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Gauhati High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 78 (GAU)

Amar Kumar Singha v. Cachar Sugar Mills Ltd.

1994-05-02

J.N.SARMA

body1994
This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed to quash the resolution dated 21.11.87 (Annexure 13) to the writ appli­cation passed by the Board of Directors of Cachar Sugar Mills Limited, respondent No. 1 in the writ application. 2. The aforesaid resolution is as follows : “Promotion cases of the year 1981 and 1982 were discussed in details. It was noted that these promotions did not have approved of the competent authority. As such the Board decided not to regularise the same and resolved that the concerned 17 (seventeen) employees of the company viz. Sarbasree (1) AK Singha, (2) Tarun Choudhury, (3) Faizur Rahman, (4) Subrata Roy, (5) Satanjib Dutta, (6) Sunamoni Singh, (7) Sankar Dutta, (8) Bidhu Bhusan Das, (9) Monoj Kanti Purkayastha, (10) Aloka Cbatterjee, (11) DR De, (12) Debeswar Das, (13) Debotosh Sen, (14) SN Roy, (15) Amalendu Das, (16) Samarendra Choudhury and (17) Biraj Hazarika be reverted back." 3. The brief facts are follows : The petitioner No. 1 Sri Amar Kumar Singha was appointed as Senior Accounts Assistant in 1975 and on 27.7.81 he was promoted to the post of Accounts Assistant. The petitioner No. 2 Sri Faizur Rahman was appointed as Junior Accounts Assistant in 1978 and on 1.11.82 he was promoted to the post of Senior Accounts Assistant. The petitioner No. 3 Sri Manoj Kanti Purkayastha was appointed as Junior Officer Assistant-cum-Typist in the year 1973 and on 28.1.83 he was promoted to the post of Senior Office Assistant. The petitioner No. 4 Sri Debotosh Sett was appointed as Typist in 1976 and was promoted to the post of Senior Office Assistant on 28.1.83. The petitioner No. 5 Sri Debeswar Das was appointed as Junior Office Assistant-cum Typist in 1976 and he was promoted to the post of Senior Office Assistant ob 1.11.82. The petitioner No. 6 Sri Bidhu Bhusan Das was appointed as Typist in 1976 and was promoted on 1.11.82 as Senior Office Assistant. The petitioner No. 7 Sri Subroto Roy was appointed as Clerk in 1980 and he was promoted as Senior Accounts Assistant on 1.11.82. The petitioner No.8 Sri Satanjib Dutta was appointed as Clerk in 1977 and he was promoted as Senior Accounts Assistant on 1.11.82. The petitioner No. 9 Sri Samarendra Choudhury was appointed as Mohorar in the year 1974 and he was promoted as Store Keeper on 23.1.82. The petitioner No.8 Sri Satanjib Dutta was appointed as Clerk in 1977 and he was promoted as Senior Accounts Assistant on 1.11.82. The petitioner No. 9 Sri Samarendra Choudhury was appointed as Mohorar in the year 1974 and he was promoted as Store Keeper on 23.1.82. The petitioner No.10 Sri Amalendu Das was appointed as Time Keeper in 1977 and promoted to the post of Assistant Head Time Keeper on 1.11.82. The petitioner No. 11 Sri Biraj Hazarika was appointed as Boiling House Fitter in 1977 and he was promoted as Boiling House Incharge on 1.11.82. The petitioner No. 12 Sri Dipti Ranjan Dey was appointed as Typist in the year 1973 and he was pro­moted to the post of Senior Office Assistant on 1.11.82. All these persons were employed under the Cachar Sugar Mills Ltd. a Govt. of Assam enterprise, respondent No. 1. The orders of promotion of petitioners are available from Annexure 1 to 12 to the writ application. Annexure 1, the promotional letter relates to Sri AK Singha. The period of probation was for a period of 6 months. Annexure 2 relates to Sri Faijur Rahman, the period of probation was for a period of one year. Annexure 3 relates to Sri Manoj Kanti Purkayastha. There was no period of probation. Annexure 4 relates to Debatosh Sen and there was no period of probation. Annexure 5 relates to Debeswar Das and there was also no period of probation. Annexure 6 relates to Bidhu Bhusan Das and there was the period of probation is one year. Annexure 7 relates to Subroto Roy and there was no period of probation. Annexure 8 relates to Satanjib Dutta and there was also no period of probation. Annexure 9 relates to Samarendra Choudhury and there is the period of probation of- one year. Annexure 10 relates to Amalendu Das and there was no period of probation. Annexure 11 relates to Biraj Hazarika and there was also no period of probation. Annexure 12 relates to Dipti Ranjan Das and there was also no period of probation. In these letters of promotion there was nothing about the requirement of approval by the Board of Directors of respondent No. 1. Annexure 11 relates to Biraj Hazarika and there was also no period of probation. Annexure 12 relates to Dipti Ranjan Das and there was also no period of probation. In these letters of promotion there was nothing about the requirement of approval by the Board of Directors of respondent No. 1. Further, by the impugned resolution all these petitioners were reverted after 5-7 years of their promotion only on the ground that these promotions were not approved by the competent authority and as such the Board by the impugned resolution decided not to regularise their services. In pursuance of the resolution on 21.11.87 the Managing Director issued orders of reversion of the petitioners to their original posts. These orders are available at Annexure 14 (1) to 14(12) to the writ application. On 1.12.87 a representation was filed to the Managing Director by the Association of Chenikal Employees. On 21.12.87 another representation was filed. These two representations are at Annexure 15 and 16 to the writ application. During the pendency of the writ application, the respondent No. 2 again promoted the petitioner No. 2 alone, but he did not promote the other petitioners. Hence, this writ application. 4. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. (i) The first point is regarding the maintainability of the writ application on the ground that the respondent No. l is not an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, (ii) Reversion of the petitioners to their former lower posts is an out and out case involving a labour dispute and for any labour dispute, specific remedy is provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (iii) The earlier promotion order was not passed by a competent person who had the power to pass it, and therefore, in fact, it is 'no order'. That such invalid order being in fact, no order, can always be set aside by the competent authority normally by a resolution of the Board as was done m the instant case, (iv) The promotions were not made against the sanctioned posts and even ii they were allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar that will confer no right to them to hold the promotional posts. 5. I have heard Sri MHR Borbhuyian, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri AK Phukan, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. 5. I have heard Sri MHR Borbhuyian, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri AK Phukan, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. I have also heard Sri AC Bora, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5. 6. Regarding the first point that it is not a State or an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, in this regard what can be stated is that this mill is owned by the State of Assam and the State of Assam owns all the shares of the mill. So, the argument that it is not an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be accepted. The next contention is that the promotion order was not made by a person who is competent to do so. It can stated that all the promotion orders were signed by the Personnel Officer to the mill and in the order it was stated that the management is pleased to promote, and the argument was advanced that the Managing Dire­ctor is only competent to make such orders of promotion. But no document in support of this claim has been produced before me. The schedule of powers delegated to different officers are also given. The power of Managing Director in case of selection, it is stated as follows : Powers to select and appointment on the basis of Selection Committee constituted by the Board all staff against the posts sanctioned by the Board in the pay scale maximum of which does not exceed Rs. 500/- PM. On the strength of this delegation it is sought to be argued that even the Managing Director has no power to promote the officers. But this delegation of power does not prima facie hold the field of promotion. So, this contention is not tenable. The next argument which is made is that on 8th of December, 1993 a notification was issued by the Government of Assam under section 3 of the State Industrial Relief Under­takings (Special Provisions) Act, 1984, which will run for a period of one year with effect from 19th day of October.1993. The notification reads as follows : "No. MT. 75/89/144 : Whereas the State Govt. The notification reads as follows : "No. MT. 75/89/144 : Whereas the State Govt. is satisfied that circumst­ances exists which render it necessary and expedient in public interest to extend the period of Notification of M/s Cachar Sugar Mills Ltd. as a State Industrial Undertaking haying its registered office/Head office and production units at Chargola, Ratabari, Karimganj District, Assam as a relief undertaking in order to re-start production and to ensure continued production and to provide relief against unemployment. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by the provisions of section 3 of Assam State Industrial Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1984 (Act XVIII of 1989) the Governor of Assam is pleased to declare M/s Cachar Sugar Mills Ltd. as a Relief Undertaking for another period of one year with effect from 19th day of October,1993." It is argued that as soon as this Notification was issued by operation of section 6, this proceeding is liable to be stayed. The provisions of section 6 is quoted below : "6. Suspension or modification of certain remedies, rights, etc. stay of proceedings, their rival and continuance. Any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in clause (b) of section 4 and suspended or modified by a notification under that section shall, in accordance with the terms of the notification, be suspended or modified, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any Court, Tribunal, officer or other authority shall accordingly be stayed or be continued subject to such modification, so, however, that on the notification, ceasing to have effect. (a) any right, privilege, obligation or liability so suspended or modi­fied shall revive and be enforceable as if the notification had never been issued, and (b) any proceeding so stayed shall be proceeded with subject to the provisions of any law which may then be in force from the stage which had been reached when the proceeding was stayed." 7. A bare perusal of section 6 will show that only the matters mentioned in section 4 (b) shall remain stayed. Section 4 (b) is quoted below : "4. A bare perusal of section 6 will show that only the matters mentioned in section 4 (b) shall remain stayed. Section 4 (b) is quoted below : "4. (b) that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force (to which any relief undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to any relief undertaking) immediately before the date on which the State Industrial Undertaking, is declared to be a relief undertaking, shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligation and liabilities accruing or arising thereafter before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such modification and in such manner as may be specified in such notification." So, the question is whether the present matter comes within the sweep of station 4 (b). Section 4 (b) refers to the following things. (i) Contract, (ii) Assurances of property, (iii) Agreement, (iv) Settlement, (v) Awards, (vi) Standing orders or other instruments in force. The matter regarding which provisions have been made by the petitioner in my opinion, does not come under any of the things mentioned above in section 4 (b). It is not a contract. It is not an assurance of property. It is not an agreement. It is not a settlement. It is not an award. It is not standing order nor ii is any other instruments in force. This being the position, as contended by Sri Phukan, this proceeding cannot be stayed in view of the Act of 1984. 8. It is settled law that even an employee is appointed on probation and even if his probation is not extended beyond that period, then there would be implied confirmation. So, these petitioners must be held to have their right to the posts to which they are promoted and they cannot be reverted from their posts as sought to be done by the authority by the impugned resolution. Accordingly, the resolution dated 21.11.87 (Annexure 13) and the orders issued by the Managing Director in pursuance of the Board's decision vide Annexure 14 (l) to 14 (12) stand quashed. 9. Regarding the argument that the remedy is available under the Indus­trial Disputes Act and as such this petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, the resolution dated 21.11.87 (Annexure 13) and the orders issued by the Managing Director in pursuance of the Board's decision vide Annexure 14 (l) to 14 (12) stand quashed. 9. Regarding the argument that the remedy is available under the Indus­trial Disputes Act and as such this petition is not maintainable. It is settled law that existence of alternative remedy does not bar a writ Court to give appropriate relief if the facts of the case justify it. After all on the face the existence of alternative remedy, the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a self imposed limitation. On the facts of this case, I am not inclined to hold that the existence of alternative remedy bars this Court from granting relief, 10. The argument that the promotions were not made against the sancti­oned posts is not also tenable in view of the fact that nothing has been shown to this Court that these posts were not sanctioned. The petitioners as stated earlier continued in the posts for 5 - 7 years and if these posts were not really sanctioned, the burden was on the respondents to establish it. But they have failed to do so. 11. The writ application is accordingly allowed by quashing the Annexuures as indicated above. I make no order as to costs.