Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) THESE three habeas corpus petitions are disposed of together by a common order, since the petitioner in each one of these petitions, is stated to be involved in the same ground crime. Preventive orders under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act) 1988 were separately passed against each one of these petitioners on 5. 4. 1994 by the second respondent in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 (1) of the afforestated Act. With a view to preventing each one of these petitioners from engaging themselves in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. In all these habeas corpus petitions, the prayer is for production of the respective petitioners before this Court to beset at liberty, after quashing the impugned orders. ( 2 ) WE do not intend narrating the facts in detail, which led to the passing of the impugned orders of detention, for the grounds urged in each one of these petitions can be disposed of, even without reference to facts in extenso. If need be necessary facts can always be called out from the grounds of detention. However, we are constrained to state, that the grounds to disclose commission of very grave offences by the petitioners. In spite of such gravity, the detaining authority or the other authorities in charge of processing of preventive orders appear to have taken the work lightly and mechanically, without application of mind, even to the minimum possible extent. We will be very soon, spelling out the reasons, for our afforestated observation. While H. C. P. No. 900/94 may relate to a different ground of challenge, the other two habeas corpus petitions contain a solitary and similar ground of challenge. Therefore, it will be necessary to consider the inherent merits of H. C. P. No. 900/94 separately, while clubbing H. C. P. Nos. 901 and 902/94 together for rendering our verdict. ( 3 ) MR. S. Samuel Rajapandian, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in RC. P. No, 900/94, submitted that there is a grave lacuna in communication of the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention on the detenu. He referred to the order of detention in Tamil, served on the detenu on 11. 4. 1994 at 02-30 hours (time ). P. No, 900/94, submitted that there is a grave lacuna in communication of the impugned order of detention and the grounds of detention on the detenu. He referred to the order of detention in Tamil, served on the detenu on 11. 4. 1994 at 02-30 hours (time ). In that order, the detaining authority has stated in the end of the order that the detenu was a resident of Madhavaram, Madras-Si. He was at that point of time a remand prisoner in Central Prison, Madras. Petitioners Counsel then made a deference to the grounds of detention, which indicate, that the petitioner had already been released on bail, in pursuance of an order passed by this Court and was enjoying liberty of the relevant time, when the impugned order was served on him. The contention was that the detaining authority was not even aware, if the detenu was on bail or was still in remand as an under-trial prisoner in Central Prison, Madras, at the relevant time. ( 4 ) ON this ground of challenge, we have heard Mr. I Subramanniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. With all the emphasis, he could command, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted, that a mistake had been committed in translation of the order of detention in Tamil and that should not be taken serious note of, more so, when the order of detention in English does not contain that impediment. He then placed before us certain documents available in the detention file, to contend, that the petitioner was arrested at 2. 30 a. m. on 10/11. 4. 1994 and if that be so, there was nothing unusual or surprising in service of the order having been effected on the detenu at 2. 30 a. m. He then pointed out certain scorings made in pencil in the order of detention in English and Tamil retained by the detaining authority, on his file, to submit, that the detaining authority was aware of the mistakes committed, in typing out the impugned orders in Tamil and English, and hence his subjective satisfaction cannot be faulted. 30 a. m. He then pointed out certain scorings made in pencil in the order of detention in English and Tamil retained by the detaining authority, on his file, to submit, that the detaining authority was aware of the mistakes committed, in typing out the impugned orders in Tamil and English, and hence his subjective satisfaction cannot be faulted. ( 5 ) OUR listing out of the arguments advanced by Counsel on either side, clearly projects the seriousness of the matter and the onerous duty cost on us to decide if the detaining authority could get off lightly by contending, that the errors are inadvertent and hence the orders of detention will have to be necessarily upheld, holding that the petitioner cannot complain of any prejudice. ( 6 ) IT is settled law, that procedure will have to be strictly followed, when preventive law is sought to be invoked. The reason for required strict adoption of procedure is not too far to seek, for, the persons detained are put behind the bars, without a trial and an opportunity to challenge, before they are imprisoned. In preventive law, communication of orders, grounds and material relied upon have a salient significance and that cannot be easily sought to be thwarted of on feigned inadvertences, which do not readily impress the court. While construing the factual details, this court has become aware, of the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioners, in all these habeas corpus petitions. That these petitioners had engaged themselves in illicit trafficking of heroin is the main fabric, made obvious, in the grounds of detention. The graver the offence alleged the greater the responsibility that will be thrown on the detaining authorities to carefully apply their minds, when they choose to invoke the provisions of preventive law to detain the partici-pants in the crime. Such seriousness, which courts can normally expect, from detaining authorities, is conspicuously absent in these three preventive orders. The provisons of the PIT NDPS Act as any other preventive law, certainly permit service of grounds of detention on the detenu concerned within the statutory time fixed, after initial service of the order of detention. The order of detention is bound to be served soon after arrest, though the grounds can still be served within the statutory period fixed under the Act, be it five days or fifteen days in exceptional cases. The order of detention is bound to be served soon after arrest, though the grounds can still be served within the statutory period fixed under the Act, be it five days or fifteen days in exceptional cases. The orders of detention in English and in Tamil were admittedly served on the petitioner at 02. 30 hours (time) on 11. 4. 1994. The signature of the detenu nothing the date and time of service, forms part of that orders served on the detenu, both in English and Tamil. There is no dispute that the detenu known only Tamil and is unacquainted with English language. That is the reason why the detaining authority though it fit to serve copies of all the documents in the language knows to the detenu. If the detenu knows only Tamil and not English, we will be totally justified in relying upon the contents of the documents supplied to him in the language known to him. The Tamil order of detention clearly shows that the person detained was the detenu, who was a resident of No. 31, Telephone Colony Main Gate, Madhavaram, Madras-Si, and that he was on the date of passing of the order on 5. 4. 1994, an inmate of Central Prison, Madras, as a remand prisoner. There cannot be a divergent note, on the face of this order, for on the date on which the impugned order was passed on 5. 4. 1994, when the detaining authority had chosen to affix his signature to the very order that was several on the detenu, his awareness was, that the detenu was then a remand prisoner in Central Prison, Madras. If that is the impression, the detenu could have had on the basis of this order, it would certainly be amazing if in the grounds of detention the detaining authority were to state, that the petitioner had already been released on bail and was enjoying liberty at the relevant time. These two statements are quite contradictory and if there had been application of mind, the contradictions apparent, must have been resolved. It is only in this context Mr. I Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, with reference to the detention file, submitted that the subjective satisfaction cannot be faulted, since certain pencil scorings are found in the impugned orders of detention in Tamil as well as in English. It is only in this context Mr. I Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, with reference to the detention file, submitted that the subjective satisfaction cannot be faulted, since certain pencil scorings are found in the impugned orders of detention in Tamil as well as in English. We are not very sure as to when these pencil scorings were made. If it is the detaining authority, who had scored certain portions of the impugned orders, he could have very well done it with the same pen, with which he had signed the impugned orders. If, in fact, the detaining authority was aware of the pencil corrections made by him, he would have certainly checked up if those corrections had been carried out, when he ultimately chose to sign the orders of detention intended to be served on the detenu. That he had not done, is evident from the impugned order supplied to the detenu in Tamil. There are two ways of looking of this lacunas. One is that the detaining authority was not the author of the pencil scorings or in the event of his having been the author of those deletions, he had failed to apply his mind, when he ultimately chose to sign the fair orders, which were intended to be served on the detenu. Either way this beneficiary will be the detenu and not the State Government. While passing preventive orders, recklessness, negligence and supine indifference cannot be tolerated. Liberties of citizens ate involved and therefore a sanguine duty is cast on the detaining authority to follow the provisions of law strictly and meticulously, for otherwise orders of detention bound to struck down, though on technicalities, for they affect the rights of citizens guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. ( 7 ) LEAVING aside for a moment this grave infirmity in the impugned order served in Tamil on the detenu, let us have a quick look at the nature of service of the impugned order as well as the grounds of detention on the detenu. It cannot be disputed, for written acknowledgements of the detenu, are available, in the order of detention and grounds of detention, that they stood served at 0230 hours (time) on 11. 4. 1994 and at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994 respectively. If we take it that the order of detention was served at 2. 30 p. m. on 1. 4. 1994. 4. 1994 and at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994 respectively. If we take it that the order of detention was served at 2. 30 p. m. on 1. 4. 1994. When apparently it is subsequent to service of grounds of detention at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994. Such service, cannot be easily pass muster for the order of detention requires immediate service, though the grounds of detention can either be served along with the order or it could be served within a few days permissible under the statute. It will be too much, of a proposition to be digested, that the grounds of detention stood served even before the order of detention was served. ( 8 ) LET us now consider if the grounds of detention could have been served at 2. 30 a. m. on 10/11. 4. 1994 on the detenu and thereafter service was effected of the grounds no him, at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994. The detention file indisputably indicates that the detenu was admitted into the Central Prison, Madras, only at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994. Therefore, it is quite possible to conceive that the grounds of detention stood served on the detenu soon after his commitment to prison at 12. 10 Noon on 11. 4. 1994. In that event, if the impugned order stood served at 2. 30 a. m. on 10/11. 4. 1994 on the detenu, it could have been only outside the prison and not inside it. Such a proposition, we are unable to accept, since the impugned order of detention in Tamil shows that even on the date when the impugned order was passed on 5. 4. 1994, the petitioner was a remand prisoner in Central Prison, Madras. Hence, logically the petitioner could not have been served with the order of detention in Tamil, at the place of arrest, for the document would read otherwise. ( 9 ) WE then had the opportunity, of perusing the endorsement made by the Investigating Officer, in the, order of detention, retained by the detaining authority. This endorsement again projects a tell-tale story. The arresting Officer has stated that soon after arrest of the detenu at 2 a. m. on 10/11. 4. ( 9 ) WE then had the opportunity, of perusing the endorsement made by the Investigating Officer, in the, order of detention, retained by the detaining authority. This endorsement again projects a tell-tale story. The arresting Officer has stated that soon after arrest of the detenu at 2 a. m. on 10/11. 4. 1994 near his residence, not only the order of detention was served on him, under his acknowledgement, but also the grounds of detention stood served on him at the same time. This document apparently runs contrary to the acknowledgments and endorsements found in the order of detention. If as contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, mistakes had occurred inadvertently at some stage or other before service, the detaining authority or the other officers working under him ought to have corrected them. If, in spite of scorings directed the office of the detaining authority would still retain the portion directed to be deleted, it only shows, that some agency was working somewhere to make these preventive orders unworkable due to created legal lacuna. We are constrained to say so, for be if negligence or deliberate show of inadvertence exhibited by the Section Officer, the detaining authority had also chosen to mechanically affix his signature, without checking if the corrections directed by him had been carried out. Not only in the State Secretariat, this grave carelessness has been exhibited, but also the Investigating Officer, had a similar role to play, in all that appears to be a drawn. It is not known, as to why the Investigating Officer had stated in his endorsement that the grounds of detention were also served on the detenu, soon after his arrest at 2. 30 a. m. on 10/11. 4. 1994. We find difference. in ink in the endorsement made by the Investigating Officer on the reverse of the grounds of detention retained by the detaining authority. It requires no shrewdness to notice that the word grounds had obviously been interrelated, probably to give a hand to the detenu to have his way paved, to escape easily on technicalities. We have said enough. If we are not, satisfied, that communication on the detenu of these relevant records, had not been made at the time and in the manner alleged at a particular place, noted therein we have to necessarily doubt communication of this vital material, on the detenu. We have said enough. If we are not, satisfied, that communication on the detenu of these relevant records, had not been made at the time and in the manner alleged at a particular place, noted therein we have to necessarily doubt communication of this vital material, on the detenu. That would suffice to hold in favour of the petitioner in H. C. P. No, 900/94. ( 10 ) IN the past, we had taken pains to observe, that quite often we come across, probably deliberate faults committed in the process of passing of preventive orders and in their subsequent execution. We have even commented earlier, that this sort of glaring infirmities, normally do occur, only when detentions are made under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act or under the COFEPOSA Act. These infirmities are not unusually seen in preventive orders made under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, though in certain cases relating to goondas, occasionally such infirmities do surface. Our lurking suspicion, that at some stages or other some help is sought to be rendered to the detenus under these Acts, to somehow or other pave way for them to get out of the clutches of preventive law, gets more and more confirmed, as we come across more and more of similar preventive orders. Even after the courts have consistently pointed out these infirmities, it does not appear, that the detaining authorities have taken serious note of these vital lacuna and acclimatized themselves to the need for exercise of greater diligence to avoid in future, this grave lacunas. It cannot be gain-said that, these infirmities can easily be avoided, only if a little more of care is bestowed. When we look at the nature of offence committed, we are in anguish. When we scrutinise the impugned order of detention, the grounds of detention-and then material supplied to the detenu, we are still more shocked. The detaining authorities must always be alive to the onerous duty cast on them, to protect the society against offences of this cult, and the dire need for better application of minds on their part, when preventive orders are chosen to be passed under PIT. N. D. P. S. Act. Of course, on certain occasions, we had directed the Government to take action against the erring officials. If such actions were taken or not, we are not aware. N. D. P. S. Act. Of course, on certain occasions, we had directed the Government to take action against the erring officials. If such actions were taken or not, we are not aware. However, in spite of such directions, if similar infirmities continue to be committed, be it by the same set of officers of different set of officers, we can only observe, that sanctity is not attached to court orders by the authorities whomsoever it may be, who also owe a duty to the society, as much as the courts do try their best to protect the interests of the public at large within the frame work of law, and if need be, by bending it wherever feasible. We are constrained to quash the impugned order relating to H. C. P. No. 900/94 and directed release of petitioner Shanmugam forthwith, unless his detention is otherwise required. H. C. P. No. 900/ 94 is allowed. ( 11 ) H. C. P. Nos. 901 and 902/94 : We have already noticed that these two petitioners are also concerned in the same ground crime as the petitioner in H. C. P. No. 900/94. The ground urged in both these habeas corpus petitions by Mr. Hameed Ismail, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, is that the detaining authority was not alive to the facts of retractions of confessions made by the petitioners, relied upon by him as voluntary clamp the impugned preventive orders. Facts available clearly show, that common bail petitions, preferred by the petitioners before the Special Court and this Court stood furnished then. In other words, these bail applications had passed through the process of subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, while choosing to pass these preventive orders. Again, there is no dispute, that the detaining authority had relied upon the statements of confession made by these two petitioners, which he has categorised as voluntary. If the detaining authority had chosen to rely upon the alleged voluntary confession statements of the detenus to pass the impugned orders, he owed a duty in law to have considered the earliest retractions of the confessions made by the petitioners in their bail applications preferred before the Special Court and the High Court. If the detaining authority had chosen to rely upon the alleged voluntary confession statements of the detenus to pass the impugned orders, he owed a duty in law to have considered the earliest retractions of the confessions made by the petitioners in their bail applications preferred before the Special Court and the High Court. Those petitions and bail orders, especially when bail stood granted, are vital materials, which/should pass through the process of subjective satisfaction, is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and Ors. That part of the law laid down, apparently. Had been taken note of by the detaining authority for supply of the bail petition and the bail order, on the detenu, stood made. Nowhere in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has exhibited his awareness, of retractions of these confession statements by the detenus, which he had categorised as voluntary. ( 12 ) A direct decision on this aspect rendered by the Supreme Court, would suffice to held that the petitioners are bound to succeed, on this vital ground. The following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Toufeek Mohd. Mulaffar v. The Addi. Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, are absolutely relevant: It was submitted on behalf of the detaining authority that once the fact of retraction was borne in mind while passing the detention order, it did not matter, whether or not, the detenus application of 16th October, 1989 was placed before the detaining authority. We would have been able to appreciate this contention had we found that the detaining authority was alive to this fact at the time it passed the impugned order. We were taken through the grounds of detention and we find from paragraph (Hi) that the detaining authority described the statement of the detenu dated 17th September, 1989 as a voluntary statement. However, we do not find anywhere in the grounds of detention evidence regarding the detaining authority being alive to the fact that the detenu had retracted his statement on the very next day in his bail application dated 18th September 1989, leave aside the retraction in the subsequent latter of 16th October, 1989. The mere reference to the bail application in paragraph (vu) of the grounds of detention is not sufficient. The mere reference to the bail application in paragraph (vu) of the grounds of detention is not sufficient. The reason for making reference to the bail application is on the question whether or not to make a detention order against the detenu in jail. Nowhere in the grounds of detention do we find application of mind to the fact that the vital controvertional statement considered to be a voluntary one by the, detenu at the earliest possible opportunity when he preferred the ban application on the very next day It is, therefore, clear from the above observations that the detaining authority ought to have been alive to the factum of retraction. Even though the copy of the bail application was very much before the detaining authority, the grounds of detention do not disclose that the detaining authority was alive to the fact that the statement which it described as voluntary was in fact retracted. If after being alive to this fact the detaining authority would still have reached the conclusion that it was voluntary that would have been a different matter with which this Court would not have interfered. But since the detaining authority had failed to apply its mind to the fact that the confessional statement of 17th September, 1989 was retracted on the very next day, the ,detention order stands vitiated. This is a case of clear non-application of mind to this vital aspect of the matter which, if considered, may have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other. ( 13 ) ANOTHER Division Bench of this Court in Arun Kumar Soni v. Union of India, on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court is Mohd. Toufeeks case (W. P. No. (Cr1.) 602 of 1989), referred to above, stated as hereunder: Once the confession is sought to be used, detaining authority must be aware, if the confession is retracted. In spite of retraction, it may still be possible for the detaining authority to arrive at his subjective satisfaction to preventively detain the detenu, after being alive to the said fact. Expression of reaction appears to be different from awareness of fact. , Awareness of fact is the availability of retraction, which should be taken note of. In spite of retraction, it may still be possible for the detaining authority to arrive at his subjective satisfaction to preventively detain the detenu, after being alive to the said fact. Expression of reaction appears to be different from awareness of fact. , Awareness of fact is the availability of retraction, which should be taken note of. The effect of retraction, taken note of by the detaining authority, while arriving at his subjective satisfaction, while be the reaction, which need not be made explicit, but awareness of the fact o retraction must get reflected in the grounds of detention. Law available on this subject enures in favour of the detenus. We have no alternative other than quashing the impugned orders in H. C. Nos. 90 and 902/94. These orders of detention shall stand quashed and the respective detenus are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless their detentions are otherwise required. H. C. Nos. 901 and 902/94 are also allowed. ( 14 ) THE net result is all the three habeas corpus petitions (H. C. P. Nos. 900, 901 and 902/94) ate allowed. Petition allowed serious concern shown over the infirmities being committed by detaining authorities.