K. R. VYAS, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant (original defendant no. 1) and respondent no. 1 (Original plaintiff) are the real brothers. The respondent nos. 2 to 4 are minor sons of respondent no. 1. ( 2 ) THE original plaintiff filed a suit being Special Civil Suit No. 184 of 1974 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at Baroda inter alia alleging that one Bai Dahi widow of Vitthal Dalpat died leaving behind her a daughter Bai Adit The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 who are two sons of Bai Adit who also died leaving behind them plaintiff and defendant. Bai Dahi succeeded as widow to the estate of her husband under the erstwhile Baroda Hindu Law as there was no male issue. She was the full fledged owner and she executed her last testamentary instrument on 2nd August 1946 (Exh. 79 ). According to the plaintiff by a specific recital in the testamentary instrument the testator devised only life interest and not full ownership rights on the legatee Bai Adit and on her death her two sons the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 are constituted the owners. Bai Dahi died on 28th August 1946 Notwithstanding the devise of life interest on Bai Adit the defendant no. 1 got her to make a will dated 20th October 1966 whereunder the said testatrix devised the estimate on the defendant no. 1 on the basis that it is her stridhan properties. According to the plaintiff the said will is null and void inasmuch as the testatrix had no disposing capacity to dispose of the suit property by will as her interest was limited one and not full ownership right. Therefore the said will being inoperative in law it does not and cannot extinguish the rights of the plaintiffs in the suit property under the will dated 2nd August 1946 ( 3 ) THE defendant no. 1 resisted the suit by filing a written statement exh. 56. He denied that Bai Dahi executed a will on 2nd August 1946 and according to him Bai Dahi must be deemed to have died intestate and so Bai Adit as her heir succeeded to her estate. The defendants denied that by will Bai Dahi has devised only limited interest on Bai Adit. 56. He denied that Bai Dahi executed a will on 2nd August 1946 and according to him Bai Dahi must be deemed to have died intestate and so Bai Adit as her heir succeeded to her estate. The defendants denied that by will Bai Dahi has devised only limited interest on Bai Adit. The defendant contends that even if Bai Dahi is legally proved the construction of will that it only conferred life interest on Bai Adit is not correct and is against the manifest intent of the testratrix. According to the defendant the testratrix Bai Dahi by her will constituted Bai Adit as full proprietary owner (Malik ). Any recital in the will repugnant to the full ownership of Bai Adit are void and no such restriction can be placed on her right under the will; she is made the full owner. In substance defendant no. 1 denies all allegations and contentions raised by the plaintiff against the will of Bai Adit. Original defendant nos. 2 to ( 4 ) IT appears have not filed any written statement. 4 It appears that both the contesting parties have interse challenged the will exh. 79 dated 2nd August 1946 executed by Bai Dahi and the will dated 20. 10. 66 executed by Bai Adit exh. 80 on the ground that the same were not executed by testratrix in sound and disposing state of mind without attesting. However by pursis exh. 78 the contesting parties have admitted the will by Bai Dahi and the will by Bai Adit by stating that the same were duly executed in sound and disposing state of mind and attested. The learned trial Judge has accepted the said pursis and therefore the proof of execution and attestation of the said Wills was dispensed with. It further appears that in the instant case the parties have led no oral evidence. The learned trial Judge after interpreting the will exh. 79 of Bai Dahi allowed the suit of the plaintiff by granting a declaration that the Will dated 20. 10. 1966 executed by Bai Adit is null and void and inoperative as she has no disposable interest in the suit property on that date. It was further declared that the plaintiff alongwith defendant no. 1 are the co-owners of the suit property as per the will dated 2nd August 1946 executed by Bai Dahi. 10. 1966 executed by Bai Adit is null and void and inoperative as she has no disposable interest in the suit property on that date. It was further declared that the plaintiff alongwith defendant no. 1 are the co-owners of the suit property as per the will dated 2nd August 1946 executed by Bai Dahi. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs. ( 5 ) THE defendant no. 1 has carried the said decision by way of this First Appeal. As can be seen from the record the appellant is duly served to remain present personally or through his advocate. However when the matter is called out today for hearing the appellant is not present nor he is being represented by any advocate. Since this appeal being of 1978 and especially when the appellant is duly served without wasting further time and issuing fresh notice to the appellant I thought it proper to decide this appeal without hearing the appellant on the basis of the record and proceedings of the case. I have gone through the judgment of the trial court as well as the appeal memo and other relevant documents. ( 6 ) HAVING gone through the same the only question that clamours for my decision is whether on a the construction of the Will exh. 79 of Bai Dahi the devise in favour of Bai Adit is absolute as contended by defentant no. 1 or it is only limited on life interest as contended by the original plaintiff. In the Will Exh. 79 dated 2nd August 1946 the dispositive words are: It appears that the appellant is mainly harping his case on the word Malik used in the will of Bai Dahi. It is the contention of the appellant that on true construction of the will executed by Bai Dahi the intention of the testratrix was clear that she wanted to give absolute ownership to Bai Adit and such an intention was manifest by use of the expression Malik which has received judicial recognition as the absolute owner of heritable and alienable estate. Reliance has been placed by the appellant on the case of Pearey Lal vs Rameshwar Das A. I. R. 1963 Sc page 1703 wherein the Apex Court while explaining the word Malik has observed that when in the will the word Malik is used it is intended to grant absolute ownership inheritable and alienable rights unless here was something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietory rights were not intended to be conferred. On the other hand it is the contention of respondent no. 1 that reading the dispositive words as above it is self evident that the testratrix only created life interest in Bai Adit and on her death her two sons are given the estate. According to his submission the mere use of word Mailk once is not determinative when in the same breath a positive restriction is super-imposed against alienation and further that on the death of Bai Adit her sons are made the heirs. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the rival submissions the crest of the whole matter is on the true interpretation of the will exh. 79. The appellant has heavily relied on the use of expression Malik under the will exh. 79 and he has placed reliance on number of decisions wherein different Courts have interpreted the word Malik when used in Hindu will. The trial Court in para 20 of its judgment has referred those decisions. They are namely: (1)Sasiman Choudharein vs. Shib Narain AIR 1922 P. C. 63. (2)Bhaidas Shivdas vs. Bai Gulab AIR 1922 PC 193. (3)Raghunath Prasad Singe vs. Dept. Comm. Partapgarh AIR 1929 PC 283. (4)Bai Kevli vs. Dalsukhram AIR 1945 Bombay 178. (5)Ram Gopal vs. Nandlal AIR 1951 SC 139 . (6)Nathoolal vs. Durgaprasad AIR 1951 1954 SC 355. (7) Sarjubala vs. Jyotrinoyee AIR 1931 PC 179. (8) Sudhamanidas vs. Supal Lal Das AIR 1923 PC 65. (9) Ram Bharosey vs. Lalchandas AIR 1924 Allahabad 715. I have gone through the said judgments. (4)Bai Kevli vs. Dalsukhram AIR 1945 Bombay 178. (5)Ram Gopal vs. Nandlal AIR 1951 SC 139 . (6)Nathoolal vs. Durgaprasad AIR 1951 1954 SC 355. (7) Sarjubala vs. Jyotrinoyee AIR 1931 PC 179. (8) Sudhamanidas vs. Supal Lal Das AIR 1923 PC 65. (9) Ram Bharosey vs. Lalchandas AIR 1924 Allahabad 715. I have gone through the said judgments. Reading the said decisions two principles deduciable from all these authorities are (i) when in will the word Malik is used it is intended to grant absolute ownership heritable and alienable unless there is something in the context or surrounding circumstances to indicate that at such absolute ownership was not intended to be conferred and (ii) when absolute estate is granted to the first donee in terms clear and explicit and when the intention of the testator to grant estate is plain and unequivocal gift over of what remains at the death of the first donee cannot be construed as cutting down the absolute estate to a life interest. The gift over being repugnant to the absolute granted to the first donee would in case fail as it is void. ( 8 ) WE have also to bear in mind certain other principles of law that it is always dangerous to construe the word of one will by the construction of more or less similar words used in different wills which were adopted by the Court in another case. In construing the language and arriving at the intention of a particular testator the decision on the construction of other Wills are of little assistance. Only guidance to be obtained from them is that what must be sought in other instances is dominant intention of the testator. The Supreme Court in Pearey Lal vs. Rameshwar Das (Supra) while following the case of Ram Copal vs. Nandlal AIR 1951 SC 139 has quoted the observations of the Judicial Committee which read as underthe meaning of every word in an Indian document must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed the subject to which it is related and the locality of the granter from which it receives its true shade of meaning. Keeping these principles in mind and applying the same I may now interpret the will exh. 79. Keeping these principles in mind and applying the same I may now interpret the will exh. 79. The word Malik is used twice in the will first in reference to Bai Adit-first donee and also in respect of the donee on the death of the first donee. The word Malik means full ownership but in all cases in the very first sentence where the word Malik is employed qualified by making the estate non-alienable a specific restriction is appended that Bai Adit bgnntka sales by the salesat or mortgage it but can only enjoy the usufract of the property. The circumstance to be noted is that expenses of the death ceremony of testratrix has to be incurred by two sons of Bai Adit i. e. the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 who are the successors by death of Bai Adit. They had to bear expenses out of their pocket and it is only if they fail to do so the expenses have to be met out of the estate left by the testatrix. This circumstance is so very eloquent and pinpoints the predominant intent of the testatrix. The first sentence in which the estate is given to Bai Adit the word Malik as qualified by making the estate non alienable and she is given only right to enjoy usufract when read in context of this eloquent circumstance the predominant intention of the testatrix is manifest that testatrix to all intend and purpose bestowed only life interest on Bai Adit. The legatee Bai Adit is the daughter of testatrix and the second donee are the sons of the first donee. The use of words leave no manner of doubt as to what the testatrix in reality intended. The conjunction i. e. but employed in the very sentence in which the word Malik is used with purpose. This context and the very language used by the testatrix is self evident that testatrix even though she used word Malik never intended to give full proprietary right to legatee Bai Adit. The language in which the grant to Bai Adit is couched in will exh. 79 manifestly shows that no absolute estate is at all granted in clear and explicit terms and the intention of the testator is not to grant absolute estate. The language in which the grant to Bai Adit is couched in will exh. 79 manifestly shows that no absolute estate is at all granted in clear and explicit terms and the intention of the testator is not to grant absolute estate. Hence the principle that subsequent restriction or gift over of reminder to next donee on death of first donee is void does not apply in the present case. The word Malik is also not used to convey absolute ownership as seen from context in the will. It is therefore not possible to dissect the sentence and read the word Malik as divorced from the settings in which it is used. It will be imprudent to construe will only by looking to word Malik used in the will without the context in which it is used and to reach a conclusion that the intention of testator was to confer absolute estate on the legatee. It would be incorrect mode of construction to accept such a clause as conferring an absolute estate and then to eliminate one by one all subsequent clauses which indicate the testators intention to limit the estate conferred upon the legatee and to hold that they are void for repugnancy to earlier clauses. It is to be noted that the word Malik is used with express prohibition against alienation in the same breath and the legatee Bai Adit is only to occupy and enjoy the usufract. The next donee of gift over were asked to bear the the death ceremony expenses and if they fail the expenses to be met from the property but legatee Bai Adit is not asked to bear the expenses. This circumstance pinpoints the predominant intent operating in the mind of the testator at the point of time when the will was brought into existence. Thus on a construction the will exhibit 79 creates a least interest in favour of Bai Adit and she is no constituted the full owner. ( 9 ) IN view of this in my view the legatee Bai Adit has not constituted full or absolute ownership by will exh. 79 by testatrix Bai Dahi. The learned Judge has in fact recorded the same reasoning and has recorded this very finding and rightly so. Suffice to say that I am in total agreement with the views expressed by the learned trial Judge. 79 by testatrix Bai Dahi. The learned Judge has in fact recorded the same reasoning and has recorded this very finding and rightly so. Suffice to say that I am in total agreement with the views expressed by the learned trial Judge. In the result I find no substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed. .