Judgment : This appeal is against the conviction and sentence of the learned IX Additional Special Judge, Madras, in C.C.No. 27 of 1980 for the offences under Secs. 409, 467, 471 read with Sec. 467, Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(c) and (d) read with Sec. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.500 for each of the first three offences and one year rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.250 the other offence. 2. The case of the prosecution is as follows: In the Port Trust, Madras, the employees are given the benefit of Leave Travel Concession. The staff member who avails the Leave Travel Concession will be sometimes withdrawing advance amount or used to claim the entire amount after the travel. Such employees, who availed the Leave Travel Concession (LTC) used to file the claim application in their respective departments and the concerned section used to verify the claim amount mentioned in the application. After the eligible amount was ascertained, a stamped voucher will be obtained from the concerned staff member and in the vouchers, the amount eligible and the code number according to the different departments, will be mentioned. The section will forward the application and the voucher to the Senior Accountant and after his signature, it will be sent Accountant and after his signature, it will be sent to the Accounts Officer. The Accounts Officer, after perusal, pass the voucher for payment. After the vouchers were passed for payment, necessary entries will be made in the register maintained in the Accounts Section and will be forwarded to the revenue section. In the revenue section, all the vouchers will be verified and a top voucher will be prepared for the consolidated amount. The vouchers and the top vouchers will be sent to the Senior Accountant, who after verification will send it to the Accounts Officer, who, once again, after verification, prepare the cheque and the Chief Accounts Officer signs the cheque for drawing the amount from the bank. The voucher and the cheque will be sent to the cashier, who draws the amount from the bank and disburse the cash to the concerned staff member through the shroff. After payment, the vouchers will be sent to the concerned sections for preservation. The voucher and the cheque will be sent to the cashier, who draws the amount from the bank and disburse the cash to the concerned staff member through the shroff. After payment, the vouchers will be sent to the concerned sections for preservation. This accused was working as the Sheroff in the month of July and August, 1979. On 9. 1979, P.W.1 was working as the Upper Division Clerk in the Revenue Section and received the vouchers under the originals of Exs.P-27 to-29 standing in the names of Gunalan, G. Ramanathan and Vadivelu, Tally Clerks, claiming Leave Travel Concession Amount. P.W. 1 prepared the top voucher Ex.P-2 for these vouchers and while he was perusing the pass order in those vouchers signed by the Accounts Officer Venkatarathnam, of establishment section, P.W.1 suspected the genuineness of the signatures of the Accounts Officer Venkatarathnam. Therefore, he took these three vouchers to the Senior Accountant P.W.2, who also suspected the signatures, and they took them to another Senior Accounts Officer P.W. 17. P. W. 17 also, after perusal, got suspicion and therefore contacted the establishment section, which is in a different place, over phone, to confirm the entries in their office relating to these vouchers. One Padmanabhan in the establishment section, who received the phone call of P.W. 17 replied that only after verifying the register it could be found out whether the questioned documents were genuine or not but as the register was sent to the auditor, he could verify it as soon as the register was received back from the Auditor. On the next day, i.e., on 9. 1979, the establishment section informed P.Ws. 1 and 2 that no vouchers in the name of Gunalan, Ramanathan and Vadivelu were entered in the establishment section. P.Ws. 1 and 2 wanted to report the matter to the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer P.W.4, but as he was not available in the headquarters on 6th and 7th they told about the bogus vouchers under the originals of Exs.P-27 to P29 to him on 9. 1979. P.W.40 contracted his counter part, P.W. 41 the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer in the establishment section, and the originals of Exs.P-27 to P-29 were sent to him for verification. P.W. 41 found that these three vouchers were not passed for payment in his section as they were not entered in the register and they were bogus entries. 1979. P.W.40 contracted his counter part, P.W. 41 the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer in the establishment section, and the originals of Exs.P-27 to P-29 were sent to him for verification. P.W. 41 found that these three vouchers were not passed for payment in his section as they were not entered in the register and they were bogus entries. On verification, he also found out that there was no staff members in the names of Gunalan, Ramanathan and Vadivelu in the sections mentioned in those vouchers. Therefore, having found that the vouchers were produced to claim money in the name of a fictitious persons, he sent a report Ex.P-84 to the Financial Adviser. P.W.42, who was incharge of the post of the Financial Adviser, sent a report Ex.P-86 to the Chairman of the Madras Port Trust with regard to this incident and P.W.46, the Secretary of the Port Trust, launched a complaint Ex.P-146 to the C.B.I. Inspector with regard to this bogus claim, P.W. 47 the C.B.I. Inspector registered the complaint in R.C. No. 47 of 1979 against the accused, took up the matter for investigation and found out that claims were made under the originals of Exs.P-2 (a) to P-4(a), P-6(a) to P-9(a) and P-11(a) to P-23(a) also in the fictitious names and the amounts were withdrawn by the culprit successfully. He found that there were no employees in the names found in those vouchers working in the Port Trust in the concerned sections barring one or two and amounts had been withdrawn under the bogus vouchers with forged entries for passing order of payments of the Establishment Section. P.W. 47 obtained the sample writing of this accused and others and sent the disputed vouchers to the handwriting expert P.W.45 who sent the report Ex.P-144 giving his opinion that certain writing in the disputed vouchers were in the hand of this accused. After completing the investigation, the charge sheet was filed against this accused for the offences mentioned above. The trial court examined 47 witnesses and the accused was questioned about the incriminating circumstances found against him under Sec. 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant denied his hand in the offence and said that he was in no way responsible for the bogus vouchers. He examined two witnesses on his side. The trial court examined 47 witnesses and the accused was questioned about the incriminating circumstances found against him under Sec. 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant denied his hand in the offence and said that he was in no way responsible for the bogus vouchers. He examined two witnesses on his side. The learned Additional Special Judge has found that the prosecution has established the charges against this appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and convicted this appellant in the manner stated above. Hence, this appeal. 3. The important and the disturbing factor in this case is that after marking of the original vouchers and other important documents relied upon by the prosecution and also the defence, a crooked scamp, who is interested in this criminal proceedings, has stealthily removed away the entire original documents from the custody of the trial court, on the belief that the removal of the records from the court will very much obliterate the fair enquiry of the case. Fortunately, as the xerox copies of the disputed vouchers and other important documents were in the custody of the prosecution, all the stolen documents have been reconstructed and as the copies of all these documents were already provided to the accused before marking them, he did not question the correctness of the reconstructed documents. Even though the prosecution is suspecting the accused as the perpetrator of the thievery of these records, the accused would allege that as important documents have been marked on his side as defence exhibits, the prosecution party has indulged in erasing out the documentary evidence, by stealthily removing them. Unfortunately, even though the theft of the records came to light when the trial was going, the Presiding Officer of the court did not take any steps to launch a complaint for the investigation of the theft of the records from the court’s custody. As it is too late now, there is no possibility for taking any efforts for that purpose. However, the court below was able to assess the evidence from there constructed documents. 4. The point for consideration is whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused. 5. As it is too late now, there is no possibility for taking any efforts for that purpose. However, the court below was able to assess the evidence from there constructed documents. 4. The point for consideration is whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused. 5. The prosecution case is that the bogus vouchers under the originals of Exs.P-27(a) to P-29(a) were pressed into service for withdrawing certain amounts as though the persons mentioned therein availed the Leave Travel Concession but they were detected by P.Ws.1 and 2 even in the initial stage on 8. 1979. According to the prosecution, the perpetrator of this crime and successfully withdrawn amounts under the bogus vouchers under the originals of Exs.P-2(a) to P-4(a), P-6(a), P-9(a), P-11(a) to P-23(a) and P-25 (a). So altogether 24 vouchers have been placed before the court which are said to be bogus vouchers, prepared for making false claims. It is also the prosecution case that this accused is the brain behind for these bogus vouchers and he has siphoned out the funds of the Port Trust under these 21 bogus vouchers out of 24 vouchers. Witnesses have been examined to prove that barring 1 or 2, there were no employees working in the Port Trust in the names mentioned in these vouchers and that the endorsements in those vouchers giving the details of the code number and the pass order by the Accountant, are all forged. So, first, let us consider whether the persons mentioned in these 24 vouchers were really working in the Port Trust of Madras at that time. P.W.3 is the Deputy Traffic Manager in the Port Trust and he has stated that S. Ramaswamy, S. Ramachandran and G. Muthu, whose names are found in Exs.P-2(a) to P-4(a) were not working in the traffic section. In these vouchers, it is mentioned that the signatories were working as Shed Masters under Deputy Traffic Manager Ex.P-31 is the gradation list of the employees mentioning the names of all the Shed Masters, Assistant Shed Masters, Tally Clerks, Head Clerks, and Upper Division Clerks. Ex.D-25 is another Gradation List. In page 21 of Ex.P-31, no doubt, the name of one S. Ramasamy is mentioned and the same is marked as Ex.D-22. ButP.W.3 would state that he was shunting Master but not Shed Master. Ex.D-25 is another Gradation List. In page 21 of Ex.P-31, no doubt, the name of one S. Ramasamy is mentioned and the same is marked as Ex.D-22. ButP.W.3 would state that he was shunting Master but not Shed Master. In page 5, the name of one K. Ramaswamy is mentioned and similarly page 9, the name of one C. Ramachandran is mentioned In page 58, the name of one S. Muthu is mentioned. But the initials of these persons do not tally with the names given in these three vouchers. P.W.3 has spoken in his evidence that whenever any one working under him in the Traffic Section had availed the Leave Travel Concession, the bill claiming the travel amount would be placed before him for his signature, and only thereafter it will be forwarded to the Establishment section. In Exs.P-2(a) to P-4(a), the initial is put above the rubber stamp containing the letters T.T.M.O.P. P.W.3 would state that he did not put these initials and these vouchers were not placed before him for his signature. As no such persons mentioned in these 3 vouchers were working in the Traffic Section under P.W.3 as Shed Masters and P.W.3 also denies his initials in these 3 vouchers, it is certain that these vouchers could not have passed on through the proper channel for claiming the travel amount. Therefore, it is certain that the brain behind this offence had straightaway sent these vouchers to the revenue section as though were proceeding from the traffic section and establishment section, after approval. So, undoubtedly, they are bogus vouchers in the names of fictitious persons. Under the original of Ex.P-2(a), Rs. 1,600 has been claimed under the original Ex.P-3(a) Rs.2,100 has been claimed and under the original of Ex.P-4(a) Rs.955 has been withdrawn. The next set of vouchers are Exs.P-6(a) to P-9(a). In Ex.P-6, P-7 and P-9, the claimants S. Ranganathan, T. Dhanasekaran and G. Muthu are described as Shed Masters. The claimant under Ex.P-8, D. Santha is described as hospital orderly. There is one D. Santha working as hospital orderly and she has been examined as P.W.11. But she has spoken that she did not avail the Leave Travel Concession for the period 1974 to 1977 and she did not make any claim under the voucher Ex.P-8 for any travel as she did not avail the Leave Travel Concession. There is one D. Santha working as hospital orderly and she has been examined as P.W.11. But she has spoken that she did not avail the Leave Travel Concession for the period 1974 to 1977 and she did not make any claim under the voucher Ex.P-8 for any travel as she did not avail the Leave Travel Concession. The hand writing expert P.W.45 has compared her sample signatures with Ex.P-8 and has given his opinion that Ex.P-8 was not written by her. Another aspect of Ex.P-8 is that it bears the endorsement of the Deputy Chief Medical Officer for the purpose of forwarding this voucher to the establishment section. P.W.10 is the Deputy Chief Medical Officer of the Port Trust and she has stated that if the Chief Medical Officer was otherwise engaged, she used to sign the Leave Travel Concession application and in Ex.P-8, a signature has been made above the designation Deputy Chief Medical Officer, but she never signed in Ex.P-8, and the signature Ex.P-8 is not hers. As the person mentioned in Ex.P-8, viz., D. Santha herself has deposed that she did not file this voucher claiming Rs.540 and that the attesting authority P.W.10 also has sworn to the effect that she did not attest this document, it is certain that Ex.P-8 also is a forged voucher. P.W.4, the Deputy Traffic Manager till 10. 1979, has spoken in his evidence that the persons mentioned in Exs.P-6 (a), P-7 (a) and P-9 (a) are not working in the Traffic Section. He also would state that whenever persons working under him filed the L.T.C. application, they used to file the application along with the tickets they purchased and after verification by his section, the counter sign the vouchers and only after his approval, it would be sent to the accounts section. He has further stated that in Exs.P-6(a), P-7(a) and P-9(a), he did not attest by affixing his signature and these three vouchers are not genuine. The accused has marked Exs.D-9, D-10 and D-11 in the gradation list Ex.P-31 to show that the persons mentioned in those vouchers are working in the traffic section. But the initials of these persons mentioned in Exs.D-9 to D-11 differ from the persons mentioned in these vouchers and therefore it cannot be denied that the persons mentioned in the vouchers are fictitious persons. But the initials of these persons mentioned in Exs.D-9 to D-11 differ from the persons mentioned in these vouchers and therefore it cannot be denied that the persons mentioned in the vouchers are fictitious persons. When the initials do not tally, they cannot be the persons found in the service Registers. Further, P.W.4, the Deputy Traffic Manager has stated that he did not attest these vouchers. Therefore, it is certain that these vouchers also are bogus prepared in the name of fictitious persons for making the also claims. 6. Exs.P-11 (a) to P-23 are the remaining vouchers. Ex.P-11 relates to one Munuvelu, said to be working as Lab Assistant. Originals of Exs.P-12 and P-13 vouchers relate to Elumalai and Sarangan, said to be Assistant Shed Masters. Exs.P-14(a) and P-23(a) stand in the name of Narasimhan and Raja said to be the hospital orderlies. Exs.P-15 and P-16 (a) stand in the names of one Shanmugam and Gunasekaran, who are described as shed masters. Exs.P-17 (a) to P-20 (a) stand in the names of Subramani Umasankar, Manickam and Venkatachalam who are also described as Assistant Shed Master. Ex.P-21(a) is in the name of Chandran, Head Clerk and Ex.P-22(a) is in the name of Ganesan who is described as Assistant Shed Masters. P.W.10, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer has stated that there are no persons in the name’s of Munuvelu, Narasimhan and T. Raja mentioned in Exs. P-11(a), P-14(a) and P-23(a) working in Port Trust Hospital, She has also stated that in the vouchers Exs.P-11, P-14 and P-23 she did not attest and the endorsement in these vouchers as though she has attested them, is a forgery. Ex.P-44 is the hospital establishment register showing that no persons mentioned in Exs.P-11(a), P-14(a) and P-23(a) are working in the Port Trust Hospital. Therefore, these 3 vouchers also are bogus vouchers. Relating to the vouchers the originals of Exs.P-12(a), P-13(a) to P-20(a) and P-22(a), P.Ws.5 and 6 have stated that there are no such persons mentioned in these vouchers and they did not subscribe their attestation in these vouchers. P.W.5 the administrative assistant working under the Deputy Port Conservator has stated that he is given powers to attest the vouchers for those working in the Marine Department and Ex.P-22 has not attested by him though it purports to be his attention. P.W.5 the administrative assistant working under the Deputy Port Conservator has stated that he is given powers to attest the vouchers for those working in the Marine Department and Ex.P-22 has not attested by him though it purports to be his attention. P.W.6, the Assistant Traffic Manager also has stated that the original of Exs.P-12(a), P-13(a), P-15(a) to P-20 (a) have not been attested by him. The registers Exs.P-31 and D-25 also do not contain the names of these persons with correct initials. Therefore these vouchers also were pressed into service to make false claims. In Ex.P-13, there is an endorsement for “please pay” P.W.7 the Accounts Officer in the Assessment Wing has stated that this endorsement “please pay” was made by him on the request of this accused. I shall refer to this aspect later when I deal with the circumstances available against this accused. But, at this stage, it is suffice to say that there was no person mentioned in Ex.P-13 working in the Port Trust as Assistant Shed Master, who had claimed Rs. 2,015 towards the L.T.C. Ex.P-21(a) is in the name of R. Chandran Head Clerk in Assistant Traffic Manager’s Office. P.W.4, the Traffic Deputy Manager has denied the attestation in the original of Ex.P-21(a) and any employee in that name in his section. Ex.P-25 is another voucher in the name of one K. Manoharan said to be a hospital orderly. P.W.10, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer has spoken about this voucher also stating that there is no hospital orderly by name K. Manoharan and she did not attest Ex.P-25. P.W.20, who is working as Upper Division Clerk in the L.T.C. section has stated mat whenever the bills were presented claiming the L.T.C. amount, he and P.W. 19 Balaiyan used to verify the bills and the voucher therein and thereafter, they used to write the code number with reference to the departments and the amount claimed with initials in the vouchers but the abovementioned vouchers namely the originals of Exs.P-2(a) to P-4(a), P-6(a) to P-9(a) P-11(a) to P-23(a), P-25(a) and P-27 (a) to P-29 (a) did not come to him and he did not write the code number of the amount or subscribed his initial therein for forwarding these vouchers. The other clerk P.W. 19 also has repeated the same. The other clerk P.W. 19 also has repeated the same. P.W.37, the Accountant, has sworn that he did not initial these vouchers, which I mentioned above and normally all the vouchers are passed through him for payment and he used to make initials in the vouchers. P.W.9, the accounts officer also has stated in his evidence that he used to pass the L.T.C. bills and only after his pass order, they will be entered in the L.T.C. Register Ex.P-48 and thereafter for forwarding the same to the other Sections, entry will be made in Exs.P-49 and P-50 despatch registers and the memo book Ex.P-59 also will contain the details about the bills passed by him, but in none of these registers, the above mentioned 24 bills are entered in Ex.P-48 for passing the bills and he did not make any pass order on these 24 disputed vouchers. In all these vouchers, the signature of the Accounts Officer Venkatarathnam are not uniform. In Exs.P-8(a) and P-9(a) the signatures Venkatarathnam is one style above the letters “F.A.R.C. A.O.”. In Ex.P-13(a) the signature is different. In Ex.P-11(a), the signature Venkatarathnam is a mere scriffle proving that it cannot be the signature of the same person. So, as said by P.W.9, he could not have signed these vouchers for pass orders. In view of the abundant evidence of the officers and clerks working in the Port Trust, denying their attestation to these documents, which is also supported by the registers Ex.P-48 to P-51 without having any entries in these registers for passing through the proper channel for pass orders, it is beyond doubt that there is some one or more than one who had devised this scheme of preparing the bogus vouchers with forged attestations and drained out considerable amount in the cash section. At this stage, it is worth to mention about Ex.D-75 the affidavit of the accused filed by him before the Sessions Judge, Madras, for the anticipatory bail filed in 1979. In this anticipatory bail application, he has mentioned that during the month when he was working as shroff in the revenue cash section of the accounts department, some bogus claims were made and the funds of the Port Trust were siphoned out by cleaver device. In this anticipatory bail application, he has mentioned that during the month when he was working as shroff in the revenue cash section of the accounts department, some bogus claims were made and the funds of the Port Trust were siphoned out by cleaver device. It would be better to reproduce the same words, which are as follows: “...It appears during the month of some bogus claims were lodged and the funds of the Port Trust syphoned out by clever “devices”. It was impossible for a Shroff to lodge any bogus claim and have them sanctioned as the matter may have to pass through various stages in the official routine. In the discovery of the bogus claims, unfortunately without causing proper investigations to be made to find out the truth of the matter, the Department placed me under suspension.” From this affidavit of the accused, he would also admit that by clever device some one had drained out the finds of the Port Trust by presenting the bogus claims. Therefore, the next question is whether this accused had the hand in this bogus claim as alleged by the prosecution. 7. The learned counsel Mr. Sudhanthiram appearing for the appellant/accused would contend that for the bogus claim, this appellant alone has been prosecuted as through he was the brain behind this scheme but this appellant was only a Shroff, whose duty was to disburse the cash to the person, who claimed himself to be the signatory of the voucher and even by negligence if the appellant had disbursed the claim amount to a wrong person thinking that he was the signatory of the voucher, it will amount only to negligence on his part and it will not amount to an offence punishable for the charges framed against him and therefore the accused cannot be found guilty of the charges. The learned counsel further argues that pressing into service of these bogus vouchers should have been done with the active connivance of more number of staff members in the revenue section and therefore, the accused done cannot be fixed with the responsibility for this mischief when the activities of the others connected with this fraud is not brought to light and for this reason also, the appellant cannot be found guilty. Whether this ingenious method of draining out the funds of the port trust under bogus vouchers was formulated and operated either by a single person or a group of persons, is immaterial for the purpose of this case against this accused. The only question is whether this appellant had a role in this fraud and whether he had participated in these false claims by manipulating the bogus bills. If it is found that this appellant had a hand in this scheme, certainly, he is guilty of the charges even if it is found that some others also were parties to the fraud. For the reason that the otherpersons connected with this conspiracy were hot brought to book, the accused person cannot escape under the cover of the defence that others are not brought before this Court. Therefore, now the question is whether this appellant accused has any connection with these bogus vouchers and collection of funds under these vouchers. 8. One instance came to light on 9. 1979 itself, to connect the accused with the bogus bills. P.W.1 has stated in his evidence that on 9. 1979, P.W.39, a peon in the cash section, brought the slip original of Ex.P-30 (a) stating that accused gave this slip to him to enquiry in the section whether the vouchers relating to the persons mentioned in Ex.P-30(a) had come for payment. P.W.2 also has corroborated this version stating that P.W.39 brought the original of Ex.P-30(a) stating that the same was sent by this accused. Ex.P-30(a) contains 12 names and according to P.W. 1, this slip came from the accused to him as told by P.W. 39, P.W.39 admits that the accused used to send the vouchers for delivering them to P.W. 1 and if P.W. 1 was not available, he used to return back those vouchers to the accused himself. But one important aspect is that the accused has admitted during the cross examination that the last two names in Ex.P-30 are in his own handwriting and he has suggested to P.W. 1 that he and P.W.2 compelled to write those two names and therefore, he wrote them. From this suggestion of the accused, the accused would admit that the last two names, viz., Gunalan and Vadivelu were written by his own hand. From this suggestion of the accused, the accused would admit that the last two names, viz., Gunalan and Vadivelu were written by his own hand. It is pertinent to mention that these two names are found in the vouchers Exs.P-27 and P-29 sent to P.W.1 on 9. 1979 for which P.W.1 prepared the top voucher Ex.P-26. Only after the perusal of Exs.P-27 to P-29 vouchers, P.Ws. 1 and 2 got suspicion about the genuineness of the signatures of the accounts officer and thereafter verified in the establishment section on 9. 1979. But within two days, the accused seems to have sent P.W.39 to verify whether the bills relating to those persons viz., Gunalan and Vadivelu were passed for payment. The persons mentioned in Ex.P-27 and P-29 viz., Gunalan and Vadivelu, were examined as P.Ws.30, 31 and 16. Even though P.W.30 is G. Gunalan whereas the person mentioned in Ex.P-27 is S. Gunalan. To clarify the doubt, G. Gunalan, Tally Clerk, was examined and P.W.30 said that though he availed the L.T.C. in 1979 for going to Mayavaram, he did not file the vouchers under the original of Ex.P-27 (a) and his signature therein is not to his. P.W.16, P. Vadivelu, Working as Tally Clerk, was examined and he would say that he did not sign under the original of Ex.P-29(a) and he did not claim the L.T.C. amount. For safer side, P.Ws.31, 33 and 34, whose names also are Vadivelu but with different initials, were examined to find out whether they signed in Ex.P-29 or whether they filed any L.T.C. claim during that time. They also denied that they had claimed L.T.C. amount during that time and they did not ask to include their names in Ex.P-30 list. Any how, the fact remains that this accused had written the last two names in Ex.P-30 and therefore it proves that he was very much interested in Exs.P-27 and P-29 vouchers for encashment. As mentioned above, neither P.W.16, whose name is mentioned in Ex.P-29, nor P.W.30, mentioned in Ex.P-27 has come forward to state that they filed these vouchers for the L.T.C. claim. There is no person in the name of S. Gunalan as mentioned in Ex.P-27. However, this accused has written these two names in Ex.P-30 to find out whether the bills Exs.P-27 and P-29 were passed for payment and was very much interested in the encashment of these bills. There is no person in the name of S. Gunalan as mentioned in Ex.P-27. However, this accused has written these two names in Ex.P-30 to find out whether the bills Exs.P-27 and P-29 were passed for payment and was very much interested in the encashment of these bills. When Ex.P-27 is in the name of a fictitious person and Ex.P-29 is not signed by the person in whose name it stands and as these vouchers are bogus vouchers created for making false claims, unless this accused was a party to this fraudulent scheme, he would not have sent the slip Ex.P-30 through P.W.39 to find out whether the vouchers were approved for payment. There was no reason for P.Ws.1 and 2 to falsely say that P.W.39 told them that he was sent by this accused with Ex.P-30 slip. No doubt, from the mere representation of P.W.39 to P.Ws.1 and 2 that he was sent by this accused, it cannot be accepted that the accused had sent P.W.39. But to confirm the representation of P.W.39, the slip under the original or Ex.P-30(a) also has been written by the accused himself. Even though it was suggested to P.Ws. 1 and 2 that the last two names were written by the accused, on the suggestion of P.Ws. 1 and 2, on a perusal of the slip Ex.P-30(a) we are able to see that all the 12 names in the list seems to be in the same hand. The employees of the Port Trust, having the same name found in the Ex.P-30(a) list, have been examined as P.W.25 to P.W.36 and all of them have denied that they requested their names to be included in Ex.P-30 list. As the names in this list has been written by the accused, it goes beyond doubt that he sent this list through P.W.39 to P.Ws. 1 and 2 in his eagerness to find out whether the amount could be withdrawn quickly. From this conduct of the accused, it can be easily understood that, he is behind this sinister drama of bogus bills. 9. There is another circumstance that has come out from the evidence of P.W.7, the Accounts Officer. 1 and 2 in his eagerness to find out whether the amount could be withdrawn quickly. From this conduct of the accused, it can be easily understood that, he is behind this sinister drama of bogus bills. 9. There is another circumstance that has come out from the evidence of P.W.7, the Accounts Officer. There was a procedure previously in the Port Trust for immediate encashment of the bills without following the normal procedure of enrouting through the various sections and whenever there was necessity for immediate payment the Accounts Officer used to make an endorsement in the voucher “please pay” and on this endorsement, the amount could be disbursed to the claimant immediately on the same day, P.W.7 has stated in his evidence that this accused brought Ex.P-13 voucher to him for getting the endorsement “please pay” and requested to oblige him, as the amount was required urgently, but he questioned him, as the amount mentioned in the voucher was heavy whether amount mentioned in Ex.P-13 would be available for payment as the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer and the Chief Cashier were not available on that day, but the accused insisted to oblige him and therefore he signed for "please pay" endorsement. Ex.P-13 voucher stands in the name of one Sarangan, Assistant Shed Master and P.W.6 has stated in his evidence that there was no person in that name in the traffic section and that he did not attest this voucher for forwarding the same. 10. Similarly, Ex.P-25, which is another bogus voucher, also was said to have been brought to P.W. 8 by this accused for getting the "please pay" endorsement. P.W.8 was to Chief Cashier during the relevant time and according to him, he also had the power to endorse "please pay" in vouchers for quick disbursement of the claim amount. According to P.W.8, this accused brought Ex.P-25 to him on 28. 1979 with a request to make the "please pay" endorsement for the sum of Rs. 125.40 and as he requested that the amount was required urgently, he made the endorsement. Ex.P-42 is the register maintained for making entries when such "please pay" endorsements were made in the vouchers and page 24 of Ex.P-42 shows that the "please pay" endorsement was for the voucher of one Manohar. 125.40 and as he requested that the amount was required urgently, he made the endorsement. Ex.P-42 is the register maintained for making entries when such "please pay" endorsements were made in the vouchers and page 24 of Ex.P-42 shows that the "please pay" endorsement was for the voucher of one Manohar. After this endorsement Ex.P-43 self cheque was issued for withdrawing this amount from the bank and the cash payment is entered in the register Ex.P-44 at page 146. Ex.P-25 voucher stands in the names of K. Manoharan, said to be a Hospital Orderly, and he is a fictitious person as stated by P.W.10, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer. According to her, there is no such person by name K. Manoharan working as orderly in the Port Trust Hospital and she did not attest Ex.P-25 forwarding the voucher. Therefore, the bogus voucher Ex.P-25 in the name of a fictitious person was brought by this accused to P.W.8 for getting the”please pay“endorsement to encash the voucher quickly. P.Ws.7 and 8 have no axe to grind against this accused to falsely depose that Exs.P-13 and P-25 vouchers were brought by this accused for immediate payment of the claim amount. Therefore, this conduct of the accused approaching P.Ws.7 and 8 with the bogus vouchers, also would make it clear that this accused was behind the bogus vouchers to drain out the funds of the Port Trust. 11. There is one other clinching circumstances to expose the surreptitious and substerracase an activity of this appellant in disbursing the claim without verifying the identity of the person, from the identity card given to each and every employee in the Port Trust. It is an admitted fact that every employee is given the identity card affixed with his/her photograph. The Port Trust Board also has passed a resolution as seen from Ex.P-98, that the disbursement of the monthly pay bills of any disbursement of supplementary bills should be done only on verification of the photo pass and also witnessing of disbursement by the supervisory staff of the respective departments. P.W.43 has also narrated this procedure, which is being strictly followed for the disbursement of the cash to the employees. Therefore, the cash disbursing officer is bound to verify the identity of a person by perusing his photo affixed identity pass and also by taking the attestation from the supervisory staff of the respective departments. P.W.43 has also narrated this procedure, which is being strictly followed for the disbursement of the cash to the employees. Therefore, the cash disbursing officer is bound to verify the identity of a person by perusing his photo affixed identity pass and also by taking the attestation from the supervisory staff of the respective departments. The accused, who was working as a Shroff during the relevant time, therefore, was bound to follow this procedure emphasized by the Port Trust under Ex.P-98. As a matter of fact, the persons,who received the L.T.C., amount, have been allowed to receive the money only after such verification as mentioned above. P.Ws.21 and 22 are the employees of the Port Trust, who availed the L.T.C. and they have stated that the cash disbursing Shroff verified their photo pass before disbursing the money and only after that procedure, they were able to collect the money from the cash section. Therefore, when this procedure was in vogue, the accused/ appellant would not have disbursed the amount covered under these bogus vouchers, without verifying the identity of the persons, who came to receive the money for these vouchers. But the learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Sundanthiram would argue that the appellant might have been negligent in enforcing the above procedure and as the person who came to receive the money, had signed the vouchers, the accused, under the wrong impression that he was the claimant under the voucher might have disbursed the amount and the non-compliance of the procedure or his negligence in his duty, cannot be counted for the perpetration of the crime of misappropriation and the learned counsel would argue that the mere suspicion in the conduct of the appellant cannot take the place of proof for the commission of the offence. In support of this argument, he relies upon the decision in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Gulsarilal, 1979 Crl.L.J. 1057, wherein the Supreme Court observes: "4......There can be no doubt that the circumstances raise a serious suspicion against the respondent but suspicion however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof." That was a case purely on the circumstantial evidence and the Supreme Court finding that though the circumstantial evidence created suspicion, that was not sufficient to convict the accused. But in this case, a procedure, was laid down by the Port Trust to verify the photo identity of every employee for the disbursement of the amount claimed by him and as a matter of fact, the accused in his affidavit Ex.D-65 has more specifically admitted that he was strictly following this procedure of identifying the persons from the photo pass before disbursement of the cash. He has stated in his affidavit Ex.P-65 that "at the time of payment, identity cards, which bear a photo of the claimant was checked and then only payments made." Therefore, it is futile to argue for the appellant that due to negligence and carelessness, he might have disbursed the cash without verifying the identity cards. Some times by oversight there might have been laches in one or two cases but not in all these 21 vouchers. As the accused himself would admit in Ex.D-65 that he was disbursing the cash only after verifying the identity of the person from the photo identity card, this appellant could not have paid cash to these 21 vouchers, if really he was not the author of these vouchers, because it is now proved that the persons mentioned in these vouchers are fictitious persons and therefore, they could not have appeared before the accused appellant with the photo identity cards. Therefore, the appellant would not have disbursed this cash to any other person and he should have appropriated by himself. This circumstance, completely entraps the appellant with the crime of criminal breach of trust. 12. Another version in Ex.D-65 exposes his guilty conscience and that is the admission of writing 24 vouchers by his own hand. In Ex.D-65, while making allegation against the Inspector of C.B.I., he has stated, the said officer instructed me to prepare 24 vouchers, I refused, but by force, he obtained. Therefore, in his own affidavit Ex.D-65, the appellant would admit that there are 24 vouchers written by his own hand available in the custody of the investigating officer. Now, this case also is based on the 24 vouchers said to have been created by this appellant. Therefore, in his own affidavit Ex.D-65, the appellant would admit that there are 24 vouchers written by his own hand available in the custody of the investigating officer. Now, this case also is based on the 24 vouchers said to have been created by this appellant. Therefore, the appellant, realising that his hand writing in these vouchers would be proved at the time of trial, had conceived a defence and would state even at the time when he was moving for anticipatory bail under Ex.D-65, that 24 vouchers, were forcibly obtained from him by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, this is another circumstances exposing the guilty conscience of the accused, relating to the crime alleged against him. 13. P.W.43, the cashier in the cash section has stated in his evidence that after the disbursement of the cash, the vouchers relating to the claims paid, shall be sent to the concerned departments after a month, as per the procedure contemplated in Ex.P-98. Therefore, the accused who was the Shroff, who disbursed the cash for the vouchers Exs. P-2 to P-4 and P-6 to P-9, should have despatched the vouchers to the respective departments. But according to P.W.43. these vouchers were kept in the bureau itself by the accused and the key of the bureau also was with him. Therefore, this is also another suspicious circumstances in the conduct of the appellant in keeping the bogus vouchers with him without sending to the concerned departments as the bogus claims would be detected immediately. 14. P.W.43, who was working along with the accused in the cash section, has stated that he is very conversant with the handwriting and the signature of this accused. He has also stated that the writing,, "Rev. I A/c -passed for payment, FACAO" in the abovementioned 24 vouchers are in the hands of the accused. The handwriting expert P.W.45 also has supported this fact in his evidence. It is true that as held in numerous decisions,, the evidence of the handwriting expert alone cannot be a conclusive proof to convict the accused. But in this case, the evidence of the expert is used only for corroboration of the testimony of the other witnesses and also the surrounding circumstances which are connecting the accused with the crime. It is true that as held in numerous decisions,, the evidence of the handwriting expert alone cannot be a conclusive proof to convict the accused. But in this case, the evidence of the expert is used only for corroboration of the testimony of the other witnesses and also the surrounding circumstances which are connecting the accused with the crime. Therefore, taking into consideration of the entire spectrum of the case, it is beyond all reasonable doubt that he is the person, who had received the money under these bogus vouchers. Therefore, the charges for the offences alleged are clearly proved as found by the court below. 15. One other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is the validity of the sanction for the prosecution. Ex.P-59 is the copy of the sanction order passed by the Chairman of the Trust. Two contentions have been raised with regard to this sanction and they are: (1) non-application of the mind by the Chairman for sanction, and (2) the copy Ex.P-59(a) issued in 1984 for substituting the original sanction, will have to be treated as fresh sanction given in the year 1984 and this also has no application of mind. The original sanction was already marked as Ex.P-59 and when it was found that the original was stolen, it was reconstructed as Ex.P-59(a) from the copy of the sanction available in the office of the Port Trust. The learned counsel Mr. Sudanthiram submitted that in Ex.59(a) there is no mention about the documents, sent to the Chairman of the Port Trust for his perusal and without perusing the records, he could not have applied his mind for sanction and as the Chairman of the Port Trust was not examined as a witness in this case, there is no evidence as to the basis on which the Chairman sanctioned for the prosecution of this appellant and therefore, the sanction is invalid. The learned counsel refers to the decisions, namely, Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1979 Crl.L.J. 633, Baikunthanath Mohanthy v. State of Orissa, 1985 Crl.L.J. 563 and Periyasamy v. Inspector, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department, 1994 Crl.L.J. 753. The learned counsel refers to the decisions, namely, Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1979 Crl.L.J. 633, Baikunthanath Mohanthy v. State of Orissa, 1985 Crl.L.J. 563 and Periyasamy v. Inspector, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department, 1994 Crl.L.J. 753. In the first decision it was observed that as the sanctioning authority had not given the facts on the basis on which the prosecution was sanctioned against the appellant and the sanction also does not mention the documents on which the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority was based for the application of mind, the mere description of the sanction is not in compliance with the provisions of law. In the next decision, the Orissa High Court has observed that when the sanctioning authority did not indicate that he had applied his mind to the facts of the case before according sanction and as no other evidence also was adduced by the prosecution to prove that all the collective materials were placed before the sanctioning authority for the application of his mind, the mandatory provision for sanctioning the prosecution would be a violation of the Act. In the third decision, which is the decision of this Court, it is held that when the sanctioning authority does not reveal that he or she had perused any records in support of the case and the sanction order also does not show as to how the sanctioning authority got himself satisfied with regard to the allegations against the accused, the sanction order is not valid and it is not in accordance with law. 16. It is true that in Ex.P-59(a), the copy of the original sanction order Ex.P-59 marked already, the documents forwarded to the Chairman of the Port Trust are not mentioned. For the reason that the documents placed before the Chairman, Port Trust, are not mentioned in the sanctioning order, straightaway we cannot come to conclusion that no documents were perused by the Chairman and therefore he could no have applied his mind for the sanction for the prosecution. In the body of the sanctioning order, the Chairman has stated that he fully and carefully examined the materials placed before him with regard to the abovesaid allegations and circumstances of the case and he considered that the Shroff Kanakasabapathy should be prosecuted in a court of law. In the body of the sanctioning order, the Chairman has stated that he fully and carefully examined the materials placed before him with regard to the abovesaid allegations and circumstances of the case and he considered that the Shroff Kanakasabapathy should be prosecuted in a court of law. Therefore even though, it is not specified what were the documents and materials placed before the Chairman, Port Trust, has mentioned that the materials were placed before him and he also carefully examined them. 17. There are certain facts which could be known only from certain records and some times certain other facts may be known to the sanctioning authority in practice, even without the relevant records for the existence of such facts. In this case, there are certain procedures and practices admitted by the appellant himself and this face is mentioned in paragraph 2 of the sanction order Ex.P-59(a) by stating that it was the duty of the payment Shroff to verify the photo pass of the employee and look for attestation of Supervisory staff in the vouchers presented for payment. As mentioned above, the accused also in his affidavit Ex.D-65 has admitted this procedure. The misappropriation of the funds of the Port Trust also is admitted in Ex.D-65 by the accused himself. Therefore, these facts could not have escaped the knowledge of the Chairman of the Port Trust when the prosecution was launched for the bogus vouchers. As the accused was the Shroff during the relevant time and when he was bound to disburse the cash after verifying the identity of the person, but it was found out, that the bogus vouchers were encashed and the cash was disbursed by the accused appellant, naturally, there will be a strong suspicion against this appellant, who was the cashier, and therefore, it is mentioned in the sanction order that when the duty of the payment Shroff was to verify the photo passes for the payment for the vouchers but Rs.27,662 were shown to have been disbursed under 21 vouchers in the name of fictitious persons, naturally the Chairman could have thought of only this accused/ appellant for the prosecution. The practice followed in the Port Trust itself would have indicated the involvement of this accused in the crime. The practice followed in the Port Trust itself would have indicated the involvement of this accused in the crime. Therefore, even without the records, the Chairman as head of the Port Trust, would have thought of only this appellant for the prosecution of the misappropriated amount. In paragraphs 3 and 4 the quantum of the amount misappropriated and the way in which the attestations were obtained, are mentioned. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the Chairman, Madras Port Trust, had not applied, his mind for the sanction of the prosecution. In State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand, 1973 Crl.L.J. 1396, it is held by the Supreme Court as follows: "17.....such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based. These facts might appear on the face of the sanction or it might be proved ".....by independent evidence that sanction was accorded for prosecution after those facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority." Supreme Court also observes in paragraph 18 that, "....it is manifest from its perusal that the facts constituting the offence have been referred to on the face of the sanction. As such, it was not necessary to lead separate evidence to show that the relevant facts were placed before the Chief Minister." From this expression if the facts constituting the offence are referred to in the sanction order, no separate evidence is required to show that all the facts were placed before the sanctioning authority because the sanction order itself contains all the facts constituting the offence. In Shiv Raj v. Delhi Administration, 1969 Crl.L.J. 1, the Supreme Court has observed that when the sanction order reads the facts constituting the offence and the prima facie case was made out and the sanctioning authority has mentioned after fully and carefully examining the materials placed before him for the allegations made against the accused, the order of sanction fulfils the requirements of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In Indu Bhusan Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal, 1958 M.L.J. (Crl.)448: 1958 S.C.R. 999, the Supreme Court observes that when the sanction order clearly states all the facts which concerned the prosecution case alleged against the appellant with reference to the acceptance of the bribe, what more facts were required to be stated in the sanction itself? In Indu Bhusan Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal, 1958 M.L.J. (Crl.)448: 1958 S.C.R. 999, the Supreme Court observes that when the sanction order clearly states all the facts which concerned the prosecution case alleged against the appellant with reference to the acceptance of the bribe, what more facts were required to be stated in the sanction itself? The Supreme Court observes: "Mr. Bokil said, and we see no reason to distrust his statement that before he accorded his sanction he went through all these papers and after being satisfied that sanction should be given he accorded his sanction. It is true that he did not call for any record in connection with the matter from his office nor did he call for the connected claim cases or find out as to how they stood. It was not for Mr. Bokil to judge the truth of the allegations made against the appellant by calling for the records of the connected claim cases or other records in connection with the matter from his office. The papers which were placed before him, apparently gave him the necessary material upon which he decided that it was necessary in the ends of justice that it was necessary in the ends of justice to accord his sanction." These words of the Supreme Court make it very clear that it is not necessary for the sanctioning authority to call for the entire records for perusal before according the sanction. If what is stated in his sanction order would constitute an offence, there was no further enquiry needed for the sanctioning authority to ascertain the correctness of the allegations. In this case, as mentioned above, the failure on the part of the accused to ascertain the identity of the persons from the photo identity card itself has created the suspicion for the encashment of the bogus bills in the names of fictitious persons. Therefore, the Chairman has stated in the sanction order that in view of these facts and also from the materials placed before him, he was satisfied that Shroff Kanakasabapathy was to be prosecuted in the court of law. Therefore, the Chairman has stated in the sanction order that in view of these facts and also from the materials placed before him, he was satisfied that Shroff Kanakasabapathy was to be prosecuted in the court of law. Even though the Chairman of the Port Trust was not examined as a witness P.W.12, the Vigilance Officer of the Port Trust has stated in his evidence that he placed the papers before the Chairman, Port Trust, who perused the papers and then passed the sanction order. In the cross examination, it was elicited from him that the Chairman prepared the sanction order with his assistance. The only suggestion put to P.W. 12 is that, the sanction order was prepared by P.W. 12 and it was signed by the Chairman without perusing it. But this suggestion was denied by P.W. 12 as he has stated that the Chairman himself prepared the sanction order with his assistance. So, when the evidence is to the effect that the Chairman prepared the sanction order stating that he perused the entire materials placed before him and the sanction order refers to the practice to be followed by the Shroff, it cannot to taken that the sanctioning authority had not applied his mind for sanctioning the prosecution under the original of Ex.P-59 which has been stolen from the court. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that Ex.P-59(a) is not a carbon copy of the original but seems to have been typed in the year 1989 and signed by the Chairman himself and in the body of this sanction order, it is mentioned that this appellant was working as a Shroff in July and August, 1984 and that payments were made in July and August, 1984, even though under the original sanction order, the irregularities were alleged in July and August, 1979, whereas in the copy of Ex.P-59 (a), irregularities are referred to for the period in 1984 and therefore, this has to be considered as afresh sanction order. There is no scope for such argument because Ex.P-49(a) is only are constructed document as the original of it, which was marked as Ex.P-59 was stolen away by the interested persons. No doubt, the year in the body of the document is typed as 1984 in two places. It appears to be a typographical mistake. There is no scope for such argument because Ex.P-49(a) is only are constructed document as the original of it, which was marked as Ex.P-59 was stolen away by the interested persons. No doubt, the year in the body of the document is typed as 1984 in two places. It appears to be a typographical mistake. The copy of the original had already been furnished to the accused before making the document at the time of the trial and therefore, when the sanction was granted already before launching the prosecution of this accused in the year 1980, there is no question of fresh sanction under Ex.P-59 (a) in the year 1984 after the commencement of the trial. Therefore, the accused cannot take advantage of the typographical error in Ex.P-59(a). The accused could have as well produced the copy of Ex.P-59 already furnished to him in case of any irregularity found in the original sanction order. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant does not hold water. 19. Even though Mr. Sudanthiram, learned counsel for the appellant, argues that as the original documents have been stolen away, the accused is handicapped for his defence. As mentioned above, for the entire original documents marked in this case, copies were furnished to the accused and the disputed documents, that have been lost are substituted the xerox copies. Therefore, the accused is in no way handicapped in putting forward his defence. Therefore, taking into consideration of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary it is well established that the appellant was responsible for pressing the bogus vouchers into service taking advantage his possession as shroff in the cash department and forging the endorsement in the bogus vouchers, he had swindled the funds of the Port Trust. Therefore, the court below was perfectly right in convicting the accused/ appellant for the offence alleged and therefore, no circumstance is brought out warranting the interference of this Court, in the findings of the court below. 20. In the result, conformitythe conviction and sentence of the court below the appeal is dismissed.