JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner was commissioned in the Indian Army as a 2nd Lt. on June, 15, 1969. He rose to the rank of Major in August 12, 1983. The petitioner was not further promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. by selection or as per Time Scale and this petition is about that. 2. According to the petitioner he could not get the promotion because of adverse remarks in his confidential reports for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86. These remarks were given by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta, respondent No. 4 who was then Commanding Officer, 28 A.D. Regiment. On October 29, 1983, the petitioner was posted as Battery Commander 105 A.D. Battery under the Commanding Officer, 28 A.D. Regiment. Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta, the then Commanding Officer 28 A.D. Regiment issued a letter dated April 30, 1985 to the petitioner calling upon him to explain as to why weak driver's training was being carried out without obtaining the permission of the Commanding Officer of the Regiment. This explanation was sought in connection with the vehicle which was involved in a fatal accident because the driver was a recruit not proficient in handling such type of heavy vehicle. The petitioner was also directed to explain as to why co-driver in the rank of Naik and above was not detailed on the assignment. On May 1, 1985, the petitioner submitted his explanation. It was stated in his explanation that the orders were flouted by Naik. A.S. Chheyamma and Hawaldar Gopinathan Nair. It was also explained that the vehicle was not used for weak drivers training and therefore, permission was not obtained. In the end, the petitioner had expressed regret for the lapses on the part of his sub-unit team and had assured that such a thing would not be repeated. Despite this explanation, the petitioner was removed from his Command and was interposed in RHQ Tp vide Regiment Order dated June 30, 1985. On June 29, 1985, the petitioner filed statutory complaint stating that his annual confidential report from June 1, 1984 in May 31, 1985 had been initiated by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta, Commanding Officer Regiment giving him overall 4 marks with an adverse remark ''Lack self-confidence and needs guidance''. On June 29, 1985, the petitioner filed statutory complaint stating that his annual confidential report from June 1, 1984 in May 31, 1985 had been initiated by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta, Commanding Officer Regiment giving him overall 4 marks with an adverse remark ''Lack self-confidence and needs guidance''. The petitioner stated in this statutory complaint that his earlier record was good and he had never earned as low as 4 marks in any of the earlier confidential reports. In 1983-84, the preceding year, the same Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta had given him 6 marks. It was prayed in the statutory complaint that annual confidential report initiated by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta for the years 1984-85 and 1985-86 be set aside and the petitioner may be removed from under the Command of Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta. 3. On July 29, 1985, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment wrote in the petitioner with reference to the statutory complaint that the petitioner had been asked to take over as Bty Cdr. 104 A.D. Bty. w.e.f. July 26, 1985 and therefore, grievance stated in para 4 of the statutory complaint stood redressed. According to the petitioner this was done by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta at the instance of Brig. Ram Pratap Commander 769(1) AD Bdg. to whom a copy of the letter dated July 29, 1985 was endorsed. On November 2, 1985, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta wrote to the petitioner informing him that his statutory complaint was under examination at Army HQ and the decision when arrived at, will be communicated. On November 4, 1986 the statutory complaint was rejected by the Central Government. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was not removed from under the Command of Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta and was not posted under some other Commanding Officer as per his request. The annual confidential report for year 1985-86 w.e.f. June 1, 1985 to May 31, 1986 was also therefore, written by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta. 4. The first Promotion Board for considering promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. held on April 30, 1988 did not find the petitioner fit for promotion and this was because of the remarks given by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta for the year 1985-1986 as per the petitioner. Col. Ashok Gupta. 4. The first Promotion Board for considering promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. held on April 30, 1988 did not find the petitioner fit for promotion and this was because of the remarks given by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta for the year 1985-1986 as per the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, submitted non-statutory complaint on July 12, 1988 against supersession in the matter of promotion for the rank of Lt. Col. in April 1988. In the meanwhile the Commanding Officer of the regiment had changed and on July 16, 1988 while forwarding the non- statutory complaint of the petitioner to the Headquarters 611(1) AD Brigade, the new Commanding Officer Col. M.P.S. Ahluwalia, recommended the petitioner as fit for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. on the basis of his performance of duties as Battery Commander i.e. from August 24, 1986 to July 31, 1987 and Second-in-Command, thereafter up to July 16, 1988. 5. On August 4, 1988, the Regiment wrote to the petitioner that his non- statutory complaint had been registered by the Complaint Advisory Board, COAS Secretariat, Army HQ. On August 1, 1988, the Head Quarter's of 769 Independent Air Defence Brigade wrote to Head Quarters 611 Independent Air Defence Brigade to forward a copy of the non-statutory complaint to Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta, who had retired in the meanwhile, for obtaining his comments, for being forwarded to the Army Head Quarters. Accordingly, the non-statutory complaint was forwarded to Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta (retired) for his comments. Despite several communications. Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta did not respond and, therefore, on January 1, 1990, the Regiment wrote to the Complaints Advisory Board that despite several communications Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta had not responded and therefore necessary action may be taken dispensing with his comments. 6. When nothing was heard about his non-statutory complaint, the petitioner filed statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act read with Paragraph 364 (i) of the DSR dated october 1, 1990. In the Statutory complaint, it was prayed that since no action was taken on the petitioner's request for posting him under the command of some other Commanding Officer, the remarks given by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta in the annual confidential reports of 1984-85 and 1985-86 be set aside and special review be granted to the petitioner for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. Col. Ashok Gupta in the annual confidential reports of 1984-85 and 1985-86 be set aside and special review be granted to the petitioner for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. based on his annual confidential reports for the years 1986-1987, 1987-1988, 1988-1989 and 1989-1990, with consequential seniority, along with his batch officers w.e.f. August 12, 1970. This Statutory Complaint was forwarded on october 12, 1990 to the Complaint Advisory Board by the Directorate General of Security, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi. On January 27, 1992, the Directorate General of Security, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi wrote to the Head Quarters Project Archer forwarding the letter of the COAS Secretariat (CAB) which stated that since the petitioner's complint of July 1988 had not been received by CAB duly processed till September 1991, the case being too old, the complaint was declared 'dead' and the officer was advised to put up fresh complaint if he wanted to revive the same. It was also stated in this letter that the petitioner have lodged fresh complaitn immediately on receipt of the letter of the COAS Secretariat in this regard. The petitioner was adivsed to file a fresh complaint immediately. The petitioner then wrote to the General, Chief of the Army Staff on March 16, 1992 drawing his attention to his case. Ultimately on July 14, 1992, the Government of India rejected the Statutory complaint of the petitioner by observing that after perusal of relevant record, the Government was satisfied that no unjustice had been done to the petitioner. This was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated July 29, 1992 by Head Quarter Project Archer. In the meanwhile on January 23, 1992. The Directorate General of Security, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi had written to the Army Head Quarters with a copy to HQ Project Archer that the competent Authority had not approved the petitioner IC 29599 Maj MS Chahar, Arty, for grant of substantive rank of Lt. Col. by Time Scale. 7. The petitioner has challneged his non-selection for promotion on Time Scale also in this petition. 8. According to the petitioner, he completed the qualifying service for being considered for Time Scale promotion on August 11, 1991 and therefore he was wholly eligible for Time Scale promotion. According to him, this was also arbitrarily denied to him. 9. 7. The petitioner has challneged his non-selection for promotion on Time Scale also in this petition. 8. According to the petitioner, he completed the qualifying service for being considered for Time Scale promotion on August 11, 1991 and therefore he was wholly eligible for Time Scale promotion. According to him, this was also arbitrarily denied to him. 9. The respondents in reply to the petition contended that no personal malice had been alleged against Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta by the petitioner and there is no foundation for the allegation that the remarks given by Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta against the petitioner were biased. It was also submitted that scope for interference with the assessment of his work officially by his superiors is very limited and this Court cannot sit in judgment over a remark made in the annual confidential reports unless malice is ex facie visible. It was also contended that overall profile of the petitioner emerging from the reports pertaining to the period from 1981-82 and 1982-1983 and 1983-1984 as also subsequent reports for the year 1986-87 and 1987-88 is not very much different from or out of tune with the remarks of 1983-1984, 1984-1985 and 1985-86. As regards the non-selection of the petitioner for Time Scale promotion, it was contended that severe displeasure to be recorded was awarded to the petitioner on July 24, 1989 for being party to back dating a minute sheet on video contract on January 19, 1987, in July 1988. Back dating minute sheet pertaining to cloth shop contract and putting a back dated signature and date in warning letter issued by Col. M.P.S. Ahluwalia. It was contended that the conduct which has led to awarding of the punishment of 'severe displeasure' to be recorded amounts to misconduct involving moral turpitude and therefore, the petitioner was not found if for Time Scale promotion also. 10. The processing of the petitioner's non-statutory and statutory complaints by the various Army Officers bring out the pathetic state of affairs in the management of such complaints by the authorities. It is extremely unfair to keep the complaints of an Officer hanging for years without redressal. Delay in disposal of such cases is bound to have adverse effect on the morale of officers who are bound to feel aggrieved and uncared for. It is extremely unfair to keep the complaints of an Officer hanging for years without redressal. Delay in disposal of such cases is bound to have adverse effect on the morale of officers who are bound to feel aggrieved and uncared for. The very purpose of the complaints redressal agency constituted by the Government for internal redressal of grievances in defeated by handling complaints in the manner in which the complaints of the petitioners have been handled. It is high time, the Government of India does something about it by fixing responsibility for the delay in processing complaints and providing punishment for the delays. 11. However, the scope of interference by this court in the matters of promotion would not be wider because of the mishandling of the non-statutory and statutory complaints by the agency set up by the Government of India. The fact remains that the petitioner has challenged remarks in his annual confidential reports. The ground of the challenge is that the Commanding Officer who initiated the remarks had called his explanation about some incident and had interposed him in the meanwhile. This by itself would not be sufficient to hold that the Commanding Officer who initiated remarks in the annual confidential reports would be biased. There is no material on the basis of which it can be inferred that Lt. Col. Ashok Gupta was biased against the petitioner to the extent of spoiling his record. It has also not been alleged that he bore malice against the petitioner. 12. In this view of the matter, there is no material on the basis of which the remarks can be quashed by this Court. 13. So far as the Time Scale promotion is concerned, they are governed by the criteria and guidelines for grant of substantive rank of Lt. Col. by Time Scale (Appendix to AO 23.90). Cl. 2 of the guidelines relates to personal qualities. Sub. clause (b) of Clause 2 provides that the officer should not have been adversely commented upon more than once in last six ACRs/ICRs in any one of the traits such a financial management, drinking habits and personal morals. 14. It appears that petitioner who was otherwise eligible had been deprived of by the promotion by Time Scale on the ground of ''severe displeasure'' to be recorded communicated to him for back-dating certain entries. 14. It appears that petitioner who was otherwise eligible had been deprived of by the promotion by Time Scale on the ground of ''severe displeasure'' to be recorded communicated to him for back-dating certain entries. It is clear from the return that this is the reason for depriving the petitioner of his promotion by time Scale. In his re-joinder to the return, the petitioner has submitted that he had signed certain documents back dating under compelling circumstances as ordered by his then commanding Officer Col. M.P.S. Ahluwalia. He has also contended that such a conduct did not involve and moral turpitude. It is also contended that had it been offence involving moral turpitude, he would not have been let off by awarding censure because under the Army Headquarter (Adjutant General Branch) New Delhi letter No. 82908/AG/DV-1 dated January 5, 1989, censure has to be awarded for conduct or omission of minor nature, both in nature and gravity. An offence of serious nature under the Army Act shall not be disposed of by awarding of censure but has to be dealt with by initiating a disciplinary action. This letter also invites attention to Paragraph 432 of the Regulations for the Army, 1962, which stipulates that ''persons committing offences involving moral turpitude, fraud, theft, dishonesty and culpable negligence involving financial loss to public or regimental property'', must be tried by a court martial or prosecuted in a Civil Courts and such cases will not be disposed of summarily or by administrative action. On the basis of this it has been contended by the petitioner that the conduct for which he was censured cannot be taken to be a conduct involving moral turpitude and his promotion cannot be taken away on that basis. 15. Let us now first take up the question as to whether backdating of documents as alleged, could be said to be a conduct involving moral turpitude. 16. In re P. and Advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 , the Supreme Court has observed that the expression 'moral turpitude' or 'delinquency' is not to receive a narrow construction. Whenever conduct proved against an advocate is contrary to honesty or opposed to good morals or is unethical, it involves moral turpitude. 17. The case before the Supreme Court was a Lawyer charged with unethical and unprofessional conduct. 18. Whenever conduct proved against an advocate is contrary to honesty or opposed to good morals or is unethical, it involves moral turpitude. 17. The case before the Supreme Court was a Lawyer charged with unethical and unprofessional conduct. 18. In Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 Allahabad 71, it is observed that the expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. 19. The term 'moral turpitude' and 'turpitude' have been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows:- MORAL TURPITUDE : The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. State v. Adkins, 40 Chio App 2d 473 : 320 N.E. 2d 308, 311 : 690.O.2d 416. Act or behaviour that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present is some criminal offences as distinguished from others. Lee v. Wisconsin State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 29 Wis. 2d 330 : 139 N.W. 2d 61, 65. The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibit. People v. Ferguson, 55 Misc. 2d 711 : 286 N.Y.S. 2d 976. 981. ''TURPITUDE'' : In its ordinary sense, inherent baseness or vileness of principle or action : shameful wickedness; depravity. In its legal sense, everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. An action showing gross deprivatiy. Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Russell. Tex. Civ. App., 99 S.W. 2d 1079, 1084. 20. As regards the conduct of backdating in certain documents without anything more it cannot be said to be a misconduct involving moral turpitude. It cannot be said that there is something immoral in itself in backdating a document. An action showing gross deprivatiy. Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Russell. Tex. Civ. App., 99 S.W. 2d 1079, 1084. 20. As regards the conduct of backdating in certain documents without anything more it cannot be said to be a misconduct involving moral turpitude. It cannot be said that there is something immoral in itself in backdating a document. It might have been done by the petitioner under pressure from his commanding Officer, as has been alleged by him, and if that was so, it could not have been said to be immoral though it would be still illegal. 21. There is also force in the argument advance on behalf of the petitioner that if his conduct in backdating, was taken to be so serious as to deprive him from the promotion, he would not have been let off any censure. While imposing the punishment, it was taken as a minor matter and without holding a Court Martial, the petitioner was awarded recordable censure. The circular of the Army, quoted above also goes to show that censure would not have been awarded to the petitioner if his conduct had been held to be involving moral turpitude. The respondents cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath by proceeding against the petitioner while taking disciplinary action for backdating certain documents treating the misconduct to be minor one not involving moral turpitude and depriving him of his time scale promotion on the ground that the conduct for which he was awarded punishment of recordable censure involved moral turpitude. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition deserves to be partly allowed and it is so allowed. The remarks in the annual confidential reports of 1984-85 and 1985-86 are not quashed but deprival of the petitioner of his time scale promotion is held to be illegal and arbitrary. Hence, Annexure 17 dated January 23, 1992 and letter dated January 2, 1992 appended therewith, are quashed. The respondents shall consider the petitioner for grant of time scale promotion afresh without taking into account the conduct for which he was awarded recordable censure as conduct involving moral turpitude. This shall be done within three months from today. The respondents shall also pay to the petitioner Rs. 2,000/- as costs of this petition.Petition partly allowed. *******