S. R. SINGH, J. Mawana Sugar Works, Mawana, district Meerut is a sugar factory (hereinafter referred to as the Factory) set up by M/s. Sriram Industrial Enterprises Limited, is a company registered as such under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at Kunchan-Junga Buildining, 18 Barah Khambha Road, New Delhi. Sidharth C. Shriram (peti tioner No. 3) is the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and petitioner Nos. 1&2 are respectively the Manager (Cane) and the Occupier-cum-General Manager of the factory. They have filed the instant writ petition with prayers, inter alia, for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the first information report dated 30-12-1991 under Section 406, 468 and 471, I. P. C. Police Station Mawana, district Meerut and all proceedings in case crime No. 443 of 1991 and a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to arrest the petitioners in connection with the aforesaid Case Crime No. 443 of 1991. 2. The impugned First Information Report giving rise to case Crime No. 443 of 1991 was lodged by Bhupendra Singh, the incharge Secretary, Sabkari Ganna Vikas Samiti, Mawana, district Meerut-a co- operative Cane Development Society of Canegrowers registered/deemed to be registered as such under the provisions of the U. P. Co-operative Sociaties Act, 1965. The area of operation of the said society falls within the area reserved for the Factory under Section 15 of the U. P Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (the Act ). The material allegations and the gravamen of accusation against the petitioners as contained in the F. I. R. , are that the petitioners through their employees purchased sugarcane, between 23-12-1991 and 28-12-1991, directly from the canegrowers without any requisition slips having been issued for that purpose by the society as per a statutory require ment and further that they conspired and dishonestly forged parchies (requisi tion slips) and purchased sugarcane from the cane-growers on the basis of such Parchies and thereby miss appropriated money belonging to the society. 3. 3. Petitioners case as stated in paragraph 9 of the writ petition, is that the employees of the society locked its office and went on strike on 21-12-1991 with the result that no requisition slips were issued by the society to the cane growers who had brought their sugarcane to the Factory on carts and tractor trolies; that the strike continued and in the afternoon of 24-12-1991 a violent mob of people came and resorted to acts of violence in the factory premises and that the employees of the factory, with a view to controlling the law and order situation and liquidating the rush at the gate, had to weigh, "completely under pressure and duress" the sugarcane brought without requisition slips having been issued by the society. 4. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioners raised three fold submissions in support of the relief claimed in the writ petition; firstly that the dispute is basically of civil nature which can be effectively resolved by means of arbitration or otherwise as provided in Rule 108 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1975 (in short the rules); secondly, there are specific provisions in the Act, viz. Sections 22 to 24 providing for punishment in case of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the Order i. e. U. P. Sugarcane (Supply and Purchase) Order, 1954 (in short the Order) and since, proceeds the submission, the Act provides "efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party", the investigation based on the impugned First Information Report should be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution; and thirdly, that the F. I. R. does not disclose commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 468 and 471,i. P. C. in that, proceeds the submission, the averments made therein do not contain ingredients forgery as denned in Section 463,i. P. C. and those of criminal breach of trust as defined in Sec. 406,i. P. C. so as to attract the penal Sections 406, 468 and 471, I. P. C. justifying police investigation under Section 157 (1), Cr PC Sri Sudhir Chandra, vehemently and dexterously urged, relying on the decision of the S. C. in State of Haryana v, Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 616:1990 (2) JIC 997 (SC), that specific articulate facts on the basis of which reason to suspect the commission of cognizable offence apart from the offence punishable under Section 22 of the Act could rationally be interred for the purposes of investigation under Section 157 (1), Crpc, have not been mentioned in the F. I. R. and hence, proceeds the submission, the very condi tion precedent for investigation as comprehended by Section 157, (1) of the Code being lacking in its fulfilment i. e. being satisfied in its non-fulfilment, the investigation undertaken and conducted by the police has to be treated as without jurisdiction and non est. 5. Sri R. S. Yadav, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respon dents refuted the submissions made by Sri Sudhir Chandra and urged that the F. I. R. is perspicuous in its disclosure of commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sees 406,468 and 471, IPC apart from the offence punishable under Section 22 of the Act and that the police having already submitted charge-sheet dated 18-9-1992, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed for, as held by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR 1991 (SC) 1260 : 1991 JIC 582 (SC), it is non for the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence to see whether an offence is prima facie made out and there is sufficient ground to proceed with the matter and it would not be a proper exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the constitution to inter fere at this stage. 6. So far as the first and second submissions of Sri Sudhir Chandra are concerned, it may be observed that Chapter XXIX of the rules no doubt provides a complete forum for resolution of disputes touching the business of a cane growers co-operative society, inter alia, between the society and a factory or between a cane grower and a factory and similarly Sections 22 to 24 of the Act provide for punishment of any person guilty of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the Order and it is true that one of the petitioners, viz. petitioner No. 3 has already been punished and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. petitioner No. 3 has already been punished and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut vide order dated 17-1-1993 for contravention of Rule 95 of the Rules and other related rules read with paragraph 5 of the Order which forbids the factory from purchasing sugarcane directly from the cane growers falling within the area of operation of the society without any requisition slips having been issued by the society, but the matter does not end there. The FIR contains averments, particularly the averments that: @ HINDi which in the opinion of the court are specific and articulate enough to lead to a reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer as to the commission of cognizable offence within the meaning of S. 157 (1) of the Code. Thus the con dition precedent to commencement of investigation being fulfilled, the investi gation based on the FIR cannot be quashed merely because part of the accusation made in the FIR give rise to a dispute comprehended by Rule 108 of the Rules and to an offence punishable under Section 22 of the Act. The provisions of the Act or the Rules referred to above do not provide for efficacious redress of the grievance of the society as to its accusation regarding forgery of requisition slips and criminal misappropriation. The grievance in this respect can find its redress only in the manner indicated in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. The Court is conscious of the provisions contained in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, Section 300 of the Code and Article 20 (2) of the Constitution which in substance create a bar against the prosecution and punishment twice over for the same offence", but this court is of the view that the bar would be attracted only if the ingredients which constitute the two offences, one under Section 22 of the Act and the other under Sections 406, 468 and 471, IPC are identical (See State of Bihar v. S. L. Apte, AIR 1960 SC 578 followed in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, 1988 (4) SCC 655 ). We are pf the firm view that the ingredient of the offence punishable under Sec tion 22 of the Act and those of the offences punishable under Sec, 406, 468 and 471, IPC are quite distinct and different. We are pf the firm view that the ingredient of the offence punishable under Sec tion 22 of the Act and those of the offences punishable under Sec, 406, 468 and 471, IPC are quite distinct and different. In this view of the matter the first and the second submissions made by Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioners have no merits. 8. Coming now to the third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be observed at the very outset that principle well settled in that so long as the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offences and the investigation thereof is being conducted in a reasonable just and fair manner is not tainted with mala fides which means want of good faith, bias and/or ulterior motive etc. on the part of the investigating agency and there is no charge of any statutory provisions being violated by it to the prejudice of the accused, interference, under Article 226 of the Constitution, with the pro cess of investigation, is impermissible except on pain of transgressing the con stitutionally demarcated field of activity within which the High Court can exercise its power of superintendence and/or of judicial review of administrative action under Article 226 of the Constitution. The legal position fairly well settled is that judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which law imposes upon them a duty of inquiry for the power of investigation conferred upon police under Sec- 157 (1), Cr PC is coupled with a duty to unearth the crime which they reasonably sus pect, on the basis of accusation made in the FIR to have been committed. [see Emperor v. Khwaja Nazer Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18; State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha, 1980 (1) SCC 554 ; State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 616: 1990 (2) JIC 997 (SC)]. We find substance in the submission made by Sri R. S. Yadav, the learned standing counsel that the police having already done its job and submitted the charge sheet in this case, it is now for the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence to see whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners. We find substance in the submission made by Sri R. S. Yadav, the learned standing counsel that the police having already done its job and submitted the charge sheet in this case, it is now for the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence to see whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners. In State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260 :1991 JIC 582 (SC), the plea for causing the criminal proceeding at the stage of taking cognizance on the ground that documents relied on by the prosecution did not disclose commis sion of an offence, was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that if the FIR and the charge sheet are quashed at the state of taking cognizance of the Magistrate, "disastrous consequence would ensue" and the quashing the charge sheet even before the cognizance is taken by the criminal court, amounts to "killing a still born ahild". It was clearly held there that "entertaining writ petition against charge sheet and considering the matter on merit in the guise of prime facie evidence to stand an accused for trial amounts to pre-trial of a criminal trial under Article 22o or 227 of the Constitution even before the Competent Magistrate or Sessions Court takes cognizance of the offence. As was rightly held. . . . . . . . . . Wisdom lies to keep the hands back and relegate the accused to pursue the remedy under the Code. 9. The Magistrate empowered to take cognizence under Section 190 (1) (b) and to issue process under Section 204 of the Code has ample power to drop the proceeding if, in his opinion there is no "sufficient ground for proceeding". In Bhagwant Sing v. Commissioner of Police, AIR. 9. The Magistrate empowered to take cognizence under Section 190 (1) (b) and to issue process under Section 204 of the Code has ample power to drop the proceeding if, in his opinion there is no "sufficient ground for proceeding". In Bhagwant Sing v. Commissioner of Police, AIR. 1985 SC 1285 it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that when the police report contends that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular persons, the Magistrate may accept the report, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or he may direct further investigation under Section 156 (3) and require the police to sub mit a further report, of course, the discretion on this regard has to be exercised judiciously for it is dispensation of justice which will become a casualty if the discretion in the matter is exercised arbitratily. The function of the Magis trate taking cognizence of an offence under Section 190 and issuing process under Section 204 is not mechanical in nature. In the opinion of this Court the nature of the power conferred and the duty cast of the Magistrate is such that it would be in the furtherance of the rule of law to hold that a person accused of an offence may appear before the Magistrate and contest the police report and pursuade him to the view that the commission of an offence is prima facie not made out and there is no "sufficient ground for proceeding". The formation of opinin as to existence of sufficient ground for proceeding is a judicial act and therefore the Magistrate has to direct himself to all relevant considerations. 3. In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 : 1992 JIC 652 (SC) it has been observed by the Supreme Court as under; . . . . . . . . . . . . There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistrate to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liabi lity or creates offence against the juristic persons or the persons impleaded, then only process would be issued. . . . . . . . . . . . There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistrate to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liabi lity or creates offence against the juristic persons or the persons impleaded, then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into con sideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendatta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of Majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance----" 11. Relying on the aforesaid decision and certain other decisions of the Supreme Court it has been held in Kailash Chaudhary v. State of U. P. , 1994 ALJ 174; 1994 JIC 442 (All) as under: "magistrate while issuing process under Section 204 must, in brief, set out the allegations made in the complaint and the material brought on record and must also state that in his opinion, the complaint disloses ingredients of the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused and that the material brought on record, as a result of the inquiry or investigation. . . . . . . . Prima facie, constitute valid evidence which if believed and (remained?) unrebutted at the trial would result in conviction. . . . . . . . . . " ** ** ** ". . . . . . . . . . The opinion must appear on the face of the record, to have been formed by the Magistrate upon proper self-direction as to the ingredients of the offence and the material on record and it must not be based upon consideration of irrelevant material. In the process, the Magistrate would be acting within jurisdiction if he considers the inhernt improbabilities and the circumstances if any, suggesting the frivolities of the complaint and the same being vexatious. " 12. In the process, the Magistrate would be acting within jurisdiction if he considers the inhernt improbabilities and the circumstances if any, suggesting the frivolities of the complaint and the same being vexatious. " 12. In our opinion, the Magistrate taking cognizence and issuing process has ample powers to see whether or not the allegations made in the F. I. R and the material collected by the police during investigation disclose any offence against the accused persons. It is implicit in Section 204 of the Code that in case the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he may drop the proceeding. It is for this reason that we refrain from expressing any opinion on merit, on third sumission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Albiet the Magistrate is under no express statutory obligation to issue notice to the accused person or persons at the stage of taking cognizance and issuing process, it would got a long way in the administration of criminal justice and furtherance of the rule of law and prevention of an avoidable injury being caused to human dignity, life and liberty-fundamentally guaranteed under the Constitution if a practice of giving an opportunity to the accused at the stage of issuing process against such person or persons is developed. This will be in tune with the holding in the case of Kailash Chaudhary v. State of U. P. (supra ). We are, however, of the firm view that if an accused appears before the Magistrate at the stage of issuing process under Section 204 and sudmits that prima facie no case is made out even if the police report is taken on its face value, the Magistrate shall be under an obligation to consider the view point of such person within the limited area of scrutiny regarding forma tion of opinion of the questions: (i) whether the commission of any cognizable offence is disclosed on the face of the F. I. R. and (ii) whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and drop the proceeding if he is satisfied that the cognizence ought to be taken. We are further of the view that an order issuing process being in the nature of an interim order, an accused may appear in pursuance of the process and pursuade the Magistrate to drop the proceeding. 14. We are further of the view that an order issuing process being in the nature of an interim order, an accused may appear in pursuance of the process and pursuade the Magistrate to drop the proceeding. 14. The nature of the power conferred and duty cast on the Magistrate being such as discussed above, it would be but proper to relegate the petitioners to pursue their remedy under the Code. The court is conscious of the legal position that while exercising the powers under Section 204 of the Code, particularly in a case exclusively triable by Sessions Court, all that the Magis trate is supposed to see as to whether there is prima facie material/evidence in support of the charge and that he would be exceeding his jurisdiction in weighing and appraising the evidence meticulously but he will be acting within jurisdiction in considering the inherent improbabilities of the prosecution case in the light of attending circumstances, if any. The High Courts power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482, Cr PC or Art. 226 of the Constitution is no doubt much wider than that of the Magistrate under Section 204 to drop the proceeding in an appropriate case, but it is settled that the High Court too, at this stage, is not supposed to appraise affidavits and/or any material not forming part of the police report and that it has to act with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings at the stage of F. I. R. and/or charge sheet. The view that we are taking is bound to sub serve the cause of justice in a larger perspective in that it would help crub the ever increasing tendency to thwart criminal proceedings by taking recourse to Section 482, Cr. P. C. or Article 226 of the Constitution on one hand and exploit the full potential of our Magistracy and thereby secure justice to an aggrieved party at the grassroots level of the judiciary on the other. 15. In view of the above discussion the writ petition fails and is dismis sed subject to the observations made herein above. Interim order stands discharged. Petition dismissed. .