JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This appeal under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter called the Act) is directed against the judgment dated 4 8-1994 passed by the Additional District Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala, whereby the petition of the respondent husband was allowed and a decree of divorce of dissolution of marriage between him and the appellant-wife was passed on the ground of cruelty as provided under section 13 (l)(i-a)of the Act. 2. The appellant and the respondent were got married on 7 2-1991 at Village Jawali, District Kangra in accordance with Hindu rites. Thereafter, on 23-9-1992 the respondent-husband filed a petition praying for a decree of divorce by dissolution of their marriage on the ground of cruelty The precise allegations made by him in the petition were that immediately after the marriage, he found the wife unfit for the purpose of performing matrimonial obligations. On her check tip by a lady doctor, she was found medically unfit for performing sexual intercourse which perturbed the respondent husband. On being informed of this fact, the mother of the appellant-wife, alongwith her two sons, visited the house of the respondent-husband on 3-7-1991 and took the appellant wife away to Delhi. This fact was disclosed to her in the Biradari Panchayat held in the house of the respondent-husband Further allegations of the respondent-husband made in the petition are that the brothers of the appellant-wife, namely, Harish and Rajnish filed false complaints against him before the Superintendent of Police, Kangra, making allegations of demand of rupees two lac in cash as dowry as well as maltreatment of the appellant-wife by the respondent husband and other members of his family but lateron neither the appellant-wife nor her mother or brothers appeared before the Police to substantiate their allegations, as a result of which the said complaint was filed. However, the appellant-wife filed another complaint before the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Crime, Women Cell) Nanakpura, New Delhi, in which allegations were made against the respondent-husband as well as all other members of his family that they wanted dowry from the appellant-wife and had been maltreating her. According to the respondent-husband, these false and vexatious allegations made by the appellant-wife to harass him and the members of his family had caused mental cruelty to him as a result of which it was impossible for him to live with the appellant-wife. According to the respondent-husband, these false and vexatious allegations made by the appellant-wife to harass him and the members of his family had caused mental cruelty to him as a result of which it was impossible for him to live with the appellant-wife. He has further stated that he had not condoned these acts of cruelty and prayed for a decree of divorce, 3. In reply, the appellant-wife has denied the allegations made in the petition and asserted that she was harassed and tortured by the respondent-husband as well as by the other members of his family and that her mother and brothers had taken her to Delhi on coming to know her miserable condition. She has specifically denied that she was medically unfit for performing sexual intercourse and according to her these allegations were made in order to force her to accede to the demand of dowry of Rupees two lacs made by the respondent-husband. It is admitted that a complaint with regard to demand of dowry was filed which was being investigated by the Police. 4 On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :—- 1. Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty ? OPP 2. Relief. 5. To prove his case, the respondent-husband appeared as PW 1 and produced his father Kundan Lai (PW 3), Dr. Mrs Neelam Mahajan (PW 4) and Bishamber Singh, Assistant Complaint Clerk (PW 2). The appellant-wife neither appeared herself nor produced any witness in support of her defence despite opportunities granted to her by the Additional District Judge. The respondent in his statement has reiterated his allegations made in the petition He has also placed on record Postal envelops Ex. P-l and Ex P-2 whereby notice dated 1-7-1992, Ex. P-4, was sent to the appellant-wife and her mother but these were received back undelivered. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that immediately after the marriage he and the appellant lived as husband and wife in his house at Harsar and thereafter at Delhi for some time. He has denied that after a few days of their marriage he had started maltreating the appellant and had asked his mother-in-law to give him money for business after selling her plot at Delhi He has further denied that members of his family used to harass the appellant-wife for fulfilling their demand of dowry of Rs. 2,00,000. He has denied that after a few days of their marriage he had started maltreating the appellant and had asked his mother-in-law to give him money for business after selling her plot at Delhi He has further denied that members of his family used to harass the appellant-wife for fulfilling their demand of dowry of Rs. 2,00,000. He has admitted that he did not get the appellant examined medically at Jawali or Harsar though some private doctors are practising there. His father Kundan Lal (PW 3) has also supported the respondent. According to him, the appellant and the respondent had lived together immediately after the marriage for about a week during which period the respondent had told him that the appellant was unfit for marriage which fact was confirmed on her examination by a Doctor at Pathankot. Thereafter, for getting her treated she was got examined from the Chief Medical Officer, Dharamshala who issued prescription slip mark-A, which was lateron exhibited by Dr. Mrs. Neelam Mahajan (PW 4) as Ex PW 4/A. According to this witness, lateron they called the mother and the brothers of the appellant who, in the presence of other relations, admitted that they will get the appellant treated at Delhi for which purpose they took her alongwith them on 3-7-1992. Thereafter they filed F, I. R against the respondent and the members of his family in connection with which they were called to the Police Station Jawali on a number of occasion, The appellant and the other members of her family did not appear in the Police Station to give evidence in support of their allegations The respondent gave legal notice to the appellant in retaliation of which the appellant filed a criminal complaint with the Delhi Police, got the respondent arrested and he could get bail after five days. In cross-examination, this witness has again reiterated that the very next day of the marriage on Suhag Rat he had come to know that the appellant was unfit for which they wanted to get her treated at Civil Hospital, Dharamshala but were not successful as she was taken to Delhi by her mother and brothers. He has categorically denied that they are greedy for dowry and intend to get the respondent re-married after getting divorce in these proceedings. 6. Bishamber Singh (PW 2) has placed on record complaint, Ex. He has categorically denied that they are greedy for dowry and intend to get the respondent re-married after getting divorce in these proceedings. 6. Bishamber Singh (PW 2) has placed on record complaint, Ex. PW 2/A, dated 3-3-1992 which was sent by one of the brothers of the appellant to the Superintendent of Police, Kangra. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the said complaint stood consigned Mrs. Neelam Mahajan (PW 4) has stated that she had examined one Poonam Sharma aged 25 years for the complaint of primary amenorrhoea and on P V. examination her uterus was found of small size, firm, mobile and no appendages were palpable. She was advised intramuscular injection of Uniprogestine 500 m.l but she never came for follow up action. She has admitted that Out door ticket, Ex, PW 4/A, is in her hand. In cross-examination, she has explained that primary ameaorrhoea means that the lady had no on-set of menstruation She has admitted that in Ex PW 4/A only dated 25th June is mentioned and that she cannot state in which year the said Outdoor ticket was issued by her. According to her, the marriage of said Poonam Sharma must have been consummated as hymen was not in fact. 7. On this oral and documentary evidence, which was not rebutted by producing any evidence on behalf of the appellant, the Additional District Judge has drawn an adverse inference to hold that the appellant was unable to cohabit with the respondent in discharge of her matrimonial obligations He has also noticed the conduct of the appellant that she failed to be present in person so that Dr. Mrs. Neelam Mahajan could identify that it was she who was examined by her under Outdoor ticket, Ex PW 4/A. Further, referring to the F. I. R. lodged in Police Station, Jawali, on the allegations of maltreatment as well as demand of dowry, which the appellant did not bother to substantiate, and the criminal case pending at Delhi, in which the respondent was arrested, coupled with wilful refusal of the appellant to cohabit in discharge of her matrimonial obligations, the Additional District Judge has held that the appellant had treated the respondent with mental cruelty, These findings have been challenged in the present appeal. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Sh D. C. Jishtu, learned Counsel for the appellant, has vehemently urged that it is only the ipse dixit of the respondent that the appellant was unfit to have sexual relationship with the respondent in discharge of her matrimonial obligations as these allegations have not been corroborated by medical evidence of Dr. Mrs Neelam Mahajan. According to Sh. Jishtu, even if the statement of Dr, Mrs. Neelam Mahajan is accepted on its face value, it does not suggest that being unfit, the appellant refused to have sexual relationship with the respondent as alleged by him. Sh. Jishtu has further submitted that though it has not been proved that it was the appellant who was examined by D. Mrs. Neeiam Mahajan (PW 4), yet, relying upon her statement, it is proved that she had examined the appellant after about four months from the date of marriage which shows that during this period the parties had lived as husband and wife which belies the case set up by the respondent Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena alias Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40, and of this Court in Parvati v. Shiv Ram and another, 1988 (2) Sim. LC 204, Sh. Jishtu has further pointed out that divorce petition made on the ground of cruelty is of the nature of quasi criminal proceedings and allegations of cruelty are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and proof in the nature of preponderance of evidence is not enough. 9. On the other hand, Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment of the Additional District Judge He has submitted that the case of the respondent is not that the marriage between him and the appellant was not consummated but that by wilful refusal to have sexual relationship with him, being unfit, the appellant had treated him with mental cruelty which was further aggravated by false and vexatious complaints/criminal cases of maltreatment and demand of dowry, bringing their relationship to irretrievable breakdown of the marriage making it impossible for them to live together. According to Sh Kuldip Singh, the conduct of the appellant immediately after the marriage as well as during the pendency of the pre sent litigation before the Additional District Judge and this Court clearly establishes that there is no possibility of the parties living together. 10. After giving our best consideration to the respective contentions of the parties, we do not find any infirmity in the findings of the Additional District Judge. The arguments of Mr. Jishtu, learned Counsel for the appellant, appear to be attractive but on close scrutiny these are found to be without any substance. Mr. Jishtu has not been able to give any satisfactory explanation that if the appellant had not wilfully refused to have sexual relationship with the respondent, as alleged by him> why did she not appear as her own witness and state this on oath in the Court and also produce medical evidence in support thereof. As noticed by the Additional District Judge, she did not appear before him despite specific orders and several opportunities so that she could be identified by Dr. Mrs. Neelam Mahajan that it was she who was examined by the said doctor. After all, in respect of sexual relationship between (he husband and the wife, they are the best evidence and if the wife does not come forward to counter the allegations of the husband that she is unfit to cohabit, the Additional District Judge was right in believing the husband as his statement was also corroborated by his father and to some extent by the medical evidence of Dr. Mrs. Neelam Mahajan that the appellant did have some deformity of having small size uterus which could be the cause of not having sexual relationship between her and the respondent. If these allegations are established on record, it is for the Court to draw a conclusion whether these amounted to mental cruelty or not. For answering this, we would like to quote the observation of Ms Justice Leila Seth made in Smt. Shakuntata Kumar v. Om Parkash Ghai AIR 1981 Delhi 53 : "A normal and healthy sexual relationship is one of the basic ingredients of a happy and harmonious marriage. For answering this, we would like to quote the observation of Ms Justice Leila Seth made in Smt. Shakuntata Kumar v. Om Parkash Ghai AIR 1981 Delhi 53 : "A normal and healthy sexual relationship is one of the basic ingredients of a happy and harmonious marriage. If this is not possible due to ill-health on the part of one of the spouses, it may or may not amount to cruelty depending on the circumstances of the case, Bat wilful denial of sexual relationship by a spouse when the other spouse is anxious for it, would amount to mental cruelty, especially when the parties are young and newly married." 11. Admittedly, the word mental cruelty has not been defined but it has been interpreted that conduct of a spouse which inflicts upon the other spouse such mental pain and suffering as would make it impossible for that spouse to live with the other. It is not necessary to prove that the alleged cruelty has caused injury to the health of the aggrieved spouse and it is enough if it has caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the defaulting spouse but such an inference is to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse which will further depend upon their social status and educational background etc. etc [Please see Dr. N.G Dastane v. Mrs Dt Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 and V. Bhagat v, B. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994) 1 SCC 337]. 12. So far the present case is concerned, the nature of complained of conduct of the appellant, which is proved on record, is such that irrespec tive of educational qualifications and social status, it can be held that wiiful refusal by the appellant to have sexual relationship with the respondent immediately after the marriage had caused him mental cruelty, Not only this, her refusal to co operate in getting her medical treatment and filing of F. f. R. in Police Station Jawali on the allegations of maltreatment and demand of dowry, which were not substantiated by producing evidence, and thereafter filing criminal case not only against the respondent but against his parents, brother and brother-in-law, did cause mental cruelty to the respondent. Even during the pendency of litigation between the parties, the conduct of the appellant, in not appearing in person despite specific orders of the Additional District Judge and also not appearing as her own witness in support of her defence, further proves that in order to harass the respondent she intends to prolong the litigation and the relationship between her and the respondent has reached such a pass that there is no possibility of their living together. 13. This Court has also made an attempt for reconciliation between the parties when they appeared in person on 28-11-199^1 and directed them to go together from the Court premises and live together happily until the next date of hearing, which was fixed on 26-12-1994 but the respondent-husband, by his application dated 17-12-1994, made a complaint to this Court that the appellant refused to accompany him and told him that she would talk to him at Delhi in this regard when he would appear in the Criminal Case fixed on 30 11-1994. She was not present in the Court at Delhi on 30-11-1994 and her brothers, Rajnish and Pappi, did not even suggest to him to visit the appellant, rather,, they asked him to get the case adjourned to some next date when they might talk over the matter. According to the respondent, the appellant had no intention to join his company as she posed in the Court. The appellant did not file any reply to this application though opportunity was given to her. In the circumstances, this Court did not make any further attempt for reconciliation. 14. It is correct that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for granting decree of divorce but it is required to be considered while examining a case for divorce. So far the present case is concerned, on the proved facts and circumstances on record, we are satisfied that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and no useful purpose will be served if their marriage is not dissolved, more so, when the respondent has successfully proved that he has been treated with cruelty by the appellant. Therefore, we confirm the decree of divorce granted by the Additional District Judge, Dharamshala. 15. So far the contention of Mr. Therefore, we confirm the decree of divorce granted by the Additional District Judge, Dharamshala. 15. So far the contention of Mr. Jishtu that the allegations of cruelty are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and not only on pre ponderance of evidence is concerned, complete answer is provided in Dr. N. G. Dastane v, Mrs. S. Dastane (supra) wherein the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that: "The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the Court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. This first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second, Within the wide range of probabilities the Court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vacillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. If the probabilities are so nicely balanced that a reasonable, not a vacillating, mind cannot find where the preponderance lies, a doubt arises regarding the existence of the fact to be proved and the benefit of such reasonable doubt goes to the accused. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. Neither section 10 of the Act which enumerates the grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented nor section 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree in any proceeding under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is satisfied on matters mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word satisfied must mean satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities and not "satisfied beyond reasonable doubt". Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases." 16, In view of the discussion hereinabove, there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.