JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.—These are separate applications under Order 22, Rule 4 (4) and in the alternative under Order 22, Rule 4, Order 22, Rule 9, Order 32, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (shortly hereinafter referred to as the Code) and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, respectively. All these applications are inter-connected with each other, accordingly, I proceed to decide them by a common order. 2. The plaintiffs have stated that defendant No. 1, Surjit Singh, expired on 14-1-1993, leaving behind his heirs/legal representatives, mentioned in para 2 of the application, out of whom, three children, namely, Manjit Singh, Devinder Singh and Gurvinder Kaur are minors and are being represented through their next friend (mother and natural guardian) Smt. Paramjit Kaur. It is alleged that during the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex parte as far back as 1989 and he did not file any written statement in the suit. Accordingly, applicant has prayed that this Court, exercising its powers under sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code use its judicial discretion by passing on order exempting the aforesaid legal representatives to be brought on record. In the alternative, it has been prayed that the aforesaid legal heirs be substituted in place of deceased defendant No. 1. In that event, vide the other application under Order 32, Rule 4, C. P. C, the minors be allowed to be represented through their mother who is of sound mind and has no adverse interest against them. By another application under Order 22, Rule 9 read with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in filing the application for substitution of the L. Rs. is sought to be condoned and abatement set aside while directing the substitution of the L. Rs. 3. Notice, pursuant to these applications, was also given to the proposed L. Rs. Replies have been filed to all the applications except to application under Order 32, Rule 4, C. P. C. However, in this respect, Mr. Bimal Gupta, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the proposed L. Rs , states at the bar that he would be representing all the L. Rs. Replies have been filed to all the applications except to application under Order 32, Rule 4, C. P. C. However, in this respect, Mr. Bimal Gupta, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the proposed L. Rs , states at the bar that he would be representing all the L. Rs. and the mother is ready and willing to act as guardian of the minor children He also states that one of the minors Manjit Singh alias Manjinder Singh has become major and for that purpose, they have already filed an application under Order 32, Rule 12 of the Code on 22-4-1994 4. Confining the decision firstly to the prayer of the plaintiffs under sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code, I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length 5. Miss Devyani Kuthiala, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/applicant has very ably argued that abatement is a general law and suit abates automatically without any order of the Court but when exemption qua the substitution of L. Rs. of the deceased is sought under sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22, C. P. C, the Court has to see only the limitations placed under this sub-rule and limitation for filing such an application is not material On the contrary, Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Counsel for the proposed L. Rs., has vehemently contended that in the absence of an application within the statutory period as provided for under Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act, 1963, abatement of the suit is automatic without any order of the Court and for setting aside such abatement, the party has to move the Court before any other order is passed. In other words, his contention is that the exemption from substituting L. Rs. could have been given only after setting aside the abatement. According to him, the suit becomes dead and unless life was first infused to it, there was no question of proceeding with it. 6. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of both the sides. It cannot be denied that whenever a party wants to bring legal representatives on record, then it is necessary to move an application to that effect. If the partys application is belated then he is to explain the delay in moving it. 6. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of both the sides. It cannot be denied that whenever a party wants to bring legal representatives on record, then it is necessary to move an application to that effect. If the partys application is belated then he is to explain the delay in moving it. It is well settled that an abatement of proceedings takes place on its own force by passage of time and no specific order is envisaged. In this respect, I am fortified in taking this view by the observations made in the case of Madan Naik (dead by L. Rs.) and others v. Mst. Hansubala Devi and others, AIR 1983 SC 676 and Union of India v. Ram Charan (deceased) through his L. Rs., AIR 1964 SC 215. 7. Sub-rule (4) is a newly added one in the Code. The question about giving exemption from bringing legal representatives on record arose before this Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Bhawani Prasad and others, 1980 Sim LC 227, wherein after taking into consideration the provisions of newly added sub-rule (4), it has been held that the power of the Court to exempt the plaintiff to bring on record the L. Rs. of the deceased defendant who had not filed the written statement, or having filed the same had not appeared to contest the suit at the hearing, is not affected by the limitation of 90 days after which the suit as against the deceased must be deemed to have been abated unless and until an order has already been made to this effect. In case no such order has yet been passed, the Court can grant exemption under this provision. I am in full agreement with the view of this Court taken earlier. It would be proper to add that sub-rule (4) itself empowers the Court to consider the circumstances by using its judicial discretion and may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting L. Rs. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the exemption could be granted only within the time limited by the law for moving an-application for substitution, then it could have provided that the application for exemption should also be moved within that specific time. There is no such period prescribed for seeking relief under this sub-rule. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the exemption could be granted only within the time limited by the law for moving an-application for substitution, then it could have provided that the application for exemption should also be moved within that specific time. There is no such period prescribed for seeking relief under this sub-rule. In other words, this sub-rule is an exception to Rules 4 and 9 of Order 22 of the Code. The fact that sub-rule (4) is an exception to the main rule is confirmed by the provision that if exemption is granted then the abatement does not come into operation. As such, the question of first moving an application for getting abatement set aside does not arise. Same view has been taken by Karnataka, Rajasthan and Allahabad High Courts in the case of 5. A. Rahim and another v. Rajamma and others AIR 1977 Kar 20 ; Mohammad Mustaqeem and another v. A/tab Ahmad and others, AIR 1983 All 368 and Girdhari Lai and others v. Laxminarain, AIR l«90 Raj 15. The next question which arises in the instant case is whether judicial discretion in exempting the substitution of L. Rs , should or should not be exercised in favour of the plaintiff ? Admittedly, consequent to the filing of the aforesaid applications and issuance of notice thereupon, the proposed L. Rs. have put in appearance, no doubt, defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex parte. Further, there is no dispute that he did not raise any defence by way of filing any written statement In that event, had he been alive, there were two courses open to him ; one that he could have allowed the suit to proceed ex parte and second, that by appearing before the Court, he could have applied fo:* setting aside the order, under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code and by showing sufficient cause, he could have joined the proceedings from the stage at which they were at the time of filing such application. In the instant case, the deceased has been represented by his L. Rs. pursuant to the notice issued by this Court asking them to show-cause as to why they be not substituted at his place. In the instant case, the deceased has been represented by his L. Rs. pursuant to the notice issued by this Court asking them to show-cause as to why they be not substituted at his place. They have vehemently objected to the grant of application under sub-rule (j) of the Code on the ground that plaintiff has filed a belated application seeking the relief of exemption from substitution of the L. Rs. of defendant No. I. As 1 have already observed above, that this newly added sub-rule is an exception to the general rule (whereunder suit is to be deemed to have automatically abated for non-filing of the application within the statutory period prescribed under Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act, 1963, yet this Court is bound to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as to why and under what circumstances the necessity arose for the introduction of such provision in the Code. Procedural law is a man made, therefore, it should not, in any way, hamper the substantial justice to be imparted to the parties who are before the Court. In case judicial discretion in the instant case is exercised, the plaintiffs would be entitled to proceed ex parte against the deceased. However, as the L. Rs., pursuant to the notice, have already appeared before this Court and they want to assist the Court in coming to the truth as to the disputed matter in between them, it would be proper to exercise judicial discretion in favour of the plaintiff but by directing the substitution of the L. Rs. on record for which the plaintiffs have already made a composite prayer in OMP (M) 38 of 1993 coupled with other applications referred to above. 8. To impart substantial justice in between the parties and also to give equitable relief to the plaintiff as well, I allow the application by directing substitution of the L. Rs. who are now before this Court. It may be necessary to detail that late Sh. 8. To impart substantial justice in between the parties and also to give equitable relief to the plaintiff as well, I allow the application by directing substitution of the L. Rs. who are now before this Court. It may be necessary to detail that late Sh. Surjit Singh having been proceeded against ex parte in the year 1989 and the plaintiff being a juristic person and also in view of the allegations of the plaintiff-applicant that they were ignorant about the death of the defendant No. 1, I deem it proper to allow the alternative prayer made by the plaintiff in this application Accordingly, the alternative prayer made in application registered as OMP (M) 38 of 1993 is allowed. 9. In view of the above discussion and statement made at the bar by Sh. Bimal Gupta for and on behalf of the L. Rs. of defendant No. 1 Sh. Surjit Singh (since deceased), application under Order 32, Rule 3 registered as OMP 558 of 1993 is also allowed. So far as the other two applications under Order 22, Rule 9 and section 5 of the Limitation Act are concerned, no further discussion is required in view of the observations made above. They are also disposed of in terms of above. Application allowed.