JUDGMENT 1. - In this case the short question which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the provisions of Section 170(12) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 is applicable to the facts of the case or Section 285 of the said Act. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 170(12) are attracted instead of Section 285 which has been wrongly invoked by the respondents in the present case. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition, briefly stated, are that the respondent No. 2 Municipal Council, Kota had granted permission through Administrator to the petitioner vide its order dated 18.5.81 under Section 170 of the Municipalities Act (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') to construct shops on his plot situated at Gumanpura, Kota vide Annex-1 to the writ petition. Thereafter the petitioner constructed a shop in accordance with the necessary permission as aforesaid. 2. On 12th October, 1981, respondent No. 1 submitted a petition before the Collector, Kota (respondent No. 3 herein) in which it was inter-alia contended that under Section 173(a) of the Act only the State Government is competent to grant such permission for construction. It was further pleaded that the requisite permission was granted by the Commissioner at the behest of respondent No. 2 which was illegal and without jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the fact that the matter was appealable under Section 170(12) of the Act, no such appeal was preferred and instead revision was filed under Section 285 of the Act. 3. Subsequently respondent No. 3 issued the notice to the petitioner calling him to appear on 20th October, 1981 but the service of the notice could not be effected before 25th October, 1981 when the petitioner was actually served. 4. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner had completed the construction of the shop in question in accordance with the permission granted vide Annex-1 before receiving the notice from respondent No. 3 and as such notice be dropped. 4. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner had completed the construction of the shop in question in accordance with the permission granted vide Annex-1 before receiving the notice from respondent No. 3 and as such notice be dropped. Instead of applying his mind to the facts of the present case by having resort to the relevant provisions of the Act, respondent No. 3 accepted the petition of respondent No. 2 and referred the matter to the Secretary, Rajasthan Local-Self Department, Jaipur under Section 285(2) of the Act for quashing the order issued by respondent No. 2 vide Annex-1 and also issued directions for taking necessary action against the officer of respondent No. 2 vide its order dated 13th April, 1982. The said action of respondent No. 3, in my opinion, was totally uncalled for since the respondent No. 3 had wrongly invoked the provisions of Section 285(2) of the Act whereas the provision which was to be attracted to the present case is of Section 170(12) as stated aforesaid. 5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the petitioner had all ready completed the necessary construction of the shop in question in accordance with the permission granted vide Annex-1 before receiving the impugned notice from respondent No. 3 and as such the said notice was inconsequential but the respondent No. 3 had not complied with the request and, therefore, the cause of action had arisen resulting in filing of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. A perusal of Section 285(2) of the Act reveals that in appropriate cases on the opinion of the competent authority the State Government may by an order in writing suspend the execution or prohibit the doing of an act which is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public at large resulting in breach of peace or which is unlawful may be suspended or prohibited by the State Government in such like appropriate cases. Sub-section (2) of Section 285 of the Act provides that on receipt of the report from the competent authority, as referred to above, the State Government may in its discretion either rescind the order or direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. 7. Sub-section (2) of Section 285 of the Act provides that on receipt of the report from the competent authority, as referred to above, the State Government may in its discretion either rescind the order or direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. 7. Section 170(12) of the Act provides that any person who is aggrieved by an order of the Board under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of Sub-section 6 or clauses (a) or (b) of Sub- section 11 of the Act may within 30 days from the date of such order, exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining the copy thereof appeal to the Collector and no such order shall be liable to be called in question otherwise than by such appeal. In the present case instead of having resort to the provisions of Section 170(12) of the Act, the respondents had wrongly invoked the provisions of Section 285(2) of the Act, as referred to above, which are neither applicable nor attracted to the facts of the present case. 8. The impugned order passed by the Collector, is thus in utter disregard to the provisions of the Act because not only the Collector, Kota but also the State Government have not appreciated the provisions of the enactment and in my opinion the impugned orders dated 13-4-82 (Annex-2) and 18-3-85(Annex.3) are wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside. Moreover since the construction of the shop premises in question already stands completed by the petitioner in the year 1981, no useful purpose would be served on the basis of the aforesaid impugned notices and rather it would be against the public interest to allow such illegal orders to continue. 9. In my opinion, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the proposition of law, as referred to above, since the construction of the sop premises in question was done and completed in accordance with the provisions of the Act in the year 1981, the petitioner is entitled to succeed and the impugned orders and directions, as referred to above, i.e. order dated 13-4-82 and 18-4-85 (Annex-2 & 3 respectively) are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is also entitled to be awarded costs of the petition which are quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. 10. The petitioner is also entitled to be awarded costs of the petition which are quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. 10. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed as indicated above.Petition allowed with costs. *******