JUDGMENT - Dr. B.P. SARAF, J.:---By this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the notice dated 14th September, 1987 under section 41(1) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 ("the Act") issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Housing and Special Assistance Department. 2. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the controversy raised in this case is fully covered by the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1990 dated 11th August, 1993 wherein the very same notice was challenged by another party in respect of one of the properties specified therein. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners does not agree with the above submissions and contends that in the above case, this Court was not concerned with the issues raised in the present case and, as such, the ratio of the decision in that case cannot apply to the present case. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana)1, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 781 where it was observed that a precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what remotely or logically follows from it. According to learned Counsel the actual issues arising in this case did not come up for consideration in the above case and as such the above decision has no application. Counsel further submits that under section 41(1) of the Act, the authorities concerned are obliged to place all material in their possession either by incorporating the proposals, plans or projects in the preliminary notice itself or by making the same available to would be objectors before they can show cause and if that is not done, the notice will be void ab initio. Reliance is placed in this connection on Division Bench Judgment of this Court in (Shyamrao v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1993 Mh.L.J. 841. 4. In reply, Counsel for the respondents submits that the above judgment has no application to the facts of the present case when in reply to his letter dated 17th February, 1990 the petitioner No. 1 was specifically advised by letter dated 7th March, 1990 to contact the office of the Executive Engineer, R.U.II in the matter and the hearing was adjourned to enable the petitioner to get all informations required by him before the hearing. 5. 5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the decisions of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1990 and in Shyamrao v. State of Maharashtra (supra). I have also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Goodyears case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 781 (supra). It is well-settled that a case is an authority only for what it actually decides. As observed by the Supreme Court in (Amarnath Omprakash v. State of Punjab)3, (1985)1 S.C.C. 345 , judgments of courts should not be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes. They do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words should not be interpreted as statutes. As held by the Supreme Court in (C.I.T. v. Sun Silk Engineering Works Ltd.)4,(1992)198 I.T.R. 299. "The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from that judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court." On perusal of the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1990 in the light of the above principles it appears that the issues raised in this case were specifically raised and decided by this Court in that case. In the above decision it has been specifically held by this Court that section 41(1) does not require a property to be cessed or non-cessed as is the case in the matter of acquisition under sections 92 and 93 of the Act. So far as the failure to incorporate the details of the proposals, plans etc. in the notice is concerned, I find that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court does not help the petitioner No. 1 in view of the fact that in reply to his letter asking for certain information, he was specifically instructed by the concerned authority as far back as on 22-2-1989 to contact the office of the Executive Engineer R.U.II for the details of plan, project etc. Not only that, repeated opportunities were given to the petitioners thereafter to file the objections. Hearing of the matter was also postponed till 22nd March, 1989. Not only that, repeated opportunities were given to the petitioners thereafter to file the objections. Hearing of the matter was also postponed till 22nd March, 1989. This clearly goes to show that all the informations required by the petitioners were made accessible to them and they were asked to contact the concerned Executive Engineer for that purpose. It is difficult in such a situation to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioners that there was any violation of the requirements of section 41(1) of the Act or the principles laid down by this Court in Shyamrao v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Mh.L.J. 841 (supra). 6. In view of the above discussion, I find that this case is fully covered by the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2078 of 1990. Following the same, this writ petition is dismissed. 7. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.