Honble MADAN, J. — The facts giving rise to the filing of this Application, briefly stated, are that on 15.4.94 when the above noted Appeal was taken up for hearing, neither the appellant nor his counsel was present in court. Shri N..R. Choudhary, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, was heard and the Appeal was decided by this court on merits. (2). Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Rajasthan Government issued a Notification which was duly published on 2.1.80 under section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act (for short the Act) for acquisition of certain lands situated in Phulera (Jaipur) including 8 bighas of land in Khasra No. 474 belonging to the appellant. After compliance of necessary legal formalities, physical possession of the land in question was taken over on 19.7.80 by the Tehsildar, Phulera and handed over to Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. (For short RIICO), Udhyog Bhawan, Jaipur (respondent No. 2 herein) for whose benefit the land was acquired for the public purpose of establishment of industrial estate. (3). The Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur after examining all relevant evidence on the record, pronounced his award on 29.11.80 which was subsequently amended on 27.4.84 as indicated above. Since the land was agricultural and not industrial, the Collector awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per bigha which was directed to be paid under the amended award to the appellant with interest at the rate of 4% per annum and solatium at the rate of 10% from the date of taking over of possession of the land till passing of the award. The reference for enhancement of compensation was made under Section 18 of the Act claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 17/- per sq. metre plus other amounts towards damages and compensation. The said reference came up for hearing before the Civil Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur and the concerned trail court vide its order date 18.5.87, while partly allowing the Reference Application, directed that compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha be paid to the appellant besides solatium at the rate of 30% and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation. It will be pertinent to mention here that the appellant himself had claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha be paid to the appellant besides solatium at the rate of 30% and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation. It will be pertinent to mention here that the appellant himself had claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/-per bigha and he having received the said amount, was still not satisfied with the award and challenged the same in Appeal before this court. (4). The Appeal was heard with the assistance of Shri Choudhary, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, and the relevant record was perused by me. It is admitted case of parties that the dispute in Appeal was only regarding quantum of compensation which was initially awarded at the rate of Rs. 1500/-per bigha by the Collector, Jaipur against a sum of Rs. 2500/- per bigha as claimed by the appellant. The compensation amount of Rs. 1500/- per bigha was subsequently enhanced by the Civil Judge, Jaipur on a reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer through the Collector, Jaipur under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. What in fact the appellant claimed, he got it as increased compensation by the impugned order of the Civil Judge, Jaipur dated 18.5.87 which has been assailed in the present appeal. (5). While disposing of the above noted appeal on 15.4.94 this court came _ to the conclusion that it was not open to the appellant to approbate and reprobate in the same breath and now to take a contrary stand before this court and he was therefore, stopped by his own conduct, act and acquiescence from pleading to the contrary on the principle of estoppel which is fully attracted to the facts of the present case. This court further came to the conclusion that the learned Civil Judge has given a very well reasoned judgment after examining the relevant evidence on the record and his finding with regard to issue Nos. 1 and 2, are well founded and not assailable in the present appeal. It was further observed by this court that with regard to issue No. 1 the learned Civil Judge has observed that the land in question was not industrial but agricultural land inasmuch as there is a clear difference between irrigated and non-irrigated land for determining the question of compensation. It was further observed by this court that with regard to issue No. 1 the learned Civil Judge has observed that the land in question was not industrial but agricultural land inasmuch as there is a clear difference between irrigated and non-irrigated land for determining the question of compensation. Since the present land in question was non-irrigated, therefore, the amount of compensation was rightly enhanced and awarded at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha and accordingly issue No. 1 was decided against the appellant. With regard to issue No. 2, the Civil Judge, Jaipur has so opined that in view of the clear difference between irrigated and non-irrigated land, the appellant was entitled to enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per bigha instead of Rs. 1500/- per bigha, as awarded earlier by the Collector. Issue No. 3 was considered not relevant for disposal of the appeal as it pertains to limitation and the period of limitation was rightly construed from the date of the amended award and the reference was held to be within limitation by the Civil Judge. (6). After hearing the learned counsel for respondents and perusing the record, this court came to the conclusion that the Civil Judge, Jaipur was perfectly right in recording well reasoned findings in his order dated 18.5.87 by decreeing the claim of appellant to Rs. 2500/- per bigha with solatium at the rate of 30% per annum and interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of taking over of the possession of the land in question till passing of the award. It was further directed that the payment of amount of interest and solatium would be effective from the date of reference on the enhanced amount. (7). With the above direction, the appeal was disposed of by this court with no order as to costs on 15.4.94. On 12.5.94 the above application under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Order 41 Rule 19 was filed by the appellants/petitioners through their advocated Shri Samandar Singh, duly supported by an affidavit of Shri B.L. Mandhana, Advocate. The grounds taken in the said application are that neither the appellants nor their counsel Shri Samandar Singh were present in the Court when the appeal was called on for hearing and was decided on merits on 15.4.94. The grounds taken in the said application are that neither the appellants nor their counsel Shri Samandar Singh were present in the Court when the appeal was called on for hearing and was decided on merits on 15.4.94. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of Order 41 Rule 17 C.P.C, this court was not empowered to dismiss the appeal on merits but the appeal could only be dismissed for default of the appellant in not appearing before the court. It has been further contended in the said application that dismissal in default under Order 41 Rule 17 C.P.C. can be set aside under Order 41 Rule 19 C.P.C. and the appeal can be re- admitted for hearing. It has been further argued in the said application that the name of counsel for the appellant (Shri Samandar Singh), did not appear in the cause list dated 15.4.94 and due to this bona fide mistake he had failed to appear before the Honble court when the appeal was called on for hearing and that his absence was not due to his negligence or carelessness. It has been stated in the said application in para No. 6 that Shri B.L. Mandhana, Advocate had long before withdrawn his power and Shri D.C. Sharma, Advocate, practices in the subordinate courts. Shri Samandar Singh, Advocate, was the counsel in charge. In view of the above circumstances, the appellants prays for restoration of the appeal and for recalling the order dated 15.4.94 passed by this court deciding the appeal on merits. (8). It is settled practice that whenever a party is represented through counsel in a court, unless there is a specific order passed by the court allowing the advocate, who was earlier representing the appellant, to get discharged from the case, the said counsel is supposed to not only watch the interest of the client but also represent him in court as and when he is called upon to do so, more particularly when his name appears in the cause list along with other counsel. In this case Shri B.L. Mandhana, Advocate, was engaged as a counsel by the appellants which is clearly apparent from the vakalatnama duly executed by the appellants in favour of the said advocate on 12/18.2.88. In this case Shri B.L. Mandhana, Advocate, was engaged as a counsel by the appellants which is clearly apparent from the vakalatnama duly executed by the appellants in favour of the said advocate on 12/18.2.88. Shri Samandar Singh, Advocate, was subsequently engaged by the said appellants on 13.9.91, as is evident from the vakalatnama duly executed by the appellants in favour of the said advocate on the record. (9). On 15.4.94, when the appeal was taken up by this court, neither the erstwhile counsel Shri B.L. Mandhana, nor subsequently engaged counsel Shri Samandar Singh, were present before the court. Shri N.R. Choudhary, counsel for the respondents, was present in court and argued the matter on behalf of the respondents. Perusal of the cause list dated 15.4.94 clearly reveals the name of Shri B.L. Mandhana with Shri D.C. Sharma, Advocates for the appellants, and that of Shri N.R. Choudhary for the respondents. If Shri Mandhana has ceased to be a counsel as per the contention of the appellants, it was the duty of the erstwhile counsel to have informed the court at the time of hearing of the appeal that since he has ceased to be the counsel for appellants, he may be discharged from the proceedings. On the contrary, neither Shri Mandhana was present nor Mr. Samandar Singh was present in the court at the time when the appeal was taken up for hearing and both the advocates had defaulted from not appearing before the court. In these circumstances, I am of the view that court could not take judicial notice as to which counsel was actually representing the interest of the appellants and that the court was not obliged to wait indefinitely for the counsel to appear, particularly when the conduct of the appellants in the past has been such that the matter has been dismissed in default thrice i.e. on 9.7.92, 22.4.92 and on 30.3.93. On 22.4.92 none was present for the petitioner and the appeal was released from the board as part-heard. (10). In the present application, which has been filed for restoration of the appeal, I am of the considered opinion that no sufficient cause has been stated by the appellants for non- appearance of their counsel on the date fixed for hearing i.e. 15.4.94. (10). In the present application, which has been filed for restoration of the appeal, I am of the considered opinion that no sufficient cause has been stated by the appellants for non- appearance of their counsel on the date fixed for hearing i.e. 15.4.94. Rule 19 of Order 41 C.P.C. clearly stipulates that where an appeal is dismissed under Rule 11 sub-rule (ii) or Rule 17 or Rule 18, the appellant may apply to the appellate court for re- admission of the appeal; and where it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing or from depositing the sum so required, the Court shall re-admit the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. (11). It follows from the interpretation of the above rule that when the appellant or his counsel is not present on the date of hearing when the appeal is taken up by the court, sufficient cause has to be explained for non-appearance of either the appellant or his counsel and the court may, in exercise of its inherent powers, re-admit the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. In other words, the court is not duty bound to restore each and every case which has been dismissed for non-prosecution, unless sufficient cause has been explained on the record justifying non-appearance of the party or its counsel before the court on the date of hearing. (12). In this appeal, when it was taken up for hearing on 15.4.94 as stated above, neither the erstwhile counsel Shri B.L. Mandhana nor Shri Samandar Singh, Advocate, the subsequently engaged counsel, were present in court and from the perusal of the court file it is further clear that Shri Mandhana, Advocate, continues to be the counsel in this appeal. In the absence of any intimation, this court could not have drawn any inference that Shri Mandhana had ceased to be counsel for the appellants. (13). I am further of the view that the present application seeking restoration of the appeal, has been drafted in a mechanical manner without disclosing any sufficient cause as envisaged under 0.41 Rule 19 C.P.C. Even the affidavits filed by Shri Mandhana, Advocate, and Shri Samandar Singh, Advocate, do not reveal any sufficient cause for their non-appearance on 15.4.94. (13). I am further of the view that the present application seeking restoration of the appeal, has been drafted in a mechanical manner without disclosing any sufficient cause as envisaged under 0.41 Rule 19 C.P.C. Even the affidavits filed by Shri Mandhana, Advocate, and Shri Samandar Singh, Advocate, do not reveal any sufficient cause for their non-appearance on 15.4.94. This application is in fact a device and an after-thought for recalling and reviewing the order dated 15.4.94 passed by this court, which is not permissible under 0.41 Rule 17 or under 0.41 Rule 19 C.P.C. There is a separate provision for filing review under 0.47 C.P.C. which has not been availed of by the appellants in the instant case. What the appellants in fact want is review of the order dated 15.4.94 in the garb of application for restoration, which is neither warranted nor permissible under the law. The present application for restoration has been filed by the appellants by engaging another counsel Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Advocate who was earlier not representing the appellants. In support of his contentions Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Advocate placed reliance on the matter of M/s Devi Dayal Textile Company & others V. Nand Lal (1). The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the court may in appropriate cases recall the order of dismissal suo motu without any application by the party concerned or even if the court is moved to do so by the parties. I am of the view that the ratio of the said decision does not help the petitioner in any manner because the court is not obliged to exercise its inherent powers suo motu or on an application of the party in each and every case but the facts of each case have to be weighed on its own merits, if it calls for exercise of inherent powers by the court for restoring the said case. In Habu Vs. State of Rajasthan (2), Full Bench of this court, while dealing with a criminal reference, held that power of recalling is different from the power of altering and reviewing the judgment. With due respects to the learned Full Bench of this Court, I am of the view that this judgment was given by the learned Full Bench while dealing with a criminal revision petition filed under Section 482 Cr. With due respects to the learned Full Bench of this Court, I am of the view that this judgment was given by the learned Full Bench while dealing with a criminal revision petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. and in that context, this court held that inherent powers specifically provided by the Legislature are all pervasive and comprehensive enough to arm the court for advancing the cause of justice and for preventing abuse of the process of the court. The ratio of the said decision does not help the appellants in any manner because the scope of revisional powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is much wider than the scope of appellate powers of the court while dealing with a civil appeal. (14). Legal position regarding the ambit and scope of powers of the court to hear and decide the appeal on merits in absence of the party, has already been well settled and laid down by this court in the matter of Dargah Officer Ajmer Vs. Smt. Hameeda Bano (3), wherein this court held that where a counsel for the party is absent e.g. appellant and his counsel in this case, the court should not sit idle and adjourn the hearing because the counsel for the appellant is not vigilant and is not appearing in the court. It was further held : "Naturally the court will have to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of counsel for the opposite party and the court in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 107 read with Section 151 read with Rule 33 of 0.41 C.P.C. and decide the cross-appeal on merits even in the absence of the appellant or its counsel." It follows a natural corollary from above, that if an cross-appeal can be dismissed by the court by deciding the same on merits in absence of the party or its counsel, the court also has inherent powers to dismiss and decided the appeal on merits in absence of the party or its counsel as well and the court is not obliged to wait indefinitely, particularly when after examining the case on merits the court is of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by adjourning the hearing to some other date as nothing survives on merits in favour of the appellant even if the counsel for appellants was present and heard by this court. (15).Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case for exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. read with 0.41 Rule 19 for recalling the order dated 15.4.94 and consequently, the present application deserves dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.