JUDGMENT By the order impugned in this revision, at the instance if the defendants, the learned Judge of the trial Court, restrained Shri O.K. Dixit, counsel enagaged in the suit from his participation in the proceedings of the case on behalf of the plaintiffs. The suit is by the plaintiffs as landlords, for eviction of the defendant as tenant from the suit premises. The impugned order was passed on the application of the defendants under Order 3, Rule 1, read with Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short 'the Code'). It was stated in that application that Shri D.K. Dixit, advocate has been a witness to the compromise talks held between the parties, prior to the filing of the suit. In those talks there was a proposal of increase of rent of the accommodation by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in their reply denied the fact that Shri D.K. Dixit, their advocate at any point of time, was a witness to any compromise talks for enhancement of rent. . Learned counsel, Shri D.K. Dixit, appearing for the plaintiffs in this revision, submits that accepting the application made by the defendants in their application as true the Court had no jurisdiction to restrain him appearing in the case for the plaintiffs. It is submitted that the case has not reached the stage of evidence and none of the parties have taken such a plea or cited Shri D.K. Dixit as a witness in the case. The order impugned was, therefore, not at all warranted in law and it has caused serious prejudice to the plaintiffs who are deprived of the legal assistance of a counsel of their choice. The learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant placed heavy reliance on a decision in the case of All India Reporter Ltd. v. G.D. Moohe and others (1950 NU 187). In this case the observations of the learned Judge are as under:- "Though a party has an unfettered right in choosing its own counsel and the Court cannot direct a party to choose any particular counsel, the right is not absolute but is subject to the paramount consideration of advancement of the interests of justice which regulates the procedure in a Court. There is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code conferring on a Court the power of directing a counsel to withdraw from a case. There is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code conferring on a Court the power of directing a counsel to withdraw from a case. There is also no provision prohibiting a Court from doing so. The Court is the final authority in all matters affecting smooth and proper trial of a suit. If a counsel is a material witness in the case it will not be right to ask the party not to examine him as a witness. The proper course would be to ask the counsel to withdraw. The Courts have consistently disapproved the practice of counsel continuing in a case if they are material witnesses. The Court has inherent power to direct withdrawal of a counsel but the power is not to be lightly exercised. The Court should closely examine the object of the application seeking withdrawal of the opponent's counsel and allow it only if it is bona fide and if it finds that the counsel's evidence is material and that his appearance as a lawyer would embarrass trial of the suit. A Court has also the power to punish a party by ordering heavy costs if ultimately it does not examine the counsel whose withdrawal was ordered at it instance or the evidence turns out to be formal. Order 3, Rule 4 (2), Civil Procedure Code recognises the power of the Court regarding determination of appointment of a counsel. Power is conferred on a Court to decide whether appointment should be terminated." Applying the test laid down in the above observations of the learned Single Judge of this Court, I do not find that appearance of Shri D.K. Dixit, counsel for the plaintiffs may in any manner embarrass the lawyer appearing in the case or would cause prejudice to the case of either of the parties. At the present stage of the suit, as pointed out by the parties, Shri Dixit has not been cited as a witness by any of the parties. The argument of the learned counsel for the N.A. is that the talks of compromise between the landlord and the tenant for enhancing the rent are relevant for deciding the issue of bona fide need. The contention needs no consideration at this stage. The argument of the learned counsel for the N.A. is that the talks of compromise between the landlord and the tenant for enhancing the rent are relevant for deciding the issue of bona fide need. The contention needs no consideration at this stage. If such occasion arises at the instance of either of the parties to examine Shri Dixit as a witness in the case, that may be a matter, at that stage, for the Court to decide to allow or not allow the evidence of Shri Dixit as a lawyer in the case. As has been held in the case of all India Reporter Ltd. (supra), the power by the Court to deprive a lawyer from appearing in a case should not be lightly exercised, unless there are weighty reasons for the same. The trial Court, therefore, committed serious irregularity and error of jurisdiction in directing Shri D.K. Dixit, not to participate in the case. The revision is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order of the trial Court dated 3.5.1993 is hereby set aside. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.