JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J.- The petitioner in this application has prayed for issuance of a writ or of in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay arrears and current salary as also for a direction to absorb him as Lecturer in M.S.K.B. College, Muzaffarpur. 2. The fact of the matter in short is as follows : (a) The petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in M.S.K.B. College, Muzaffarpur by the Managing Committee on 7.9.1979. According to the petitioner an advertisement had been issued for the said post and he was called for interview on 25.1.1980 and thereafter an offer of appointment dated 31.1.1980 was issued in continuation of the earlier letter dated 7.9.1979 which is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ application. (b) That the aforementioned College was taken over by the State of Bihar and is now a constituent unit of the Bihar University. (c) According to the petitioner he has been granted certificate by the Principal of the College to the effect that he had been working in the said college as a Lecturer. (d) The petitioner has contended that the State Government has sanctioned the post held by him by a notification No. 1647 dated 4th November, 1981. (e) The petitioner has contended that despite the said fact no teacher employed in the said College was given their salary. The Syndicate of Bihar University allegedly took a decision to grant honorarium to the teachers of the aforesaid college at the rate of Rs. 25/- per lecture subject to a maximum of Rs. 1000/- in a month. Later on the said honorarium was raised to Rs. 35/- per lecture, but neither any honorarium nor any salary was paid to the petitioner. (f) The petitioner has contended that ignoring his first services, an advertisement had been issued through the Bihar State University (Constituent College) Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). It was further contended that the petitioner filed a representation before the Chancellor who called for a report from the University by a letter dated 9.1.1989 and the Vice Chancellor by his letter dated 18.11.1989 as contained in Annexure18 to the writ application inter alia stated that steps should be taken for amendement in the statute for regularisation of the services of all concerned. The Chancellor however did not acceed to the request of the Vice Chancellor. The Chancellor however did not acceed to the request of the Vice Chancellor. The petitioner states that although 74 teachers have regularly been paid their salary, the petitioner is not being paid his salary. The stand of the University, on the other hand, is that in terms of the provisions of Bihar State University Act, 1976 and the statute framed thereunder, the petitioner is not entitled to any salary. 3. It has been stated that at the relevant time when the petitioner was appointed, the college was not an affiliated one and the Adhoc Committee could not have appointed the petitioner in the manner as was done which was in complete violation of the provisions of the statute as also Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. It has been pointed out that Shrimati Shanta Devi at the relevant time was not even a Principal. The learned counsel pointed out that at the time when the petitioner was appointed he was not even a holder of M.A. degree. The post was also not sanctioned at the relevant time. 5. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the University has constituted a Committee which also did not find the petitioner working in the said college. Even in the agenda of the Syndicate which considered the matter for grant of honorarium, the petitioner's name does not figure. 6. It has further been stated that another screening committee known as Malviya Committee was set up in the year 1985 but even in the report of said committee, the petitioner's name did not figure. Later on, the District Magistrate who was the convenor of the adhoc committee was asked to submit a report and in his report also the petitioner's name does not figure. It has been stated there is no records to show that the petitioner has been working prior to 1985. 7. The learned counsel further pointed out that the proceeding books of the Committee had not been produced by the governing body despite requests made in that regard by the University. 8. It has been contended that the Vice Chancellor made a report to the Chancellor on the basis of the materials supplied by the Principal which are not borne out from the records maintained in the college as also the University. 8. It has been contended that the Vice Chancellor made a report to the Chancellor on the basis of the materials supplied by the Principal which are not borne out from the records maintained in the college as also the University. It has been contended that the post in which the petitioner was allegedly appointed had been advertised. The learned counsel further pointed out that neither any recommendation has been made by the Commission for the purpose of appointment of the petitioner nor any concurrence of the State Government has been obtained. 9. It has further been submitted that admittedly no provision exists in the statute framed by the University for regularisation/absorption of a teacher. It has been stated that the appointment of the petitioner was made hurriedly and even the governing body did not pay any salary to the petitioner. The learned counsel further pointed out that in Political Science six persons arc claiming In have been duly appointed although now only four posts have been sanctioned. The learned counsel submitted that unfortunately the State Government took over the college in question without examining the entire facts relating to the college in question. 10. Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in view of the fact that the petitioner had been working for a long time, the University is bound to pay salary to the petitioner. The learned counsel also submitted that in view of various decisions of this court as also of the Supreme Court of India, the services of the petitioner should be directed to be regularised. 11. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon Anjani Kumar Sinha vs. State of Bihar reported in 1989/PLJR 130, Chandradeo Mahto vs. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (1) PLJR no, K.S.P. College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AI R 1992 S.C. 677 and Jacob M. Puthuparambil Vs. Kerala Water Authority reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 2228 and State of Haryana and others Vs. Piara Singh and other reported in J.T. 1992 (5) S.C. 179. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Mrs. Suraiya Khatoon and others Vs. The Bihar University and others in CWJC No. 4757 of 1990 disposed of on 8th September, 1993. 12. Mr. Piara Singh and other reported in J.T. 1992 (5) S.C. 179. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Mrs. Suraiya Khatoon and others Vs. The Bihar University and others in CWJC No. 4757 of 1990 disposed of on 8th September, 1993. 12. Mr. P.N. Roy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent -University, on the other hand, relied upon Sections 35 and 54 of the Bihar State Universities Act and Chapters XIV & XIV (A) of the statute framed by the University. Mr. Roy submitted that in any event, in view of the statements made in the counter affidavit, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 13. Section" 35 and 57 of the Bihar State University Act read thus: "Section 35. No post for appointment shall be created without the prior sanction of the State Government.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no University or any' college affiliated to such a University, except such college- (a) as is established. maintained or governed by the State Government; or (b) as is established by religious or linguistic minority (i) after the commencement of this Act no teaching or non teaching post involving financial liabilities shall be created without the prior approval of the State Government. (ii) shall either increase the pay or allowance attached to any post, or sanction any new allowance : Provided that the State Government may, by an order, revise the pay-scale attached to such post or sanction any new allowance ; (iii) shall sanction any special pay or allowance or other remuneration of any kind including ex-gratia payment or any other benefit having financial implication to any person holding a teaching or non-teaching post; (iv) shall incur expenditure of any kind on development scheme without the prior approval of the State Government. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no college other than one mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) shall, after the commencement of this Act, appoint any person on any post without the prior approval of the State Government: Provided that the approval of the State Government shall not be necessary for filling up a sanctioned post of a teacher for a period not exceeding six months, by a candidate possessing the prescribed qualification." 57. Appointment of teachers and officers. Appointment of teachers and officers. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the statutes, the Bihar State University (Constituent Colleges) Service Commission shall, as far as may be, perform, in respect of appointment to the post of teachers and officers (other than Vice Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellor and the Dean of Faculty) of the University the same functions as arc assigned to the State Public Service Commission in respect of the State Services under Article 320 of the Constitution of India. (2) The Bihar State University (Constituent Colleges) Service Commission shall, on the basis of an interview held for appointment of teachers and officers of different categories in all Universities and Constituent Colleges, prepare a separate panel for each University. This panel will be prepared for the teachers subject wise and teachers and officers of different Universities and Colleges shall be appointed on the basis of the said panel. (3) In making recommendations for appointment to every post of teacher and officer, the Bihar State 'University (Constituent Colleges) Service Commission shall fulfil conditions contained in section 58 of the Act. (4) The appointments of teachers of affiliated colleges shall be made on the recommendation of the Bihar Col1cge Service Commission." The learned counsel has further drawn our attention to Article 13, 14 and 15 of Chapter XV of the Statute framed by the University. 14. For the purpose of a valid and legal appointment a post has to be sanctioned by the State and the appointment has to be made in the manner laid down in Chapter XV of the Statute. At the point of time when the petitioner was allegedly appointed, the College in question was not an affiliated college, as the affiliation of the said college was granted upto 1975 to 1976. Later on, on 6.8.1980 the affiliation of the college was granted with retrospective effect. 15. From a perusal of the offer of appointment made to the petitioner as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application it appears that an adhoc governing body appointed the petitioner at the point of time when he even did nut pass his M.A. examination. He was to be placed against the sanctioned post after publication of his result. 16. 15. From a perusal of the offer of appointment made to the petitioner as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application it appears that an adhoc governing body appointed the petitioner at the point of time when he even did nut pass his M.A. examination. He was to be placed against the sanctioned post after publication of his result. 16. From a perusal of Annexure-5 to the writ application it appears that the said offer of appointment was made in continuation of the Principal's previous letter purported to be against the sanctioned post. The said appointment was made considering the purported honorary service rendered by the petitioner in the said college prior to publication of- his M.A. result. 17. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondents in their counter affidavit categorically stated that one post of Principal and 16 posts of Lecturers were sanctioned only on 2.5.1980. On the date of appointment of the petitioner, therefore, no post was sanctioned and thus the question of appointing the petitioner against the sanctioned post did not arise. 18. Further evidently at the relevant time even the college was not affiliated although as noticed hereinbefore, such affiliation had been granted by the University with retrospective effect. But as during the period an order of affiliation was in existence, the purported appointments made by the governing body of the college cannot be said to have been recognised by the University. 19. Further it has not been disputed that for the purpose of appointment of a Lecturer even in an affiliated college, the procedures laid down under Chapter XV of the Statute were required to be followed which has not been done in the instant case. 20. The University upon taking over of the college by the State Government by a letter dated 22.7.l980, entrusted the Screening Committee with a job to examine the claims of the teachers and the non-teaching staff. 21. It has been contended that Shrimati Shanta Devi, despite requests made by the University, as also the Commissioner of the Tirhut Division and the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, did not supply the relevant papers, proceedings books and other relevant documents. The Chancellor also had set up a Committee known as Malviya Committee to inspect the College and submit a report. The report of the said Committee was submitted on 7.1.1985. The Inspector of Colleges also submitted a report. The Chancellor also had set up a Committee known as Malviya Committee to inspect the College and submit a report. The report of the said Committee was submitted on 7.1.1985. The Inspector of Colleges also submitted a report. According to the respondents on the basis of the aforementioned reports, a list of teachers, whose bonafide was ascertained on the basis of documents available prior to 12.7.1980, was prepared but wherein the name of the petitioner's name did not find place. 22. The respondents have also stated that no copy of the advertisement, pursuant whereof the petitioner was allegedly appointed, had been placed before them nor the recommendation of expert committee counter signed by the Principal had been produced. 23. The respondents have categorically denied that any recommendation of the commission had been obtained and thus the University has not notified absorption of a single teacher of the college in question. 24. It has further been stated that the University Service Commission was requested by the University to advertise the post for the purpose of recommending the names of eligible candidates for appointment in different disciplines. The question that no appointment can be made by the Governing body or any ad-hoc committee of the affiliated college, if the post is not sanctioned is no longer in doubt or dispute. Such appointment could be made only for a period of six months. 25. Recently a Division Bench of this Court in Manoj Prasad Vs. Ranchi University reported in 1993 (2) BLJR 894, having held that the appointments were made in breach of the mandatory provisions of section 35 of the Act are nullities, observed as follows : "Once it is held that the appointments were illegal and they stood terminated by separate orders issued in May, 1988, there is no question of payment of wages to the petitioners. It is not disputed that from May, 1988 onwards till August, 1989 the petitioners were not paid their wages. From September, 1989 to January, 1991 the then Principal without any authority permitted them to work and paid them their wages despite the orders of termination of their services. That would not clothe the petitioners with a right to continue to receive wages from the college. The claim of wages is dependent upon the subsistence of employer-employee relationship. From September, 1989 to January, 1991 the then Principal without any authority permitted them to work and paid them their wages despite the orders of termination of their services. That would not clothe the petitioners with a right to continue to receive wages from the college. The claim of wages is dependent upon the subsistence of employer-employee relationship. If the services of the petitioner stood terminated in May, 1988, and that order was never recalled, set aside or stayed by any competent authority, the petitioners will not be justified in claiming wages because they ceased to be employees of the college. Their claim for wages has, therefore, no merit. We may only observe that this is not the solitary instance where such illegalities have been discovered. The educational system in this state is in shambles and the whole system has come to a grinding halt for many reasons; one of them is various colleges, and in some cases governing bodies, have been making illegal appointments against unsanctioned posts for ulterior considerations. The fund granted to the colleges by the University is based upon the' sanctioned posts. When that amount is sought to be distributed amongst a' larger number of employees, most of them illegally appointed, it gives rise to resentment on the part of the genuinely appointed teachers who are either not paid their salary in full, or do not receive any salary at all. Illegal appointments give rise to lawlessness, and the atmosphere in the colleges is completely vitiated. Unless the State and University authority take firm action against such Principals and the members of governing body, the situation is not likely to improve." 26. Yet another Division Bench in Gopi Krishna Pathak Vs. Ranchi University reported in 1993 (2) BLJR 897 held as follows: "From the facts of these cases it is not in dispute that both the colleges before they became constituent were affiliated colleges of the University and are not covered by clauses (a) and (b) of section 35 of the Act as it is neither established, maintained or governed by the State Government nor by a religious or linguistic minority. Further, it is not in dispute that the appointments of the petitioners were not made after taking prior approval of the State Government. Further, it is not in dispute that the appointments of the petitioners were not made after taking prior approval of the State Government. On the contrary the State Government have not approved their appointment still it is claimed that they have continued to work' for a period exceeding six months. In that view of the matter, the appointments of the petitioners and even continuance of the teachers amongst them beyond six months arc in breach of the mandatory provisions of section 35 of the Act. Thus, in view of the aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of this Court even if the Principal, governing body, Vice Chancellor, Registrar or any other authority acted in the matter of their appointment/continuance or even in relation to payment of wages contrary to the aforementioned provisions contained in section 35 of the Act, then they have done so at their own risk and that cannot confer any right in the petitioners to claim the reliefs prayed for in these writ application". 27. Bound as we are by the aforementioned Division Bench decisions, the petitioner cannot be granted any, relief particularly in view of the fact that question as to whether the petitioner has in fact worked in the said college or not remains a disputed question of fact. 28. In Piara Singh's case (Supra) the Supreme Court was considering the matter of regularisation of ad-hoc employees who were continuing for several years pursuant to the policy decision taken in this regard and in terms whereof services of a number of persons who satisfied the conditions prescribed therein were directed to be regularised but some employees were allowed to continue in service although they were not regularised. The said employees approached the High Court. The High Court gave certain directions. The Supreme Court upon consideration of the Scheme framed by it in the matter of regularisation of service in its earlier decisions found that if the judgment of the High Court is implemented various problems would arise. In that situation, the Supreme Court observed : "This is not a case, we must reiterate, where the Governments have failed to take any steps for regularisation of their ad-hoc employees working over the year. Every few years they have been issuing orders providing for regularisation. In that situation, the Supreme Court observed : "This is not a case, we must reiterate, where the Governments have failed to take any steps for regularisation of their ad-hoc employees working over the year. Every few years they have been issuing orders providing for regularisation. In such a case there is no occasion for the Court to issue any directions for regularising such employees more particularly when none of the conditions prescribed in the said orders can be said to he either unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory. The Court cannot obviously help those orders for their failure to satisfy the condition prescribed there in. Issuing general declaration of indulgence is no part of our jurisdiction. In case of such persons we can only observe that it is for the respective Governments to consider the feasibility of giving them appropriate relief, particularly in cases where persons have been continuing over a long number of" years, and were eligible and qualified on the date of their adhoc appointment and further whose record of service is satisfactory." The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to hold : "The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an ad-hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation effort should always be to replace such an adhoc temporary employee by regularly selected employee as early "as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete alongwith others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well, and good, but if he docs not he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc temporary employee: Secondly, an ad-hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad-hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority. Thirdly, even where an ad-hoc or temporary employment in necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Articles 16 should be followed. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Articles 16 should be followed. In other words, there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. An unqualified person ought to be appointed only when qualified persons are not available through the above processes. If by any reason, an ad-hoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to rule and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment docs not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. The proper, course would be that each State prepare a scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme is already framed, the same may be made consistent with our observations herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. If and when such person is regulariscd he should be placed immediately below the last regularly appointed employee in that category, class or service as the case may be." 29. In Jacob Vs. Kerala Water Authority reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 2228 , a rule existed for regularisation of their services. This aspect of the matter was also noticed by the Supreme Court in Director, Institute of Management Development Vs. Smt. Puspha Srivastava reported in 1992 S.C. 2070, which distinguished Jacob's case. 30. In Anjani Kumar Sinha Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1989 PLJR 130 again was a case where the State of Bihar adopted a policy decision to regularise the service of the concerned employees and in that situation it was held that the state of Bihar was bound to give its effect to its own policy decision. 31. In Chandradeo Mahto vs. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 110 this Court was dealing with a case where teachers were irregularly appointed and in that situation it was held that even if an appointment is irregular, the same may not be lightly cancelled after a lapse of many years. However, in that case the question of regularisation of some services did not arise. 32. In K. S. P. College Stop-Gap Lecturers Assocn. Vs. However, in that case the question of regularisation of some services did not arise. 32. In K. S. P. College Stop-Gap Lecturers Assocn. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 677 the Supreme Court was considering the practice of the management of the private Colleges to appoint teachers for a fixed period then break their services for one day and again re-appoint them. In that situation, the Supreme Court gave certain directions. 33. In that case, the question as to whether any appointment can be made on an unsanctioned post did not arise for consideration. The Supreme Court inter alia directed that the management should take steps to fill up the posts in accordance with the rules. It was also held that only for adequate reasons it can terminate the services of temporary teachers. The Supreme Court however, directed that he State Government would be entitled to take such steps including super-session of affiliation and stoppage of grants in-aid if permitted under law to compel the institutions to comply with the rules. 34. In A. M. R. P. V. S. Teacher's Association vs. State of Manipur reported in AIR 1991 S.C. 2088 the Supreme Court was dealing with a different situation. 35. The Supreme Court however in none of the aforementioned cases did not take into consideration its earlier binding decisions in State of Mysore Vs. S.V. Narayanappa reported in 1967 (1) SCR 128 , R.N. Nanjudappa Vs. T. Thimmiah reported in 1972 (2) SCR 799 and B.N. Nagarjan and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 1676 . 36. This Court and the Supreme Court in various decisions has held that in absence of any policy decision or statute, a writ court cannot direct regularisation of services of an employee. 37. Reference in this connection may be made to Satyendra Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1991 (2) PLJR 460 , Kamla Kumar Sinha Versus Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences and others reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 465 , M.L. Gupta Versus Instrumentality reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 137 , Union of India and ors. Versus Tejram Parashramji Bombhate reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 570 . 37. Recently in Sitaram Thakur Vs. Versus Tejram Parashramji Bombhate reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 570 . 37. Recently in Sitaram Thakur Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 (1) PLJR 68 , a Division Bench upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions including the decisions of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union Versus Delhi Administration, Delhi and others reported in 1992 (1) Judgment Today 394, Karnataka State Private Colleges Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnatka reported in 1992 (2) S.C.C. 29 , State of Punjab and others vs. Surinder Kumar and others reported in 1992 (1) S.C.C. 489 , Sandeep Kumar Vs. State of U.P. reported in 1992 S.C. 713 and Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers reported in J.T. 1992 (1) S.C. 373, held that - no direction for regularisation of services can be granted. In State of Orissa Vs. Sukanti Mohapatra reported in 1993 (2) SCC 486 the Supreme Court held: "If compassionate ground is the public interest for regularisation it is difficult to understand how such a factual aspect can form the basis for public interest. Assuming that their having served for long years is a valid reason for regularisation, that, without anything more, will not meet the requirement of the action being in public interest. Rule 14 requires that the reasons in support of the action being in Pub lie interest must be stated' in writing but no reason other than compassionate grounds' appears in the first order. And what are those compassionate ground? The order docs not provide the answer. The subsequent order of February, 14, 1985 does not even pretend to state that the action is in public interest. It is totally silent on this point. It would, therefore, seem that the essential requirement i.e. the condition precedent for the exercise of power under Rule 14 namely, public interest, is not shown to have been satisfied." In that case the regularisation was held to be ultra vires the rules framed under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution of India. 38. In Director, Institute of Management Development vs. Puspha Srivastava reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 2070 the Supreme Court held: "This ruling, in our considered view, docs not advance the case of the respondent, as it turned on the interpretation of Rule 9(a) (i) of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules of 1958. 38. In Director, Institute of Management Development vs. Puspha Srivastava reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 2070 the Supreme Court held: "This ruling, in our considered view, docs not advance the case of the respondent, as it turned on the interpretation of Rule 9(a) (i) of Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules of 1958. The relevant part of the judgment is at page 569 (of suppl SCR) : (at p. 2233 of AIR) which is extracted below : "The claims made by the employees in this group of, case is contested mainly on the plea that their tenure and service conditions were regulated by Rule 99 (a) (i) of the Kerala Stale and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, (hereinafter called 'the rules') which were statutory in character and were, therefore, binding on the authority as well as the employees. It is contended that the employees belonging to different categories were appointed on different dates by the PHED prior, to 1st April, 1984 under this rule and, therefore, their service could only be regulated thereunder". In dealing with this, at page 577 (of 1990 (1) Supp. SCR 562) : (at p. 2238 of AIR 1990 S.C. 2228 ), the Court observed: "If any person who docs not possess the requisite qualification is appointed under the said clause, he will be liable to be replaced by a qualified person. Clauses (iii) of Rule 9 states that a person appointed under clause (i) shall, as soon as possible, be replaced by a member of the service or an approved candidate qualified to hold the post. Clause (e) of Rule 9, how ever, provided for regularisation of service of any person appointed under clause (i) of sub-rule (a) if he had completed continuous service of two years on December, 22, 1972, notwithstanding anything contained in the rules. This is a clear indication that in the past the Government also considered it just and fair to regularise the services of those who had been in continuous service for ‘two years' period of the cut-off date. This is a clear indication that in the past the Government also considered it just and fair to regularise the services of those who had been in continuous service for ‘two years' period of the cut-off date. The spirit underlying this treatment clearly shows that the Government did not consider it just, fair or reasonable to terminate the services of those who were in employment for a period of two or more years' period to the cut-off-date, This approach is quite consistent with the spirit of the rule which was intended to be invoked to serve emergency situations which could not brook delay as such appointments were intended to be stop-gap temporary appointments to serve the said purpose and not long term ones. The rule was not intended to fill a large number of posts in the service' but only those which could not be kept vacant till regular appointments were made in accordance with the rules. But once the appointments continued for long, the services had to be regularised if the incumbent possessed the requisite qualification as was done by sub-rule (a). Such an approach alone would be consistent with the constitutional philosophy adverted to earlier. Even otherwise, the rule must be so interpreted, if the language of the rule permits, as .will advance this philosophy of the Constitution. If the Rule is so interpreted it seems clear to us that, employees who have been working on the establishment since long, and who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining on the date of their employment, must be allowed to continue on their jobs and their services should be regularised". 39. In Mr. Suraiya Khatoon and others vs. the Bihar University and others in CWJC No. 4757 of 1990 a learned Single Judge of this Court did not assign any reason for directing regularisation of services nor took into consideration the mandatory provisions of sections 35 and 57 of the Bihar State University Act as also Chapter XV of the Statute. It only proceeded on the basis that as the petitioners thereof have been in service for last 15 to 25 years, they should be regularised. The learned Judge also did not consider a large number of the Supreme Court decisions and the binding decisions' of this Court. In the view of the matter the decisions in Mrs. It only proceeded on the basis that as the petitioners thereof have been in service for last 15 to 25 years, they should be regularised. The learned Judge also did not consider a large number of the Supreme Court decisions and the binding decisions' of this Court. In the view of the matter the decisions in Mrs. Suraiya, Khatoon and other's case (Supra) cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. The said decision, in our opinion, and for the reasons stated hereinbefore docs not lay down a good law and is hereby overruled. 40. For reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. 41. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there will he no order as to costs. S. K. Singh, J. - I agree.