Judgment B. R. ARORA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed this Third Bail application for his release on bail during the pendency of the trial in Sessions Case No. 49 of 1990 pending in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner. ( 2 ) PETITIONER Om Prakash, along with eleven other accused, is facing trial in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner, for the offences under Sections 302, 323, 324, 147, 148 and 149, I. P. C. He was arrested in this case on 4-2-90. After his arrest, he filed a bail application before the learned Sessions Judge, Bikaner, which was dismissed by the order dated 10-10-90. Dissatisfied with the order dated 10-10-90, passed by the Sessions Judge, Bikaner, dismissing his first bail application, the petitioner preferred a bail application before this Court which was dismissed on 1-2-91. As the trial was proceeding with a slow speed, after examination of some of the prosecution witnesses, the petitioner filed second bail application, which was dismissed by this Court on 14-1-94. While dismissing the second bail application, this Court directed the trial Court to complete the trial within the period of six months from that day. The trial has not been completed so far though the period of six months, fixed by this Court for completing the trial, has expired. The petitioner has, therefore, preferred this Third Bail Application on the ground that since the directions issued by this Court for completing the trial within six months have not been complied with by the trial Court, therefore, he should be released on bail. ( 3 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the directions issued by this Court for completing the trial within six months have been flouted by the trial Court and the trial has not been completed though eight months have elapsed and the prosecution is delaying the matter on one pretext or the other and the delay cannot be attributed to the accused, therefore, the accused-petitioner may be released on bail as the persons similarly situated have already been ordered to be released on bail. It has, also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a speedy trial is the Constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which has been denied to the petitioner and, therefore, he deserves to be released on bail. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036), Kadre Pehadiya v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 939 (1981 Cri LJ 481 Loola Bisira v. State 1986 Cr LR (Raj.) 625, Lokesh Bhardwaj Versus the State of Rajasthan (1987 Cr LR (Raj.) 65), Mithu Singh v. State (1987 RCC 113), Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 Patna 219), Arjun Singh Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1988 Cr LR (Raj.) 476 and Ranchhod v. State of Rajasthan (1994 (1) WLN 221 ). The learned Public Prosecutor, assisted by the learned counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, have supported the order passed by the Court below and submitted that since the trial is at the concluding stage and the next date fixed in the case for examination of the remaining prosecution witnesses is 23-9-94, therefore, the bail application, filed by the petitioner, deserves to be dismissed. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor have placed reliance over. Heera Ram v. State of Rajasthan (S. B. Criminal Fourth Bail Application No. 69 of 1992) and Kana Ram v. State of Rajasthan (S. B. Criminal Second Bail Application No. 785 of 1994 ). ( 4 ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 5 ) THE accused is behind the bars since 4-2-90. A direction was issued by this Court to the trial Court on 14-1-94 (while decided the Second Bail Application) to complete the trial within the period of six months from that day. That period of six months expired on 14-7-94 and the trial has not yet been completed so far even after the expiry of eight months. The delay in the trial can neither be attributed to the accused-petitioner nor it occurred due to some extraordinary reasons. The trial is proceed at a snails speed for the last four years. Promptitude is the prime need of administration of justice. The delay in the trial can neither be attributed to the accused-petitioner nor it occurred due to some extraordinary reasons. The trial is proceed at a snails speed for the last four years. Promptitude is the prime need of administration of justice. Article 21 of the Constitution of India recognises the right of every citizen for a speedy trial regardless the innocence or guilt of the accused. Protracted trial is most traumatic to an innocent person. The object of the new Code of Criminal Procedure is the expeditious investigation, enquiry and trial of criminal cases. Indefinite detention of the accused, even in graver offences, is against the Legislative intent and the object of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Procedural constraints in the Code are designed to protect the rights of the accused. Section 309, Cr. P. C. gives a mandate to the trial Court that the proceedings in every enquiry or trial shall be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular when the examination of the witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. Rule 43 of the General Rules (Criminal) enacted by the High Court, is, also, to the same effect and states that Sessions trials should ordinarily be held in order in which the commitments are made; once a Sessions Trail is opened, the Sessions Judge shall see that it is disposed of in the same Session and not adjourned to next Session. Section 437 (6) gives a mandate to the Magistrate in the cases triable by the Magistrate to release the accused on bail if the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case. Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. , which deals with the investigation part, also gives a mandate to the Magistrate to release the accused on bail if the investigation is not completed within the period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may be. Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. , which deals with the investigation part, also gives a mandate to the Magistrate to release the accused on bail if the investigation is not completed within the period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may be. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that every one arrested or detained shall be entitled to conclusion of trial within a reasonable time or to be released pending the trial. In the United States, speedy trial has been recognised as one of the Constitutionally guaranteed right and states that in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trial. United States Federation Speedy Trial Act, 1974, provides time-limit for completion of investigation and trial. ( 6 ) IN Hussainara Khatoon v. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036) it has been held by the Supreme Court that "a procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable fair or just unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. " It has been further observed by the Court that even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough. ( 7 ) IN Kadra Pehadiya v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1981 SC 939 : (1981 Cri LJ 481), the Apex Court reiterated the view taken in Hussainara Khatoons case (supra) and observed that speedy trial is fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it is a crime and shame upon our adjudicating system which keeps a man for years together in a jail without the end of the trial. IN Loola alias Bisir v. State (1986 Cr. IN Loola alias Bisir v. State (1986 Cr. LR (Raj.) 625) a direction was given by the High Court to the trial Court to complete the trial within two months but the trial was not completed within the stipulated period of two months. The Court, therefore, held that flouting the order of the High Court cannot be tolerated and the accused was, therefore, ordered to be released on bail. IN Lokesh Bhardwaj v. State (1987 Cr. LR (Raj.) 65), a direction was given by the High Court to the trial Court expedite the trial. The accused was aged about 19/20 years and the High Courts direction was not received by the trial Court and, therefore, the trial proceeded with a snails speed. The Court, therefore, directed that it was not the fault of the accused that the order passed by the High Court has not been received by the trial Court and the trial has not been expedited and no useful purpose will be served to keep the young boy in jail with the company of harden criminals and, therefore, ordered the accused to be released on bail. IN Mithu Singh v. the State (1987 RCC 113), while rejecting the Third Bail Application, it was directed that the petitioner shall be free to move another application after the principal witness Rehmat Bibi is examined and it was further directed that the prosecution should see that the witnesses are examined by the end of June, 1984. The witnesses could not be examined up to 23-2-85. The Court, after considering the circumstances of the case, held that the prosecution is not taking proper care and interest in completing the trial despite the directions of this Court and, therefore, the Court ordered for the release of the petitioner on bail. IN Surya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1987 Patna 219 a Full Bench of Patna High Court held that a callous and in ordinarily prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the fault of the accused and is otherwise not occasioned on any extraordinary reasons) in the investigation and trial of the criminal cases for capital offences punishable with major punishments, will violate the Constitutional Guarantee of speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution and the Court, therefore, recommended for the time-frame of five years for investigation and trial of such offences. IN Arjun Singh v. State (1988 Cr LR (Raj.) 476 a direction was issued by the High Court to complete the trial within a specified time. That direction issued by the High Court, was not complied with and the trial was not concluded within the time granted by the Court. The Court, therefore, in the Seventh Bail Application filed by the accused-petitioner, ordered to release the petitioner on bail on the ground that the trial has not been concluded within the specified time granted by the Court and rule 43 of the General Rules (Criminal), 1980, has not been followed. IN Ranchhod v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 (1) WLN 221 the accused were facing trial for the offences under Sections 302/149, 307/149, 326/149, 324/149, 323/149 and 452 I. P. C. A bail application on behalf of the accused was filed. The incident pertained to the year 1988 and only three witnesses were examined since 7-2-84. This Court, therefore, directed the trial Court to take-up the case with all expedition and complete the trial within the period of four months from the date he receives the certified copy of the order. The Court further observed that if the trial is not completed within four months then the accused will be enlarged on bail on his furnishing a Personal Bond and the Surety Bond. ( 8 ) IN the two cases, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the complaint the controversy raised in the present case was neither considered nor decided and the bail applications were dismissed only looking to the facts and circumstances of those cases. ( 9 ) BAIL is a matter of judicial discretion. While considering : whether to grant or not to grant bail, conflicting claims of individual liberty of the accused and the larger societal interest have to be taken note of. Article 21 of the Constitution of India recognises the right of a speedy trial to every citizen. The object of the new Code of Criminal Procedure is the expeditious trial. The delay in the conclusion of the trial violates the Constitutional Guarantee of a fair, just and reasonable procedure and in fact a fundamental right of speedy trial. Delay in the present case in the conclusion of the trial cannot be attributed to the accused. The object of the new Code of Criminal Procedure is the expeditious trial. The delay in the conclusion of the trial violates the Constitutional Guarantee of a fair, just and reasonable procedure and in fact a fundamental right of speedy trial. Delay in the present case in the conclusion of the trial cannot be attributed to the accused. A person accused of whatsoever graver crime cannot be indefinitely detained and languish behind the bars merely because the witnesses are not coming or the prosecution failed to take steps to examine the witnesses. The accused is behind the bars since 4-2-90. More than 41/2 years have elapsed but the trial has not been completed. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to act according to the object of the Code of Criminal Procedure land the trial continued with a snails speed and has not been completed so far. Delay in the trial has forced the accused-petitioner to languish behind the bars for such a long period of 41/2 years. It is true that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has directed the Additional Public Prosecutor to produce the remaining witnesses on 23-9-94. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has further directed that if the witnesses will not be produced on that day, the evidence of the prosecution would be closed. Though the direction has been issued to the Additional Public Prosecutor by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to produce all the witnesses on the next date of hearing, i. e. , 23-9-94, but looking to the past history of the case and the manner in which the adjournments are being granted, the witnesses are not produced and the directions issued by this Court have not been complied with, I think it proper to direct that if the prosecution evidence is not completed on or before 7-10-1994 (October 7, 1994) then the petitioner shall be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- with two sureties of Rs. 10,000/- each to the satisfaction of the trial Court. ( 10 ) WITH these observations, the Third Bail Application, filed by the petitioner, is disposed of. Order accordingly.