate that the Chairman of the Advisory Board shall be a sitting Judge of the High Court. In fact this question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710. In that decision, it was held that inasmuch as Sec. 3 of the4th Amendment had not come into operation, the fact that the Advisory Board was not presided over by the sitting Judge of the High Court will not vitiate the proceedings. 44. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, that the grounds of detention had not been properly formulated has no foundation whatsoever. Besides any proposal which is sent by the sponsoring authority to the detaining authority is purely in the nature of interdepartmental communication and hence it need not be supplied to the detenu. The constitutional requirement is only that the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention together with all the documents relied upon by the detaining authority while arriving at the subjective satisfaction alone need be forwarded to the detenu. If demand is made by the detenu for supply of any document that will be considered by the State Government in the context of the facts of the particular case. 45. In view of the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the order of the detention dated 212. 1993, made by the detaining authority under Sec. 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 (as amended). In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.