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1994 DIGILAW 743 (MAD)

V. Annasami and others v. V. K. R. K. Govindaraja Mudaliar and others

1994-09-20

N.ARUMUGHAM

body1994
Judgment : Invoking the inherent power of this Court, a direction to the second and third respondents being the Executive Officer of Arulmighu Subramaniya Swami Temple, Kumarakottam, Kanchipuram and the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, respectively to remove the first respondent who is the Fit Person appointed to manage and look after the affairs of the temple above referred is sought for in this petition pending disposal of the above appeal. 2. The short facts which have become necessary to effect the proper adjudication are extracted as hereunder: Four appellants herein are the plaintiffs before the trial court claiming that they are the hereditary trustees of Arulmighu Subramaniya Swami Temple Kumarakottam situated at Kanchipuram filed the suit for declaration and other reliefs against the 3 respondents herein and after full trial partly succeeded and partly failed. Aggrieved at the said decision of the learned trial Judge, the present appeal has been filed and it is pending disposal before this Court. The relevant suit was O.S.No.10 of 1983 . disposed of by the learned Sub Judge, Kancheepuram, which emerged out of the order passed by the third respondent herein on 24. 1982. Since the other facts are out of points for the purpose of this application, enough for me at this stage to stop with the factual aspects in the above background. 3. That being so alleging that when the suit was filed on 211. 1982 before the trial court, the age of the first respondent was 67 and now he has attained the age of more than 79 invoking the embargo provided under sub-clause (1)(b) of Sec.26 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Act 22 of 1959) the petitioner wanted that the first respondent is removed from the designation of his fit person by the respondents 2 and 3 for the reason that he has now completed 78 years in all. Of course, this plea is being raised on behalf of the appellant pending disposal of the main appeal itself, which is pending sub judice. Of course, this plea is being raised on behalf of the appellant pending disposal of the main appeal itself, which is pending sub judice. This petition was objected by and on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 on the ground that the eligible age of a fit person and the duration for which he has to discharge his duty in such capacity has since not been spelt out anywhere in the Act itself, and that it was a matter of policy decided by the Government, the fit person, namely, the first respondent appointed in such capacity cannot be removed and even assuming that there was no age limit for a fit person to be in the office and that, therefore, the petition was resisted on the abovesaid grounds. Since no other point has been urged in this regard by the Bar for the respective parties, it has become necessary for me to advert to the relevant provisions of law adumbrated in the Act itself (Act 22 of 1959 as amended). 4. While dealing with the qualifications of trustees, Sec.26, clause (1)(b) reads like this: "Sec.26 (1): A person shall be disqualified for being appointed as, and for being, a trustee of any religious institution: (b) except in the case of a hereditary trustee if he is less than twenty-five and more than seventy years of age." It is thus seen that Sec.26 provides that in the case of non-hereditary trustee, the qualification to be appointed as a trustee for a temple coming under the operation of the provisions of the said Act is between those who got the age above 25 and below 70 years, and those who got the age below 25 and after 70 being a non-hereditary trustee he comes under the teeth of the embargo provided therein. In this case, there is no controversy or dispute with regard to the age of the first respondent as he having crossed 78 years. If this is so, it is made very clear that the first respondent clearly comes within the ambit of Sec.26, clause (1)(b) of the Act as claimed by and on behalf of the petitioner/appellant. 5. In this case, there is no controversy or dispute with regard to the age of the first respondent as he having crossed 78 years. If this is so, it is made very clear that the first respondent clearly comes within the ambit of Sec.26, clause (1)(b) of the Act as claimed by and on behalf of the petitioner/appellant. 5. It cannot be overlooked the other provision of law, namely, Sec.54, sub-clause (3) of the Act, which runs as follows: "Sec.54(3): When a permanent or temporary vacancy occurs in such an office and there is a dispute respecting the right of succession to the office, or When such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately or when a hereditary trustee is a minor and has no guardian fit and willing to act as such or there is a dispute respecting the person who is entitled to act as guardian; or When a hereditary trustee is by reason of unsoundness of mind or other mental or physical defect or infirmity unfit for performing the functions of the trustee, The Deputy Commissioner may appoint a fit person to perform the functions of the trustee of the institution until that disability of the hereditary trustee ceases or another hereditary trustee succeeds to the office or for such shorter terms as the Deputy Commissioner may direct. Explanation: In making any appointment under this sub-section the Deputy Commissioner shall have due regard to the claims of members of the family, if any, entitled to the succession." Thus, a mere casual regarding of the power vested with the Deputy Commissioner who is the third respondent in the instant case to appoint a fit person in cases of the contingency provided in the section itself is wider in scope but however narrow in its implication. The arguments advanced in this regard by Mr.P.M.Baskaran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the third respondent is that the age qualification for a fit person has not been defined in anywhere in the Act and that therefore, the relief is now being asked for cannot be granted. The arguments advanced in this regard by Mr.P.M.Baskaran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the third respondent is that the age qualification for a fit person has not been defined in anywhere in the Act and that therefore, the relief is now being asked for cannot be granted. With great constraint I am totally unable to persuade myself to countenance the said contention projected by the learned counsel for the simple reason that even on factual aspects, assuming that if a man appointed as a fit person has attained the age of more than 78 years may not even be physically fit to look after the entire administration and affairs of the temple. True, the old age is not the criterion to act as a fit person, but he must be a person physically fit and capable of looking after the affairs and administration of the temple in question to carry out the functions of the trustee. There was no plea or iota of evidence available in this case that the first respondent is physically alright and still capable of looking after the affairs analogued the powers to be exercised to and carried out by the trustee irrespective of his attaining the age of above 78. One could understand and pursue what a man could do while he was at the fag end of his life tenure. Therefore, the implications of the provisions in built in sub-clause (3) of Sec.54of the Act has to be read in conjunction with the implied meaning and the ratio in Sec.26(1)(b) of the Act. That was the reason perhaps keeping in mind the disqualification has been spelt out specifically by the legislature under Sec.26 of the Act simply for the reason that the age of the fit person has not been spelt out or the qualification of the fit person has not been defined in the Act. It is a misnomer to contend that the first respondent can be allowed to continue as the fit person during the entire period of his life time. Therefore, I am at every difficulty to countenance the arguments advanced by and on behalf of the respondents herein. 6. It is a misnomer to contend that the first respondent can be allowed to continue as the fit person during the entire period of his life time. Therefore, I am at every difficulty to countenance the arguments advanced by and on behalf of the respondents herein. 6. In the context that the present age of the first respondent is more than 78 has not been controverted or denied and that his physical worthiness to carry out the functions of the trustee to the temple in question has not since been claimed, I am of the firm view that the first respondent being a non-hereditary trustee clearly comes within the teeth of Sec.26(1)(b) of the Act and that, therefore it has become highly necessary and desirable for the respondents 2 and 3 to relieve him from the designation of the fit person and to appoint a new person as a fit person in this regard till the disposal of the proceedings in the court. 7. Of course, the relief claimed in this application is a limited one and it has not been projected towards as to what shall be done by the respondents 2 and 3 after the relief was accepted. It is the settled law that whenever a remedy is available as provided under the Act, then the concerned authorities must act in accordance with the said remedy and that therefore on the basis of the explanation and directions mandated in Sec.54, sub-clause (3) the Deputy Commissioner shall exercise his power in appointing a proper and eligible person as a fit person to the temple in question in accordance with law that would mean considering the names of the four appellants/ petitioners also herein after having given full opportunity to them to take charge of the affairs and the administration of the temple in question. Explanations provided to sub-clause (3) of Sec.54 directly refers to the procedures to be followed by the third respondent herein. Therefore, I do not want to traverse once again to givea specific direction. Explanations provided to sub-clause (3) of Sec.54 directly refers to the procedures to be followed by the third respondent herein. Therefore, I do not want to traverse once again to givea specific direction. It is thus having considered the whole factual and legal aspects projected before me, I have constrained to hold that this is a fit case in which the plea of the petitioners can be accepted and as a result of which the first respondent is to be relieved from his duty as the fit person to the suit temple in question and consequently, the third respondent is to appoint another fit person who is fully eligible and qualified to act as a fit person to the deity including the consideration of the names and claims of all the petitioners for doing so without any delay. Of course, this order is to be in force only the proceedings in the Court of law are decided finally. Since the Act provides appointment of a fit person to look after the entire affairs and administration of the temple in question on par with the trustee and functions and duties the concept of the functions and duties of a trustee shall be entrusted with the fit person and that, therefore, such fit person must be not only capable and eligible person, but a qualified person also to look after the affairs and administration of the temple and the objects for which the very Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act has been enacted. No other point was argued or placed before me to consider. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed. Consequently, the second and the third respondents are hereby directed to remove the first respondent from the designation of fit person to Arulmighu Subramaniaswami Temple, Kumarakottam, Kancheepurarn, from to-day onwards and take all necessary steps immediately to appoint another fit person in his place who is not only eligible and capable but also qualified including the names of all the petitioners herein and put him incharge of the entire administration of the said temple like a trustee within a maximum period of six weeks from today onwards. This order is to be inforce during the pendency of the appeal. No order as to costs under the circumstances of the case.